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SUMMARY
COMPANIES OF CLOUDS: THE DEVELOPMENT OF MULTILATERAL
CULTURAL COOPERATION IN WESTERN EUROPEAN
INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS.
This thesis traces the development of styles and theories of cultural cooperation from
the pre-World War II models developed by France and Britain in particular, through
the post-WWII international cooperation structures which included cultural
cooperation as part of their structures. Organisations considered include the
International Committee for Intellectual Cooperation, the Brussels Treaty
Organisation, the Council of Europe and the European Union, focusing primarily on
the non-educational or scientific aspects of cultural cooperation. Sources used include
documentation of the two latter bodies and the public records of the UK Foreign
Office and Ministry of Education.
Intellectual cooperation was launched under the auspices of the League of Nations as
a separate entity from the bilateral cultural relations of governments. Its tradition
continues to be powerfully felt in the activity of the Council of Europe, after WWII
the fulcrum of multilateral cultural cooperation. The thesis shows how it moved away
from acting as a counterpoint to political developments towards the creation of a
programme based on sociological study, which contained a strong element of
federalist ideology, developing its own orthodoxy of "cultural policy", until partly
"repossessed" in the 1990s by political imperatives.
The contrast with the tightly regulated European Union is marked, and shows in
certain respects a return to earlier experiments in cultural cooperation, which
developed most of its theory and practice in the pre-1992 era when the Community
Treaty did not provide for action in the field of culture. The thesis argues that the EU's
cultural programme is not a manifestation of a "Europeanisation" of cultural policy,
although policies elsewhere in the organisation may well have that effect, but of
multilateral cultural cooperation.
COMPANIES OF CLOUDS:
THE DEVELOPMENT OF MULTILATERAL CULTURAL COOPERATION IN
WESTERN EUROPEAN INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS
"...la compagnie internationale des nuages....." (Gonzague de Reynold, referring to the more
idealistic members of the International Committee for Intellectual Cooperation, Mes
Memoires, 1963).
"...il venait ...en Europe...comme a la source de la plus haute activite spirituelle; ce qu'il
cherchait en Europe, c'est la beaute que creent les hommes dans la mesure et l'harmonie..."
(Julien Luchaire, of a Latin American member of the ICIC, Confession d'un francais moyen,
1965)
".....to vote large budgets and then quickly adjourn to leave the secretariat unhampered in its
pursuit of such objectives as the compilation of an international catalog of recorded music or
the investigation of 'how the artist lives" (mnis L. Claude, on the role of governments as seen
by international organisations, Swords into Plowshares, 1965)
"...pour sauver, en face de la terre des masses et de la terre des machines,...une Europe qui
denzeure la terre des hommes..." (Jacques Freymond, on the task of intellectuals in Europe
after WWII as seen by Denis de Rougemont, Denis de Rougemont, L'imagination et le
courage au service d'un vocation, 1995)
....its belief in the power of words... .aggravated by a return to a sociological dialectic
founded on a vision of the world in total contradiction to the ideas that stimulated politicians
in most member states." (view of unnamed delegate to the Council of Europe as to what
constituted the Council of Cultural Cooperation's major failing, 1982)
"Culture.... Is but a diffracting prism of the religious sense upon those activities of ours
called creative..." (Denis de Rougemont, Man's Western Quest: the Principles of Civilization,
trans. Montgomery Belgion, 1957)
"I hate the Intellectual Cooperation" (de Reynold, op. cit., attributed to an Irish secretary in




Cultural cooperation is an "assumed" feature of international relations, not very
important in itself, a footnote in the study of pre-war and post-war Europe, oil for the
wheels which turn to produce more important things. If asked what European cultural
cooperation was about, most people would probably mention pupil exchanges and
town twinnings, two widely familiar and popular activities intended to provide
ordinary citizens with a taste of the daily life of other countries and to create
transnational friendships.
Such activity is in practice only one part of what is undertaken as "cultural
cooperation" and in fact has almost nothing to do with the cultural cooperation
undertaken between governments either bilaterally or through the international
institutions which exist to encourage and support this kind of cooperation.
Furthermore, the range and purpose of the activity carried out is so diverse and so
difficult to agree on that it calls into question whether this "low-level policy" is as
straightforward as it is assumed to be.
This thesis attempts to establish what happens in cultural cooperation: to identify its
relationship to diplomacy and international relations on the one hand and to the
cultural polices formulated and practised by European states on the other. What is
cultural cooperation for, and why do governments agree to spend money on it? If it is
so emollient why is it so difficult to make it work effectively? What role does it fill as
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public policy? Is it supposed to encourage a sense of common ownership in the
project of European integration, and if so is it really well suited for this task? Or is it
linked to fears about loss of national diversity in the face of Europeanisation or
Americanisation? Is there such a thing as a "European cultural policy" and is cultural
cooperation a stage towards creating it? Or is it a reflection of competing notions of
cultural policy within Europe?
The method chosen to try and arrive at some answers to these questions is to follow
and analyse the century's efforts to create a multilateral cultural cooperation through
formal institutions which require, normally, governmental participation and thus a
level of political engagement which will help to determine what value is placed on the
process and its results. The value for an artist in experiencing other cultures or making
connections with artists from other cultures is reasonably evident; the value for a
national administration in investing public money in that artist's experience less so.
It should also be noted that "cultural cooperation" is not simply about the "high arts".
Indeed, nothing is more frequently emphasised than that "culture" is about as fluid a
category of public policy as it is possible to find (the lines are far less clearly drawn
than in "health", "employment" or "defence", for example). Much ink has been
expended on trying to draw up a workable definition of culture, but no-one has ever
succeeded in producing one that everybody accepts. What is clear, however, is that in
terms of intergovernmental cooperation, the fields covered by the term tend to define
themselves. No government or international body can seriously claim to have policy
responsibility for the spiritual dimension of mankind. What takes place within cultural
cooperation is mostly a generally worded commitment in a founding statute to
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promote, respect or otherwise have concern for "culture", "cultures" and/or "the
common heritage".
The ways in which this obligation is to be fulfilled are left wide open. The methods
vary; the subject matter quickly refines itself down to a few specific areas of public
policy in which most, if not all, governments have an interest and are authorised to
intervene. The subject matter of culture may be as broad as you will; the subject
matter of cultural cooperation is not defined by theoretical considerations but by what
is introduced onto the agenda. It can be summarised, despite regular protestations to
the contrary, as, on the one hand, what concerns the wellbeing of the international
intelligentsia' and, on the other, the "matter" of Europe's past and present as it is
reflected back to the populace. Cultural cooperation invites its participants to consider
themselves and their society within a context of political change. In its more dynamic
manifestations it attempts to influence the direction of that change.
The area covered by cultural cooperation is, broadly, education, both statutory and
extra-statutory (e.g. adult education); the visual and performing arts; the built and
moveable heritage; the media (mostly film, broadcasting and publishing, though there
has been sporadic interest in the press); exchange and language teaching; and
copyright. To this we should add a sub-set which is not normally thought of as part of
public policy, but which nevertheless is a significant element in cultural cooperation
in its own right: intellectual contact between individuals and groups. Finally, science,
sport and youth are all policy fields which at various times have been considered part
'the constituency of cultural cooperation is likewise ill-defined, and ranges from the scientists and
academics of pre-World War II intellectual cooperation to the "cultural workers" espoused by the
European Commission and Parliament meaning all those with jobs connected to the "culture industries"
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of cultural cooperation, though by no means consistently. These are treated as mostly
outside the scope of the present study.
The term "cultural cooperation" nearly always includes cooperation in the field of
education. This thesis cannot avoid discussion of the education component, if only for
purposes of comparison, but in general it focuses as far as possible on "pure" culture —
that part which most closely affects what in the UK has generally been called "arts
policy". This is partly in order to keep the subject matter manageable but also in order
to relate it to a single domestic policy field. Nevertheless, it is impossible to restrict
an examination of cultural cooperation to this "soft policy" core, since it is constantly
affected by the "hard policy" which surrounds its dissemination: audiovisual policy,
publishing policy, copyright policy.
However, there are at least four other reasons for concentrating on this side of
cooperation. One is its political ambiguity: there is no consensus about what the
state's job is in relation to culture and therefore cultural cooperation is free to devise
and follow its own agenda to a very considerable degree. Secondly, it lacks technical
requirements in a way that is not true of education or even of heritage management.
The artist is not central to the cultural agenda in the way that the educator is central to
the educational agenda or the conservation technician to the heritage agenda. Culture's
technical sector is hard to pin down and consult. Thirdly, culture has special
resonance in the context of the European project: it is seen as in a sense embodying
what is particular about Europe. In some readings, as we shall see, it is presented as
the central issue of a European identity. Finally, there is simple expediency: "culture
committees" feature in most manifestations of cultural cooperation and their agendas
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show a surprising consistency down the years, making it possible to follow how they
attempt to make sense of the (usually extremely imprecise) brief they are given.
The symbiosis of education and culture within cultural cooperation is traceable to its
roots in bilateral "cultural diplomacy". The thesis begins with a consideration of the
development of this form of foreign policy. It then goes on to look at the major pre-
World War II manifestations of multilateral cultural cooperation in the form of the
International Committee for Intellectual Cooperation, carried out under the auspices
of the League of Nations. After an examination of post-war ideas of cultural
cooperation via UNESCO and the Brussels Treaty Organisation, it will consider the
two primary organisations concerned with this in western Europe since the war: the
Council of Europe and the European Union. The thesis does not attempt to cover
developments in eastern Europe prior to the resumption of democracy in the late
1980s and early 1990s.
It will be argued in this thesis that cultural cooperation is not a constant which can
easily be identified and labelled, but a series of continuous reinventions resulting from
changing sets of political circumstances and the interacting priorities of, mainly, the
governments who take part in it. Despite its apparent role as a contribution to mutual
understanding, its capacity for generating conflict and mutual mistrust is striking. It
argues for unity, yet nearly always displays a divided nature. Its attempts to argue
instead for diversity, however, become thwarted by the unsuitability of its mechanics
for this and its lack of an underlying consensus. Because of the extent to which
cultural cooperation is not state-dictated, despite being negotiated formally at that
level, it has an oppositional quality which can be traced throughout its history, in
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which different aspects dominate at different times, hence the importance of a
chronological approach. It often provides a commentary: upon European identity,
upon the policies of the different governments, ultimately on the success or failure of
the European integration project.
The term "policy" needs some definition. This thesis finds that the view, formulated
by Karl Deutsch, that "politics is based on the interplay of habits of cooperation as
modified by threats" is a reasonable description of the process it observes, while
policy is "an explicit set of preferences and plans drawn up in order to make the
outcomes of series of future decisions more nearly predictable and consistent" 2. In
other words, policies are not themselves a matter of applying principle (or
fundamental truths), though they may be designed to encourage or discourage certain
values, but are predicated on instruments of management.
Literature and methodology
Cultural cooperation's literature is both thin and fragmentary. It consists largely of the
output of the international organisations themselves, often in the form of explanation,
interpretation or justification. It has not acquired a theoretical literature in which
different commentators discuss and evaluate it, though "European cultural policy" is
beginning to develop a literature of sorts, sometimes based on the experience of
international organisations. Cultural diplomacy has a more substantial corpus to draw
upon, although this too is often in the form of memoir or presentation from
practitioners or former practitioners.
2 K. W. Deutsch, "The Analysis of International Relations", p. 16. Prentice Hall, 1988
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It has a secondary literature, however, in the form of related theories which impinge
upon it. Of these, works of pure cultural theory 3 are not as helpful as may be supposed
in relation to cultural cooperation. Cultural critics comment on the nature of culture
within society and to a certain extent on its management as a field of public policy.
This tends to form part of the intellectual consensus of the day, rather than to inspire
the process of policy formulation directly. This thesis is less concerned with how
particular interpretations of culture find their way into public policy than with the
relationship of governments' policies to the ideas about culture held by
"internationalist" idealists, even though the two may overlap.
The thesis does, however, find a useful framework within international relations
theory, which provides the "missing" typology, relevant to the actions of these
particular protagonists as well as describing the context within which cultural
cooperation operates. It should be emphasised that in most of the more general
discussions of international relations theory, cultural cooperation barely features. In
general they provide background and context rather than theories which can be tested.
Exceptions to this are the work of Chris Brown, from whom I have borrowed two key
concepts, those of cosmopolitanism and communitarianism, which provide a
satisfying framework in which to locate cultural cooperation; and, more generally,
that of James Der Derian.
3 by which is meant the analysis of cultural phenomena generally called "cultural studies". The
academic framework provided by this discipline, though sometimes invoked as background, is not the
basis by which decisions in cultural cooperation are reached. This is not to suggest that public policy
occurs in a vacuum, simply to point out that in this respect cultural cooperation reflects the times,
rather than attempts to interpret them
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Two related (though rarely overlapping) literatures, that of nationalism, such as that of
Benedict Anderson and Anthony D. Smith, and that of European integration have also
been consulted. A particularly valuable source is the literature of federalism,
particularly that of the Swiss "personalist" Denis de Rougemont 4, who, though only
tangentially involved in the work of intergovernmental cultural cooperation, is a
strong invisible presence in its story.
My primary source material throughout has been the publications and, where publicly
accessible, meeting papers of the main cultural cooperation bodies. I have also drawn
on the available files of the UK Foreign Office and Ministry of Education, which
contain internal minutes relating to national attitudes to cultural cooperation as well as
background detail about motivations and decision-making. The argument thus makes
much use of official statements and positions, which often require some
deconstruction. To analyse these I have drawn on my direct involvement as a civil
servant and national negotiator, although it should be noted that in doing so I have had
to observe rules of government confidentiality. Accordingly, nothing in this thesis is
directly based on material or knowledge which is not normally accessible to
researchers. Since it is my contention that, to a considerable degree, the programmes
and philosophies of cultural cooperation are shaped not by abstract theory but by the
political and other conditions in which they were formulated, I have considered it
necessary to devote a good deal of space to historical narrative and the analysis of
particular paths taken.
4 De Rougemont, as will be explained in Chapter Six, was prominent in situating a strong cultural
component in the federalist congress of 1948 which led to the setting up of the Council of Europe and
subsequently established a European Cultural Centre to promote his ideas. Alongside such federalist
luminaries as Henri Brugmans, he wrote copiously on the history and destiny of Europe
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Multilateral cultural cooperation is greatly affected by the interaction between
"realist" and "idealist" 5 approaches to international relations. Attention is therefore
paid to analysing motives, with a bias towards pragmatic rather than theory-based
explanations of developments. My aim is not to advocate a "philosophy of cultural
cooperation" or indeed to elaborate a "theory" but to demonstrate how cultural
cooperation tailors its responses to shifting patterns in the political as well as the
social landscape. It is central to my argument that cultural cooperation is the product
not merely of the preoccupations of national policy-makers but also of the relationship
between the different institutional players themselves. In many cases this involves a
triangular structure consisting of governments: secretariats: parliamentarians. Where
appropriate, therefore, attention is paid to the way in which these mechanisms are
structured and how they interact, since it is often this interaction which explains the
decisions taken, at least as much as the intrinsic merits of the action proposed. I have
not attempted to evaluate cultural cooperation's impact: as should become clear, this is
a task impossible to carry out in the absence of serious attempts at evaluation by the
organisations and member states themselves.
Cultural cooperation and cultural policy
While cultural cooperation is clearly linked closely to both cultural diplomacy and
cultural policy, it is a subset of neither. The often contending duality of ideology
which it embodies is inadequately conveyed by the international relations terms
5 see S. Smith, "The Self-images of a Discipline: a Genealogy of International Relations Theory", in K.
Booth and S. Smith, eds., "International Relations Theory Today", Polity Press, 1995. The terms are
used to describe approaches to international relations based on progressive thinking associated with the
1920s and 1930s — the time of "intellectual cooperation" — and on conservative ideas of the 1940s and
1950s which were a reaction to them. The "social scientific" thinking of the 1970— exemplified in the
Council of Europe's cultural programme — rejected both
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"realist" and "idealist" (hence the preference for Chris Brown's subtler and less
judgmental terms "cosmopolitan" and "communitarian"). The conflict can also be
seen as between expedient and intellectual approaches (it is not usually appropriate to
see cultural cooperation in terms of solutions to problems, as will be seen); between
federalist and integrationist views of Europe; between personalist and individualist
views of society; even, at its most fundamental, as a conflict between the spiritual and
the temporal, an idea which begins with the notion of a "League of Minds" as
counterpart to the League of Nations.
It follows from this that cultural cooperation is unlikely to function effectively in the
ways traditionally expected of international cooperation: either as low-level support to
ease the passage of other policies considered more significant by the various
protagonists; or as a functionalist 6 method of effecting the transfer of popular loyalty
away from the national level towards the supranational; or even as a way of
institutionalising the place of the artist and the intellectual within the European polity.
Furthermore, unlike most forms of cooperation, it often does not represent the
interaction at intergovernmental level of clearly understood and accepted national
policy interests.
To a considerable extent, cultural cooperation writes its own scripts. The reason is
partly to be found in its (theoretically) 7 non-governmental origins, but also in the
6 functionalism is the idea, common in international relations literature and particularly that of the
European Community, that international organisations will take over from nation states technical
functions which they can deliver better because they meet the function better, and which in due course
will establish themselves in the public mind as a more effective source of government than that
provided at national level
7 see Chapter Four for the role of the French government in the International Committee on Intellectual
Cooperation.
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divergence of views held by different European national administrations about the
extent to which the state intervenes in cultural questions. This ranges from a highly
dirigiste approach in France in which cultural policy is sometimes presented as a
central plank of government policy across the whole sphere of public life; through a
precisely demarcated split of functions in the former Federal Republic of Germany
(FRG) between the national federal government and the Lander; to a fragmented
approach to cultural policy in the UK at government level which remained until the
1990s to the extent that a Minister for the Arts could disclaim the existence of any
cultural policies8.
Over the years, and particularly within the Council of Europe, cultural cooperation
has developed an approach to cultural policy itself which tries to make sense at a
European level of the different sets of preferences and plans (in Deutsch's terms)
favoured by its member states and to steer them in the direction of consistent
decisions based on a common goal. It is this in particular that has led to discussion of
cultural cooperation as if it were the basis for a "European cultural policy". However,
this thesis hopes to show that the approach is both a relatively recent one and is far
from being the unchallenged and accepted aim of European cultural cooperation.
Some themes found in cultural cooperation
Cultural cooperation is a hybrid, combining an independent tradition (intellectual
cooperation), which is not simply non-governmental but anti-governmental, with a
system (cultural diplomacy) based on straightforward national self-interest. It is this
8 
report of the ad-hoc conference of European Ministers with responsibility for cultural affairs, p.39.
Council of Europe, Oslo, 1976.
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which gives it its curious duality and internal tension. Cultural diplomacy, examined
in the following chapter, is based on the idea that national policy is served and
advanced by the active promotion of a nation's culture abroad. Seen as cultural
relations, it still forms the bedrock of international cultural interchange and has not
been supplanted, either in terms of investment or political importance, by multilateral
cultural cooperation.
Within cultural diplomacy some central issues — national identity, language, the
chosen self-image to be displayed to potential political and trading partners — can be
accommodated without difficulty. Its relationship to cultural cooperation, within
which these things have to be set aside or overridden, is ambiguous. Nevertheless, it is
from cultural diplomacy that some enduring themes of cultural cooperation derive:
notions of "rayonnement" 9, the idea that a particular (national) culture can extend an
influence that is both self-serving and morally improving to the recipient; the
importance attached to manifestations of high art as a symbol of unity as well as
prosperity; the idea that opinion-formers and future elites should travel and
experience (favourably) each other's cultures.
Cultural relations, though a term appropriated by governments to provide a positive
gloss on "official level" exchange), is of course not exclusive to them. Intellectual
contact has its own status and input, which converged with that of governments
9 this term, borrowed from French cultural diplomacy, has recently reappeared in the literature of the
European Commission. It is used here because of its evocative quality as an image of Europe, which is
not conveyed by English translations such as "influence"
io see Chapter 1 of J. M. Mitchell, "International Cultural Relations", British Council, 1986, for a
discussion of the importance attached to the term "relations" as opposed to "diplomacy"
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during the life-span of the International Committee on Intellectual Cooperation (ICIC)
under the auspices of the League of Nations, continued briefly in the General
Assemblies of UNESCO, then dissipated into the national committees of that body. It
reconstitutes itself as a force after 1968 in the form of expert groups advising the
Council of Europe (to use Chris Brown's term, "epistemic communities") and expands
into the "cultural networks" of the 1980s and 1990s.
Intellectual cooperation in its turn supplies some key themes of its own: the social
security, employment and remuneration of artists; copyright and "droit de suite";
cross-frontier collaboration on joint projects; the idea of organisation at the working
level for artists and others involved in cultural activity; professional training. To
intellectual cooperation too might be attributed the idea that cultural cooperation
should concern itself with the impact of industrialisation and globalisation upon the
cultural good of the population, a theme which runs from pre-war concern about the
taste of the masses through the Council of Europe and UNESCO's sociologically-
based programmes endorsing cultural "animation" policies to the attempt to obtain a
"cultural exception" in the GATT negotiations between the EU and the USA.
Bound up with intellectual cooperation is a thread of symbolic association of Europe
with the cultural tradition of western man. This is perhaps most clearly expressed in
Paul Valery's idea of the "cultural capitar li possessed by Europe, which he
introduced to cultural cooperation through his work with the ICIC's Arts and Letters
Committee, but which was taken up by the federalist movement and Denis de
it see "Freedom of the Mind" (1939), in Collected Works, Vol.10, p. 200. Routledge & Kegan Paul,
1967
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Rougemont in particular. This strand of thinking, although it had its high-water mark
at the Hague Congress of 1948, continues throughout much of cultural cooperation,
particularly by way of the parliamentary assemblies, and manifests in a general
argument for culture to be regarded, not as low-level policy but as in some
unspecified way central to European integration. There is a subtext in much of this
which is about the place of intellectuals themselves as "unacknowledged legislators of
the world", in the phrase of Shelley which neatly associates cultural cooperation with
the Romantic movement.
European federalism itself provides another theme of cultural cooperation. It will be
argued that whereas the integrationist approach embodied by Jean Monnet discarded
much of federalism, many of its elements — the insistence on diversity, the
championing of regionalism, the emphasis on community values and on networks of
people co-operating on shared projects — emerge in what is offered, especially by the
Council of Europe, as the "European" vision of what cultural policy ought to be. If
federalism has been defeated politically, it lives on in the values of cultural
cooperation.
Conversely, this communitarian vision may conceal contending national political
visions. From the earliest days of the ICIC, cultural cooperation has reflected a
struggle for leadership based on different visions of how cooperation should be
conducted, on the role of culture itself in European policy-making and on the degree
to which "European" priorities should override national ones. It would be
disingenuous to deny the part played by language issues, initially in perpetuating the
dominant status of French, latterly in diminishing the impact of the dominant status of
English (and leading to the fiercely fought issue of regulating the cultural industries,
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especially television). The pivotal role played by France in cultural cooperation is
impossible to miss; but there are also subsidiary "national" themes at work, including
the diplomacy-centred view of the UK and Germany, the well-timed interventions of
the Nordic countries, the support of the Netherlands for supranational rather than
intergovernmental techniques and the role played by the French Community of
Belgium as, almost, a surrogate for France and a driving force towards an attempted
"Europeanisation" of cultural policy.
Finally, attention should be paid to the insistence often found within cultural
cooperation on the special nature of the enterprise — all-pervasive, at once
commonplace and numinous, culture, it is sometimes asserted, cannot be subject to
the rules that govern the rest of intergovernmental activity. The word is, as Raymond
Williams notes 12, notoriously difficult, and not without associations of hostility (some
of which percolates into the way the UK, in particular, has prioritised cultural
cooperation). The sense in which cultural cooperation carries about it an aura of
peculiarity is hard to pin down, whether via the almost priest-like assumptions made
by intellectuals, or the belief that the task of cultural cooperation is to identify and
codify sets of values which are somehow specially "European", or the arguments
which seek to exclude certain areas of activity, both industrial and individually
"creative", from the normal rigours of life in a market-led economy.
This thesis tries to identify this thread of "resistance" through the influence and
thought of a small number of individuals who provide an ideological subtext to the
development of cultural cooperation which also acts as a counterpoint to the
R. Williams, Keywords", Fontana, 1976: pp. 87-93, "Culture"
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interactions on the political level of nationa41 and institutional interests. A focal point
will be suggested in the ideas of Henri Bergson, whose theories of creative evolution
were popular at the turn of the century as a way of handling the intellectual conflicts
between Enlightenment and Romantic attitudes to culture, and in particular the French
and German versions of these. Bergson has been credited 13 with the idea for the ICIC,
and was its first chairman.
Some of "Bergsonism" later found its way into the quasi-religious "personalist"
movement which was influential in France before and after WWII, and which,
associated with the politics of the French Resistance, subsequently influenced
federalism. Bergson's influence will be explored in the context of the ICIC, but his
thinking, often attacked as anti-intellectual and irrational, has something to offer to
account for the persistently non-practical strand in cultural cooperation which favours
rhetoric over achievement, champions the alternative, and hankers after the grail of
"fostering creativity" in preference to the less challenging but more achievement-
oriented activity of facilitating exchanges and financing tours. A particular example of
this is the Council of Europe's attempts to promote "cultural democracy" and a
"Cultural Charter".
13 by Gilbert Murray: see "An Unfinished Autobiography" and other texts
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Culture and Europe
Why associate European integration so closely with European culture? It is worth
beginning with a survey of the ways in which this linkage is traditionally made. "The
cultural dimension" is assumed to be a unifying factor, evoking common imagery and
positive feelings 14. The imagery of European culture, however, suggests a more
complex set of associations. It contains a strong element of fear, of a common enemy,
the "barbarian at the gate". It also contains the powerful image of the community of
the learned, for whom part of the attraction of European integration is that it bolsters
their "special role".
Appeals to Europe's culture as the raison d'être of European unity were fairly
commonplace in the first half of the century even before WWI and certainly after it,
including in the burgeoning literature of European federalism. French writers and
intellectuals seem to have engaged more directly with the notion of European
culture l5 whereas their British counterparts 16 have preferred to comment, often at one
remove, on notions of world government or institutional reform, or for purposes of
comparison.
Articulations of European cultural identity as well as those of national cultural
identity find their source in Rousseau and Montesquieu 17 . Such images were in part a
reaction to theories elevating national culture which these writers and others (Herder,
14 it is consistently used this way in political texts of European organisations and throughout the
literature of integration
15 examples include Julien Benda, Jules Romains and Paul Valery
16 for example, Leonard Woolf
17 see the discussion of the federalist idea in these authors in Elazar (1987) and of their ideas of
nationhood in Llobera (1994) and elsewhere
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Fichte) had already made a commonplace, including the association of shared
language with shared society, and which had already become distorted by politico-
cultural extremism in both France and Germany - hence the need to imagine "Europe-
ness". The imagery may sometimes be transferred from one to the other with little
amendment: for example, Denis de Rougemont approvingly quotes Hoffmansthal, "a
great man or a great achievement becomes European.. .Where a great idea is
iconceived, there is Europe" 1 8 . This n fact echoes a comment of Victor Hugo made
about France19.
Probably the most consistently invoked image of Europe is that of "les trois sources":
Greece, Rome and the Christian church. Denis de Rougemont and others attribute
this formulation to Paul Valery - an emphatically western and Christianised vision
which embraces the espousal of democratic institutions, the love of order and the idea
of the sanctity of the rights of the individual which is held up as uniquely European.
De Rougemont encapsulates this in a metaphor of the town square: "shared spiritual
values, the rule of law, the tacit respect accorded by all citizens to public
institutions...a balanced mass of interacting tensions" 20.
This staple of European imagery appears again in the speech of welcome of the
French education minister to the Second Conference of University Vice-Chancellors
in 1959, but in a slightly different form: "the Graeco-Latin heritage, the Christian
18 D. de Rougemont , "The Idea of Europe", trans. N. Guterman, p. 361. MacMillan, 1966
19 "La France est d'intera public. La France s'eleve sur l'horizon de tous les peuples. Ah! disent-ils, il
fait jour, la France est la". (Speech at opening of an International Literary Congress, 1878. Calmann
Levy, 1879)
20 D. de Rougemont, "The Meaning of Europe", trans. A. Braley, p. 42. Sidgewick & Jackson, 1963
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faith...and science based on observation and reason" 21 . The Enlightenment notion of
Europe as the embodiment of Reason, of "I'Universel", is particularly popular with
French writers staking their country's claim to embody Europe, but it is by no means
confined to them: the British historian Christopher Dawson 22 uses it too, referring to a
specifically European "irrational faith in Reason" 23 , and de Rougemont (who was
quite aware of the pitfalls of presenting "Europe" as white, Catholic and
francophone), more cautiously expresses the same principle as "objective truth".
Another favourite image is the university. These form the "republic of letters", the
unifying force of Europe, and are particularly identified with key figures, such as
Erasmus24, and periods (the Middle Ages). For de Rougemont, they are the
forerunners of the cities, which he sees as peculiarly European in the cross-
fertilisation of ideas which they permit (a preoccupation later taken up by both the
Council of Europe25
 and the EU26).
The "European man" (who appears in many other forms as thinker, monk, Faust or
Tristan) is portrayed as the partaker of knowledge, linked with others by a common
thirst for understanding and especially by the common language of scholarship, Latin,
"a reticulum which held Europe together" 27 in the phrase of Sir Eric Ashby. The
intellectuals whose deliberations are recorded by Max Beloff in 1956 wondered
21 proceedings of the 2'd
 conference of European University Rectors and Vice-Chancellors, Dijon,
September 1959 (Western European Union)
22 de Rougemont regarded Dawson, alongside T.S. Eliot and Hilaire Belloc, as one of the few British
authors with an understanding of Europe
23 C. Dawson, "Understanding Europe", p.39. Sheed and Ward, 1952
24 hence the naming of the European Community's university interchange programme
25 in Project 5, which looked at cultural infrastructure in 21 cities
26 the European Cities of Culture, one of the EU's few popularly known cultural initiatives
27 proceedings of the 2"d
 conference of European University Rectors and Vice-Chancellors, op.cit.
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whether science could replace Latin as the "substitute common culture to which all
Europeans would in future have access" 28.
This is often accompanied by a real sense of the duty that falls upon intellectuals and
universities in particular to take upon themselves the recreating of Europe, and the
leading of others towards it. Some writers extend the metaphor to the monastery: it is
not unusual to find the idea of the "secular monk" in connection with advocates of
European unity, from Salvador de Madariaga' S29 use of it to describe the dry
Englishness of Gilbert Murray and Lord Robert Cecil to John Hellman's use of the
term "knight-monks" to describe the enthusiastically ascetic idealists of the Uriage
community during the Vichy period30 . This recalls Talcott Parsons' description of
modern intellectual groups in terms of old monastic elites, an aristocracy of the
humanities31.
The Middle Ages have a particular place in the imagery of Europe, as a Golden Age
of spirituality and social coherence. In the writings of Count Coudenhove-Kalergi,
one of the pioneer figures of European integration, there is a yearning for the Europe
of the chivalric idea1 32. This is the "true Europe", the age of the scholar, of moral
28 M. Beloff, "Europe and the Europeans - an international discussion", p.127. Council of Europe,
1957
29 in his contributory essay to J. Smith and A. Toynbee, eds., "Gilbert Murray — an Unfinished
Autobiography", p. 178, in which he refers to "this forward-looking, possibly heretical, group of British
Civic Monks"
3° J. Hellman, "The Knight-Monks of Vichy France, Uriage 1940-45", McGill, 1993
31 T Parsons, "The Intellectual: a Social Role Category", in P. Rieff, (ed.), "On Intellectuals", New
York, Doubleday, 1969
32 "the intellectual and moral aristocracy of the future which is bound to replace one day the material
principle of numerical superiority now dominating democracy", Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi, "An
Idea Conquers the World", p.133, Hutchinson, 1953
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certainty, of faith and of a form of unity under the Roman church 33 . The conferences
organised by Paul Valery's Arts and Letters Committee are said to have had "a
flavour of cultured medieval Europe" 34. This sense appears strongly in the writings of
Catholic intellectuals such as Dawson, who pursues the idea of ties between
intellectuals as the last remnant of the unity between north and south after the
Reformation.
In this view of Europe - Catholic, spiritualised, given leadership by a quasi-chivalric
corps of scholar-knights - Charlemagne is a primary symbol, although his value is
limited. Apart from his direct link with the Papacy as giver/recipient of temporal
authority to rank alongside the spiritual, the justification for the constant invocation of
Charlemagne is the association of the name "Europe" with his empire (which, as
Norman Davis35 notes, is itself a revival of an ancient name ). It is a rather small
Europe, covering roughly the "Rhineland corridor" of the unenlarged European
Community, and Carolingian unity itself was short-lived. 36 A more convincing
explanation for the enduring potency of the Charlemagne symbol is the way in which
it unifies France and Germany, whose pervasive cultural imagery of light and
darkness, reason and mystery, universality and particularity, Catholicism and
Lutheranism, is so central to "cultural Europe" that the absence of so many other
Europes often hardly seems to matter.
33 the Papacy itself is sometimes explicitly, often implicitly, equated with Europe as a unifying force,
the latter a way of replacing what Protestantism took from the former, and of bringing the strayed
sheep back into the fold
34 G. Davies, "Intellectual Cooperation between Two Wars", p. 6. CEWC, 1963
35 N. Davies, "Europe, a History", p. 302. Pimlico, 1996
36 "a flash in the pan, a tardy reminiscence of ancient Rome", G. Barraclough, p.3 , "European Unity in
Thought and Action", Vogelenzang Lecture, Haarlem, 1963
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Whereas even contemporary French writers, such as Edgar Morin 37 , seem to find it
quite difficult to move away from the classic French insistence on the call to
intellectuals to rouse Europe in the name of culture and the "universal", others, such
as the non-French federalists Denis de Rougemont (Swiss) and Hendrik Brugmans
(Dutch), and Salvador de Madariaga (Spanish) all make efforts to shift the image of
Europe away from the Catholic stereotype towards something more all-embracing.
Each of them wishes to convince the reader of the culture of Europe as its unique gift
to the world, indeed, the main reason, after World War II especially, why it should
continue to exist. Accordingly, they make rather less than the French intellectuals of
European unity as moral regeneration, and more of Europe as the embodiment of the
indomitable individual spirit, with or without God.
For Brugmans, Europe is "a civilisation of non-conformists.. .it is the European
climate that makes life dangerous, adventurous, magnificent and tragic" 38 . Madariaga,
a Spaniard equally at home in Paris, Oxford or Geneva, compares the special
characteristics of different nationalities in a sometimes eccentric fashion, but singles
out the idea of the individual as a European discovery - they instinctively humanise
the abstract39 . His "European Olympians" (Don Juan, Don Quixote, Hamlet and Faust
- all notably non-French) personify the expansionist, the abstract, the enquiring mind.
The Protestant de Rougemont concurs with the notion of the Faust figure as
essentially European. Despite his attraction to the orderly notion of the microcosmic
town square, he also concedes that the "spiritual adventure" of Europe involves
37 E. Morin, "Penser l'Europe", CNRS, 1987
38cited in "Europe Unites: the Story of the Campaign for European Unity", p.121. Hollis & Carter,
1949.
39 S. de Madariaga, "Portrait of Europe," Hollis & Carter, 1967
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motion, change and perturbation. At the centre of his idea of European culture is the
notion of tension and balance, passion ordered by reason. In "Man's Western Quest"
(1957) he draws on Grail quest imagery to argue that western man, possessed by a
"principle of imperfection", is in perpetual search, without resolution40 .
These are versions of Europe which are clearly designed to accommodate Germanic
culture, not exclude it. They still insist, nevertheless, on the culture of the exceptional
man. The idea that "Europe" may consist in a cultural life shared by, and made
accessible to, ordinary people is so absent from these writings that the inference may
be drawn at which Coudenhove-Kalergi 41 hints: "low" culture is national, particular,
"vollcisch", even domestic, whilst "high" culture is European, universal, and the
preserve of high minds. Cultural cooperation, to a certain extent, sets out to rectify
this.
40 D. de Rougemont, "Man's Western Quest - the Principles of Civilisation". (M. Belgion, trans.) p. 58.
New York: Harper & Bros
41 in "Pan-Europe": see Chapter Four
24
CHAPTER TWO
Cultural diplomacy up to World War I
Multilateral cultural cooperation has had an informal life since the medieval heyday
of the universities. It would be remarkable if it had not. This existed separately,
however, from diplomacy, which evolved from court practice for purposes very
different from the high-minded exchange of ideas. This chapter, which does not
contain original research, is a scene-setter, examining the growing desire of politically
powerful nations to present themselves to the rest of the world related to their
different responses to the state's role in cultural life within their domestic spheres and
their different expectations in promoting interest in their culture as part of their
diplomatic effort.
The literature of diplomacy
The theory and practice of diplomacy has received some attention from international
relations theorists and is supplemented by the memoirs of some diplomats. An early
"standard" text for the Anglo-Saxon is that of Sir Harold Nicolson, whose 1939 book
"Diplomacy", still in print in 1969 1 , has classic status. Nicolson embodies the image
of the well-bred Englishman and of the diplomat as super-civilised cosmopolitan,
"homme de culture": like many diplomats, he combined accomplished authorship
with a career in the foreign service. As a later writer, James Der Derian, observes, he
presents diplomacy as "common sense" without analysing how its norms come to be
i H. Nicolson, "Diplomacy", Oxford University Press, 1969
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accepted. Nicolson compares different national styles of diplomacy, noting the
importance placed on method and system, concluding that it relies above all on
creating a space of trust, within which different means of obtaining a goal can be
tested without destruction (the tragedy of the Cold War for him was that it shattered
the convention of mutual trust).
Later writers include Adam Watson, also a former diplomat, who defines diplomacy
as "the instrument of international society: a civilised process based on awareness and
respect for other people's point of view; and a civilising one also, because the
continuous exchange of ideas.. .increases that awareness and respect" 2 . Although this
description sounds made for multilateral cultural cooperation, he concurs with
Nicolson in concluding that multilateral diplomacy, while having its place, "shows no
sign of replacing bilateral contact" 3 , offering the frequently-heard observation that
most useful work at international gatherings gets done in the margins. Multilateral
diplomacy (by which he mostly means the United Nations) acts mainly to shift the
status quo: "in the realm of doctrine and belief, of ideology, then diplomacy is apt to
find itself at a loss"4.
Der Derian (1987) goes more deeply than either into the theory of diplomacy partly
by acknowledging its cultural nature. Drawing on Sartre and Foucault, he defines it as
"a mediation between estranged individuals, groups or entities" 5 . He accepts much of
Nicolson's association of diplomacy with high culture, but notes it has folk origins
too, from priesthood to scapegoat. Nicolson offers the image of diplomats as angelic
2 A. Watson, "Diplomacy: the Dialogue between States", p. 20. Methuen, 1982
3 ibid.
"ibid., p. 69
5 J. Der Derian, "On Diplomacy: a Genealogy of Western Estrangement", p. 6. Blackwell, 1987
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messengers 6 ; Der Derian glosses this with a reference to early imagery of daimons
("knowers"), and "the unsettling possibility that the earliest mytho-diplomat had not
wings but horns and a tail" 7 . Nevertheless, he does not dissent from the overall image
of diplomacy as the province of the cultivated man.
Some definitions
Cultural diplomacy has a (limited) literature of its own, which mostly derives from the
post-World War If (WWII) manifestations of the form and falls mainly to be
considered in the next chapter. At this point it seems preferable to offer some
definitions of the terms cultural diplomacy, cultural relations, cultural cooperation and
two variants, cultural projection and cultural propaganda. Some commentators find all
of these inadequate and supply their own, as does J. M Mitchell in his term "external
cultural policy" 8 . This thesis makes use of all these terms at various points, also
referring (in the context of the EU in particular) to "cultural intervention", meaning
the action taken by an international organisation.
There is an element of evolution involved: the term "cultural relations", for example,
is advanced at a specific point in time to mark a shift in public policy (or at least in
the presentation of public policy) away from a one-sided approach which considers
only the national foreign policy interest towards a reciprocal approach which
considers that that interest will be better served if it appears to receive as well as to
offer. Broadly, therefore, we can consider cultural propaganda and cultural projection
6 citing the Greek "angeloi" as "messenger"
7 Der Derian, op.cit., p. 66
8 Mitchell, op. cit, throughout
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as aspects of a cultural diplomacy which tends to be one-way. "Cultural diplomacy"
refers to the use of culture as a mechanism in the practice of diplomacy to serve the
broader ends of a nation's foreign policy. As such it may be influenced by
developments in internal cultural policy, where this exists, but is no sense either
governed by it or required to serve its aims.
"Cultural propaganda" ( a term which it should be noted is not necessarily always
used pejoratively) seeks to convince its targets of the superiority, power, material and
spiritual wealth or military invincibility of those who generate it, and the
weakness/inferiority of the opposition. The sum of such messages is that here is a
world power not to be trifled with. It is associated most often with the actions of
Germany between 1870 and 1945, and with all the main protagonists during the two
World Wars.
"Cultural projection" is a term much favoured specifically by the British pre-WWII to
distance themselves from the type of cultural diplomacy practised by their main
rivals, the Germans and the French, and to a lesser extent the Italians (see particularly
Tallents9 , Taylor l ° and most writing by or about the early British Council). The
intention was to portray the British version as morally preferable to both the French
and German models. Cultural projection, therefore, enabled a country to present a
positive vision of itself and its values but abjured any element of imposition (as
practised, it was implied, by the rival versions). The term remains useful to describe
the activity of non-governmental organisations, particularly those operated by private
9 Sir S. Tallents, "The Projection of England", Faber & Faber, 1932
I ° P. M. Taylor, "The Projection of Britain. British Overseas Publicity and Propaganda 1919-1939",
Cambridge University Press, 1981
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individuals, in promoting the culture of their countries.
By the end of WWII, the term "cultural relations" had generally replaced all of these.
As the use of cultural conventions' 1 became commonplace, this softer-edged, more
neutral-sounding term was considered a fairer reflection of what was actually taking
place on a reciprocal basis. It avoided suggestions of inequality between the partners
and signified that cultural diplomacy had an existence and a raison d'être of its own
that was both part of the normal discourse of diplomatic relations and apart from it. It
also underlines the idea of diplomacy as a privileged space of trust, where certain
types of public rhetoric are suspended12.
The consciously neutralised idea of cultural relations provided a useful separating
function for diplomats, particularly during the Cold War period: it was possible to
assert that cultural relations were untouched by the cruder political imperatives of
foreign policy, and could therefore continue to operate independently of national
political positions. While this may have been more of a comforting illusion than
reality, it was nevertheless for many years a successful one, and has had significant
value as a justifying belief, as essential for the Americans 13
 as for the Russians, and
for east-west relations in general. As Mitchell points out, "relations" imply, as
"diplomacy" does not, the possibility that non-governmental agencies or individuals
can take part in the process. While that has appealing overtones of inclusiveness and
11 bilateral agreements negotiated in order to authorise and regulate the traffic of international exchange
at government level
12
see any diplomatic memoirs, such as those of Sir Nicholas Henderson or Sir Pierson Dixon, for
examples of how this operates
13 there are many examples of former State Department officials testifying to this, including P. H.
Coombs, "The Fourth Dimension of Foreign Policy: Educational and Cultural Affairs", New York,
Harper & Row, 1987 - originally 1965; C. A. Thomson & W. H. C. Laves, "Cultural Relations and
Foreign Policy", Indiana University Press, 1963
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participation for non-governmental bodies, for governments the element of distancing
that accompanies it is equally attractive: an appearance of independence that can
nevertheless be controlled. It also brings that which cannot be directly controlled
(day-to-day contact between individuals) within an acceptable framework and
minimises conflict.
"Cultural cooperation" is multilateral, not bilateral, and takes cultural relations a
crucial step away from the foreign policy area towards a mechanism for adapting and
influencing a set of increasingly homogeneous internal cultural policies operated by
those who participate within it. As this study will argue, its operation is significantly
more precarious than that of cultural relations, partly because the mixture of external
and internal cultural policy priorities is not always resolved, but also because the
degree of consensus on what is involved in the process is very far from clear. Whilst it
is arguable that the "game" element is a large part of all international negotiation, it is
perhaps particularly evident in multilateral cultural cooperation - a game where
everyone decides for himself what the rules are.
The diplomatic background of cultural diplomacy
Historians of diplomacy trace its origins to the role of envoys between powers -
Harold Nicolson emphasises that the skills employed by these individuals (oratory,
negotiation, tact, discretion and information gathering) remain the classic skills of the
diplomat. Diplomacy's ground rules appear to have been established by the Roman
Empire, which gave diplomats the framework of international law in which to operate,
notably the binding validity of contracts, and thence of treaties.
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In the case of cultural diplomacy, other origins can be identified, along with
accompanying sets of skills to define the practice of the form. Ninkovich recalls the
Pharaonic practice of exchanging princelings between courts 14 , in which the young
potentate returns home with an understanding of his host's culture and manners,
useful for future alliance building and possibly other less reputable purposes
(assuming, of course, he returns home at all). This kind of strictly controlled
exchange can be considered alongside the way artistic developments themselves were
transmitted via the less formal but still court-focused "oral tradition" which facilitated
cultural cross-fertilisation in Europe, creating inter alia the literature of the "Matter of
Britain" and of courtly love. Der Derian 15 also gives weight to the role of the
church 16 , which Nicolson does not, and makes the artist-diplomat link explicit in his
reference to Minnesanger. Both forms involve a kind of normalisation of self-image
which is central to any consideration of cultural policy, in which the diplomat
embodies a certain level of courtly refinement. Image is perhaps the strongest
common thread of the internal and external cultural forms.
The formal recognition of cultural diplomacy as part of the armoury of the state
mission abroad is nevertheless relatively recent. According to Harold Nicolson,
diplomacy itself was not formally established as a profession until the 15th century
when the Italian city states began to appoint individuals to represent them at foreign
courts, rapidly followed by France and England. Diplomacy was a trade practised by
the elite without much reference to the population in general and its main concern was
14 F. A. Ninkovich, "The Diplomacy of Ideas: US Foreign Policy and Cultural Relations 1938-1950",
Cambridge University Press, 1981
15 1987, op.cit
16 he connects it explicitly with a form of "mission civilisatrice", as do Deibel & Roberts (1976) in their
discussion of Pope Gregory XV's "Congregatio de Propaganda Fide", a committee of cardinals set up
to do what its name suggests
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access to and influence with the higher echelons of the ruling class.
Cultural diplomacy at this level was therefore essentially a mating ritual intended to
attract allies. It had no social dimension independent of the strategic and political, and
involved a strong element of display. This ranged, and continues to range, from the
siting of an embassy and the good connections of the ambassador to the level of
decorative opulence to be found in the furnishings of both 17 . In some cases, France
being the obvious example, the diplomatic value of being able to promote an image of
cultural pre-eminence was established very early on. Roche and Pigniau I8 , in their
history of French cultural diplomacy, attribute this in part to the fact that diplomacy
provided a suitable career for men of letters such as du Bellay, Diderot or Voltaire (a
tradition which carries through to Claudel and Giraudoux). But it also suggests that, at
some level, thought was being given to the idea that France, even before reinventing
herself through the Revolution, needed to assert an international identity that was
neither military nor mercantile.
In 1914 Germany's flagrant disregard for the rules threw the diplomatic game into
confusion 19 . For Nicolson, it was not surprising that it should have been the Germans
who did this - he saw in them the lack of a solid centre, evidence of a "spiritual
homelessness" 2° dating from the withdrawal of the Romans, and in their hands
17 
even in the cash-strapped 1990's, the UK government maintains a modest but museum-standard
Government Art Collection for show in embassies and relatively junior officials are still eligible to
have the costs of entertainment figured into their cost of living allowances.
18 F. Roche and B. Pigniau, "Histoires de Diplomatie CultureIle des Origines a 1995, Ministere des
Affaires Etrangeres, Documentation Francaise, 1995
19 
according to Lord Eustace Percy, who after a distinguished diplomatic career became one of the first
chairmen of the British Council, they "wantonly broke out of the well-understood bounds of
permissible adventure set by the Concert of Europe" ("From the Concert of Europe to the United
Nations — an Estimate of Change", Burge Memorial Lecture, International Friendship, 1954)
20 Nicholson, op. cit., p. 145: the phrase is attributed to Friedrich Sieburg
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diplomacy became Machtpolitik. Bismarck had broken the rules half a century
previously during his period of "Kulturkampf' when he had operated through covert
funding to manipulate opinion in other countries for his own political ends21.
Bismarck's Kulturkampf was new because it did not look to "the proper channels" for
achieving its goals but tried to influence public opinion directly. Historians confirm
that governments were already aware that with new communications and a growing
section of their populations which were both educated and enfranchised, foreign
policy was changing, and cultural diplomacy involved more than maintaining an
impressive and cultivated official presence. Cultural projection and propaganda
achieved two aims that unsupported diplomacy could not: they reached various strata
of public opinion in key countries abroad; and they also provided a self-image that
could be reflected back to the populace at home.
Cultural diplomacy and projection in France, Germany and Britain
France
The thirty years preceding WWI saw three players in particular developing their
cultural diplomacy: France, Germany and Britain. Each was pursing territorial
ambitions outside Europe. They fed off their anxieties about each others' ambitions
and used each others' perceived advances in areas where they were competing for
influence to cajole more resources out of national authorities. Other countries were
not out of the game altogether (Italy's Dante Alighieri Society was established in
1889, but, as Mitchell points out, until Mussolini the Italians colonised mainly
21 M. 0. Kolbeck, "American Opinion on the Kulturkampf', Catholic University of America, 1942
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through emigration), but in broad terms the standard-bearers were the two major
colonial powers and their new rival, with France well ahead of the opposition. As a
result, both Germany and Britain chose in many ways to define their image by its un-
Frenchness.
Roche and Pigniau describe French diplomatic activity up until 1870 as accompanied,
without a systematic plan but in a very regular manner, by "action culturelle" 22, which
appears to mean primarily the links maintained with expatriate French and the work
done by the missionary societies and others to teach French abroad. Like its rivals,
France in the course of the 19th century established French schools and institutes in
areas where it wanted to maintain its political influence 23 . In Greece particularly,
archaeological schools were established, of which the French had the first in 1846. In
Turkey, French lycees were established to assure the French-speaking future of the
Turkish elites. Lauren 24
 notes that French public administration underwent a major
upheaval after the Franco-Prussian War, which included the formulation of new
concepts of "total diplomacy". These brought the press and information clearly
within the remit of the diplomatic function, (and in doing so, saved the French from
the contortions later experienced by both the British and the Americans in trying to
separate out the information and culture functions). By the end of the century the
French Foreign Office had set up the first formal governmental structure for
supporting cultural diplomacy, the Service des Oeuvres Francaises a l'Etranger.
22 this term, much used subsequently in French cultural policy, was later taken up by the European
Commission to describe its interventions
23 
especially Egypt and the Balkans
24 P. G. Lauren, "Diplomats and Bureaucrats: the First Institutional Responses to 20th Century
Diplomacy in France and Germany", Hoover Institution Press, 1976
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France was, of course, marketing more than her intellectual pre-eminence 25 . The
French had assumptions about the universal validity of their recent achievements -
"the international climate of the Enlightenment , refined by the French environment,
was to them the real revolution" 26 . This assumption of special-ness amounting to a
vocation in the world persists to the present in French writing on cultural policy,
internal as well as external. Even Jacques Rigaud, whose 1979 assessment of French
external cultural policy generally eschews French cultural rhetoric, speaks of France's
"position singuliere" 27 and "vocation" in these matters.
The mystical relationship French culture has with French national identity is well
expressed by Lebovics as "the founding myth of 19th century nationalism: the belief
that there existed, or should exist, a functional relation between political unity and
unity of culture" 28 . French policy subsequently replicated this national myth on the
new stage of European integration. Kolodziej 29 shows de Gaulle taking it to its
extreme as a guiding principle: France cannot be France without grandeur. The myth
was retrospective: Raoul Villedieu, writing about the French Academy at Rome, Villa
Medicis (an unusual 17th century experiment which combined cultural policy
interests at home and abroad in a manner which seems to be without parallel),
described the institution without apparent embarrassment as "I'Ambassade du genie,
du coeur, de la France" 30•
25 see Heald & Kaplan (1977, below) for a discussion of the relationship between France and the
former American colonies over free trade (lack of) and the ideals of the French Revolution.
26 M. Heald & L. S. Kaplan, "Culture and Diplomacy, the American Experience", p. 36. Greenwood
Press, 1977
22 J. Rigaud, "Les Relations CultureIles Exterieures, Rapport au Ministere des Affaires
Etrangeres", p. 13. Documentation Francaise, 1979. One of Rigaud's interlocutors goes much further
and asserts that "la culture francaise appartient au monde et nous ne sommes que les grants" (ibid).
28H. Lebovics, "True France, the Wars over Cultural Identity, 1900-1945, p. 5. Cornell, 1992
29E. A. Kolodziej, "French International Policy under De Gaulle and Pompidou: the Politics of
Grandeur", Cornell, 1974
30 R. Villedieu, "La Villa Medicis", p. 306. Rome, 1950
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What this amounts to in cultural diplomacy terms seems to be a pace-setting talent for
spiritualising the most pragmatic of motives: the gaining of influence by other means
when the obvious methods of trading and military pre-eminence are unavailable or
cannot be consistently maintained. Villa Medicis is interesting because it attempted to
bring the world to France - the idea was to expose selected artists to the riches of
classical and renaissance Rome so that they would replenish French art both culturally
with the influences thus gained, and physically with a supply of original works and
copies to decorate the palaces of their homeland. The fact that it also sent a subliminal
message about the open and welcoming nature of the French cultural establishment
would hardly have been missed, yet seems not to have been predominant. Villa
Medicis was not in itself an early example of cultural diplomacy, therefore. Yet it
contains the elements of the French type: a statement to the effect that a nation's
significance could be measured through a dialogue conducted in the language of the
arts other than displays of ambassadorial plumage; the principle of "accueil", which,
by declaring France's readiness to embrace the high culture of others, subtly implants
the message that France is the acknowledged centre of such culture; and the
willingness of the state openly to assert that the arts and artists fall within the bounds
of affairs of state.
France established the "model" bilateral cultural organisation in the form of the
Alliance Francaise in 1883. It was not entirely the first in the field: the Deutscher
Schulverein was created two years earlier, and there had been church missionary
groups before that. But its aims were much wider than those of the Deutscher
Schulverein. The subtitle of the Alliance Francaise was the "National Association for
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the Diffusion of the French Language in the Colonies and Abroad". Its historian,
Maurice Brueziere, states that the immediate impetus for its creation was national
military defeat at Sedan in 1870, and the loss of "les deux provinces martyres" 31,
Alsace and Lorraine. Its aim was to restore France's "image de marque
internationale" and it was to operate on the grand scale. Explicitly created not as an
organ of the state but as an association of subscribing members, it nevertheless had
obvious state approval and, within a few years, overt state financial support.
It was recognised by public decree as an "êtablissement d'utilite publique" in 1886,
with a governing body including Paul Cambon, the influential future Ambassador to
London and Madrid, a civil servant from the Foreign Affairs ministry, a former
minister of public instruction and, to reinforce its ecumenical image, an "israelite", a
"protestant" and a "missionaire apostolique". Later this line-up was strengthened by
intellectual heavyweights such as Ernest Renan, Hippolyte Taine and Louis Pasteur.
Its first public subsidy, according to Brueziere, was granted in 1886 by the Conseil
General de la Seine, followed rapidly by other regions. By 1889 it had not only its
prestigious board of governors, but also a general assembly which elected 50
members to an administrative council in charge of distribution, a steering committee
on propaganda, committees throughout the Levant, Spain, Latin America,
Copenhagen, Zurich and London (though not in Germany) and link groups in Prague
and New Orleans.
Roche and Pigniau note that although the Alliance itself was the initiative of a group
31 M. Brueziere, "L'Alliance Frangaise: Histoire d'une institution", pp. 11-12. Hachette, 1983
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of "personnalites francaises"32, from the outset diplomatic posts abroad were
instructed to offer as much practical back-up as they could to the Association's
efforts. Government funds were channelled openly through the Oeuvres Francaises
department and in secret through other mechanisms. The Alliance itself was at great
pains to establish its private credentials and its seal of official approval
simultaneously. The description33 of its role by its secretary-general, Pierre Foncin, is
masterly in this regard and is worth summarising here. Whilst independent, he
observes, the Alliance is naturally supportive of government. It does not engage in
politics but has a policy, namely, the promotion of concord within its own country,
"rayonnement pacifique" without. Far from disliking foreigners - who are represented
on its committees - it asserts that every man has two fatherlands, his own and France;
and that being so, one day perhaps French will become the universal language
common to mankind. In the meantime, the reader of a French book may be a natural
customer for other French products. This, in a nutshell, is the mission of bilateral
cultural diplomacy.
It is worth noting here the amount of space given to a description of the Alliance's
flag, since it anticipates European Union imagery by nearly a century. The national
colours appear on a blue backdrop: "a la fois, le bleu de la mer et le bleu du ciel,
l'espace immense et ideal" across which the French language will resound and, more,
32 Roche et Pigniau, op.cit., p.30
B taken from a prospectus published in 1889. More luxuriant and less cautious language follows in
respect of France's colonies, where the task is one of "moral conquest" of the soul of those peoples
sheltered beneath the flag of France, and of besieged Francophones bravely holding out on the North
American continent ("Louisiane, isolee, lutte couragieusement"). For those who have somehow missed
the message, there is back-up physical imagery in the form of mother France seated under a palm tree
instructing her children, and an exhortative article by the statesman Jules Simon listing the qualities
which link the nation and the language and making the case for French as the universal language. The
combined effect is to persuade the patriotic French reader of the merits of the enterprise not only in
terms of the cultural enrichment of the fortunate heathen, but also of France's place as the cultural
crossroads of the western world, both drawing in and radiating out — again, France as universal gift
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will articulate "les hautes verites...qui, pareilles aux astres, se cachent dans le ciel
profonde de la pens6e humaine".
The Alliance proved a successful and enduring vector of French cultural influence,
with, according to Brueziere, strong national committees in all its priority areas by the
end of the century and the active commitment of influential men such as Cambon,
publishers such as Plon and Hachette and industrialists such as Michelin. It achieved a
number of things: it dealt with the situation, delicate for an avowedly secular
government, whereby the protection of French as a world language was largely left to
religious organisations; its participatory structure allowed the public at large to feel a
sense of national mission which went beyond colonialism to taking on the rival
powers directly, and on ground of French choosing; it succeeded in bringing the
commercial sector into the game by providing the major publishers with opportunities
for display and marketing at the major intentional expositions; and showed how to
diversify into new areas of development34.
By the end of the century, France had a structure for cultural propaganda that
provided a valuable back-up resource to conventional diplomacy and was much
envied elsewhere. It combined a powerful state resource (the Oeuvres Francaises)
with a private network which conveyed the message back to the French public that
France counted internationally through the universal appeal of her language and her
culture, a message that seems to have commanded an enduring level of acceptance.
The imagery of offer and welcome, integrated into a powerful national rhetoric,
34 Brueziere (op. cit., p. 35) cites a children's scheme, "le Sou de l'Alliance Francaise", which was not
successful, and holiday courses for teachers of French, including "visites artistiques" and free theatre
tickets, which were
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enabled France to appear innocent of base imperialist motives. The offer made of
herself to the world, an offer the world could hardly wish to reject, was reinforced by
her willingness to take the world to herself. Universality matched by "acceuil", but at
the same time preserving exclusivity - this was an offer only France could make.
Even the fact that the policy failed in its primary goal - preventing the encroachment
of English and preserving French as the language of civilisation - could be turned to
advantage, in that a defeat for French could be presented as a defeat for culture. At the
same time, France succeeded in creating the template for bilateral cooperation which
would be followed elsewhere. What could not be replicated was the identification of
French interests with the good of civilisation in general, which allowed an official
report as late as 1927 to speak of France's policy as offering "with complete
disinterestedness" to educated elites the opportunity to assimilate the "treasure" of
French "elegance of expression.. .the flower of humanism"35.
Germany
Cultural diplomacy in Germany at first reflected developments in France after the
Franco-Prussian War. Lauren 36 notes that the German public administration
reorganised itself along the pattern of the changes in France and, in order to keep pace
with public opinion, the Foreign Affairs Ministry developed a propaganda interest.
Like both Britain and France, Germany had interests in the Levant and by 1878 was
subsidising a Burgerschule in Constantinople. Germany's priority, however, was
35 quoted in R. E. McMurry and M. Lee, "The Cultural Approach, Another Way in International
Cultural Relations", p. 19. University of Carolina Press, 1947
36 1976, op.cit
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closer to home, i.e.. the Austro-Hungarian Empire, where the position of Germans and
the German minority was considered to be under threat from Magyar interests. The
Deutscher Schulverein 37 , established in 1881 in Vienna, was meant to counter
Magyarisation38.
Germany's cultural diplomacy rapidly became focused on the need to create a viable
state quickly, and accordingly played on a sense of identity. The idea of
"Germanism", drawn from Hegel, Fichte and Herder, was heavily promoted and its
target was expatriate Germans. Its prevailing theme was the notion that a German
living abroad, or even a citizen of another country of German extraction, had two
loyalties: to the state of which he was a citizen and to the wider community of Pan-
Germany. That greater loyalty involved a duty to secure for German culture and the
German language a place in the world. Academics such as Kuno Francke39 , based in
Harvard, devoted much effort to persuading Americans that German culture was
enjoying a Renaissance equal to anything to be found in Britain or France.
Private associations such as the nationalistic All-Deutscher Verband, the Deutsche
Kolonialgesellschaft and in particular the Schulverein were involved in the invention,
on the grand scale, of a national self-image in which culture played a central role.
Ralph Bischoff4°, an American of German origin who researched these associations in
1942 with a view to determining to what extent they had been made effective
instruments of nazification, was confident that, despite the nature of their mission,
37 the full title is Allgemeiner Deutsche Schulverein zur Erhaltung des Deutschtums im Auslande —
roughly, the General German School Association for the preservation of the German way of life abroad
(my translation)
38 McMurry and Lee, op.cit.
39 K. Francke, "German Ideals of Today", Houghton, Mifflin & Co., 1907
40 R. E. Bischoff, "Nazi Conquest through German Culture," Wesley College, 1942
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most, prior to the 1930's, were genuinely privately funded and only loosely
political41.
The prevailing tone of German cultural diplomacy at this time was aggressive, and it
created insecurity in others. The new German state responded to what Nicolson
identified as a national sense of spiritual homelessness by propagating the idea of a
global home of the spirit of which all Germans were a part. This was partly a response
to the experience of America, where German communities were failing to retain their
language42; and partly a way of articulating a sense of frustration that the successful
and prospering German state was less highly regarded abroad than recently defeated
France and arrogant England. A 1907 dispatch from Germany to the British Foreign
Secretary explained how culture was seen by the Germans as a way of counteracting
hostility and suspicion "because German culture is really the culture of the civilised
world"43.
Drawing conclusions about the early years of German cultural diplomacy is difficult
because of the relative scarcity of coverage in English. Two distinct strands of activity
seem to emerge from the literature, however. One is the substantial consciousness-
raising effort involved in the promotion of Germanism, which has some present-day
parallels in attempts to create a sense of Europeanism through creating new imagery
and appealing to common values and a common sense of destiny. Encouragement for
festivals, celebrations of heritage and a flow of information to incline expatriate
41 he notes that German-American patriotic fervour, strong during the Franco-Prussian War, was muted
once the US entered WWI, with loyalties to the state easily winning out over those to "Greater
Germany"
42 see McMurry & Lee, op.cit, also Bischoff, op.cit
43 Lauren, op.cit., p. 185
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Germans to feel part of a larger cultural community were the mechanisms for this.
Male voice choirs were particularly strong in pre-WWI America. Germanism was
also given an academic underpinning in the form of research, taken up by a
substantial number of universities, into the origins of the German race in the world
(although this seems to have taken off in earnest around WWI) and encouragement to
build up archives of German heritage.
At the same time, the selling point of Germany to non-Germans was its modernity.
Kuno Francke, who succeeded in establishing a Germanic Museum at Harvard, was at
pains in 1907 to distance himself from what he felt was the overly popular "Schiller"
view of the German as specially chosen to devote his work to the "eternal structure of
human culture"45 . This was out-of-date, and the task facing the modern German was
how to harness the fact of his overwhelming success as a citizen of a modern nation
and empire to the national search for "higher forms of national existence" towards
which there was "a wonderfully organised collective will"46.
Francke rejects universal brotherhood in favour of universal sympathy and points to
the successful secularisation by Germany of its inner life, freeing it from the mistakes
of the past, which, he notes, still weigh down other, older, European countries. He
cites scientific achievement as a part of this process. Lewis Pyenson47 has described
how Germany was actively pursuing an imperialist strategy in the exact sciences well
before WWI, noting that technological advances greatly assisted the process of
44 Bischoff, op.cit
45 Francke, op. cit., p. 4
46 ibid, p. 8
47 L. Pyenson, "Cultural Imperialism and Exact Sciences, German Expansionism Overseas 1900-
1930", P. Lang, 1985
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establishing the dominant interests. Germany also made use of shifting borders within
Europe: in 1870 the German authorities consciously "germanised" the University of
Strasbourg by filling it with serious German scientists to create a seat of German
learning. Pyenson describes how this process led in due course to a rhetoric of
"German science" which by the turn of the century could be translated into "Aryan
physics".
German cultural diplomacy succeeded in that it fulfilled its first main purpose: it
reached substantial numbers of opinion formers and future elites. Both France and
Britain became seriously alarmed by the sheer numbers of overseas students who
were studying at German universities. In so far as Germany was marketing itself as a
successful modern nation, it was doing no more than they were doing. Of serious
concern, however, was the "dual loyalty" notion being fostered by the Germanists,
which undermined accepted ideas of what was due to the state and created concern
about the relationship of the German government to ethnic German minorities in other
states. "Kultur" became a sinister concept48, well beyond anything the French had
pioneered, and outside the reasonable limits of cultural diplomacy. It seems to have
set up for the first time the feeling that a counter-campaign was needed if "culture"
was not to become a destabilising force rather than the universal gift advocated under
the French system.
There is some evidence that German diplomats themselves were uneasy with what
was happening. Mitchell (1984) notes that in correspondence between Reichskanzler
Hollweg and Karl Lamprecht (credited with the first use of the term "auswdrtiges
44
Kulturpolitik", or external cultural policy) there was concern about the showing made
by Germans: "not every German abroad represents his fatherland in his person, as the
Frenchman does Paris and the Englishman the British Isles"49 . The disjuncture
between the kind of national feeling being promoted by the Germanist organisations5°
and what was permissible within the bounds of diplomatic convention cannot have
been easy to bridge.
It is possible to speculate that a strategy based on the spirit of modernity alone and
conducted within the constraints of conventional diplomacy alone, might well have
succeeded, as France's did. Cultural expansionism, after all, was deemed permissible
within certain limits and there was a case to be made for the recognition of the
contribution of German cultural life to world culture on equal terms with that of
France. German policy, however, tried to set cultural claims above the normal
conduct of international affairs. Essentially, the proposition that German blood
provided access to a cross-border community whose interests should be promoted
independently of and alongside the state of which a person was a citizen cut across
accepted rules of international commerce.
The image Germanism reflected back to the nation was dangerously out of control;
that of a civilisation uninterested in other civilisations; to which other nations were
unreasonably denying the opportunity to fulfil itself; membership of which
transcended territorial borders; and all members of which had long been denied
access to their own history and heritage, which they were now in the process of
48 
see P. Fussell, "The Great War and Modern Memory", Oxford University Press,1977, on the use of
"Kultur" as an anti-German image
49 Mitchell, op. cit., p. 25
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regaining after centuries of suppression. In Francke's words, "what is the colonisation
of Asia Minor by the Greeks compared with the gigantic colonisation of America by
the Germanic and Romance nations?. ..we should be made intellectually at home in
our own country and people"51.
Britain
Most commentators agree that there was little concerted activity to promote British
culture abroad prior to WWI and indeed for some time afterwards. McMurry and Lee
do not discuss Britain prior to the setting up of the British Council in 1935; Taylor
and Sanders 52 focus on information policy only; both Taylor53 and Mitche1154 make
reference to the reluctance of both the Treasury and the Foreign Office to bring
culture within the field of formal diplomacy. Or, as a contemporary commentator put
it, possibly ironically, "British genius speaks for itself'.
This is somewhat to overlook the way Britain's rivals saw things. The "official view"
which accompanied the launch of the British Council, with its self-deprecating and
rather self-satisfied references to "national shyness" 55 , sounds remarkably similar to
the justification Lord Keynes makes of the "very English, informal, unostentatious,
half-baked if you like" Arts Council of Great Britain 56 . To the Alliance Francaise in
50 
see also B. Bond, "War and Society in Europe 1870-1970", Leicester University Press/Fontana,
1983, who notes that the Germanist societies were not always popular with the authorities
51 Francke, op. cit., pp. 25-6
52 P. M. Taylor and M. L. Sanders, "British Propaganda During the First World War", Macmillan,
1982
53 P. M. Taylor, "Cultural Diplomacy and the British Council 1934 - 1939", in British Journal of
International Studies, Vol. 1, No.2, Oct 1978, pp 244-265
54 Mitchell, op. cit.
55 "Interpreting a Civilization", inaugural speech by H.R.H. the Prince of Wales to the first meeting of
the British Council, 2" July 1935
56 J. M. Keynes, "The Arts Council, its Policy and Hopes", (reprinted from The Listener, 1951)
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1889 British national shyness was not evident. There may not have been a society for
the propagation of the English language, but the activities of many religious and
missionary societies, such as the British and Foreign Bible Society, made up for that:
"us ...fondent des missions qui deviendront peutetre un jour des colonies car en meme
temps qu'ils préchent l'evangile, us repandent les idees et propagent l'influence de la
mere patrie"57 . This is backed up with estimates of the numbers of members and of
the annual incomes of a list of such associations. Roche and Pigniau cite the concern
of a budget rapporteur in 1906 about the "guerre des langues" being waged in Egypt
where since 1891, "les agents anglais ... commencaient a envahir le domaine de
l'instruction publique presque exclusivement reservee jusque'la a Yelement
,58francais' . Mitchell points out that to the nascent Germany, the entire British Empire
was an attempt to impose British "Kultur" on the world by the export of British
stock.
What commentators on cultural diplomacy are reflecting in the case of Britain is a
lack of state sponsorship for a very real and active cultural propaganda effort abroad
and the fact that there seemed to be little need for such a state role. The job was
already being done quite effectively. Aside from the work of the missionary societies,
English libraries were to be found abroad, often maintained by anglophile societies59
and the British School at Athens was founded not long after the French one in 1886.
National self-image was vested in perceptions of Empire, which included, if
necessary, a policy of isolationism60. For as long as the Empire was perceived to be
57 Alliance Francaise, Association nationale pour la propagation de la langue francaise dans les
colonies et a l'etranger — Prospectus, 1889
58 
op. cit., p. 14
59 D. Coombs, "Spreading the Word, the Library Work of the British Council", British Council, 1988
see D. Reynolds, "Britannia Overruled, British Policy and World Power in the Twentieth Century",
Longman, 1991
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functioning, it served in itself to promote British culture and to send the messages that
needed to be sent. This, rather than any ancillary attempt to promote British
institutions and cultural life, was deemed sufficient 61 . In the same way, the
infrastructure of Empire obviated the need to reinforce ties of loyalty by constant
reminders of the culture left behind. Indeed, the main difference between France and
Britain at this time seems to have been the need in France for the state to articulate a
formal external cultural policy - had the British been pressed to do so, they might well
have produced a lower-key translation of very much the same rhetoric of offer and
universality (for the latter read democracy and parliamentary government).
Nevertheless, as Reynolds points out, that self-image was shaken after the Boer War.
The debate which took place as a result led the British to undertake some of the
reforms which France and Germany had carried out decades previously, notably in the
sphere of bureaucratic reform and that of active diplomacy 62 . The search for a
stronger self-image seems mainly to been channelled in ways which reinforced ideas
of the virtuousness of Empire, whilst drawing on some of the defensiveness and
uncertainty which resulted from defeat. Examples are the proliferation of
organisations such as the National Service League and the Victoria League, as well as
youth organisations such as the Boy Scouts (developments which had parallels in
Germany).
Bond63
 has looked at the impact of war on society at the end of the 19th century. He
61 Taylor (1981, op.cit) points out that in 1911 the government still refused to allow foreign readers to
subscribe to journals and newspapers
62 the experience of negotiating the Entente Cordiale with France around 1904, which Roche and
Pigniau regard as having been reinforced by the work of the Alliance Francaise, must have introduced
the concept of a cultural diplomacy policy to the British, even if they chose not to pursue it
63 Bond, op. cit.
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points to the way the military associations inter alia contributed to a public climate in
Britain that was both aggressive and defensive. As instances of this he cites the
fashion for scare stories64 and outbreaks of spy fever. It is interesting to consider
whether this activity has a parallel in the explosion of interest in museums and the
emergence of "English heritage" as a concept at the same time. Between 1890 and
1914 the number of museums in Britain doubled 65 , the Museums Association was
established in 1889, and the National Trust followed in 1894, founded by three
members of the Commons Preservation Society. This somewhat subverts the idea
that the British image of itself was entirely secure, even before the Boer War. It
suggests a need both to verify the nation's claim to what it had - a public museum is
a powerful legitimiser of acquisition as well as a highly visible way of reflecting a
nation's status back to itself - and to protect it from outside onslaught.
Accordingly, when the need arose with the outbreak of war in 1914 to formulate the
national myth for propaganda purposes, the elements were in place. The choice of
image was consciously un-French as well as un-German: few claims were made for
intellectual pre-eminence; rather a kind of heightened ordinariness became and
remained the leitmotif - a myth of national character rather than national
sophistication or national destiny. Anti-French feeling in a cultural sense went back at
least as far as the eighteenth century, as Linda Colley has shown 66. Sir Frederic
Kenyon, addressing a university audience in 1915, attempted to define "English"
culture in terms of its distinctive contribution to offset "German thoroughness" and
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(sic) as against this arrogant claim of Germany" to cultural supremacy. He came up
with individualism, common sense and morality, which take the forms of a dislike for
formal regulatory structures such as academies, a preference for enlightened
patronage over what he describes as a "professional" approach to the arts, and an
unwillingness to "dissociate art.. .from its effect on conduct" 67 . In fact, the impression
conveyed is that English culture is one of good taste, and the ability to appreciate
rather than create or innovate. However, Kenyon's speech conveys both anxiety that
English culture risks being judged inferior to French or German and the sense that
different territory must be found to project it.
A very different character, Sir Evelyn Wrench, a pre-war imperialist deeply impressed
by Cecil Rhodes, also chooses a form of morality as his cultural leitmotif, and his
progress reflects the gradual shift of British policy towards acceptance of a cultural
component in its approach to diplomacy. He refined his vision of "a great secret
society for promoting British interests" 68 , which would be somewhere between the
Jesuits, the Freemasons and "a kind of grown-up Boy Scouts" 69 (with girls in it, for
inspirational purposes), to "a new Imperialism... .of the sister-nations of the Britannic
alliance". It would be built on Britain's power for doing good in the world and offer
admission to those of non-British stock (such as Afrikaners and French Canadians)
who nevertheless believed in the "English-speaking world's ideals and institutions" 70 .
Two results of this vision, the Overseas League and the English-Speaking Union,
prepared the way for a post-war third, the All People's Association which in due
67 Sir F. Kenyon, "Ideals and Characteristics of English Culture", p. 17-18. 1915. Kenyon, a classicist
and director of the British Museum, was later to chair the British National Committee of the ICIC
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course became absorbed into the British Council. In both these morality-based
approaches, reflecting the observations of Matthew Arnold in "Culture and
Anarchy", is found a reluctance to associate the state with the propagation of culture
(Wrench does not seem at any point to have considered that his "secret society"
should have had any kind of public function).
Conclusion
This historical examination is intended to establish a particular point about the
development and practice of bilateral cultural diplomacy. This is that there seems to
be a gap between the way in which bilateral cultural relations is seen by most
commentators on the political process as low-level policy facilitating more serious
diplomacy and the weight of national image and identity placed on it when it was
started. The intensity of the battle for linguistic dominance justified the use of
considerable resources in France, as did the necessity to establish French pre-
eminence in the intellectual sphere. For united Germany, what was at stake was
national identity and a challenge to the hegemony of the European state, for which the
German intellectual inheritance was prayed in aid. The overwhelming need was to
create dependable structures of loyalty which would reinforce that image and lead to
influence within the states where those loyalties were operating.
In Britain, these were not, initially, public policy goals since they arose from a sense
of threat and the need to counter weak self-image. Nevertheless, there was sufficient
activity wherever rival powers were at work to ensure that British interests were
maintained, although this was not state-supported and where the aim was the
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propagation of English, this happened under the cloak of religion. In addition, a
heightened sense of threat led to new developments of cultural protection and
preservation which were reflected externally in popular defensive structures and
values-based organisations which formulated specifically "British" ideals of service to
be promoted to the Empire, though not to rival empires.
Cultural projection, therefore, appears to have been acceptable and even desirable as
an instrument of foreign policy, overt or covert, for as long as it did not aspire beyond
that status. When it did so, as in Germany's attempt to create a dual loyalty with
culture as its key element, it became an embarrassment, and a negative element. The
response was to develop rules for its containment, leading to the present situation of
"diplomatic marginality and scholarly indifference" 71
 which the subject has since
enjoyed. Cultural diplomacy thus became regulated into a system of support for
institutes and for dissemination through voluntary organisations. Although new
elements were added after the two world wars, and the element of language teaching
has become predominant, this model remains at the core of the structure, and bilateral
cultural relations remain essentially a support structure for diplomacy, as the next
chapter will show. Furthermore, after decades of exploration of different modes of
cultural cooperation by multilateral organisations, there are signs that this model is
reasserting itself, this time on behalf of a newly confident and dominant European
Union.
71 Ninkovich, op.cit., p. 1
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CHAPTER THREE
The growth of bilateral cultural relations 1914 — 1945
Multilateral cultural cooperation on an institutionalised level emerged from the
experience of the First World War. The two world wars in fact provide a distinct
framework in which to examine it, since the International Committee on Intellectual
Cooperation (ICIC) existed from 1922 to 1939 1 and its successors (UNESCO, the
Brussels Treaty Organisation, the Council of Europe) were all created after 1945. The
purpose of this chapter is to supply the cultural relations background against which
the ICIC operated and which was formalised at the end of WWII as the generally
recognised western European system for cultural relations, based on a network of
bilateral cultural conventions. The emphasis, once again, is on Britain, France and
Germany as the major influences on structured cultural diplomacy.
Cultural propaganda in World War I
The use of propaganda by Britain in WWI (famously admired by Hitler) has been
researched exhaustively by Sanders and Taylor 2 . From their work a number of points
are worth noting. Firstly, the decision to create a Ministry of Information under
Beaverbrook (dismantled after the war) included the setting up of an Art and Literary
Branch, which produced and disseminated books, periodicals and art work, including
the first war artists. There was also a cinema committee which was responsible for a
propaganda film, "Britain Prepared". Eminent authors were recruited to produce
'technically it continued to exist until 1947, when it was formally replaced by UNESCO, but it did
nothing significant after 1939
2 P. M. Taylor and M. L. Sanders, "British Propaganda During the First World War", Macmillan, 1982
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pamphlets which represented the arguments for war in a way which purported to be
objective and was accordingly more likely to be suitable for, in particular, intellectual
American opinion. Propaganda on behalf of Britain in neutral countries and the
dominions was discussed by a writers' conference convened at the outbreak of war.
Towards its end, Arnold Bennett and H. G. Wells were enlisted to manage British
propaganda in France and Germany respectively under the direction of John Buchan
in the Ministry of Information . Despite its success, it was dismantled when the war
ended, partly because of public distrust of the techniques involved, partly to remove
the press barons (the team included Lord Northcliffe) from public office.
In France, where there was already a functioning department in the Foreign Affairs
Ministry and a "Maison de la Presse" to manage not simply newspaper propaganda
but also the supply of books, films and "manifestations artistiques", there were
pressing reasons to keep the operation going. The most immediate was the need to
present France as strong and victorious. In the wings, Roche and Pigniau note, "la
culture americaine avait commence a seduire 1'Occident"3 . For France, the insistence
of Woodrow Wilson that the Treaty of Versailles be drafted in both English and
French was a key defeat for the language policy. According, the "Service des
Oeuvres" continued after the war and was not replaced until 1946.
Germany had the problem in reverse: its aim was to vilify France and discredit the
Versailles deal. Despite the widespread disdain which its Kulturpropaganda section
attracted, the press office's budget was doubled in five years from 1918 and a culture
department was established in the Schuldreferat (War Guilt Section) with the task of
3 Roche and Pigniau, op. cit., p. 39
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winning back sympathy for Germany. This was no easy task: the war had been
consistently presented by British and French propagandists alike as a war about
culture, which played on the image of Germans as barbarians and connected the
destruction of historic buildings with atrocities to people. "Real German culture in all
its manifestations ... accepts and champions the new principles and fresh ideas which
are to regenerate the effete social organisms of today...." with militarism as "the
paramount power before culture can ascend the throne"4.
Exercises in cultural propaganda took different forms and, indeed, began to discuss
the practice itself, as when, around 1916, opposing groups of French and German
Catholic academics took up the question of attacks upon buildings. The German
group5
 accused the French and the British of turning German culture into a convenient
totem for disguising their own territorial intentions by blowing up the threat out of all
proportion. One of the first significant acts of international cultural cooperation,
article 56 of the 1899/1907 Hague Convention, concerned the preservation of
monuments in wartime, thus, it was argued, transferring responsibility for the
preservation of civilisation to the international community. The destruction of great
architecture had a profound impact on both sides, notably the ruin of the Ypres Cloth
Hall, "witnessed by hundreds of thousands" 6, and contributed to the widespread sense
after the war that the visible and invisible signs of European civilisation alike had
been obliterated.
The role of culture as a weapon of national identity during this period seems to have
4 E. Dillon, "A Scrap of Paper", p. viii. Hodder & Stoughton, 1914
5 G. Pfeilschifter (ed.), "German Culture, Catholicism and the World War", Wanderer Printing Co.,
1916
6 Fussell, op. cit., p. 40
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been highly varied: the use of men of letters directly to present propaganda arguments
suggests a need to convince a better educated and better informed public with diverse
arguments, emotional and intellectual as well as political and diplomatic. The impact
of war on Europe's built heritage could be used to inspire feelings of national outrage
but also gave rise to more thoughtful arguments based on an idea of the "common
property" of civilisation. Cultural feeling was open to manipulation at all levels, not
just amongst intellectuals. Paul Fussell's7
 account of the imagery favoured by soldiers
at the front (war diaries, memoirs) shows how strong was the attachment to images of
England8
 and the English literary tradition, where pride and possessiveness went
alongside a dislike of the Catholic imagery of mainland Europe which may underlie
some of subsequent UK attitudes to the idea of "European culture".
Cultural diplomacy between the wars: the pre-Nazi period
During the 1920s bilateral cultural diplomacy began to assume its standard pattern,
particularly in France9 and Germany l°: the creation of schools and institutes in
selected countries, catering to a mixed expatriate and local audience, the latter drawn
usually from the educated classes. This was counter-balanced by increased efforts to
attract foreign students to French and German universities, there to ingest the
language, culture and influence of their hosts. Language teaching became, as it
remained, a keystone of the strategy, complemented increasingly by efforts to create,
then meet, a demand for cultural products, specifically books, journals and films.
7 ibid.
8 recalling Ralph Bischoffs memories as a child in America of receiving annual calendars depicting
German pastoral and traditional views
9 Roche & Pigniau, op. cit
10 ..-...H Arnold, "Foreign Cultural Policy: a Survey from a German Point of View", Oswald
Wolff/Erdmann, 1979
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Even in France, where budgets continued to grow, Roche & Pigniau note that as much
as 95% at times was absorbed by educational and university-based action.
In France, there were two developments of particular interest. The first was the
creation in 1922 of the Association Francaise d'Expansion et d'Echanges Artistiques
(later AFAA), which was both publicly and privately funded and is described by
Roche and Pigniau in a footnote as the "secular arm" of the Ministere des Affaires
Etrangeres. The second was the pioneering of bilateral cultural accords 11
 to establish
a framework within which language teaching in particular could be formalised (the
authors note that this was a way of gaining the entrée in countries where foreigners
were not permitted to open language schools). Roche and Pigniau also note the French
initiative of establishing and financing an institute° in Paris attached to the ICIC, an
ostensibly multilateral body which nevertheless had close links to the Service des
Oeuvres. There was also the Cite Universitaire, an Alliance Frangaise - sponsored
venture for foreign students in Paris.
In Germany, a significant development was the foundation in 1924 of the
Akademischer Austauschdienst, which became the Deutsche Akademischer
Austauschdienst (DAAD) in 1931. By 1927 it had an office in London, followed by
one in Paris in 1930, where it ran a cultural programme° The Goethe Institut was not
established until 1932. According to Bischoff, the Verein fiir das Deutschtum in
Ausland, formed in 1908 from the erstwhile Allgemeine Deutsche Schulverein, had
II with Iran in 1929, then with Denmark, Austria, Sweden and Romania
12 the International Institute for Intellectual Cooperation (HIC) which will be discussed in detail in a
later chapter. The UK Foreign Office was sceptical about its international vocation, noting the
government had given 2 million FF to the body which, "although ostensibly an organisation of the
League of Nations, has proved itself a most powerful factor in the spread of French culture abroad".
13 See B. Pellissier in H-M. Bock (ed.), "Entre Locarno et Vichy, les Relations Culturelles Franco-
allemandes dans les Annees 1930", CNRS Editions, 1993
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had a cash-strapped war after which it had shifted its focus away from the Austro-
Hungarian territories towards areas where there was now anti-German feeling.
Early signs of the kind of ideology which Nazism would graft onto the structures of
the policy of Germanism, well adapted to receive it, were already evident in the
1920s. In 1926 T. S Eliot's international literary review "The Criterion" published
"The Defence of the West" by Henri Massis, a far-right figure associated with the
crypto-fascist Action Francaise movement. Massis attacks Weimar Germany's
fascination with eastern culture ("Oriental anarchy") and warns that the unstable
German soul cannot cope with such influences: "it is her intellectual revenge on the
classic West which has conquered her that Germany is seeking to prepare"14.
Compared with this flourishing investment, British reactions remained slow. British
post-war cultural life was deeply ambivalent - while a sense of nostalgia for the lost
Eden and a culture of "heritage in danger" was growing, intellectuals were neither
particularly popular in themselves nor inclined to lend their support to ideas of
spreading the word about England's merits. Even those who had been involved in
wartime propaganda seem to have held aloof subsequently 15 . The pressure which
eventually led to the setting up of the British Council came mainly from Foreign
Office circles, both serving officials and retired ambassadors, and the cultural
personalities it attracted were the establishment figures 16
 who later served CEMA (the
Council for the Encouragement of Music and the Arts).
14 The New Criterion", p. 235. Vol. IV, no. II, April 1926
15 
e.g. Arnold Bennett, whose diaries record a mild interest in the activities of the League of Nations
but nothing more passionate
16 like John Masefield, Walford Davies and Kenneth Clark
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Roche and Pigniau record a similar withdrawing amongst French intellectuals who
also grew less interested in the idea of national promotion: in particular, those who
had been opposed to war "ne partagaient plus les valeurs du messianisme francais"17.
In France too, a mixture of cultivated politicians and establishment literati dominated
the Alliance Francaise. There is even a parallel in the revival of interest in
ethnography and folklore as a way of life which was passing (and which was annexed
by the Vichy regime for internal propaganda purposes)18.
Fussell's account of experiences during the war, reinforced by accounts such as that
of Williams (1972) 19 of public opinion in Britain, France and Germany, show that
national cultural attachments deepened as a result of the war (although only in Britain,
it appears, was internationalism widely regarded as unpatriotic by definition). There
was also revulsion against the use which had been made of culture as propaganda.
Some of the WWI propagandists, such as J. Wickham Steed, seem to have moved
towards federalism: the "New Europe Group" set up in 1929 attracted a mix of
Chatham House and Bloomsbury 20 , while in France the attraction of European
federalism was much stronger, appealing to both the groups of statesmen who backed
the ICIC and to the circles surrounding Emanuel Mounier and Jacques Maritain. It is
hardly possible, therefore, to argue either that public and intellectual opinion began to
reject cultural sentiment as a result of the war, or that it rejected feelings of a wider
cultural closeness. The two coexisted, possibly without much mutual reference in
most cases.
17 ibid., p.39
18 C. Faure, "Le Projet Culturel de Vichy, Folklore et Revolution National", Presses Universitaires de
Lyon, 1989
19 J. Williams, "The Home Fronts: Britain, France and Germany, 1914-1918", Constable, 1972
20 R. Mayne & J. Pinder, "Federal Union: the Pioneers", Macmillan, 1990
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As ever, perceptions differed: according to the Secretary General of the Alliance
Francaise in 1926, "l'Angleterre, l'Italie, l'Allemagne font partout des efforts pour
developer leur langue....la France est loin de depenser pour sa propagande les sommes
que consacrent a la leur les autres nations", an argument intended to extract more
funds from the French government 21 . However, by the 1930s, not only did France and
Germany have substantial investment to show in national projection overseas (though
admittedly, the UK did not have the complication of the Versailles settlement to deal
with), but the beginnings of the intense Franco-German cultural cooperation were
under way, starting with the Cercle du Sohlberg (groups of young intellectuals)22.
In Britain, the 1920 Tilley Committee had considered the cultural and educational
welfare of expatriates, but to little effect. In 1928, the Travel Association (in due
course the English Tourist Board) was formed out of the "Come to Britain"
movement, essentially a businessman's committee 23 , with the support of the
Department of Overseas Trade. It had a vague cultural interest - its members included
a representative of the Society of West End Theatres and, as had been the case with
the Alliance Francaise, diplomatic missions were urged to help by identifying local
organisations and provide facilities for propaganda films. It was followed in 1930 by
Evelyn Wrench's internationally-minded All People's Association (APA) which had
the backing of the great and good including the Archbishop of York, John Galsworthy
and John Buchan. Its structure was not unlike that of the Alliance Francaise, and
despite its optimistic internationalist aims, it remained overwhelmingly British-
21 
at the same time, the head of DAAD in Paris observed, "non sans amertume, l'habilite avec laquelle
la politique culturelle francaise fair servir sa propre buts par l'autres" (B. Pellissier, "L'Antenne
Parisienne du DAAD a travers les Archives de IAA de Bonn jusqu'a en 1939", p. 275, in Bock, op.cit)
22 
see R. Thalmann, "Du Cercle du Sohlberg au Comite France-Allemagne: une Evolution Ambigue de
la Cooperation Francais-Allemand". in Bock, op.cit
23 Taylor, 1981, op.cit
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dominated and struggled to get sufficient funds on a voluntary basis to expand. These
two formed the basis of the new British Council established in 1935, and the APA
ceased to exist the following year.
Disparaging reports of British showings had also been coming back from international
expositions, which appear in themselves to have been very influential as weapons of
cultural diplomacy, both as benchmarks for international comparison and propaganda
for domestic consumption. Lebovics (1992) describes the propagandist elements of
the Paris exhibition of 1931, designed to convince the French of their mission to the
colonies. Sir Stephen Tallents, an eccentric former diplomat credited by Taylor (1981)
with focusing much of the debate in British official circles, visited Barcelona in 1929
and found the (unofficial) British exhibit depressing, whereas the German pavilion,
designed by Mies van der Rohe, impressed with a sense of Germany as a modern
industrial power24.
1933-1939: the British Council and "national projection"
The British ambassador to Egypt, Sir Percy Loraine, whose 1933 despatch is credited
by historians of the British Council with providing the impetus for the British change
of heart25 , described French cultural diplomacy as "a rather unpleasant form of
propaganda for purely selfish national ends" 26 . A less prejudiced Foreign Office view
came from R.K. Johnstone (later employed by the British Council) who conceded in a
1936 memorandum about cultural projection in the Mediterranean that France was
successful in "the national propagandist's dream of intellectual domination" partly
24 ibid.,
25
see F. Donaldson, "The British Council: the First Fifty Years", Cape, 1984; also A. J. S. White, "The
British Council: the First 25 years", British Council, 1965
26 PRO FO 431/1
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because her tradition is "lucid and accessible", partly because of the French
conviction of "the power of culture in general and the superiority of their own in
particular", and partly because France had had a lot of practice. He concluded that
British interests were damaged by such activity, although the clincher was, once
again, its practice by Mussolini's Italy (considered to be overdoing it to the extent of
being counter-productive) and Nazi Germany ("more discreet and more thorough") 27.
The history of the British Council is well chronicled and will not be repeated here.
However, the Foreign Office papers covering this period reveal much about why
cultural diplomacy was starting to acquire priority for British diplomats and what sort
of action was considered a suitable response. Alongside the growing threat of fascist
regimes operating in spheres of British interest was the need, initially more pressing,
to counteract the negative image of a country in economic depression. To achieve this
it was deemed acceptable to allocate small sums for the purchase of books, to assist
with the expenses of lecturers (preferably touring) to anglo-foreign societies, and to
advise about suitable films "which would attractively depict British scenes" and
events of national importance such as Henley and the Derby28.
Responses from diplomatic posts also did much to determine the approach to be
adopted29 . There was solid consensus that a low-key operation which played on the
contrast with the opposition would be effective and welcome. Not only the Germans
and Italians (there was by now a heavily subsidised programme under Mussolini) but
27 PRO FO 431/2
28 ibid.
29 PRO FO 431/1. These ranged from Loraine's broadside from Egypt against the scandalous behaviour
of the French in attempting to get their language onto the same footing as English, to a suggestion from
a diplomat in Estonia with a wide-ranging conception of what constituted culture that, whilst the art
lectures from London were much appreciated, some Keep Fit classes would also be well received
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also the French are criticised for general pushiness and, in the latter case, excessive
Paris dirigisme. The report from Greece asserts that the British are respected for not
trying to stuff their culture down Greek throats.
The British Council, accordingly, was launched as something reassuring,
unthreatening, essentially ordinary, and the Britain it presented as a stable society
whose unassuming values deserved to be better known. Despite disclaimers that "we
should avoid the idea that it is directed against any other country or indeed that it is
competitive"30, the determinedly non-evangelical tone seems designed to draw
comparisons with the French as well as the Germans and Italians. Indeed, until the
outbreak of war, the British Council hardly attempted to articulate a policy or
philosophy at all. It did not produce an annual report until 1940 (partly to avoid giving
information to rivals, according to White), and its main publications, the "British Life
and Thought" series and "Britain Advances", also date from WWII. Its early effort
seems to have consisted of behind-the-scenes support for the three existing British
Institutes in Florence, Paris and Buenos Aires, establishing more where the support
was thought likely to be strongest (Portugal, Scandinavia and the Baltic States) and
encouraging the involvement of the travel and publishing trades.
Nazi cultural propaganda
The literature available in English on the cultural policy of Nazi Germany says little
e
about Hitler's external cultural relations policy, which was part of the Goebbels
culture/propaganda portfolio. Arnold 31 skirts the issue somewhat. Grosshans,
30 Rex Leeper, quoted in Taylor, op.cit., p. 144
31 Arnold, op.cit
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however, mentions the personal influence on Hitler of Dietrich Eckart, who
considered that "the European invitation to peoples of diverse characteristics and
different historical experiences to participate in European culture" 32 was a failure (so
was Germanism, in his view). Eckart died in 1923, but Hitler, in the opinion of
Grosshans, came to see Germany as the custodian of the "true Europe", and
cosmopolitan France as corrupt, racially impure and not fitted to represent a European
ideal. The Deutsche Schulverein changed its name again, from `Verein' to
`Volksbund', and, though remaining a private organisation, nevertheless squared
Nazism with its own established aims without too much trouble and was used as a
channel for disguised funding (to Sudeten Germans, at a time when Reich funding
was illegal)33 . McMurry & Lee describe how a number of organisations (including a
foreign division of the Hitler Youth) were briefed to promote a "community of
destiny for all Germans" 34, a centralised direction justified by the argument that such
bodies needed information in order to do justice to the regime's philosophy.
A 1993 colloquy35
 provides an invaluable collection of papers showing how Franco-
German initiatives of the pre-war period, mostly involving young intellectuals,
followed a similar pattern of increasingly strained relations as German attitudes
hardened and became more racist and propagandist, while the French partners either
split off in disgust or became increasingly apologist for the regime (the 1935 Franco-
German Committee which resulted from one such initiative is pithily summarised as
"somme tout, le Gotha de la future collaboration" 36). There was some reciprocity with
other fascist regimes - in the FO's trawl round its posts, Spain was reported as having
32 H. Grosshans, "Hitler and the Artists", p. 66. Holmes & Meier, 1983
33B ischoff, op. cit
34 McMurry and Lee, op. cit., p. 63
35 Bock, "Entre Locarno et Vichy", op.cit
36 Thalmann, p. 82, in Bock, op. cit.
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established links with the recently established DAAD, described as a "semi-official
body".
The British Council in its first annual report in 1940 summed up: "Nazi cultural
propaganda is the fanatical propagation of a gospel fanatically held, differing from
English (sic) cultural policy in that it is determined to overawe where it cannot
convert"37 . Pêlissier corroborates the view of Bischoff that the cultural propaganda
bodies had few problems adapting their mission to that of Nazism. She cites the
opinion of the director of the Paris branch of the DAAD that efficacy depended on
getting rid of the idea, "frequente outre-Rhin"38, of the superiority of France,
particularly as France is a centre of Jewish and Marxist counter-propaganda.
Germanism and Nazism were to be considered identical. In 1938, Germany followed
France in establishing cultural agreements (with, unsurprisingly, Italy and Japan).
There were attempts to retain at least an element of persuasion by cultural means.
Pelissier states that DAAD's French "antenne" had until 1938 tried to remain a
cultural centre open to all French, with the aim of proving how committed all non-
Jewish Germans were to the cause. Meanwhile, T.S. Eliot noted after the war how
what he considered to be the much more important task (compared to formal cultural
relations) of keeping channels of contact open between men of letters had become
impossible: first Italian contributors to "The Criterion" "became silent", then German
writers became "worse than silent...unintelligible" 39 . Eliot was not a great believer in
cultural diplomacy, but this experience had convinced him of the importance of non-
formal cultural cooperation at the intellectual level.
37 First Annual Report of the British Council, p. 18
38 Pelissier, p. 278, in Bock, op.cit
39 T. S. Eliot, "The Unity of European Culture", BBC broadcast, Berlin, 1946; also appears in "Notes
towards a Definition of Culture", p. 116. Reprinted Faber, 1983
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Evelyn Wrench, too, found things grew increasingly problematic for his All People's
Association as the 1930s progressed. Despite lengthy articles in the APA newsletter
on the "Kraft Durch Freude" programme and Wrench's own efforts at understanding -
"the first Englishman in these critical times tries to explain the German point of view
to his countrymen"4° - , moral and intellectual fissures were apparent by 1935, when
the Amsterdam branch of the APA failed to appreciate Dr Eugen Kuhnemann's talk
on "Deutsches Schicksal im Lichte des Geschichtes" - "a point of view which is
seldom fully understood abroad"41.
Cultural relations during WWII
Of the three countries under consideration here, only the UK was in a position to
develop anything during the wartime period which could contribute to a European
system after the war ended. German cultural propaganda was of a piece with the
internal cultural policies of the Reichskulturkammer 42 . By 1943 a Kulturabteilung in
the Auswartiges Amt under von Ribbentrop was operating alongside Goebbels. The
general account given by McMurry & Lee in 1947 remains the most useful on
external cultural policy after 1939: all available organisations were mobilised for
fund-raising and propaganda amongst allies and potential allies, with explicit roles
4° Newsletter no. 12, 1934
41 Newsletter no. 17, 1935. Other examples of post-WWI national responses to cultural diplomacy
included the Soviet VOKS (All-Union Society for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries) created
in 1925 with the express aim of winning sympathy abroad for the USSR through friendship groups
under the guise of "the triumph of genuine world culture" (see McMurry & Lee, op.cit) and the very
different non-governmental Swiss organisation Pro-Helvetia, created in 1939 specifically as a spiritual
defence against Nazism and which remains an important element in Swiss cultural policy-making today
42 see H. Grosshans, "Hitler and the Artists", Holmes & Meier, 1983; B. Taylor and W. van der Will,
(eds), "The Nazification of Art: Art, Design, Music, Architecture and Film in the Third Reich",
Winchester, 1990, etc. See also J. W. Baird, "The Mystical World of Nazi Propaganda", Minnesota
Press, 1974, for a discussion of the use of propaganda broadcasts aimed at denigrating French culture
as a "softening up" process preceding the invasion of France.
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vis-à-vis the population when the Germans invaded, e.g. Norway. The authors note
that the Nazis nevertheless continued to maintain they had no European or world
mission - the idea of Lebensraum remained substantially unchanged from that which
was propounded in WWI.
Although the apparatus of the external cultural policy of France passed to the Vichy
regime, its scope for independent operation was severely limited. Roche & Pigniau
note that the heads of the Service des Oeuvres and of AFAA were removed from their
posts, while all the institutes with the exception of those in Spain and Portugal were
closed. Villedieu (1950) notes that the Villa Mêdicis was left throughout the war in
the hands of an Italian caretaker. Vichy was debarred by the terms of its armistice
agreement from maintaining diplomatic relations with countries occupied by the
Germans, terms subsequently extended to the UK, USA and the whole of the
American continent except Argentina. Where it could operate, the Service des
Oeuvres was mainly used to promote the values of the "National Revolution".
The London branch of the Alliance Francaise severed relations with Vichy in 1940
and acted until 1942 as a backup service for de Gaulle's Free French, co-operating
closely with the British and maintaining a provisional management committee
rallying committees abroad and keeping the Alliance afloat until the liberation. In
1942 it moved with de Gaulle to Algiers, having established itself in Brueziere's
words as "le front intellectuel et culturel pour dêfendre la prestige de la France encore
intact"43 . Meanwhile, the separate Institut Francais was kept operating as a British
company under the chairmanship of the head of the FO's French Welfare Department,
43 Brue'ziere, op. cit., p. 130
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Lord Bessborouge.
The British Council, meanwhile, became, somewhat to its own surprise, the focal
point of European cultural relations in exile. From 1940 the Council worked closely
with CEMA45 , to which it channelled part of its grant to present concerts and
performances for Allied troops stationed in Britain. This operation was managed by
the Home Department, which also operated hostels and centres in provincial ports for
Allied seamen and in provincial towns for refugees. It was also responsible for the
lease on the London headquarters of the Alliance Frangaise which it also subsidised
from specially augmented appropriations. The Council formed the centre of a network
of cultural institutes keeping alive the culture and contacts of the Allied and occupied
countries: during the 1941/42 financial year, there opened an Institut Beige, a Czech
Institute, a Polish "hearth", a British-Norwegian Institute, a Turkish "Halkevi", with a
Greek Institute and a Netherlands Institute on the way and plans for a Yugoslav
House46.
The British Council and CEMA acted as complementary agencies throughout the war
44 PRO FO 370/756. These links gave rise to a curious discussion in 1943 about the future of French
culture after the war. Bessborough, Sir Henry Pelham, chairman of the British Institute in France and
Prof. W.J Entwhistle of the British Council agreed to ask the Foreign Secretary to put together a
national plan to assist the French nation in "their cultural reconstruction after the war". Their anxiety
was caused by the proliferation of private schemes for Franco-British organisations, many unfamiliar
with France, with the potential for causing a "disastrous imbroglio". The Foreign Office commented
that this was both naïve and unnecessary, believing that French culture, far from being ruined, "may
astonish us after the war". More pragmatically, Bessborough noted that "as rumour has it that Vansittart
has collected £100,000 to persuade us to hate the Germans, it may take a good deal more than...
£1 0,000... to persuade us all to like the French!". The scheme perished
45 Council for the Encouragement of Music and the Arts, the forerunner to the Arts Council of Great
Britain, set up in 1940 as a joint venture of the Pilgrim Trust and the Board of Education. In 1943, the
Treasury compared it favourably to the British Council in terms of self-sufficiency, thus preparing the
way for a post-war programme of state subsidy to the arts.
46 British Council, 2" d
 Annual Report, 1941-42
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period. The Public Record Office contains the minutes of CEMA meetings, as well as
CEMA's correspondence with the British Council. These show that the two bodies
mainly saw themselves as responsible for facilitating and managing the activity of a
similar range of clients at home and abroad respectively, rather than as formulators of
a strategic policy. They shared a certain cosiness of style, populist rather than
intellectual, pragmatic rather than visionary. Practical problems arose regularly when
one side made arrangements without consulting the other but the records show no
evidence of significant policy disagreements. The respective tasks of each body were
understood and largely unchallenged by the other47.
At the end of the war the British Council felt sufficiently confident about its role to
articulate a theory of cultural relations: "this work, conducted as one side of an
exchange, rather than the intentional projection, as it is called, of Britain and the
British way of life, is the core of popular relations, as it is the core of relations
between individuals"48 . In his foreword to the 1947 study by the Americans
McMurry and Lee, Archibald MacLeish, fervent internationalist, US delegate to
UNESCO and contributor of the "ringing phrases" to its constitution 49 , says much the
same thing more bluntly: "Foreign Offices are no longer offices to speak for one
people to another; the people can now speak for them themselves" 50 . The authors,
using the Council's own phrase "national interpretation" to describe the newly
47 see also Sir Stephen Tallents, whose 1932 pamphlet "The Projection of England" is credited by
Taylor (1981) with helping to change the climate of opinion on the use of cultural propaganda. Despite
his easily mocked ideas about the attractions of foxhunting and the House of Lords for foreigners,
Tallents is interesting because he looks beyond the narrow concept of cultural diplomacy towards "the
borderland which lies between government and private enterprise ...a school of national
projection.. .more free to make experiments than the ordinary government department dares to be",
(Tallents, p.45), a rare instance when the internal and external aspects of cultural policy are seen as
combined.
48 British Council, 5th Annual Report, 1944/5, p. 9
49 R. Hoggart, "An Idea and its Servants, UNESCO from within", p. 27. Chatto & Windus, 1978
80 foreword, p. x
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developed British approach, noted the contrast between the French emphasis on
intellectual life and high culture and its slightly folksy British counterpart51 , which
they thought had the effect of de-politicising diplomacy by distancing it from
government.
American diplomats generally were impressed by this British model. The State
Department had resisted any formal cultural diplomacy other than the (genuinely)
private. George N. Schuster regards the British Council as the most influential of the
European systems, albeit rather disingenuously describing it as "an organisation of
private citizens". For him, it "very greatly encouraged those who believed that an
effective cultural relations programme should be divorced from official
propaganda" 52. If the first distinctive characteristic of the Anglo-Saxon approach to
cultural relations was its normalising quality, noted by McMurry & Lee, the second,
and more significant, is precisely that well-marketed separateness. It is the external
mirror-image of the "arm's length principle" which is still regarded as the defining
characteristic of the UK arts policy system, and might even have influenced it.
The Foreign Office appears to have been more cautious than the British Council
(whose post-war existence, as it well knew, was by no means assured) about using the
UK's position of dominance at the end of the war to impose a British model of
cultural relations on the rest of Europe. However, there was nonetheless a sense
throughout official circles that something of a cultural lead would be looked for from
51 for example, the early British Council publications included the series "British Life and Thought"
which aimed to introduce the rest of the world to the merits of "The British System of Government"
("...the qualifications for becoming a Parliamentary candidate are not exacting...") and "British
Justice", which contains an example of a murder trial and a photograph of police moving on some very
orderly-looking demonstrators from Downing Street "where they had been causing a disturbance"
52 p. 5, in P. Braisted (ed.), "Cultural Affairs and Foreign Relations", Englewood Cliffs, New York
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Britain after the war.
One of the centrepieces of the British Council's wartime triumph was its role as
secretariat to the Conference of Allied Ministers of Education (CAME), which had
been its own initiative. In 1943 R. A. B. Butler, Minister of Education, was
persuaded to convene and chair a meeting of governments-in-exile for the purpose of
discussing the educational reconstruction of Europe after the war. Its initial aims were
to monitor, discuss and collect information about war damage, no more. However, it
formed the basis for an Anglo-American proposal for the post-war cultural
cooperation body that became UNESCO. This is evidence that the Council saw a
multilateral role for itself within cultural cooperation.
There seems, nevertheless, to be some lack of clarity in planning for a post-war role
for Britain in cultural relations. The report commissioned from Sir Findlater Stewart
is ambiguous about its European commitment, partly because of the sheer extent of
potential British commitments, which paralysed any action beyond the immediate
continuation of the Council on a "business much as usual" footing. Stewart describes
Europe as the main problem to be faced, yet devotes only one paragraph to it. He gets
no further in defining the content of such relations than the need to convey a sort of
generalised niceness, treated in order of symbolic importance53 . When, in due course,
the FO and the Council did consider policy on Europe 54, their approach to it was to
use it as a testing ground for new policy approaches (such as a move away from the
53 PRO FO 924/112. The report concludes that, for instance, the merits of queuing and of British
c4olicemen should be conveyed, while those of a particular "fried fish shop in Barking" need not be
PRO FO 924/535, 1946
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resource-intensive British Institutes)55.
Accordingly, the British were less well-prepared than they may have believed
themselves to be to take the initiative in post-war cultural cooperation, particularly as
the model of bilateral reciprocity they had pioneered, and which they expected to
become the cornerstone of any cooperation, proved not to be the only possibility. In
particular, the structures of Franco-German cooperation proved durable enough to
withstand the testing-to-destruction they endured during the 1930s and subsequently,
becoming the bedrock of European unity.
55 Europe was divided into three zones - "normal", "semi-normal" and "abnormal". The first consisted
of wartime allies, plus Spain, Portugal and Switzerland, where there was an established government, no
military occupation and conditions were relatively stable. The second was Italy and Germany, where
British forces were present but conditions were stabilising gradually. The third (which at that point




The League of Nations: the International Committee on Intellectual Cooperation
"...like a new Columbus, they seem to have seen before their eyes a world that only
needed to be grasped with wide enough arms and it would rejuvenate the tired efforts
of people who had worked hitherto in the isolation of their own cabbage patches..."1
(Sir Frank Heath on the first years of the ICIC, minutes of the British National
Committee, 1929)
WWII brought about a major change in attitudes to cultural relations. By 1948, all the
major structures of multilateral cultural cooperation were in place 2, suggesting a fairly
seamless transition from the wartime activity centred on the Allies and building on the
structures of bilateral cultural diplomacy culminating in the network of bilateral
cultural conventions. In fact, this was not the case.
To understand the post-war diversification into multilateral cultural cooperation, and
the extent to which it was a new direction, not a progressive development, it is
necessary to examine two pre-war themes: intellectual cooperation and European
federalism. This chapter looks primarily at the French-led initiative which brought
leading intellectuals of the day together under the auspices of the League of Nations3
as the International Committee on Intellectual Cooperation (ICIC). This lasted from
1922 until the outbreak of war. The committee, and France's role in shaping it, not
only created a template for the subsequent subject matter of cultural cooperation, but
also established a tradition whereby the function of cultural cooperation was to act as
a commentary upon the actions of governments rather than, as with bilateral cultural
diplomacy, a lubricant for achieving national objectives.
'PRO ED25/25
2 
apart from the European Community, which did not become established until the Treaty of Rome was
signed in 1957 and did not acquire an active role in cultural cooperation until the late 1970s
3 the forerunner of the United Nations set up under the Versailles settlement which was intended to act
as arbiter in all subsequent international conflicts, but which lacked binding authority
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The ICIC provided post-war cultural cooperation with its shape and its methodology.
However, it was not intended as an exclusively European exercise. In order to provide
as complete as possible a picture of the influences that brought about the particular
configuration of structures for cultural cooperation in 1948, the concluding section of
this chapter will look at a scheme, unrealised, for European unity which explicitly
foresaw a place for cultural cooperation in bringing this about. The Pan-Europa
movement never became more than a pressure group, but its founder, Count
Coudenhove-Kalergi, was influential and his ideas offer a counterpoint to the thinking
of both the ICIC and to their intellectual successors, the European federalists who
developed more fully a theory of culture in the context of European integration which
detached it from the individual interests of nation-states and relocated it within the
unification project. Although Pan-Europa and the ICIC appear to have had no contact,
the latter seems almost perfectly to embody the former's vision of a cadre of
intellectuals working on behalf of other intellectuals to bring a sense of international
mission into their day-to-day activity.
The International Committee on Intellectual Cooperation: its inception and aims
The membership of the International Committee on Intellectual Cooperation (ICIC)
could hardly have been more eminent: it included Henri Bergson, Albert Einstein,
Marie Curie, Paul Valery and a range of statesmen/men of letters such as Edouard
Herriot and Jules Destree 4. Though usually discussed as the precursor of UNESCO, a
more rounded picture emerges from other literature, including the detailed memoirs of
"respectively, a former Prime Minister of France and a government minister in Belgium
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two of its founder members 5 , and from its proceedings, which are available in full in
the Public Records Office, along with some original correspondence relating to the
work of its British National Committee6.
The most detailed account in English of its work appears to be that of Jan Kolasa7,
who has researched its origins thoroughly. Otherwise, accounts of its activities are
mainly perfunctory. Frank Ninkovich discusses it briefly from an American
perspective 8 in the context of the activity of American voluntary societies in the
1920's. J. A. Joyce regards the Committee ("a small League brains trust") 9 as one of
a number of attempts in the 1920s to win over public opinion to the League. Other
historians of the League l ° touch on it in passing, if at all. F. S. Northedge, a respected
international relations commentator of the realist school, notes that, if the League had
seemed quixotic, the ICIC "must have seemed a thing of pure fantasy", but also that
this "quiet seminar.., of great names in the learned world" did make a contribution to
international cooperation as a concept: "a symbol of the fact that, at the highest level
of mental achievement, the human race is one, not a chaos of conflicting parts".
Kolasa's account is particularly helpful on the origins of the ICIC, less so on its
5 J. Luchaire, "Confession d'un Fran cais Moyen", Leo S. Olschslci Editeur, Florence, 1965; and G. de
Reynold, "Mes Memoires", Editions Generales Geneve, 1963
6 PRO ED25/34 and 35
7 J. Kolasa, "International intellectual cooperation (the League experience and the beginnings of
UNESCO)", Travaux de la Societe des Sciences et des Lettres de Wroclaw, no. 81, 1962. Kolasa
himself refers to a 1950 thesis on the subject by A. L. Bennett, University of Illinois, not consulted for
the present thesis
8 F. A. Ninkovich, "The Diplomacy of Ideas: US Foreign Policy and Cultural Relations 1938-1950",
Cambridge University Press, 1981
9 J. A. Joyce, "A Broken Straw, the Story of the League of Nations 1919-39", p. 165. Swansea, C.
Davies, 1978
10 E. Bendiner, "A Time for Angels, the Tragi-comic History of the League of Nations", Weidenfeld &
Nicolson, 1975; N. Bhuinya, "The League of Nations, Failure of an Experiment in Internationalism",
Calcutta, Bagchi, 1980; F. S. Northedge, "The League of Nations, its Life and Times, 1920-1946",
Leicester, 1986; G. Scott, "The Rise and Fall of the League of Nations", Hutchinson, 1973
11 Northedge, op. cit, pp. 186-9
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programmes, as he concentrates on the less purely "cultural" aspects of its work12.
Accordingly, I have drawn most heavily on the ICIC's own documentation,
supplemented by memoirs, to enable me to concentrate on the most relevant areas of
work to cultural cooperation, especially the work of the Arts and Letters Sub-
Committee.
Most commentators attribute the idea for a "League of Minds", as the ICIC was
sometimes known, to Leon Bourgeois 13 . Bourgeois was certainly its proposer at the
League of Nations, of which he was president. However, the British classicist Gilbert
Murray, a founder member, gives the credit to his predecessor as chairman, and the
ICIC's first, the French philosopher Henri Bergson. 14 Curiously, few (English
language) accounts of Bergson and his work, which was highly influential in
intellectual circles at the turn of the century, mention his involvement with the ICIC
or suggest what influence he had on cultural cooperation. As this chapter hopes to
demonstrate, he in fact left a lasting legacy.
The ICIC existed for seventeen years in active form, although technically it survived
until 1946 when its assets and functions were formally made over to the United
Nations. From 1926 onward it was supported by the Paris-based International Institute
of Intellectual Cooperation under the directorship of, first, Julien Luchaire (an
Inspector-General of Schools), then Henri Bonnet (subsequently French ambassador
to the USA at the time of the creation of UNESCO). By 1937 it supported a
programme of such completeness that it was able to provide a substantial base for
i.e. its scientific, educational and international relations programmes
13 Luchaire and de Reynold both give this impression, which is echoed by Roche and Pigniau, op.cit.
The term "League of Minds" was used by Paul Valery in the first of the "Correspondences", open
letters by prominent intellectuals, which he edited in the 1930s
14 G. Murray, (ed. J. Smith & A. Toynbee), "An Unfinished Autobiography", Allen & Unwin, 1960.
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UNESCO.
The status of the ICIC was that of a technical/expert committee. It had no
representative function: its members were appointed ad personam by the League
Council l5 and were supposed to advise the League on its action, if any, in the field of
intellectual cooperation, a function which did not appear in the League's founding
Covenant and for which no budgetary provision was made until 1926, when the
Committee was provided with back-up in the form of a permanent Institute, housed
and subsidised by the French government. According to Kolasa, the French
Association for the League of Nations had urged the creation of a permanent
supporting organisation from the outset, and it seems that such a body was the real
political aim of the French government.
The Committee met annually for sessions of four or five working days each. Its task,
which it had to define for itself, was to act as a focal point for intellectuals on a global
basis, including picking up the threads of those organisations which had been
disrupted by the war, and to improve their function by the encouragement of new ones
or the completion of existing ones. There was nothing new about gatherings of
intellectuals — Kolasa notes that the Union of International Associations, which itself
acted as a kind of forerunner to the ICIC, had 230 members by 1914, and the ICIC
seems to have seen itself initially as taking over some of the work of this body. In so
far as intellectual cooperation was ever defined, it was this process of liaison and the
encouragement of new structures to facilitate contact 16 . The majority of the
and elsewhere
15 •	 ••in tact, the secretariat — see Luchaire, op.cit
16 
see PRO ED 25/34, ICIC first session, minutes — opening remarks of Dr Nitobe of the League
Secretariat state that the work "had not been strictly defined", but was intended "to facilitate intellectual
relations between peoples"
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committee's members were drawn, at first at least, from the science and university
research community.
As it settled down, the committee began to assume other aims for itself, such as the
fostering of international solidarity or advocating the interests of the intellectual
community. There was not always consensus about these; nor did the Committee
agree at first about the extent to which its work was supposed to obtain practical
results as opposed to indicating the right way ahead in world affairs. It was shaped,
therefore, by the enthusiasm of individual members. Like other such groups that came
after it, the ICIC started with a blank sheet of paper and figured out what it was meant
to be doing as it went along, as its minutes make clear17.
Structures and working methods
As an advisory committee the ICIC could not act independently of the League's
principal organs. It had to make recommendations at the end of each session for
onward transmission to the General Assembly. It would then have to wait until the
Assembly's reaction was transmitted back. If money was required to implement a
proposal, this would have to be expressly voted 18 . The Committee relied a great deal
on the physical presence of its members to direct and coordinate activity between
sessions. The sheer difficulty of getting to Geneva meant that despite its best
endeavours the Committee was dominated by Europeans and by European concerns (a
problem which bedevilled the League in general). This showed most clearly in the
composition of the work of the various sub-committees, which had to meet more often
17 the minutes are verbatim and comments attributed, giving a vivid picture of the way in which the
Committee reached its conclusions
18 which the Assembly was reluctant to do — according to Luchaire, it regarded intellectual cooperation
as "une fleur a sa boutonniere" (op. cit., Vol. 2, p. 94)
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and thus became composed mainly of those who could spare the time to travel.
The South Americans tried hardest to keep non-European concerns at the forefront of
the agenda, but the struggle was an unequal one and few topics of concern mainly to
non-European members ever got beyond the stage of initial discussion 19 . However,
the difficulty extended even to the Scandinavian and East European countries 20. Once
the Institute had been set up in Paris, with its demands for frequent attendance by a
Committee of Directors, the narrow geographical concentration of influence
worsened.
The ICIC also encountered difficulties making contact with the intellectual
associations who were supposed to be its raison d'être and persuading them to respond
if it succeeded (those who did become involved with it tended to be Paris or Brussels
based). The solution was thought to be a system of National Committees who would
act as its information-gatherers and disseminators, especially in liaising with
academies, intellectual workers' federations and learned societies. However, these
tended rapidly to become bored with being post-boxes and started to see themselves
as either lobby groups or generators of ideas, or both. By the 1930s they had their own
regular conferences; and by 1937, when the ICIC discontinued active work, they had
more or less displaced the ICIC as the main influence on the, by then largely
autonomous, Institute. The Institute itself encouraged "national delegates" and
"correspondents", which it accredited, who mainly lobbied for national projects but
were also able to secure national donations for work which interested their authorities.
19 those that did often reflected European aspirations, as, for example, the attempt of a Japanese
member to persuade the ICIC to promote the use of western script for official purposes in the Far East
20 the member from Norway, the scientist Kristine Bonnevoie, pointed out that it took her four days
each way to get to and from Geneva
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Despite the Committee's cherished and often-reiterated belief in itself as a group of
non-aligned individuals, it is evident that individual members sometimes spoke and
acted with the support of their national governments, and on occasion felt obliged to
press a governmental agenda 21 . This was most obviously the case with France, where
the politician Paul Painleve, who joined ICIC when Bergson stood down, was obliged
to admit that he was, in effect, under government instructions to resist the reforms of
the Institute which were being pressed for in 193022.
ICIC's non-political status became a polite fiction where the Institute was concerned.
The French offer to establish and fund it was made and the arrangements pushed
through the League Assembly by Bergson between two sessions of the Committee,
several of whom appear to have felt bounced, with some reason. Despite early claims
that it would be "a small international island" outside Paris and efforts made to attract
non-French nationals, French personnel tended to predominate amongst its staff.
Although the disinterestedness of both the French government and the Committee are
many times proclaimed throughout the minutes of the Committee, Roche and Pigniau
state frankly that the Institute was "tres liee au service des Oeuvres"23 , while
Luchaire, who claims credit for suggesting the Institute to the Minister of Education,
states that "une conversation suffit pour lui faire comprendre Pinter& qu'aurait la
France a prendre la téte des affaires internationales sur le plan intellectue1"24.
21 from 1932 onwards, the ICIC was obviously unlikely to be immune from the general political
disintegration of the League: Madariaga in his memoirs ("Morning Without Noon", Saxon House,
1973) notes how from 1932 onwards the meetings he attended as part of the Arts and Letters Sub-
Committee featured government placemen who forced him to sit through "fascist twaddle".
22 See ICIC, Twelfth Session (ED25/35)
23 Roche and Pigniau, op. cit., p.44
24 Luchaire, op.cit, vol. II, p. 95
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However, this was not confined to France. Jules Destree, a passionate advocate of
artists' rights, had domestic interests in mind as surely as international ones when
arguing for the general adoption of measures such as "droit de suite" and "droit de
respect" which had recently been introduced in France and Belgium. The members
from these countries in particular were fond of announcing to the Committee that its
"ideas" (generally formulated in working groups they themselves attended and
adopted subsequently by the committee in plenary) had been conveyed to their
national governments and subsequently implemented by them25.
In the case of Italy, the Mussolini regime actually sacked one ICIC member and
replaced him with another26 , which the ICIC seems to have accepted without protest27.
The regime's role in the creation of the Rome-based Cinematograph Institute is less
clear-cut. This became, by rather unclear means, officially linked to the Institute in
Paris, but was paid for and run by the Italian government. Oliver Bell, secretary to the
British National Committee and later the first director of the British Film Institute,
was sent to look at it in 1929, and confirmed this28 . Links were severed when Italy left
the League of Nations. According to de Reynold, however, Mussolini was persuaded
to set up the Cinematograph Institute in order to wrest it from the grip of Luchaire,
who wanted it as part of the Paris Institute.
Likewise the US, if less overtly, made efforts to push the Committee in a direction
which would accord more with US policy, particularly over reform of the Institute,
25 in fairness it should be noted that some East and Southern European countries with no obvious axe to
grind are also recorded as having taken up some of the Committee's recommendations and
implemented them nationally
26
see Kolasa, op.cit; also de Reynold, op.cit
27 
apart from Einstein, who walked out but was persuaded to return
28 he reported that "at the moment, the Institute is Mr de Feo. Everything is centralised in himself"
(minutes, British National Committee, 9 th December 1929, PRO ED25/25). De Feo had previously run
the Fascist propaganda film agency, LUCE.
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much criticised as a French bastion under Luchaire, and an inefficient one at that. The
US used budget appropriations as a bargaining counter, blocking these in the League
Assembly to make up for its geographical distance. As Ninkovich notes, after 1930
the US actively put pressure on the Committee to develop a role in promoting the
study of international relations in order to justify its continuing involvement, and
made sure that money was forthcoming from the Rockefeller Foundation to enable it
to do so.
The UK held back from any obvious direct involvement at the political leve1 29 , an
attitude about which Gilbert Murray, both as British member and as chairman, had
mixed feelings. Although his correspondence makes clear that the Foreign Office
made no attempt to influence his actions as a member one way or the other, it often
joined with the US in blocking appropriations at the General Assembly and declined
either to appoint a UK National Committee itself or to offer financial support when
one was set up under pressure from the UK's learned societies30 .
German involvement is hard to pinpoint, if any, due no doubt to the fact that the
German member was Albert Einstein, who consistently found his position difficult
and according to Kolasa insisted that he be regarded as representing not Germany but
German science. He was not a regular attender, a fact which de Reynold attributes to
29 though according to de Reynold, the Foreign Office took exception to the Indian intellectual Mr
Bannerjea when he turned out to have strongly anti-British views and tried to get him sacked
30 ironically, on the eve of WWII, Gilbert Murray believed he had persuaded the Foreign Secretary,
Lord Halifax, to change his mind. But by then it was too late (correspondence of the British National
Committee, ED25/12). The British National Committee (1926-1934) rubbed along on voluntary
donations to cover expenses (Lord Eustace Percy gave them £30 a year) and unpaid work by its
members, responding to requests for advice, about which it then frequently heard no more (minutes,
ED25/25)
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his discomfort as a German. In 1932 he quit, finding his position untenable31.
Luchaire, on a fund-raising trip for the Institute in 1926, records receiving a friendly
welcome and some financial assistance in Berlin. As for the Russians, de Reynold's
account suggests that neither of the two Russian members was exactly persona grata
with the regime: the first was tried as a Trotskysite and hanged; his successor was
Geneva-based and later joined the League secretariat.32
The ICIC's programmes 1922-1937
The ICIC's earliest preoccupation was with the situation of the intellectual
community, particularly those in distress, and ways in which the League might
"facilitate intellectual relations between peoples" 33 , with particular reference to
scientific relations. Its attempts were often misread as an attempt to impose a layer of
bureaucracy on networks that were functioning quite well without it34
 and it moved
instead towards a different role as a spokesman for the intellectual community,
beginning with an "enquiry into intellectual life", conducted by questionnaire, which
produced an interesting but useless pen-picture of the financial and social status of
intellectuals across much of Europe and beyond. The enquiry, which seems to have
made little impact on the governments to which its findings were addressed, set a
31 Einstein was not in any case impressed with the ICIC, calling it "the most ineffectual enterprise with
which I have been associated" (M. White & J. Gribbin, "Einstein - a Life in Science", p. 188, Simon &
Schuster, 1993) and as "too French, too Allied" (G. Holton & Y. Elhana, eds., "Albert Einstein:
Historical and Cultural Perspectives", p. 333, Princeton University Press, 1982)
32 it may have been this member who caused one of the ICIC's diplomatic problems with the Russians
over the choice of contemporary Russian authors suitable for translation — unsurprisingly, his selection
did not appeal to the Soviet delegation at the League who insisted, successfully, that the Ministry of
Culture should decide on the content
33 PRO ED 25/34, First Session, 1 May 1922, opening remarks
34 in some instances, the effects seem to have gone beyond the merely irritating: a letter to the UK's
League of Nations Union refers to ICIC's interference with pre-war international scientific
organisations as "disastrous", referring to "the wreckage accomplished in the name of the politically
imposed" (PRO ED 25/11)
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pattern for future European cultural cooperation in two important respects 35 : it created
expectations of action (notably teacher exchange) which could not be fulfilled
because of lack of resources; and it tilted the balance away from disinterested
coordination towards actively representing the interests of the intellectual
constituency.
Without a clear remit, the Committee could also get into new areas on a largely ad-
hoc basis, usually on the suggestion of a particular organisation or individual member
(for example, Destree on copyright, and a number of other topics which, until the
arrival of Paul Valery, steered the "cultural" output of the ICIC). The scope was not
limitless: it had already been decided by the Council of the League that education36
was too sensitive an area for a committee of non-governmental intellectuals to tackle:
it was thus restricted to university cooperation and a sideline on the contents of school
textbooks. It was "tacitly understood that any vexed questions should be avoided"37.
This meant the Committee's pronouncements on any subject had to be cautious,
uncontroversial and apolitical, which effectively drew any sting they might have and
made them easy for the Assembly to ignore.
Accordingly, the Committee's work began to diversify in an unstructured manner.
While some members, such as Marie Curie, consistently argued that it should stay
faithful to its original constituency, the scientific community, the tendency to colonise
new areas of work was irresistible to others, particularly Destree, who developed what
was, in effect, the blueprint for a cultural cooperation process.
35 it also resulted in an immediate and lasting focus on Europe, the "understood" area, at the expense of
the rest of the world
36 this did a great deal to alienate the non-European countries, who regarded education as the sphere
where the Committee could potentially exert most influence
37 Bergson, speaking at the ICIC's Second Session, 1923. PRO ED 25/34
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ICIC accordingly developed an "intellectual cooperation" which broadly consisted of
the revision of school history and geography textbooks to remove nationalistic bias38;
the US-backed effort in international relations, which duly became the Anglo-Saxon
world's answer to the French39 ; university cooperation, which was taken up by
governments and duly absorbed by the Council of Europe; scientific cooperation,
which lost its primacy as the composition of the committee changed; and "arts and
letters". In time, education itself replaced textbooks, alongside university matters, as
the fourth pillar of intellectual cooperation in the process of becoming "cultural"
cooperation. The fifth pillar, arts and letters, which was always more than that term
implies40, did involve both learned societies and universities, as the others did, but
quickly broke loose from this institutional base.
With arts and letters, the tendency was either to appeal to individuals directly, or to
form new groups amenable to the Committee's outlook. One reason for this seems to
have been the different north-south traditions at play - early attempts to make use of
the PEN Clubs to act as arbiters of taste in compiling lists of recommended
translations came to grief because the movement was mainly strong in anglophone
spheres of influence, whereas continental Europe and Latin America (in this area
European by extension) traditionally looked to academies and national associations.
Another reason, or perhaps a different version of the same one, was the unregulated,
weak and disorganised nature of much of this sector - the Committee found that where
it could deal with existing international organisations they were often based in the
38 
a consistent thread in cultural cooperation through to the Council of Europe and the work of the
Georg Eckart Institute it supports
39 it is interesting to note that international relations specialists agree on their discipline's strong Anglo-
Saxon bias, suggesting that a perhaps subconscious division of territory was happening as early as the
1920s
40 •including, for example, what became the International Museums Office, and subsequently ICOM
(International Council of Museums) under UNESCO
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small triangle of Paris, Brussels and Rome, and without influence, or even
acknowledgement, in London or Washington, let alone further afield. This left a
relatively empty space which it, and more particularly the Institute, could colonise.
The Arts and Letters Sub-Committee was a late addition to ICIC's portfolio. It roared
into high gear, however, by assembling committees of museum, library and cinema
experts within a year of being set up in 1926 and by 1937 seems to have been
regarded as having the highest profile of the ICIC's activities, presumably more on
account of its star cast than any concrete achievements. Its rise is certainly linked to
the creation of the Institute, which had a dedicated staff section in place even before
the sub-committee had been appointed. Its proposer, and first chairman, was Destree,
who continued to preside over the International Museums Office, but Paul Valery
soon succeeded him at the head of Arts and Letters. Under Valery's chairmanship, it
rapidly assumed a strong, almost independent identity, towards the end attracting
members of the eminence of Bela Bart& and Thomas Mann.
Lack of clarity about boundaries meant activities with a cultural angle to them were
often contentious. Early work on operational definitions for an international
bibliographical standard in the field of scientific periodicals became first broadened,
then steered back to science again by Madame Curie; while the status of intellectual
workers was the subject of a long-drawn-out institutional struggle between the Paris
Institute and the IL041 , which interestingly prefigures a much later theme of the
European Commission42. The core of the disagreement was about whether intellectual
workers were a potentially vast white-collar employment cadre or whether, as
41 International Labour Organisation: generally agreed to have been the League's one big success story
42 see Chapter Ten, on "cultural workers"
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Luchaire believed, their importance was as upholders of spiritual values: "notre
institution put renforcer un immense mouvement des ames, pareil aux grands aans
religieux du moyen-age, mais s'etendant a toute la terre. C'etait une belle chimere."43
In other areas, the Committee attempted, with varying success, to develop new
instruments by testing governments' reactions and then convening expert groups to
formulate proposals. Success would be measured by whether a diplomatic conference
was then convened and a multilateral convention developed. In the case of
archaeology ICIC was cautious, seeing a need for international regulation but (rightly
as it turned out) reserved about the chances of succeeding unless the countries most at
risk could be brought to see the benefits of cooperation. It had more success in tfie
field of intellectual property where two initiatives were pursued in parallel, one
related to the protection of scientific inventions, the other to that of authors' rights.
Although some valuable work seems to have been done on formulating proposals for
both, it had to be transferred to the existing remit of the Berne Convention secretariat
to make an impact. The Destree group in particular shifted significantly from
coordinating the mutual cooperation of intellectual workers towards advocating their
interests, although Destree never succeeded in getting his proposals on "droit de
suite"44 universally accepted. Nevertheless, their gradual gain in popularity in
continental Europe and consistent reappearance on international agendas suggests that
the ICIC could exercise a moral clout with governments when it acted as advocate for
intellectuals, even when intellectuals themselves stayed aloof from it.
ICIC interest in the audiovisual sector was largely politically inspired, with various
43 Luchaire, op.cit., p. 157
44 the payment of a royalty on each sale of a work of art to its author or his estate
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committee members and Luchaire vying to secure the lead role for a League-
sponsored European film cooperation organisation on behalf of a national initiative.
The Committee tried to keep clear of the issue, initially refusing its patronage and,
when obliged to do a deal with the Italians, taking only a reluctant interest in the
Cinematograph Institute45 . The justification for activity in this area was the
distribution of educational films rather than developing a policy on film as an art-form
or concern for regulation of a growing sector. However, later attempts to achieve
cooperation in this sector focused on the effects of debased content on the moral fibre
of the audience and worrying about the unfavourable depiction of foreigners 46 . Not
until the last years of its active life did the ICIC begin to consider the state of the film
industry itself.
The Arts and Letters Sub-Committee did not so much tidy up this situation as allow
the ICIC to diversify into new areas including museums cooperation, popular arts,
theatre, music and translation. Of these, the immediate success story was museum
cooperation. The speed with which an International Museums Office (IMO) was set
up inside the Institute and the absence of much debate about it in the Committee's
minutes suggests that this was probably an initiative of the Institute itself which the
Committee found uncontroversial. The records certainly give the impression of a full
and valued programme of work. A periodical, "Mouseion", was launched and by 1929
had 250 subscribers. The Office prepared and promoted agreements on exhibitions of
engravings, established relationships between cast workshops in Europe and set up a
45 this seems to have had a lot to do with Luchaire, whose diverting account of it in his memoirs
includes the fury of one of the Lumiere brothers, despatched to meetings with a brief to insist on the
dignity and grandeur of the new art form, only to find himself expected to discuss import tax on
educational films
46 
at one point, to the horror of the Committee's scientists, a League of Nations taste committee seemed
to be on the cards
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travelling exhibition of sculpture casts. It saw a role for itself as a clearing-house for
requests for information and documentation, as well as the possible standardisation of
museum catalogues, and was successful enough to begin pressing for its own separate
budget and status.
Like the later Council of Europe art exhibitions, the EVIO also had the benefit of a
high-powered bureau, consisting of the directors of the major European collections,
including the Louvre, the Rijksmuseum and the Victoria & Albert Museum. This gave
the work a kind of professional and technical credibility which seems to have been
hard to replicate elsewhere; thus, museums cooperation seems to have had a high
degree of autonomy. Like no other area of the ICIC's work it had visible public
approbation. The UK "Museums Journal", it was reported proudly, had praised its
work. As Murray noted when pointing to its "remarkable record of success", the IMO
had seen a gap and filled it. While its range as a practical provider of exhibition
material was obviously limited (its touring exhibitions were seen in such contrasting
locations as Liege, Rouen and Cologne), the ICIC's Euro-centricity was perhaps less
of a disadvantage in the European-dominated field of museums than elsewhere.
Less successfully, the ICIC took "folklore" into its programme as a result of
arrangements made bilaterally by the Institute with the organisers of an independent
congress held in Prague 47 , rather than out of any clear sense of mission towards
"popular art". In due course this work became absorbed into wider-ranging activity
into which Madariaga, who succeeded Destree as chairman, steered the IMO with the
setting up of a central desk for art history and archaeological institutes, a monuments
47 this was one of the incidents for which Luchaire was strongly criticised: in this case, for having
detached a member of his staff to act as secretary to the congress without consulting the committee
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committee and a renewed interest in the traffic in and protection of what was not, at
the time, called heritage or cultural property.
Other sub-groups either became marginalised (music) or never got started (theatre).
Ideas for a convention about music and for coordinating music conservatoires made
little progress, although tentative plans for an International Music Centre seemed to
be under consideration for 1939. The "Letters" part of the Sub-Committee achieved
some low-profile work in library cooperation but was mainly involved in the
compilation of a widely-used "Index Translationum"48 , published quarterly and listing
the appearance of noteworthy works in translation in different countries. It also
oversaw the publication of various books about life and culture in different countries,
usually explicitly linked to the initiative of particular countries with an interest in
getting such material published ( such as the lbero-American collection 49) or even, as
in the case of a book about Japan mentioned in the IIIC's annual report, written by a
Committee member.
The most frequently mentioned aspect of the Arts and Letters Sub-Committee's work,
however, is the series of high-profile colloquies and debates it organised from 1932 to
1933 under the titles "Entretiens" and "Correspondances". At least one of the latter, a
sequence of "open letters" between Einstein and Sigmund Freud, entitled "Why
War?", became quite famous50. These were, essentially, designed by Paul Valery. who
consciously moved the ICIC's work in a new, less technical direction, more concerned
with "pure" intellect. It is really this part of the ICIC which corresponds to Valery s
48 taken over by UNESCO
49
a series of Latin American works in translation (mainly into French) published commercially but
overseen by the ICIC
50
see W. C. Olsen and A. J. R. Groom, "International Relations Then and Now: Origins and Trends in
Interpretation", Routledge, 1992. Others in the series included Valery's own compilation. -A League of
Minds", and a dialogue on "East/West" by Gilbert Murray and Rabindranath Tag.ore
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own notion of a "League of Minds": a recognition that, until that point, intellectual
cooperation had fatally failed to appeal to intellectuals: "the intellectual... .does not
need it (intellectual cooperation); it has not entered into his habit of thought. To create
this need and to make it habitual should be our principal task"51.
To Gonzague de Reynold, the task of these "Entretiens", themed conferences
("ideospheres") where intellectuals debated chosen themes, was to "export"
intellectual cooperation into Europe. In his view, the Arts and Letters Sub-Committee
under Valery had begun to eclipse the ICIC as a whole in terms of public profile. The
subjects varied from a celebration of Goethe to the relationship of art and the state,
and the future of the European spirit. Some of the conferences generated proposals for
the ICIC as a whole to take forward 52 ; most (apart from one which took place in
Buenos Aires) were emphatically European in their focus, and may have been one
reason why, after the war, the non-European countries were so highly critical of the
ICIC and disinclined to reconstitute it wholesale as the UN agency for culture.
Not everyone agreed with de Reynold. The British National Committee took little
interest in the "entretiens". Its minutes 53 suggest much greater interest in reform of
working methods, international relations and, towards the end of ICIC's career,
support for the proposals of the American sociologist James Shotwell to launch an
enquiry into the impact of industrialisation and involvement in Moral Disarmament (a
particular cause of Gilbert Murray's). They felt this showed an evolution from "the
narrower conceptions of the past" towards "a world view in which the legitimate
51 PRO ED 25/35, memorandum by Paul Valery to the ICIC considered at its 12 th session, July 1930
52 
such as an enquiry into book acquisition, proposed at the 1937 Paris "entretien" on "The future
destiny of letters" (IIIC, Report, 1939)
53 which include the first recorded instance to my knowledge of that favourite Council of Europe
image: "a nursery of ideas", c. 1929 and used of the Institute
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interests of each nation shall find full expression"54.
The development of intellectual cooperation under ICIC: Bergsonism and world peace
The British involved in the ICIC, at any rate, therefore felt most at ease with it when it
seemed to be acting as a conduit of intellectual opinion into the conduct of world
affairs. As one definition had it, "the object of intellectual cooperation is intellectual
collaboration... .Its purpose is to create an atmosphere favourable to the pacific
solution of international problems." 55 This was far from being the only possible
approach, however, and the vagueness of the Committee's remit ensured that many
variants could be tried out. One was the Curie view, centred almost exclusively on the
scientific community and its interests: in this view, the ICIC acted as a sponsor for the
interests of intellectuals. Another was the Destree 56 view, in which the intellectual as
artist took centre stage, and efforts were directed not simply towards intercession with
governments on their behalf, but towards the harmonisation of national legislation in
their favour.
The defining influence of the ICIC, however, was that of Henri Bergson, its chairman
until 1926 when ill health forced his retirement. The literature of "Bergsonism" says
little about his involvement with international cooperation but the debate his ideas
stirred up in pre-WWI Europe illuminates the way in which the ICIC moved away
from simple facilitation of contacts and towards a very specifically European idea of
asserting culture and spiritual values in a formal international context. Bergson's ideas
54 minutes, 7 th June 1932, PRO ED 25/25
55 memorandum on the organisation of the work of intellectual cooperation from the point of view of
moral disarmament (probably authored by Gilbert Murray), in papers of 12 th meeting of British
National Committee, 15 April 1932, PRO ED 25/25
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help to explain the presence in post-WWII continental Europe of an already
established "acquis" 57 of cultural cooperation which exists independently of the
interaction of governmental interests. (Deering 58 attributes this acquis entirely to de
Rougemont, who certainly developed it, but not from nothing).
Bergson was already involved with the League of Nations 59 when he took on the
ICIC. There is no evidence in the ICIC's minutes that Bergson attempted to impose a
vision of his own upon the members — he was rather a good chairman - but his
addresses to the committee set the tone for a high-minded sense of spiritual mission
which goes well beyond the technical aspects of cooperation. Indeed, intellectual
cooperation as a concept hardly suited the philosophy known as Bergsonism, which
turns on the idea that human life cannot and should not be seen in terms of the
operation of the intellect alone. Seen in their time as subverting the classical French,
indeed the European, tradition, Bergson's works emphasise intuition, "creative
evolution" (the title of his best-known work), the "élan vital", accompanied by
theories of non-linear time, to try to account for the spiritual dimension in a post-
Darwinian, and post-Nietzschian, world60 . Amongst the accusations levelled at him
was that he opened the doors to fashions both for occultism and right-wing
extremism.
Destree's track record as Minister for Fine Arts in Belgium had included the setting up of a Belgian
Literary Academy. Pain!eve described him as a mouthpiece for writers and thinkers (R. Dupierreux,
"Jules Destree", Editions Labor, Brussels, 1938)
57 the term "acquis communautaire" is used in both French and English to describe the body of
accumulated action of which the European Community consists
M-J. Deering, "Denis de Rougemont, l'Europeen", Fondation Jean Monnet, Lausanne, 1991
59 he represented the French government in an attempt to persuade President Wilson to commit the
USA to the war, as a result of which he came to know Wilson's adviser, Colonel House, and to discuss
the embryonic League with him (R. C. Grogin, "The Bergsonian Controversy in France, 1900-1914",
University of Calgary Press, 1988)
60
as well as Grogin, op. cit, see, inter alia, M. Antliff, "Inventing Bergson: Cultural Politics and the
Parisian Avant-Garde", Princeton University Press, 1993; A. E. Pilkington, "Bergson and his
Influence", Cambridge University Press, 1976; E. Kennedy, "Freedom and the Open Society: Henri
Bergson 's contribution to political philosophy", Garland Publishing, 1987
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Grogin61 identifies the central question of Bergsonism as "what ensures the
preservation of our humanity in the midst of mechanical societies?". This question
recurs so frequently in cultural cooperation that it might be said to be its central
theme. Undoubtedly it preoccupied the French federalist-personalists who
acknowledged a debt to Bergson and who later promoted culture as a central theme of
European integration 62 . Yet he initially took on the propagation of strictly intellectual
cooperation in a form which gave primacy to contact between scientists — possibly as
a way of answering those who had criticised him, earlier in life, for attacking pure
intellect. Nevertheless, the extent to which ICIC moved away from this simple vision
of its task must have been due in part to Bergson 63 . At least two of his former
students, Julien Luchaire and the art critic Henri Focillon, who later worked closely
with Valery on the "Correspondences" and "Entretiens" events, were key players in
ICIC.
According to Pilkington (1976), Valêry professed himself puzzled when accused of
Bergsonism, but the author himself considers Valery's celebrated poem "Le Cimetiere
Mann" to be influenced by Bergson and his concerns. It is Valery, not Bergson, who
is sometimes regarded as the "father of cultural cooperation" 64 and it seems to be the
case that Valery went considerably further than Bergson in elevating the "pure"
creative element into "the highest and most complete form of human activity"65.
Val6ry appears to have distrusted Bergson's interest in the spiritual as akin to
mysticism, a search for an unnecessary God. Yet it was Valery who famously
61 op.cit., p. 30
62 There does not seem to be evidence that Bergson himself was interested in European unification
63 and a possible reason why, as both Luchaire and de Reynold attest, he did not get on with Einstein
64 and who is cited by Walter Benjamin at the beginning of the preface to "The Work of Art in the Age
of Mechanical Reproduction" with reference to the impact of change upon art
65 Pilkington, op.cit., p. 145
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pronounced a eulogy on Bergson to the Academie Francaise on his death in 1941 in
which he credits him with having rescued metaphysics: "il osa emprunter a la poesie
ses armes enchantees, dont il combina le pouvoir avec la precision dont un esprit
nourri aux sciences exactes ne peut souffrir de s'ecarter"66 . And it was clearly Bergson
who, from the outset, broadened the notion of intellectual cooperation to ensure that
its remit included the creative, as reconciling rationalism and faith (it may have been
this breadth of vision, too, that kept the scientists and what de Reynold liked to call
the "international company of clouds", as well as Catholic activists like himself, more
or less happily engaged in the same committee without major upsets for four years).
Bergson began immediately to redefine the ICIC's mission in transcendent terms,
speaking at the conclusion of its first session of its "moral aim, namely, the realisation
of a greater ideal of fraternity, solidarity and agreement between mankind"67 , which
he believed the League hoped "could be more readily realised in high intellectual
circles" from whence it could "descend progressively amongst the nations". Valery
elaborated this eight years later as "a belief in humanity and a certain faith in man's
intelligence" 68 ; and throughout ICIC's existence one finds the idea of intellectuals
being brought together to create a kind of rarefied space which would be conducive to
the finding of solutions to the problem of war.
Madariaga took this further, and hoped ICIC might set "its hand to a glorious task if it
sought to organise the synthesis of human knowledge". He felt that it had never
fulfilled its potential: it remained "haphazard 	 like the work of a bee gathering
66 P. Valery, "Henri Bergson — allocution prononcee a la séance de l'Academie, 9 janvier 1941".
Domat Montchretien, (?) 1945
67 PRO ED 25/34, First Session, May 1922
68 PRO ED 25/35, memorandum debated at Twelfth Session, July 1930
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pollen"69 . Murray commented that he had trouble defending the ICIC's work within
his own country since so little that was concrete ever came of it 79, while de Reynold
argued that the Institute under Luchaire had become a vast bureaucracy generating
mostly paper, the ICIC itself becoming "a sort of constitutional monarch" 71 . These are
criticisms of a sort that are still levelled half a century later at UNESCO and the
Council of Europe.
By 1930, when it undertook the major inquiry that displaced Luchaire in favour of
Bonnet, the ICIC had a record of achievement which had some substance but was
inchoate, as Madariaga noted; the eclecticism of the remit combined with the free
hand given to different committee members to take areas of work in the directions
they favoured had led to a wide range of issues being tackled but a low hit rate and
little thought being given to the impact, if any, on public opinion72 . As Valery pointed
out, the committee was responding to unmade demands73 . At the same time, other
members asserted that the committee's achievement was in its redefinition of
intellectual cooperation: "the real definition consisted in freeing culture, which up to
the present had been eminently individual and national, from any element of
egotistical nationalism"74.
By the time the ICIC wound down eight years later, however, it was clear that, despite
the improvements in the work of the Institute, the fundamental inconsistencies of
intellectual cooperation had not been sorted out. In one sense, the charge that it lacked
concrete achievement could not be sustained: the Institute could supply a list of
69 S. de Madariaga, "Morning Without Noon", p. 411, Saxon House, 1973
7° ICIC, Ninth Session, 1927 (ED25/35); this became less true after the reform of the Institute
71 PRO ED 25/35, Ninth Session, 20 July 1926
72 though references to "diatribes in the Press" suggest they did not entirely escape the public attention
73 see memorandum, Twelfth Session, 1930 (ibid.)
74 ibid.
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publications, surveys and conferences, plus the work of at least one respected centre
(the International Museums Office); it had a good track record with regard to
educational associations 75 ; and it could always claim that with a decent budget it
could have done much more. At the same time, its claim to provide an intellectual
contribution to the process of world peace was hardly sustainable. The work (certainly
the "cultural" work) had had insufficient impact 76
 either at the public or at the
opinion-forming level and the structures it had built up were largely ignored as
countries developed their own cultural cooperation at bilateral leve177.
Furthermore, the balancing act which Bergson had established between the moral and
the purely utilitarian seems to have faltered, so that the committee's work shows a
kind of dichotomy between the type of activity the British National Committee liked
on the one hand; and on the other the Arts and Letters Sub-Committee, regarded by
Murray amongst others as a process centred on the intellectual world itself and
increasingly devoted to the theory and practice of its own intellectual and cultural
values in the modern world, to the virtual exclusion of science — a triumph of
Bergsonism.
As early as 1930, France had been considering how to embed this field of
international relations in which it had established a dominance more firmly within the
developing system of international cooperation. Accordingly it built on the evidence
of growing cultural diplomacy amongst countries to create momentum for an
75 in 1930, the UK Ministry of Education thought it was "just beginning to be useful", although they
also thought the French should drop the pretence and take it over as a national institution (ED25/11)
76 even in 1943, Gwilym Davies was writing of it as a largely forgotten episode in League of Nations
history (G. Davies, op. cit)
77 ibid; and see also the minutes of the British National Committee concerning the establishment of the
"British Council of Foreign Relations", about which they considered writing a letter of protest to "The
Times"
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International Act on Cultural Cooperation, under which intellectual cooperation
would be entrusted to a new Intellectual Cooperation Organisation combining the
Institute and the National Committees but omitting the ICIC itself. By 1937 it had
gained enough support to call a diplomatic conference, although without the
participation of Germany, Italy and the USSR and with the US, UK and Japan present
as observers only. The document was subsequently signed by the requisite number of
countries78 and after the war, France launched an initiative to have the main elements
of the Act taken into the new UN agency. The resulting compromise between the
French and US/UK approaches (the latter derived from the wartime experience of
CAME) became UNESCO.
Conclusion
In his assessment of the ICIC, Kolasa considers that they fixed the ascendancy of the
"aristocratic internationale" bound by "family ties,.. .common education, common
cultural values" and a common lifestyle which found it natural to transcend national
boundaries and based its attempted "intellectual reunification of the world" on an
exclusion of the masses in favour of the "higher interests of man" 79 . He concludes that
in doing this they were acting not only as counter-revolutionaries but were even
"preparing the intellectual version of the ancient religious crusades" 8° on behalf of
European culture. This is excessive, suggesting a level of planning and premeditation
hardly borne out by the records, but Kolasa is right to draw attention, firstly, to the
ICIC's disregard for non-European ideas and interests and, secondly, to its
78 mostly from continental Europe (including the Baltic States and Turkey) and Latin America, but also
China, Iraq, Iran, Siam and South Africa
79 Kolasa, op. cit., p. 52
80 ibid., p. 63
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"scandalous toleration" 81 of Nazism up to the outbreak of war.
It did not entirely overlook the latter: in the Institute's report for 1938 it records
concern for shielding values against "the threats of disorder". Gilbert Murray is more
explicit in a 1933 letter: "I don't say Germany has gone mad-dog, but supposing she
has the duty of protecting civilization becomes paramount." 82 Even so, the ICIC's
response - a debate over whether to accept the resignation of Professor Krliss, director
of the National Library of Germany - suggests that its idea of "protecting civilization"
involved above all preserving the unity of the intellectual community. At no point in
its minutes is there any statement of abhorrence, which is consistent with the ICIC's
view of itself as above, or untainted by, politics. In this way the ICIC effectively
surrendered any claim it may have had to moral leadership.
In fact, it had not succeeded in establishing multilateral intellectual cooperation as the
legitimising element of international relations, nor had it affected the growing
tendency of individual countries to create cultural relations structures at the national
level. Post-war attempts to preserve the paradigm of the ICIC had more to do with
French interest in protecting its sphere of influence in an Anglo-American world than
with the wish to retain the services of the League of Minds. What the ICIC did, with
its Bergsonesque breadth of definition, was to delineate a certain area which went
well beyond the facilitation of large-scale networking amongst scientists. It
established and colonised the territory of cultural cooperation as presently perceived,
comprising intellectual property, the media (books, films and broadcasting), the
heritage (including museums), and an additional category, which has no obviously
81 ibid., p. 61
82 letter to Sir Frank Heath, 27 th November 1933, PRO ED 25/12
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exact name but which may be described as the operation of culture in society. By the
end of its life-span its materiel was human values.
It also set up a confusion about means and ends. At various times it was concerned to
act as an advocate for its special interest group and press for favourable legislative
action through international conventions; to uphold the social and political authority
of intellectuals (including artists and thinkers); and to use the mechanisms of
international cooperation to supply services for the intellectual community. At the
same time it had no sense of a mission to reach a popular audience directly; nor did it
question its right to attempt to "lead" society 83 while disengaging itself from the
political crises of the day. Its claims to disinterestedness while clearly, in some
instances, driven by political interest, and the imbalance between those who were
there to advise and those who had the energy and resources to push through a specific
programme opened a gap between appearance and reality which remains present in
cultural cooperation, not uniquely (almost certainly other areas of international
cooperation are prone to this) but to the extent that it can sometimes seem the
dominant characteristic.
A telling comment appears in the minutes of a 1926 session: "it was not the duty of
the Committee... and the Institute to obtain any concrete results, at least not for the
moment. It was not for them to produce works of science or art but to bring the
savants and artists of the different nations in touch with each other..."". The
confusion about "results" persists in a strain running through cultural cooperation
which insists on the right of intellectual cooperation not to be judged by normal
83 quite the reverse - on its list of "things to do after the war" was an enquiry into the formation of
Rublic taste.
"PRO ED 25/35. Seventh Session, 18 January 1926
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administrative criteria. Yet the self-imposed requirement for the ICIC to act rather
than opine — the League never required it to devise a programme — created the
situation in which a mechanism becomes needed to achieve for the Committee the
sort of influence it craves; which then emancipates itself from its managers and first
marginalises, then eliminates them.
If, as seems likely, the real aim behind the ICIC was the creation of a funded body
(the Institute) rather than a co-ordinating group of apolitical advisers, as Luchaire
suggests, then this outcome is hardly surprising. The experiment of intellectuals
acting within a political structure, yet not being of it, was in these terms a failure.
Much of the work of the ICIC was in fact the result of French national policy interest,
made more complex by backstage manipulation from other countries, less overt but
undoubtedly present. This raises the question of whether it could have succeeded if
the system had in fact been allowed to proceed entirely free of governmental
interference. The probability is that it could not unless it had been content to act
entirely in the capacity of a debating chamber. Furthermore, the activity of the
Institute prefigures the role of a strong secretariat in a field where the lines are not
clearly marked out in advance.
In broader ideological terms, however, the ICIC "style" in cultural cooperation owed
much to individuals. It was Bergson who ensured that intellectual cooperation would
evolve away from scientific dialogue and commentary into cultural cooperation, a
form with no clear boundaries. As chairman, he could have insisted on clear and
narrow definitions. Instead he ensured its complexity as a series of cooperation sub-
systems mixing vanity projects for the appeasement of artistic and intellectual peer-
groups; political projects, legislative or prescriptive in intent, requiring a conjunction
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with one or more set of national government interests to enable it make progress; and,
now and then, problem-solving initiatives, usually exchange or information-based,
and relatively free of complex political or intellectual principles which might be
politically contested.
Valery's "Entretiens", embodiment of the idea that the interaction of minds on an
abstract topic will have a trickle-down effect into public and political consciousness,
have successors in the one-off cultural conferences which are hosted by particular
countries with institutional support and used to advance or block particular trends in
cooperation. In that sense, Valery is rightly seen as a pioneer, not simply of cultural
cooperation, but of the idea that cultural policy can and should be managed by
intellectuals away from the level of national interest and in the interest of Europe.
Certainly one finds in Valery the sense of cultural cooperation as a kind of intellectual
resistance to cultural diplomacy which later appears in the Council of Europe: "the
competition for concessions or loans, for the purpose of sending out machines or
experts, of establishing schools and arsenals — a competition that is nothing but the
export far and wide of Western dissensions — that is inevitably bringing about
Europe's return to that secondary rank to which she is destined by her size, a rank
from which the labours and internal exchanges of her intellects had lifted her"85.
Finally, Jules Destree, first in a line of committed Francophone Belgian cultural
cooperation specialists, should be credited with the invention of cultural cooperation
as the advocacy of artists' needs and particularity. His 1930 observations on the role
of ICIC stand as a blueprint of this strand of argument, in which he rejects the
narrowness of scientific cooperation and asserts the difference between artists and
85 Valery, Collected Works, Foreword to Volume 10, p. 18. Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1962
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"ordinary" workers (their deferred recognition, for instance) which makes it the duty
of the ICIC to see to it that governments impose measures which make up for the
perceived imbalance between the rights of artists and the generality of the workforce.
In these three individuals can be seen the paradigm of the future "cultural
cooperation" of European institutions as a critique, albeit an imperfect one, of the
processes of public policy.
Pre-WWII European unity: Pan-Europa
If the ICIC set out the ground rules of future European cultural cooperation, others
provided its rationale within a European political context. Count Richard
Coudenhove-Kalergi, founder of Pan-Europa, was born in 1894 into an Austro-
Hungarian diplomatic family with an exotic and aristocratic pedigree: he claimed
descent from Charlemagne and could relate the experience of much European history
directly to the fortunes of his own ancestors. Like many who regarded the disaster of
WWI as a demonstration of the unfitness to the old order (and "old diplomacy" — see
Claude (1965) for a discussion of "open diplomacy II 8 6) to decide the fate of the many
as opposed to the few, Coudenhove-Kalergi urged a federation of European nations.
Sources for Pan-Europa are its manifesto", published in 1923, Coudenhove-Kalergi's
wartime appeal for European unity published in 1940 at the time when Churchill's
ideas for UK-French union seemed a real possibility 88 , and his memoirs 89 , published
in 1953, when the establishment of the Council of Europe and the beginnings of the
86 I. L. Claude, "The Impact of Public Opinion upon Foreign Policy and Diplomacy", Mouton & Co.,
The Hague, 1965
87 R. Coudenhove-Kalergi, "Pan-Europe," Knopf, 1926
88 R. Coudenhove-Kalergi, "Europe Must Unite", PanEuropea Editions, 1940
89 modestly entitled "An Idea Conquers the World", Hutchinson, 1953
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European Community seemed to have fulfilled his aims. His own account of his
activities cannot be relied on entirely, given his gift for blithe hyperbole (in 1940 he
was confident that only "a very small but very influential minority" 90 had reservations
about European union), but he did attract influential supporters from both the
intellectual and political worlds, including Heinrich Mann and Edouard Herriot, and
his distinctive view of the role of culture in European union is illuminating.
"Pan-Europe" devotes a chapter to culture. Much of what it says is intended to
construct a credible alternative to nationalism, untainted by what are seen as the
levelling excesses of bolshevism, but which attempts to reconcile nationhood to the
wider ideal and at the same time defines Europe by what Europe is not. Coudenhove-
Kalergi attempts to define a "cultural" Europe by identifying periods of European
civilisation91 .The "European idea", he states, was created by Hellenic resistance to
Persia; thereafter he traces its embodiment from the Roman Empire through
Charlemagne, the Roman Catholic church, the Enlightenment (which lets in the
Russia of Peter the Great) and finally Napoleon, last creator of a European empire.
The next Europe is to be characterised by democracy 92, and for this reason Russia is
now excluded.
There are racist overtones in Coudenhove-Kalergi. European culture's poles of
"Hellenic individuality and Christian socialism" ensure that it is "essentially activist
and rationalist", and its "highest attainment is Science" and that its Nordic vigour will
ensure its victory over other cultures, which "are fast decaying". Coudenhove-Kalergi
9° Coudenhove-Kalergi, (1923), op. cit., p. 51
91 many writers favour this method of invoking the unity of Europe, up to and including J-B Duroselle
and Norman Davis today. The drawback is the tangles of exclusion it leads to, with many early 20th
century writers arguing against the European status of Russia, or Britain. Duroselle ran into trouble
dropping the Greeks from European history after the Byzantine period; Davis' s determined inclusivity
reinstates the Celts (as one would hope from a Welshman).
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is confident that a century hence "European culture will have absorbed all other
cultures" 93 . His cultural Europe is an imperialist force, as his lengthy consideration of
the problem of the British Empire shows — Britain, defined by its imperial interests,
nevertheless belongs culturally to Europe 94 with a part to play in the European
"mission civilisatrice": "while the British World Empire (sic) has assumed the
extensive mission of Europeanising the world through conquests, Pan-Europe will
have to assume the intensive mission of bringing European culture to its highest
development through the co-operation of all nations" 95 (quite what he means by this is
never clear).
This is a pretty conventional exposition of European culture, of its time, and not very
different from that of Evelyn Wrench, the admirer of Cecil Rhodes: the case for
basing Pan-Europe on culture is to ensure the propagation outside Europe of European
values and civilisation, so that, ultimately, they may be safeguarded by prevailing
over others. This is cooperation in an aggressive-defensive sense, underpinned by
Coudenhove-Kalergi's belief that Europe needs its own Monroe Doctrine, "Europe for
the Europeans' ,96 . It also illustrates how close the arguments for the "cultural unity of
Europe" sometimes seem to those of right-wing nationalist movements, where the
word "Europe" can almost be substituted for "France" or "England"97.
However, Coudenhove-Kalergi also offers a theory of the spirituality of nationhood
which depends on recognising a centrality of culture in the European identity which
92 albeit a democracy which features a quasi-chivalric intellectual aristocracy
93 Coudenhove-Kalergi, (1926), op. cit., pp. 29-30.
94 bringing the rest of the English-speaking world with it: Coudenhove-Kalergi has no hesitations in
identifying English as the dominant European language
95 ibid., p. 48
96 ibid., p. 92
97 at the same time, it could appear anti-clerical, as the memoirs of Gonzague de Reynold and the
experience of UNESCO with American Catholic movements testify
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helps to anchor actions into the Pan-European scenario. This avoids some later
federalist and functionalist pitfalls where a European cultural identity is set up either
as an alternative belief system to guide people away from the evil of nationalism 98 or
as a means to the "transfer of loyalty" away from the state 99 . Coudenhove-Kalergi's
originality is to propose national identity as the cultural part of the wider European
identity - almost pan-Germanism in reverse: "the future separation between nation
and state will be a cultural need as great as was the separation between church and
state" I °°, so that, just as German nationhood has nothing to do with German empire,
to the state are owed civic duties, to the nation one's cultural membership.
Coudenhove-Kalergi links this explicitly to the task of leadership, appealing to the
community of intellectuals derived from the now-decayed chivalric spirit of the
Crusaders' Europe, once united by their religion, their code and their common
language, Latin, now fragmented into national cultures and literature. He sees their
task as to lead their peoples in "deepening and broadening national cultures into a
general European culture" by making sure that the "national pantheon becomes a
European pantheon" 1 ° I : for instance, by weaning the Germans off their suspect
leanings towards orientalism i02 onto a healthy diet of French encyclopaedists on the
grounds that they would at once perceive how much these had in common with the
great thinkers of Weimar.
The Pan-Europe view of culture was aristocratic and conservative. In the 1923
manifesto there is no interest in spreading, Matthew Arnold-like, the benefits of
culture to the masses. A single reference to the two great questions of the time, one of
98 as with Denis de Rougemont
99 as in European Community neo-functionalism
Coudenhove-Kalergi, op. cit., p. 167
lei ibid., pp. 161-2
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which is "the reckoning between the states" and the other that "between the classes",
is as much as he has to offer about the social dimension. In his compartmentalising
fashion, Coudenhove-Kalergi proposes the man of learning as a bridge between feudal
aristocracy and future meritocracy: "the intellectual and moral aristocracy of the
future which is bound to replace one day the material principle of numerical
superiority now dominating democracy"1°3.
Coudenhove-Kalergi's assumptions about the natural aristocracy of the cultivated
were clearly sufficiently widespread to be attacked by Julien Benda in his well-known
polemic "La Trahison des Clercs" at the end of the decade, alongside those who
regarded culture as a matter of national superiority 104 . However, the idea that
European culture should be taken into account as a political factor in the unification
project is unusually strongly articulated; while the notion that rather than being
regarded as symbolic of unity, culture shouid be treated as a way of integratthg kive
of country with love of Europe is unusual, and the main reason why Smith (1996)105,
though certainly right to criticise Coudenhove-Kalergi for his top-down and
paternalistic view of culture, perhaps does not do him enough credit for thinking
through how cultural identity in fact operates within a unification scenario.
Few other "European utopians" take this view of culture. A far more common view is
that culture is the factor that will liberate Europeans from the sterility of the nation-
state, and the case for prioritising it is grounded in the aim of eliminating national
102 also the theme of Massis, op.cit., used in defence of nationalism.
103 Coudenhove-Kalergi (1940), op. cit., p. 133. In 1940, the spirit of chivalry was conveniently to be
found embedded in "the civic ideal of the English gentleman" (op.cit., p. 131)
104 for discussions of the French intellectual milieu in which notions of French cultural dominance were
prevalent see e.g. Antliff, op. cit., also K. E. Silver, "Esprit de Corps: the Art of the Parisian Avant-
Garde and World War!, 1914 —1925", Thames & Hudson, 1989
105 A. D. Smith, "Nations and Nationalism in a Global Era", Polity Press, 1996
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feeling 106. Coudenhove-Kalergi, by contrast, sees national feeling as having the
potential to transmute into European feeling by allowing culture to act as the
guarantee of national identity, even as elements of it become recognised, under
intellectual tutelage, as having universal application. His proposal for a "Magna Carta
of all European nations" m looks ahead of its time, prefiguring the debate about
"cultural rights" in its suggestion that there is a right to use one's mother tongue in the
courts and to be educated in the appropriate cultural community. In such a scenario,
culture is used as an element of reassurance in European integration, combating fears
that one culture, or even one "image of Europe" 1 °8 , will dominate the rest.
By the 1930s Coudenhove-Kalergi had been supplanted in influence by the European
federalist movements. Pan-Europa fell apart, though not before it had organised a first
European Education Congress in 1937. Coudenhove-Kalergi looked to the
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe as his movement's heir. His
arguments about the link between culture and nationhood seem to have passed with
him, but serve both to establish cultural cooperation within the European project and
to point up the extent to which it has set aside engagement with the issue of identity in
favour of the Bergsonian preoccupation with man in modern society.
106 a critic of this kind of belief was Benda: "constructeurs de l'Europe, ne vous y trompez pas: tous les
sectaires du pittoresques sont contre vous", although in his case this derived from a strong reaction
against the Romantic and the sensibility of the artistic contrasted with the strength of the intellect:
"l'Europe sera une victoire de l'abstrait sur le concret" ( "Discours a la Nation Europeenne", p. 184,
Gallimard, 1933)
107 Coudenhove-Kalergi, 1926, op. cit., p. 166
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l is easy to overlook the extent to which the imagery of Europe between the wars remained the
imagery of the French "l'universel" and of Catholicism (the Reformation being frequently perceived as
the force that shattered the former cultural unity of Europe); even in 1954 it had to be pointed out that




Developments in cultural cooperation after World War Two: (I) UNESCO
Reference has been made to the growing importance placed politically on cultural
diplomacy, repackaged as cultural relations, on the one hand; and to the separate
development of intellectual cooperation, set in the context of the new internationalised
"world order", on the other. After WWII the two strands came together in the
explosion of multilateral activity which took place around 1947-1948. In Europe, this
happened at three levels, which interlock: relations between countries; international
relations within the United Nations (UN) system; and the progress of European
integration.
No further space in the present thesis will be devoted to the development of bilateral
cultural relations, except where this is relevant to the multilateral situation. But one
should note, as McMurry & Lee did in 1947 1 , that despite the availability of new
institutions offering, apparently, economies of scale and a new purity of purpose,
countries invested more money than ever in their own bilateral programmes; even, in
the case of the USA, becoming converted to the idea for the first time. It seems,
therefore, that even in 1947, reports of the forthcoming demise of the nation-state
were somewhat exaggerated2.
I R. E. McMurry and M. Lee, "The Cultural Approach, Another Way in International Cultural
Relations," University of Carolina Press, 1947
2 In "The European Rescue of the Nation-State" (Routledge, 1992), Alan S. Milward casts doubt on the
notion that increased post-war contact was necessarily conducive to a Europeanisation of public
sensibilities: pointing out that the greatest increase in visitor numbers between 1950 and 1980 was to
Spain, he observes that this has not generally been claimed as "representative of Europe's finer cultural
affinities. Their contribution to the development of common cultural attitudes, like that of the great
increase in the number of spectators of sporting events, seems to have been mainly to an increase in
popular comparative international knowledge of riot police procedures, sentencing traditions and prison
conditions" (p. 13)
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It is necessary to devote some space to the development of UNESCO in a European
context for two reasons: first, it is the only intergovernmental organisation dealing
with multilateral cultural cooperation and nothing else; and second, it is often
symbiotic with the Council of Europe in creating a "philosophy of cultural policies"
as a specifically "European" contribution to the UNESCO world view.
However, the main focus of this thesis is the third level: European integration. Here
again, one finds a divided vision at play — the idealist strand found in European
thinkers, of whom it is suggested that Coudenhove-Kalergi is the most interesting on a
pre-war political level; and the realist strand which associated cultural relations, in its
"goodwill" manifestation, populist rather than intellectual, with the defence and
foreign policy strategies of the Allied forces in Europe - strategies directed initially at
the containment and then rehabilitation of Germany, and subsequently at the Eastern
bloc. In the interaction of these two strands cultural cooperation's split personality
becomes clearly visible for the first time.
CAME, the Intellectual Cooperation Organisation and UNESCO
UNESCO has been well-documented, initially by those who were involved in its early
years, writing to convince a sceptical US audience, (for example, Walter Laves, later
Deputy Director General of UNESCO, and James Thomson 3 , both State Department
officials) or an equally dubious French audience (Jean Thomas 4 , likewise a former
Deputy Director General). A thoughtful paper by Brenda M. H. Tripp 5 (1954),
3 W. H. C. Laves & C. A. Thomson, "UNESCO: Purpose, Progress, Prospects," Dennis Dobson, 1958
4 J. Thomas, "UNESCO", Editions Gallimard, 1962
5 B. M. H. Tripp, "UNESCO in Perspective", in International Conciliation, no.497, Carnegie
Endowment for World Peace, 1954
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intended to provide a context for UNESCO, also looks at some of the contemporary
European initiatives.
A more recent literature of UNESCO has been developed by academics interested
primarily in the political conflicts culminating in the US/UK decision to withdraw
from membership in the mid-1980s. These studies shed relatively little light on
European cultural cooperation. However, Sagarika Dutt 6 (1995) demonstrates through
her researches into UNESCO that it is unsafe to assume that education and culture are
politically neutral subjects. This reads across convincingly as true of Europe too. A
more general assessment is that of James Sewell (1975) 7, who is interested in
UNESCO as a case study of an international organisation. A good non-advocacy
account is found in Ninkovich (1981) 8 . A recent publication by UNESCO itself
provides a helpful summary of activity between 1946 and the present day9.
Richard Hoggart's 1978 account l ° from his time at UNESCO as Assistant Director
General comes somewhere in between these two types, being not just a personal
memoir but also an assessment of the way in which UNESCO developed as an
international organisation. He too manages to avoid acting as its advocate or
concentrating only on the issue of UNESCO's alleged politicization, which is not of
interest to this thesis. The historical perspective available to him adds greatly to the
value of his observations. Some speeches by Director General Rene Maheu l I made to
6 S. Dutt, The Politicisation of the UN Specialised Agencies, a case study of UNESCO", Mellen
University Press, 1994
7 J. P. Sewell, "UNESCO and World Politics - engaging in international relations", Princeton
University Press, 1975
8 F. Ninkovich, op.cit
9 M. Conil Lacoste, "UNESCO: the Story of a Grand Design 1946-1993", UNESCO, 1993
10 R. Hoggart, "An Idea and its Servants, UNESCO from within", Chatto & Windus, 1978
11 R. Maheu, "International Cooperation, Techniques and Ethics", Azad Memorial Lecture, 1965:
Bhaktal Books, 1968
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National Commission 12 audiences in the 1960's also provide a valuable articulation of
UNESCO's processes from a classic European perspective.
French action in supporting the experimental model of cultural cooperation, and
particularly the Paris Institute, had established a distinctly European style of
intellectual cooperation despite its apparently global remit. It was a style to which
other countries, particularly anglophone countries, did not necessarily respond. At a
conference of ICIC National Commissions held in 1935 there had been some
recognition of this. The most hostile view was that of the Australian National
Commission, which made no bones about regarding ICIC as a European organisation
concerned almost exclusively with European things: for them useful cooperation
required economic outcomes and therefore meant more emphasis on libraries in
particular and closer links with the International Labour Office.
The MC continued to exist during the war and for a short time after it. As Allied plans
for the United Nations firmed up, Henri Bonnet, who had been director of the Institute
and was now Ambassador for the Free French in the USA, lobbied heavily for the
Intellectual Cooperation Organisation provided for in the pre-war International Act
sponsored by France to be taken up as the new educational and cultural agency of the
United Nations. In 1937, the National Committees had resolved upon regional
cooperation to make the organisation more meaningful to non-European delegations.
However, European considerations may still have been at the forefront of Bonnet's
campaign: as Gilbert Murray wrote to Sir Frank Heath: "I think the idea is that Europe
12 the UNESCO National Commissions retained the system used by ICIC to feed in ideas and expertise
from the member states through panels of distinguished individuals or representatives of organisations
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should be encouraged to revive its own culture and neither let it perish nor be entirely
Americanised13."
The Free French based in London during the war had also, however, been fully
involved in the arrangements which led to the British Council-inspired Conference of
Allied Ministers of Education (CAME). Its initial aims were confined to monitoring,
discussing and collecting information about war damage. The preparatory committee
interpreted its brief widely, created a sub-committee system and developed a number
of active projects which, by the end of the war, were going concerns. Through its
Books and Periodicals Committee, for example, it pioneered a book voucher scheme
to get around the lack of hard currency and was much concerned with the likely book
provision needs of the liberated countries. A sub-group drafted a model bilateral
cultural convention, drawing on the type pioneered by France before the war. Other
groups considered the restitution of works of art, copyright and the use of film.
The key difference between this and the ICO was its rejection of intellectual
cooperation as the central element, perhaps reflecting the differences in public policy-
making in France and Britain. In addition to the premium traditionally placed by
France on its own ascendancy in cultural matters, French public policy assumes the
centrality of cultural life which it translates into a state-directed decentralisation of
cultural provision, leading in due time to a proactive and innovative cultural policy
model. In the UK there was no such philosophy at work: public policy towards the
arts, while positive, was nevertheless reticent and non-assertive. Unconcerned with
the need either to restore national self-esteem or to reassert a damaged status in the
world, it looked away from culture towards the creation of a strong state education
13 PRO ED25/12, letter dated 27 April 1945
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system 14. It also had plenty of faith in its own institutions and saw no need to modify
these to accord a particular status to the intellectual in society.
Whether consciously or not, CAME represented a break with the pre-war tradition of
intellectual cooperation, impatiently dismissed, and to an extent misunderstood, as a
high-flown talking-shop. It was intended to focus on "real" problems, practical needs
capable of solution either rapidly or by patient negotiation. There was no definite
decision for some time in favour of making CAME permanent - indeed, the Foreign
Office initially opposed this, partly because it considered that the process of
reconstruction was better effected by UNRRA (the planned UN Relief and Refugee
Agency). It provided an alternative to the European mainstream which the Anglo-
S axon countries in particular could support, drawing on the recent experience of
anglicised cultural diplomacy, exemplified by the British Council: low-key, focused
on economic results, linked closely to public policy processes and with a strictly
limited role for individuals not directly involved with the business of government.
This is not to say that its view was narrowly restricted to educational matters. It
covered the whole range of what was normally considered within the sphere of
cultural diplomacy. But it was certainly not an "ideosphere".
CAME also shifted the focus away from diplomacy towards the burgeoning domestic
policy area 15 . By involving government officials with domestic policy responsibilities,
as opposed to diplomats concerned only with external relations, it permitted
14 • -	 •
1 is interesting to note how France's contrasting move away from what was seen as a hidebound state-
centred tradition towards "education populaire" later resurfaced in the Council of Europe as the basis
for "cultural democracy"
15  ironically, by brokering its ideas with the Education Minister rather than the Foreign Secretary, the
British Council distanced itself from subsequent influence, to the extent that ten years down the line it
had to ask the Foreign Office for information about what exactly UNESCO did
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international organisations to concern themselves with questions which before the
war would have been considered matters of no concern in a context of external
relations. The Ministry of Education 16 was much more open than the Foreign Office
to the idea of turning CAME into a permanent body, but what clinched the decision in
favour was the upsurge of US interest in placing such a body under UN auspices. The
State Department was under pressure from educational organisations. Ninkovichnotes
that a good deal of this interest was actively anti-European, in the sense that "the
trustees of the great European cultures" 17 had ruled the roost for long enough and
were now tainted with imperialism.
The UK Ministry of Education (successor to the Board of Education) was developing
an embryonic responsibility for the arts, museums and libraries sector in the wake of
the decision to establish the Arts Council of Great Britain. But this was low-key and
motivated by the new post-war relationship with local government 18 rather than
pressure for a new state policy for culture, as in France. The aim was to ensure that
municipal cultural institutions had the protection of some kind of formal relationship
with the public policy structure. As regards CAME, there seems little to support the
idea that the "cultural dimension" was seen as anything more than an add-on, possibly
to mollify the French, to a broadly educational project. Nor do the records of the
time 19 suggest that CAME was regarded as a response to the problem of post-war
European reconstruction, other than in the short term.
16 it had already developed a certain degree of autonomous cultural cooperation on education matters,
mainly with the French but also, before the war, with the Commonwealth Bureau of Education.
17 Ninkovich (1981), op.cit., p. 36
18 see PRO ED 121/375: minute of 12 December 1946 to Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Education
19 PRO FO 371/720-1;885-6; FO 924/23; ED 25/390; Sewell (1975) clearly does think that Europe
played a part and quotes some public speeches in illustration. However, government thinking in the UK
on denazification was more cautious than in the USA, and it would be more consistent for HMG at the
time to have concentrated on the work of the Allies within Germany.
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UK officials became increasingly aware that the new French government found
CAME an unsatisfactory basis for post-war intellectual cooperation as they saw it.
This was more than the national empire-building assumed by the British, though that
was obviously an element. The aspect of CAME which concerned the French most
(apart from the fact that, as Jean Thomas 2° observed, it spoke English) was the lack of
a role for the intellectual community in these intergovernmental deliberations. It also
became evident, after UNESCO was established, that there were fears that it might
even dilute the European cultural inheritance: for example, France blocked any
attempt to give the UN any role in the training of national civil servants, fearing "the
spiritual and cultural ideas of Europe might suffer"21.
The CAME draft proposing a new UN cultural agency was essentially an American
text, which made few concessions to intellectual cooperation, was generally worded
and seemed designed to minimise the scope for any decision-making on the
multilateral level which might affect domestic policy22 . It was left to Allardyce Nicoll,
attached to the British Embassy in Washington with a special brief for the proposed
new organisation, to note that the American preoccupation with "peace through
cultural strategies" would not be a sufficient response to Europe, where the Allied
representatives were insisting "on the belief that, after the war, the European nations
will look to Britain for intellectual and cultural leadership"23.
At the San Francisco conference, at which future UN agencies were to be discussed,
20 Thomas, op.cit
21 PRO FO 924/294
22 the Australian and American positions on intellectual cooperation had been made particularly clear.
The former regarded it as an unacceptable European construct ("une invention fumeuse de la vieille
Europe", according to Julien Luchaire); that of the latter, as evidenced by a speech of Waldo Leland in
1947, was that intellectual cooperation had failed and was to be replaced with a limited number of
specifically educational projects
23 PRO FO 370/721
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the French government tabled an alternative draft, based very closely on the pre-war
International Act and emphasising the importance of intellectual cooperation in the
ICIC tradition. Gilbert Murray was asked to intercede with Bonnet on behalf of the
"res integra", to avoid the setting up of two separate bodies for education and culture.
An acceptable compromise resulted, but the impression remains of a split of sorts.
Educational concerns became associated with the "Anglo-Saxon" element, whilst
culture became in some sense "European", specifically continental European: a new,
and potentially damaging, dichotomy which it is possible to see reflected later in the
Europeans' own cultural cooperation programmes.
Its primacy in UNESCO denied, the idea of "intellectual cooperation" 24 itself seems to
have become identified with culture and cultural activity, or perhaps more accurately
as not-education and not-science. Director-General Rene Maheu 25 , addressing a
conference of European National Commissions in 1962, had to explain that, although
the countries of Europe together contributed over 48% of UNESCO's budget, "of
activities specially designed for Europe there is no trace" in the programme. To do so
he falls back on the universality of Europe: UNESCO's humanistic values are
themselves "the voice of Europe in UNESCO". And the areas in which Europe takes
an interest are "general activities", which he notes is another name for intellectual
cooperation.
But UNESCO itself became neither a model nor a substitute for a specifically
European multilateral cultural cooperation. As new international organisations came
into being for various reasons, they developed cultural cooperation tailored to their
24 the term is rarely used after this period
25 Maheu, op.cit
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own structures rather than delegate to UNESCO. Although the creation of a European
region within UNESCO was from time to time proposed, European countries turned
away from it. One reason was undoubtedly the presence of the USA26 in UNESCO,
counterpointed by the absence, in the early years, of the USSR. The battleground
seems to have shifted early to east/west mutual distrust with the Western Europeans
somewhere in between 27 . In addition, the organisation itself was seen to work badly.
In 1957, the UK government considered whether to withdraw28 . UNESCO was
"cumbrous and ineffective"; the UK taxpayer got nothing back on the investment of
£300,000 a year; and it provided "a world forum for irresponsible high-minded
talk"29.
Reasons for staying in included looking impotent if the UK piffled out, and the fact
that more UNESCO experts came from the UK than anywhere else. But the primary
reason not to leave was symbolic: "UNESCO stands for cultural cooperation among
nations feeling themselves morally equal as opposed to the old-fashioned method... of
cultural imperialism" 30 . The argument, ultimately, was a propaganda one: in
politically important parts of the world UNESCO stood a chance of being listened to
26 the USA pursued a somewhat ferocious personnel policy, annoying both the French and the British
by their pursuit of suspected "fellow-travellers" within the organisation and their insistence on
importing American administrative methods (see Hoggart, op.cit )
27 examples include US policy on mass communications, where the Foreign Office was all too aware of
the "cloven hoof of American interest in freedom of information, though according to Ninkovich US
publishers thought the same about the British-backed book voucher scheme; and the USSR-inspired
Congress of World Intellectuals at Wroclaw in 1947 (PRO FO 925/725), a public relations disaster
which according to Ninkovich proved the main catalyst for the US cultural propaganda counter
campaign against the Iron Curtain countries
28 the fact that this was a possibility so many years before the UK actually did withdraw in 1986
suggests that those authors who regard such concerns as merely a façade for political displeasure about
thwarted western imperialism are not entirely right
29 PRO FO 924/1155: paper by Anthony Haigh, Cultural Relations Department, entitled "Should the
UK leave UNESCO?". He concluded, on balance, that it should not
3° ibid
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when the UK might not be. Jacques Rigaud used similar arguments nearly twenty-five
years later when reviewing French policy on multilateral cultural cooperation31.
UNESCO had taken over some of the ICIC's "service activities" 32 and pioneered a
new method of creating specific bodies (NG0s) to co-ordinate activity in particular
subject areas. Thus the International Council of Museums (ICOM) was established as
a successor to the International Museums Office shortly after the International Theatre
Institute (ITT). But the Arts programme was considered thin, as Julian Huxley 33 , its
first director, acknowledged in his report of activities in 1948. A Canadian observer
thought the arts community had been seriously short-changed: "artists all over the
world are uneasy about UNESCO" 34 which, in its emphasis on barriers, favoured the
distributor and not the creator.
Huxley clearly had difficulty in seeing how UNESCO might act effectively in the
domain of the arts, which he saw as a medium for communicating universal values to
the public. He disregards Destree's idea that artists, not the public, are the
constituency of cultural cooperation. However, there are echoes of the
BergsonNalery theme of the spiritual in a materialistic society in his concern about
the loss of beauty in daily life, expressed partly in terms of improving public taste but
also championing the non-industrial in a positive way, a kind of cultural
conservationism which might be considered UNESCO's most distinctive cultural
contribution.
31 see Mitchell, 1984, op.cit
32 such as the Index Translationum and the periodical Mouseion (relaunched as Museum).
33 J. S. Huxley, "UNESCO, its Purpose and Philosophy," (1948). Huxley's first report was considered
too contentious to present as an official document (his comments about its humanist vocation upset, in
articular, religious groups in America) and was published separately
H. A. Voaden, "The Arts and UNESCO", p. 166, in University of Toronto Quarterly, pp. 161-167,
Vol.XVIII, No.2 (1948)
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UNESCO began as a compromise between two different visions of what multilateral
cultural cooperation should be and in the event satisfied neither. Its global remit and
highly politicised priorities did not correspond to continental European ideas of
culture as a cohesive element in European reconstruction (Denis de Rougemont notes
that intellectuals ceased to bother much with it and turned their attention to European
integration). Its size made the secretariat, and thus the programme, hard to manage; its
domination by political issues, from both sides of the Atlantic, made it unsuitable as
an arena for building bridges; and it turned out to be problematic as a mechanism for
promoting western values to emerging states who might be wavering between the
competing blandishments of Coca-Cola imperialism and the socialist utopia.
It should be noted that European countries such as the Netherlands, who were able to
make use of UNESCO as a way of exporting influence and services which they could
not do bilaterally on the same scale, were more inclined to place it at the head of their
cultural cooperation priorities and invest heavily in their national committees35.
Countries outside the "golden circle" of the wartime allies (the Swiss, the
Scandinavian countries and the Austrians) also found UNESCO rewarding as a forum
where they could act without having, in effect, to negotiate a relationship with
British and French national interests. Over the years both Finland and Sweden have
used UNESCO to advance aspects of the European agenda in which they were
particularly interested.
35 see Hoggart, op.cit, on which national committees worked effectively and which did not — he singles
out the Swiss and the Dutch for praise
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Conclusion
The impact of UNESCO on the developing European cultural cooperation sector is
not easy to determine. As the next chapters will show, the Council of Europe acquired
its ideas and working methods from a range of sources which include UNESCO. A
certain eclecticism and lack of discipline in programming reflects the inheritance of
both bodies from ICIC, including its history of pressure to prioritise, reform, do less36.
Several of UNESCO's landmark events have had European resonance", however, and
at various times one finds debates taking place about the extent to which the Council
of Europe can and should operate as a "region" of UNESCO, or whether certain topics
(such as international conventions) should be regarded as proper to UNESCO or to
the European organisation in question. Insofar as European cultural cooperation turns
on the integration of (western) Europe, UNESCO appears as a strong presence, but
not a central one. It is represented and on occasion invited to present its work in the
Council of Europe but with one notable exception there is little evidence either that it
sets the agenda for European cooperation or that it intervenes in it38.
UNESCO's importance in European terms lies primarily in the fact that, until the late
1980s, it was the only forum in which both sides of a divided Europe participated.
One significant development is the 1966 Declaration of the Principles of International
Cultural Cooperation, adopted to mark the 20 th anniversary of the organisation. The
text does not define international cultural cooperation, but does define its field of
36 see Hoggart, Lacoste, op.cit
37 such as the decision in 1955 to create a major "East-West" cooperation project. for which. how‘exer.,
the Council of Europe, acting as a UNESCO "region", managed onl . to contribute copies of its an
exhibitions catalogues
38 To illustrate this, countries which haxe not signed up to UNESCO comentions. as has been the case
for the UK on the illicit traffic of cultural property, are not disadx antaged in their negotiations on the
same topics in other fora; and although exhortations to sign up to this or that UNESCO instrument max
occur in resolutions or other texts, they are not binding and are rarelx accorded ati .x/ Menton
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action and its aims39 . It goes on to assert cultural cooperation as a right and a duty in
that all "should share with one another their knowledge and skills" 40. The remainder
of the declaration emphasises diversity, dissemination of ideas and reciprocity. Its
significance is as a harbinger of UNESCO's developing interest in standard setting for
domestic cultural policy, a field where in the 1970s it worked closely alongside the
Council of Europe. This is already present in subsection (4) of article IV and will be
explored further in the chapter on the Council.
UNESCO seems, therefore, to operate with a European dimension on two levels: as a
vector for European diplomacy to act beyond Europe through economies of scale
(whether by technical assistance or through the elaboration of international
instruments); and as a standardising structure for public policy in and administration
of culture. This aim of internal cultural improvement is one of the strikingly post-war
characteristics of cultural cooperation. To what extent this was a European input into
UNESCO is unclear, but it does not seem to have been a strong element prior to the
mid-1960s, when the Council of Europe's driving influences were likewise promoting
an agenda of domestic policy change at European level.
39 Article III: "International cultural cooperation shall cover all aspects of intellectual and creative
activities relating to education, science and culture"; Article IV: "...aims....shall be: (1) to spread
knowledge, to stimulate talent and to enrich cultures; (2) to develop peaceful relations and friendship
amongst the peoples and to bring about a better understanding of each other's way of life; (3) to
contribute to the application of the principles set out in the UN Declarations that are recalled in the
Preamble to this Declaration; (4) to enable everyone to have access to knowledge, to enjoy the arts and
literature of all peoples, to share in advances made in science in all parts of the world and in the
resulting benefits, and to contribute to the enrichment of cultural life: (5) to raise the level of the
spiritual and material life of man in all parts of the world."
40 • •it is clearly drafted with an eye to the Cold War situation
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Finally, a major characteristic of UNESCO (reflected in the 1966 declaration) is the
idea of diversity of cultures. This, I think, is drawn from bilateral cultural relations
rather than intellectual cooperation. UNESCO is free to place this emphasis, since it
has no context of unity and integration within which it needs to situate culture.
Diversity as an aim has no particular roots in ICIC (indeed, for the kind of
intellectuals who were interested in international cooperation, it held no special appeal
compared to the spiritual union of the life of the mind). However, there is clear
pragmatic advantage in asserting the virtues of mutual exchange and mutual
enrichment of a plethora of different cultures, in the context both of the
European/non-European undercurrents of UNESCO's composition and of the message
being sent across the Iron Curtain.
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CHAPTER SIX
Developments in cultural cooperation after World War Two: (II) European
international systems after 1945
Post-war, Europe sprouted a bewildering number of different, but overlapping,
organisations: the Brussels Treaty Organisation (BTO), also known both as Western
Union (WU) and Western European Union (WEU), which was its formal title from
1955 when West Germany and Italy joined; the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
(NATO); the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC); the Council
of Europe (CoE); Nordic Cooperation; and the European Communities (EC). All of
these except for OEEC (subsequently OECD)', NATO and the EC included some sort
of provision for cultural cooperation. Only OECD showed no interest in multilateral
cultural cooperation, although it has a strong presence in the related areas of education
and public administration. At a later stage the non-institutional but significant
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CS CE) also played a role 2 . All of
these were and are government-led bodies 3 : to a greater or lesser extent their actions
reflect the policies of national governments.
However, several also had consultative assemblies of parliamentarians. It is this
element which will be considered first in this section, in the context of the Congress
of Europe organised by the various European federalist movements in 1948. Since it
is the argument of this thesis that part of the ideology of cultural cooperation is drawn
from these movements, the ideas of federalism itself and in particular their relevance
I Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
2 this will be discussed briefly in terms of the later development of the Council of Europe
3 the odd one out is Nordic Cooperation which began as a parliamentary system
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to the philosophy known as "personalism", associated most closely with the French
thinker Emmanuel Mounier and his circle, will be examined first.
European federalism, personalism and the Congress of Europe
In 1953 Stephen Spender published "European Witness", an account of a journey
through Germany and France at the end of the war. Turning the imagery of "true
Europe" on its head, he observes that "the destruction.. .is the climax of deliberate
effort, an achievement of our civilisation, the most striking result of cooperation
between nations in the twentieth century. It is the shape created by our century as the
Gothic cathedral is the shape created by the Middle Ages" 4 . He speaks of an
"epidemic of despair" 5 throughout Europe, and of a "strangeness and newness about
the apocalyptic time in which we live" 6 . The 1948 Congress of Europe which brought
together the diverse European federalist movements in an effort to press governments
towards the federation of Europe was a response to the climate Spender articulates.
Spender had been amongst those who attended a series of "Rencontres
Internationales", which drew "the attention of an elite to the European problem and
made it fashionable" 7 . These were organised by Denis de Rougemont's European
Union of Federalists (UEF), one of several European federalist organisations 8 which
4 S. Spender, "European Witness", p. 24. Hamish Hamilton, 1953
5 ibid., p. 97
6 ibid., p. 95
7 D. de Rougemont, "The Campaign of the European Congresses" in Government and Opposition, pp.
109-124, No. 88, Vol. 23, No. 1, reprinted from same journal, 1967
8 For an account of the evolution of the European federalist movements see A. Greilsammer, "Les
Mouvements Federalistes en France de 1945 a 1974," Presses d'Europe, 1975; also R. Mayne and J.
Finder, "Federal Union: the Pioneers", Macmillan, 1990
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combined after the Congress of Europe to create the European Movement 9 . These
meetings of intellectuals, intended to gain support amongst opinion-formers for the
federalist vision of Europe, seem to derive directly from the tradition of the
"Entretiens" and of Coudenhove-Kalergi. De Rougemont used them as preparation for
what he later referred to as a summons to the "Estates General of Europe" 10 . The UEF
represented the "idealist" wing of European federalism, grouped around the
intellectuals of the "Ordre Nouveau" movement (which grew out of the Franco-
German "Cercle de Sohlberg" meetings of the early 1930s) 12 and the magazine
"Esprit", edited by Emmanuel Mounier.
Denis de Rougemont, a Swiss philosopher and journalist, was an associate of Mounier
and Ordre Nouveau in the 1930s, who joined the Resistance during the war and took
on board many of their ideas, including the Resistance commitment to networking.
"The international links within the moral elite, typified by Denis de Rougemont and
the Union Europeenne des Federalistes provided an... exemplary mode of
organisation. The intellectuals' ideal, inspired by their Resistance experience, was
thus a network of local voluntary associations, vehicles of direct democracy, united
within a European federation. The old nation-states, bellicose and unresponsive to the
needs of their citizens, were to be superseded at both a lower and a higher level by
9 which was and remains the main vehicle for federalist views of European integration
mi.e. the Congress of Europe — the phrase itself is actually borrowed from de Rougemont's colleague
Alexandre Marc
11 Ordre Nouveau is exhaustively explored by J. Hellman in "Emmanuel Mounier and the New Catholic
Left, 1930-1950", Toronto, 1981, and "The Knight-Monks of Vichy France, Uriage 1940-45", McGill,
1993. (Also J. Hellman and C. Roy, in Bock, op.cit). Hellman's arguments associating Ordre Nouveau
with the government of Vichy France are controversial (similar claims made in France by Bernard-
Henri Levy were indignantly denied by de Rougemont towards the end of his life). However, these
aspects are not relevant to the present thesis, and the ideas that Hellman traces are illuminating for the
study of cultural cooperation. See also R. Kedward & R. Austin (eds.), "Vichy France and the
Resistance: Culture and Ideology", Croom Helm, 1985
12 see Bock, op.cit
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more responsible institutions" I3 . However, it was de Rougemont in particular who
synthesised a version of federalism which brought together different strands into an
ideology, or "theology", to use the phrase of Mary Jo Deering I4, in which culture
became a central element of the federalist agenda. Cultural cooperation, drawing on
the pre-war tradition of intellectual cooperation, was seen as the mechanism for
cultivating grassroots diversity and eradicating nationalism in favour of community.
European federalism itself belongs in a tradition encompassing Rousseau and
Proud'hon I5 and traceable back to medieval tradition I6 . It is more organic and more
societal in its conception than the Anglo-American tradition, a holistic rather than a
purely territorial approach. Pentland and others who analyse the schools of thought
about European integration are divided about the extent of federalism's impact, but
frequently concede its superiority over other approaches in one respect: its readiness
to confront all the obstacles head-on and propose radical solutions rather than rely on
a process of gradual accretion (a characteristic of functionalism I7), or live within the
limitations of the world as it is (the "realist-pluralist" view). De Rougemont himself
regarded federalism as "revolutionary". It acts as what de Rougemont frequently
refers to as a "persistent conscience" of European integration, an ideal which depends
almost entirely on successful advocacy, since it cannot, like other theories such as
functionalism, rely on outcomes to make its case — federalism, after all, was not the
method finally selected for integration and the nation state is yet to be supplanted by
the European assembly.
13 J. D. Wilkinson, "The Intellectual Resistance in Europe", p. 268, Harvard University Press, 1981
14 see Deering, op. cit
15 see introduction to D. J. Elazar (ed.), "Federalism as a Grand Design", Open Press of America,
Center for the Study of Federalism, 1987
16 C. Pentland, "International Theory and European Integration", Faber & Faber, 1973
17 for a discussion of functionalism and cultural cooperation see Chapter Ten
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De Rougemont's 1950 pamphlet, published for a British readership by the
organisation Federal Union, sets out six principles of federalism, of which the most
relevant for cultural cooperation are the last three. These propose an agenda of
cultural diversity, grassroots control and rejection of globalisation: "the object of
federation is not to destroy diversity and to reduce all nations into one block but, on
the contrary, to safeguard their individual qualities; federalism rests on a love of
complexity, in contrast to the brutal spirit of simplification, which distinguishes the
totalitarian attitude; a federation is formed between neighbour and neighbour, through
the medium of persons and groups, and certainly not by working, from the centre
outwards, or through the medium of governments" 18 . De Rougemont regards "a love
of culture" as central to the federalist regime. However, the centrality which he
accords it is explicitly grounded in his ideological background within the French
personalist Ordre Nouveau, many of whose members achieved prominence in Freack
cultural life and who acknowledged the influence of Bergsonism19.
"Ordre Nouveau" was not an exclusively Catholic ideology20, but it did demand a
high degree of spiritual awareness and there seems little doubt that its roots were in
Catholicism21 . Personalism substitutes the idea of the person for that of the individual,
proposing that society be based on "the integral man" 22
 - that is, the individual within
the community, with spiritual as well as material needs. On this basis it rejected both
communism (which subjugated the person to the state) and capitalism (which did the
18 D. de Rougemont, "The Way of Federalism", (trans. R. Anson), pp. 11-13 . London, 1950
19 according to Hellman (1981), op.cit, Mounier was a pupil of Jacques Chevalier, a disciple of Bergson
who wished to direct Bergson's ideas into a specifically Catholic movement
20 Mounier himself was strongly Catholic, but de Rougemont was Protestant and some others professed
no religious faith
21 see Hellman, op.cit
22 F. Kinsky, "Personalism and Federalism", in Elazar, op.cit, p. 273 (again, quoting Alexandre Marc)
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opposite, denying the individual's integrity within his community). It also involved
the notion of "engagement", the duty of the intellectual to concern himself with the
public world. Although this became associated with Sartre, de Rougemont claimed to
have thought of it first. John Wright 23 identifies personalism's main features as a
revulsion from materialist values, coupled with a distaste for the state (which in de
Rougemont manifests in strong support for regionalism) and an interest in creativity
and human rights.
The theoretician of personalism, Emmanuel Mounier, had the standard intellectual's
dream of European unity: "a circuit of active friendship.. .intellectual collaboration.. .In
as many cities as I can.. .little work groups" 24 with a contact in another city for every
two in France 25 . But his relevance to cultural cooperation is indirect: he was interested
in European unity but did not involve himself with it actively. However, he linked
personalism to the idea of a "cultural policy" as early as 1934 in a "preface a une
rehabilitation de l'art et l'artiste", part of his book "Revolution personnaliste et
communautaire". Here he sets out ideas about the role of the state in cultural life and
the role of the artist, which emphasises the artist's task as ministering to the interior
life of the community: to connect the community's outer with its inner life - the
"Inutilisable", with which a community must be in touch in order to survive.
These ideas grew in part out of Mounier's association with the youth movement
"Jeune France". Fumaroli 26 regards Mounier as the father of the Maison de la Culture
movement on the strength of his work for this movement, and his 1941 report for the
23J. Wright, "Mollifier, "Esprit" and Vichy, 1940-44: Ideology and Anti-ideology", p. 41, in Kedward &
Austin, op. cit
24 Hellman (1981), op.cit. p. 45. Cf. T. S. Eliot, another profound believer in the importance of
intellectual communication, urging the ideal of a network of intellectual reviews
25 his list of ideal antennae was a mixture of cultural capitals and university centres - Glasgow, Vienna,
Oxford, Gent, Cracow, Salamanca
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organisation of cultural activity in France as the blueprint for post-war French cultural
policy, notably in its emphasis on popularising, rather than academicising, culture. A
colleague of Mounier's in Ordre Nouveau, Joffre Dumazedier, later founded the
movement "Peuple et Culture" which reflected similar concerns and provided the
grounding philosophy for the Council of Europe's cultural thinking in the 1960s27.
In writing about federal Europe culture tends to be seen as both spiritually uplifting
and a supplier of symbolism and ritual, both of which will lead people away from
nationalism towards a sense of greater unity. As Pentland says, referring partly to the
communitarian theories of Etzioni, "by such means as education,... national rituals....
and the manipulation of symbols, the integrating elites can harness or create a
supporting popular will. This will in turn provide a justifying ideology or a degree of
legitimacy for integration" 28 . De Rougemont certainly regarded culture as a justifying
ideology, but saw culture as much more than symbolism, as an active agent for
change - "une presence vivante et dynamique" 29 without which the project of
European unity, indeed, the survival of Europe itself, really had no point. De
Rougemont's "theology" for Europeans was intended to provide less a programme for
facilitating understanding than a paradigm for governance centred in western ideals
and values30 , and intended to define the objectives and aims of future European
institutions. His vehicle for this vision was the Congress of Europe.
The Congress gathered together the various European movements for integration in
the wake of Churchill's Zurich speech calling for the United States of Europe. Its
outcome was the call to governments to set up the Council of Europe. De Rougemont
26 M. Fumaroli, "L'Etat Culturel", Editions de Fallois, 1991
27 see chapter 8 for Marcel Hicter and the 1965 "leisure debate"
28 Pentland, op. cit., p. 182
29 Deering, op.cit., p. 562
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took charge of its cultural discussions and drew up the section of its report which
concerned culture. According to Deering 31 , whose account draws on the papers of the
Congress itself and the archives of the European Cultural Centre 32 , de Rougemont's
initial proposals closely reflected his own vision, supported by a significant
proportion of the intellectuals who were involved in the drafting of them. Though
watered down and rendered more general, the "Message to Europeans" which formed
the preamble of the final resolution remained clear33.
The aim of the "Message" was to "donner une voix et une autorite a la conscience
europeenne"34 . Without this voice, economic and political integration would have no
meaning for Europeans: "la primaute de la culture appartient donc a la definition de
1'Europe" 35 . The structures by which it would have been achieved are left hazy, but it
is possible that de Rougemont had in mind some kind of elected senate of the
eminent, acting as "elders" — recalling Talcott Parsons 36 , a laicised priesthood.
Deering suggests that the Congress's British chairman, the Conservative politician
Duncan Sandys, set out to marginalise the group to which de Rougemont belonged
from the main (i.e. economic and political) business by confining them to culture. De
Rougemont nevertheless tried to insist that "far from being a single ornamental
adjunct to the serious commissions" the Congress's cultural committee "must assume
30 those, at least, of which he approved
' 1992 op.cit
32
set up by de Rougemont in Geneva, and still operating as a research and documentation body, with
observer status on the Council of Europe's Culture Committee (though without any other status vis-à-
vis intergovernmental cooperation)
33 "Europe's mission is ... to unite her peoples in accordance with their genius of diversity and with the
conditions of modern community life and so open the way towards the organized freedom for which
the world is seeking. It is to revive her inventive powers for the greater protection of and respect of the
rights and duties of the individual...."
34 quoted in a number of sources, including D. de Rougemont, "L'Europe en Jeu", p. 104. Neuchatel,
1948
35 ibid, p. 108
36 T. Parsons, "The Intellectual: a Social Role Category", in P. Rieff, (ed.), "On Intellectuals", New
York, Doubleday, 1969
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the decisive role in defining the purpose of the whole undertaking and its hoped-for
consequences" 37 . In the event his idea of a central cultural committee within what
would be the Council of Europe, with real powers to direct policy, was replaced by a
proposal for a European Cultural Centre38.
The account of the proceedings published under the title of "Europe Unites - the
Hague Congress and After" 39 gives few clues as to what the centre, or a committee,
was meant to achieve. French delegates in particular were concerned to protect the
primacy of UNESCO, possibly reflecting the recent battle to ensure that matters
cultural remained based in Paris. De Rougemont decided upon a "lieu de rencontre et
d'initiative europeenne"40, informing and educating the public, not simply developing
the European loyalty that did not yet exist, but also inculcating in them a love of
liberty and the other "European" virtues. Over the years which followed he tried to
establish the Centre, which was set up under his directorship in Lausanne, as "une
sorte d'Institut de la conjoncture culturelle en Europe", or "quelque chose cornme un
Chatham House41 europeen, mais certainement plus militant" 42 but given his
insistence on a policy-making role it is not surprising that he failed to attract resources
which remained under the control of governments43.
The impact of the Congress itself was somewhat neutralised by the fact that at
37 De Rougemont, "The Campaign of the European Congresses", op. cit., p. 117
38 "Federalism", he noted, "triumphed only in the documents", ibid., p.120
39 Congress of Europe, "Europe Unites: the Story of the Campaign for European Unity", Hollis &
Carter, 1949
40 Deering, op. cit., p. 277
41 Chatham House, the non-governmental British research centre for foreign policies and international
relations established in the 1920s
42 de Rougemont, "Europa und Seine Kultur", p. 27, Schriftetzreihe der Deutschen Europa-Akademie,
No.8., 1951
43 
see next chapter for the relationship between the Council of Europe and the European Cultural
Centre
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intergovernmental level work was already in hand on what the British called "Western
Union". The UK in 1948 was prepared to participate in a closer European cooperation
system but not to compromise what it saw as a larger vision involving American
support and a defence-based strategic alliance, rather than a "United States of Europe"
which would attract the hostility of the USSR. Ironically, the European Cultural
Centre was favourably perceived, as long as it remained unofficial (and therefore
without pretensions to affect governments' policies)45.
The constitution of the Council of Europe, a direct result of the Congress, was a well-
documented conflict between, mainly, the UK and France over the extent to which it
should embody federal aims (in which a consultative assembly would have
precedence) or remain within the management of the member states (through a
council of ministers). In the UK France's support for a federal structure was attributed
unambiguously to its ambition to lead Europe and thus restore lost prestige 46 . UK
priorities were focused on the newly negotiated Brussels Treaty, which for the first
time included cultural cooperation within a European structure other than that of the
Nordic countries, who had been active since before the war.
The Congress of Europe provided an explicit philosophy of cultural cooperation in
Europe which went well beyond the limitations suggested by the experience of
cultural diplomacy. It asserted the primacy of intellectual influences and suggested
that the decisions of politicians ought to be guided by these. It rejected the association
of "culture" with "national identity", whilst embracing diversity as its principle
44 see memorandum in PRO F0371/73095
45 ibid. The organisation of the Congress was described as chaotic: "the story goes that.... what
archives there were left lying....and were swept into dustbins by the charwomen whence as many as
possible were sorted out from the cigarette ends the next day by a distraught secretary" (PRO FO
371/73095)
46
see PRO FO 371/73096
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characteristic, and sought to redefine it as the special contribution of Europe to the
world, to be sustained for the purpose of "civilising" mankind beyond Europe.
Finally, it looked away from culture as an instrument of mutual understanding
between nations towards culture as a way of asserting a community identity which
required the fostering of spiritual values — in other words, cultural development within
European states which was not, however, to be left in the hands of those states
themselves. Though apparently vanquished at The Hague in 1948, this "theology"
remained embedded in the "federalised" elements of the Council of Europe to surface
twenty years later in the debates about a "cultural policy" for the organisation which
would amount to more than straightforward multilateral exchange and problem-
solving.
The Nordic Council
The only significantly Western European multilateral cultural cooperation in action
before the war began as a parliamentary group and was adopted after it by
governments as the Nordic Council. A comprehensive account of the early days of
this is provided by Ingeborg Lyche47 in a study prepared for the Council of Europe,
although Clive Archer" also discusses it, and updates Lyche's study. The new Nordic
Council also took up a pre-war precedent of regular meetings of ministers responsible
for education and culture.
The Nordic Cultural Commission which operated from 1947 onwards was advisory
only, and did not acquire a budget until 1966. Its advantages of language and common
47 I. Lyche, "Nordic Cultural Cooperation: Joint Ventures 1946-72", Universitetsforlaget, 1974
48 C. Archer, "Organising Europe: the Institutions of Integration", Edward Arnold, 1994, 2nd edition.
See also E. Solem, "The Nordic Council and Scandinavian Integration", Praeger, 1977
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administrative tradition enabled it to function as an "informal working team" 49 of civil
servants and non-governmental advisers which aimed at preparing reports and
recommendations so thoroughly "that any proposal could be realised without further
investigation or treatment" 50 .
By the 1970s it was felt to have shown "only minor achievements and slow
progress" 51
 and was thus reinforced with a new Cultural Treaty meant to underpin
stronger economic cooperation. It fell at the expensive fence of television, when the
Nordic countries failed to agree a common broadcasting satellite channel. Lyche saw
this coming: in 1974 she had noted press comments on the trend for "the fai)ures of
the great projects and the successes of the small steps' t52 . I wenty years on, Archer
backs this view, noting that modest cultural achievements paled before this major
setback. In a recent (1995) Council of Europe review of educational cooperation it is
nevertheless stated that education, research and culture now absorb about 50% of the
Nordic Council's 53
 budget.
Lyche also notes that Nordic cooperation became essential as a factor of cohesion in
the face of different Nordic patterns of representation in other European groupings
(Sweden's absence from NATO, Denmark's early entry into the European
Communities, Finland's lack of full membership of the Council of Europe): "the
cultural field was considered the least controversial" 54 . Considered in the context of
49 Lyche, op.cit, p. 69
ibid., p. 52
51 ibid., p. 101
52 ibid., p. 154
53 the Nordic Council has met at ministerial level since 1972, a strengthening of the Nordic cooperation
process made necessary by the accession of Denmark to the EC. See Carl-Einar Sthlvant, "Nordic
Cooperation", in W. Wallace (ed.), "The Dynamics of European Integration", Royal Institute of
International Affairs, 1990
54 Lyche, op.cit, p.48
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other European cultural cooperation, what is striking about Nordic cooperation is the
method: the habits of close working 55 help make the Nordic countries an influential
co-ordinated voice within, for example, the Council of Europe, even though they do
not formally act as a single unit 56. The insistence on protracted evaluation and
analysis before decisions can be taken reduces the risk of railroading from the centre.
But on the whole this does not read across into the wider forum, where secretariats
tend to push forward their own agendas without careful preparation, and, despite
occasional hopeful references in secretariat documents to converging "habits of
thinking", individual member states pursue their domestic priorities largely
uninfluenced by those of others.
Brussels Treaty Organisation
The Brussels Treaty Organisation, which as we have noted, took precedence over the
nascent Council of Europe for the UK, was the first intergovernmental attempt to
build a system of multilateral cultural cooperation without the linguistic and
historical57 infrastructure of coordination enjoyed by the Nordic countries.
The Treaty of Economic, Social and Cultural Collaboration and Collective Self-
Defence58 , known as the Brussels Pact, had as signatories the five Allied European
states of France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg and the UK. The Brussels
Treaty Organisation (BTO), known also as Western Union59 (WU), was firmly
55 Stalvant (op.cit) makes a similar point when he observes that, in Nordic cooperation, coordination of
views and exchanges of information are standard procedures
56 neither does Benelux, and efforts to rally the EU members states around a single position have
enerally failed too
7 Stalvant (op.cit) states that of 436 Nordic non-governmental organisations with at least three
members in 1972, 40% had pre-war origins
58 Cmd. 7599, 17 March 1948
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intergovernmental — all decisions on the political level were taken by Foreign
Ministers acting as a Consultative Council and served by a Permanent Commission of
diplomats. There was no elected Assembly, and certainly no National Commissions or
favoured NGOs as in UNESCO. In 1954 the Treaty was revised to admit the Federal
Republic of Germany (FRG) and Italy, whereupon the name was changed to Western
European Union (WEU). In 1960 the WEU's cultural work was absorbed into that of
the Council of Europe (CoE).
The Brussels Treaty Organisation served four purposes; defensive (in the form of
mutual aid); political (consultation and recourse to arbitration by a Court of Justice);
economic (improved living standards and better social services); and cultural. Culture
is intended to underpin the other three, as a measure for inculcating understanding and
developing the habits of interchange: in other words, creating the conditions for the
achievement of the other aims.
The preamble to the Treaty defines the aims. Emphasising the signatories' "common
heritage" of democracy, personal freedom and political liberty, the constitutional
traditions and the rule of law, the Treaty intends to uphold these through
strengthening economic, social and cultural ties and coordinating action towards
economic recovery. It also stresses a commitment to the United Nations. Article III of
the Treaty deals with cultural cooperation. Under Article III the parties undertake to
"make every effort in common to lead their peoples towards a better understanding of
the principles which form the basis of their common civilization and to promote
cultural exchange by conventions between themselves or by other means."
59 though mostly, it seems, by the British: the term was apparently coined by Ernest Bevin to seem
inclusive towards the Atlanticists and emphasis the BTO's distance from European federalism. It is
certainly much used in Foreign Office minutes to denote the BTO
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It is not obvious from surviving Foreign Office papers 60 , which have been my main -
almost only - source for the BTO cultural programme, why cultural cooperation was
included in what was primarily a defence treaty. What evidence there is suggests that
for the UK, at least, solidarity rather than bilateral influence was the goal, in the sense
that encouraging a sense of fellow-feeling between its members might also encourage
public confidence in the Treaty. Official pronouncements of the time make much use
of the rhetoric of morality, suggesting that cultural cooperation in some way endows
the "Western democratic system" with spiritual authority, or provides a rallying-point
for western values 61 . The task in hand was thus not the transmission of expertise bin-
the construction of family feeling in the face of the Soviet threat 62: to define "us"
made us better able to resist "them".
Archer63 points out that the BTO was also in some sense a political response to the
European Movement 64 and the Congress of Europe. UNESCO had already provided
the UK with practical experience of how quickly multilateral cultural cooperation
60 the relevant material is on PRO FO 924/727-732, 746-751, 869-871 and 904-908. Board of
Education papers are on ED 121/318 and 320. Council of Europe-BTO relations are covered on FO
571/96355 and 102318. The move to Western European Union is dealt with on FO 371/107920. After
1953, records concerning cultural cooperation in the WEU have not been preserved. I have not
encountered any critical literature or history which deals with cultural cooperation under the BTO other
than the somewhat sparse account given by Anthony Haigh in his book "Cultural Diplomacy in
Europe" prepared for and published by the Council of Europe in 1974. Haigh was a British diplomat
who, until he joined the Council as director of education and culture in 1962, was head of Cultural
Relations Department at the Foreign Office. Several of the files consulted, therefore, contain advice
and assessments by Haigh during the formative period of multilateral cultural cooperation when he was
involved in most of its manifestations as the UK delegate to its various intergovernmental committees
61 c.f. the 1950 pamphlet produced by the Central Office of Information explaining UK participation in
BTO cultural cooperation explicitly in terms of spreading "western" rather than "European" civilisation
(i.e. by associating the US and the British Commonwealth with the exercise) (PRO FO 924/869); also
A. and F. Boyd, "UNA 's Guide to European Recovery", Hutchinson, 1948, a "world government" view
meant to appeal to the general public, which places strong emphasis on the "common heritage" in terms
of democracy and the rule of law.
62 See W. Park, "Defending the West: a History of NATO", Wheatsheaf Books, 1986: it was widely
believed that the USSR's "preferred mode of advance was political subversion", until the Korean War
shattered that belief
63 Archer (1994), op.cit
64 in the UK files the favourite Foreign Office adjective in respect of federalism is "dangerous"; the
second favourite is "premature"
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could go adrift, both by trying to do too much and by pushing ahead without clear
objectives, if not kept under strict contro1 65 . It had also shown how fine the balance
was between the positive and negative advantages of innocuous-seeming cultural
cooperation if political goals were not harmonious to start with. The Foreign Office
was thus determined that BTO should not go the same way. Later papers show that
UK officials subsequently held up BTO as a model of operational cultural
cooperation. However, this happy position was reached only slowly and after much
frustrating experimentation.
Putting Article III into practice
From the outset, therefore, the British wanted to keep BTO activity limited 66 . The UK
starting point, and its central argument, was that multilateral cultural cooperation had
to be grounded in the system of bilateral cultural conventions (negotiated in the UK
by the Foreign Office's Cultural Relations Department (CRD) and operated by the
British Council as the government's agent). By 1948 such conventions were in place
between most permutations of the Five Powers67.
It is worth describing the system in some detail. Despite the fact that France had
pioneered it well before the war, the UK chose to see it as having had its roots in
CAME68 , where a model text had been developed. By 1954 fifty such agreements had
65 See PRO FO 924/727
66 u ....the Brussels Treaty was fundamentally based on strategic considerations and on the idea of a
common way of life in the political or near-political spheres.. .We would do well to soft-pedal the
strictly cultural aspect of the Brussels treaty and concentrate much more on the information services
side" (ibid)
67 the five countries signatory to the BTO were known as the Five Powers following Allied practice
during the immediate post-war period
68 In a CRD guidance note of 1954, "the modern all-embracing Cultural Convention" is described
specifically as "a child of the wartime Conference of Allied Ministers of Education" (PRO FO 924/
1037).
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been concluded, mainly by European countries, amongst themselves and with others.
The Foreign Office's own guidance note acknowledges the system has deficiencies,
in that it simply classifies what exists already 69. In its favour is the Mixed
Commission system, under which each partner fields an equal number of
members who meet alternately in the two capitals at prescribed intervals and under
the chairmanship of the host country. "The Commission reviews the whole field of
cultural relations between the two countries and makes proposals to the two
governments for giving effect to the Convention between them". Where there is a
genuine two-way traffic, CRD considers, as with European countries, there is also a
genuine cultural benefit. In other cases, the underlying motive is to safeguard the
position of, for example, British archaeologists operating in the Middle East: thus the
motive behind a Convention may be political.
This was to be the template for all multilateral cultural cooperation. Additional action,
if necessary at all, would be strictly complementary to the established bilateral norm.
This British thinking was not shared by the other partners, however. A first meeting,
which the British fondly hoped might be exploratory and non-committal, perhaps
even one-off, ended not only in the convening of a "committee of cultural experts"7°
but in a de facto plan of action, consisting partly of wish-lists, partly of more
structured assessments of what might be attempted within the BTO framework.
The five "country memoranda" all survive in Foreign Office files. The French and
British efforts are analytical assessments of the scope for common action, and were
drawn up by Foreign Affairs officials. It is unclear who drafted the others, as the
69 "it is said that when political winds are set fair there is no need for a Cultural Convention, but when
political storms arise, Cultural Conventions provide no shelter and are soon blown away" (ibid)
70 the Foreign Office agonised for some time about exactly who its fellow "experts" were, how far they
could commit their governments politically and what constituted a "cultural expert" anyway
140
Benelux countries were represented throughout the BTO process by a mixture of
education officials, academics and politicians. The French seem to have wanted a
forum for the debate of common issues rather than a mini-UNESC0 71 . The Dutch, on
the other hand, favour the creation of new European cultural institutions 72 and a
specific link with UNESCO. Their text contains an underlying anxiety - it worries
about the impact of the new Fulbright scholarships 73 (designed to create European-
American university interchange) and suggests the creation of a European cultural
property institute to guard against any repetition of German expropriation of works of
art (this was remitted to UNESCO). This is in keeping with the Dutch approach to
cultural cooperation for some years thereafter — defensive, seeing cultural cooperation
as a bulwark against cultural encroachment from elsewhere74.
Belgium and Luxembourg offered lists of things, mainly cultural events, the partners
might do together, and policy areas where they wanted to reach some common view.
Many of these were the same topics that had preoccupied the ICIC — translation,
artists' rights, film co-production agreements and schemes for the mass reproduction
and distribution of works of art. Belgium in particular seemed to have in mind a
kind of Brussels Treaty-wide cultural service offering at the multilateral level what a
national government might do. The question of finance was left vague. BTO's
secretary-general optimistically proposed the sum of 40 million French Francs, but
71 "une large tour d'horizon sur les problemes culturels interessant les cinq puissances et d'examiner les
suggestions presentees" (PRO ED 121/318)
72 they may have felt politically obliged to take forward the recommendations of the Congress of
Europe they had so recently hosted
73 the motive being fear that their nationals would lose university places in their institutions to
incoming Americans
74 this has not been true for many years of official Dutch policy, but it can still be found, notably in the
speeches and articles of Maarten Mourik, a former cultural ambassador
75
a particular obsession of the Belgian delegate, with which he persisted well into the mid-1950s: "it is
to be hoped that M. Kuypers will eventually lose heart", commented Cultural Relations Department the
following year, unaware how long they would have to wait (PRO ED 121/318)
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the BTO cultural programme never gained a central fund. Governments incurred
spending as they went along. This was problematic, especially for the British, who
relied on the system of parliamentary estimates 76 , but the initial assumption that
governments (in practice, Britain and France) would be prepared to approve notional
figures seems to have set up an abiding distrust in the BTO secretariat by the partner
governments77.
The BTO Cultural Programme
The four continental partners accepted the British view that the bilateral convention
system should be regarded as the core of the system, but resisted the notion that a
joint programme should be minimal. An internal note by the British Council's Richard
Seymour, who played a leading role in the work of the "Cultural Experts", explicitly
took as its measurement of success the work of CAME: if these "experiments"
succeeded, they would achieve "the sort of inter-allied co-operation in administration
which existed during the war" 78 — an intriguing British parallel to the way in which
continental Europeans sought to carry across their Resistance experiences into post-
war cultural policy.
The programme devised was hasty and looks fitted in around other, more pressing,
work, without much part being played by the secretariat. As with much multilateral
cultural cooperation, it gives the impression that its objectives were formulated to fit
76 under the system of annual estimates, UK government departments had to seek and justify
supplementary estimates on individual items approved by the Treasury if they wished to incur extra
spending during the year. The only alternative was for offsetting savings to be made from the British
Council budget, causing many agonies over priorities. For example, the Foreign Office failed to
persuade the Treasury to authorise extra spending on a contribution to a series of Five Power (i.e. BTO)
films about western art ("a frill") (PRO FO 924/908).
77 "the so-called budget is a collection of random guesses", briefed a CRD official (PRO FO 924/747)
78 PRO FO 924/746
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the action rather than vice versa79 . Accordingly it is difficult to discern a guiding aim
5ehind the rather miscellaneous programme which was assembled by trial and error.
The creation of new bodies a la UNESCO was ruled out. Although high profile
projects were not excluded in theory, in practice lack of access to resources made it
unlikely that anything ambitious would be attempted. Having decided, or in the case
of the UK conceded, that the BTO should create a programme, the committee of
cultural experts seems to have selected activity which conformed broadly to two
categories — administrative and service 80. The first covers administrative action to
negotiate changes in the national regulatory framework which meet the goals of
multilateral cultural cooperation: something which approaches the approximation of
laws, either through the signing of an international convention or through unilateral
action in each country. BTO does not seem to have contemplated normative action
which would change national policies: in practice action only happened if it could be
achieved without changes in policy being necessary, as opposed to modifications in
procedure.
This was the case with early BTO action to try to remove obstacles to the free
movement of cultural and educational material. Understandably, given wartime
restrictions, the facilitating of travel and of import and export were the key themes.
On the basis of a questionnaire each country identified administrative barriers which
existed under its present provisions and tried to press within government for
relaxation of controls (for example, on the importation of works of art). Results were
not spectacular - the tendency was for liberalisation to take place only when this
would have happened anyway, - but the exercise had some merit in that it obliged the
79
a frequent criticism of the cultural programme of the Council of Europe
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lead policy departments to look for concessions which could be offered up in the spirit
of cooperation without involving major policy shifts 81 . Comparative information
material was also provided which could be used for monitoring the progress of
liberalisation.
The question of passports is especially interesting as it led to a debate about whether it
was possible to discriminate between would-be immigrants on the grounds of
"cultural status". This revealed the gap in thinking between the UK and its partners.
The former found distasteful the idea that "cultural persons" were somehow morally
more deserving than others, even if a workable definition could be found, which it left
was unlikely. The latter were much readier to extend the boundaries and worry about
refining definitions afterwards if this turned out to be necessary.
The outcome of this falls into the second, service, category. As originally conceived
the card would have been a "cultural passport", as valid for travel as a real passport.
The compromise was found in a French suggestion for creating a "Cultural Identity
Card" which would entitle the holder to concessions such as access to collections,
reduced accommodation costs or cheap travel. There was found to be a demand82. The
scheme was later taken over by the Council of Europe and lasted well into the 1970s,
enjoying in its time a degree of success that persuaded the UK to drop its original
opposition.
80 BTO itself did not classify its activity in this — or any other - way
81 examples of this included persuading rail companies to offer fare concessions by for groups of young
people travelling "for cultural purposes"; ensuring the removal of restrictions on the importation of
types of printed matter (the UK proudly announced the implementation of open general import licences
for all sheet music except "cheap dance music from the USA"); and attempts to institute a single
passport or entry card for youth groups (this was firmly resisted in the UK, where officials despairingly
suggested that a sheepdog might be hired instead) (PRO FO 924/751). It is notable that very little
attempt is made to justify a refusal to act where this is given
82 L yu 1968 around 30,000 had been issued (M. Palmer, J. Lambert et al., "European Unity: a Survey of
the European Organisations", George Allen & Unwin, 1969)
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The great merit of the Cultural Identity Card was that it could be described and held
up as a practical example of the benefits of cooperation. It may not have made much
appreciable difference to the numbers of "cultural visits" but it was made use of and,
unlike the vast majority of multilateral cultural cooperation projects, had measurable
results. It is probably the closest cultural cooperation has ever come to establishing a
popular, recognisable European "service" aimed at the general public 83 . Both types of
cooperation responded in some sense to the overall aim of Article 111 84, if somewhat
indirectly. But they did help to make the nuts and bolts of cultural transactions a little
easier and "European cooperation" could be pointed to as the agency which achieved
this. If that cooperation additionally offered the public something which had not
previously been available to it, the result should be warm feelings towards the source
of that something. This is closer to the functionalist concept of the transfer of
loyalties 85 (from the national towards the European) than to the somewhat pedagogic
formulation of Article III.
Throughout its history there was disagreement between the UK and the continental
partners about the purpose of BTO activity. The UK wanted cultural cooperation to
focus on public awareness, on the understanding of democratic values and systems
and on mutual appreciation of one another's education systems. Its favourite types of
activity were courses for teachers, civil servants and youth leaders. Its representatives
constantly complained about, and were baffled by, the emphasis placed by the
83 another "service" activity, a "calendar of congresses" put together by the British Council, was
dropped to general relief once it was found to be entirely unwanted. Briefly dredged up again in the
mid-1980s by the Council of Europe as "Europe's Cultural Summer", it enjoyed a similar span of
popularity and life.
't "...to lead their peoples towards a better understanding of the principles which form the basis of their
common civilization...."
85 the idea of culture as a method of achieving loyalty transfer will be examined in the context of the
EU
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continental partners on "high culture" and on artistic appreciation which, to the UK,
had nothing to do with the aim of creating a "Western European point of view". If
anything symbolised this gap, it was the idea of a "cultural person": a British account
of the discussion about this comments plaintively that "with the exception of the
Belgian representative, the others were thinking in terms merely of professors,
students and practitioners of the arts and journalists, film producers etc... .They did
not seem interested in exchanges of trade unionists and rising men and women
pursuing ordinary non-cultural vocations. Similarly they showed an undue interest in
the more rarefied things such as poetry, modern pictures etc. ... ”86
Some of the reasons for this difference are discernible from the files. It is clear from
the set of papers just quoted that the sense of European culture under siege was not far
from the surface. National interests were also in play. For France, it would have been
less than strategic to allow a cultural cooperation programme to play down the artistic
and intellectual achievements of Europe, since it was there that France had already
decided its claims to world leadership chiefly resided. Meanwhile for the Benelux
countries, the BTO represented an opportunity to export and promote their own
cultural products, albeit in a limited setting, on a par with the so-called "major
powers". Thus "high culture", where excellence was unpredictable and did not
necessarily reflect a country's political status, was simply not the secondary issue for
the continental countries that it was for Britain.
BTO approached the audiovisual sector cautiously, and without, it appears, any idea
of trying to regulate it in common. In the sphere of the broadcast media the technical
nature of the main issues (such as wavelength standardisation for television) masked
86 PRO FO 924/728
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some of the difference in viewpoint. Here the sector was already working on problems
independently, via the European Broadcasting Union. There seems to have been
general agreement that it was best equipped to agree its own solutions without
interference. BTO was kept informed but added nothing to the policy deliberations on
such issues. The main stumbling block tended to be incompatibility of government
policies towards the administration of broadcasting. In 1949 a Franco-Belgian
proposal for a unified TV system was briefly considered but not pursued: the
differences in approach were too great 87 . Often, BTO ideas were simply dismissed by
the BBC88 which preferred to make its own arrangements.
The case of film was somewhat different. Everyone accepted it was important to
establish some kind of cooperation. For the British film was the vital "popularising"
link which would help build up commitment to the theme of Western solidarity89.
Their interest, accordingly, was in non-fiction. The agenda of the continental partners
was initially, in discussion at least, much more geared towards resisting the
encroachment of Hollywood 90 . However, the actual work of BTO's film group, which
remained as a separate entity in the WEU and was finally incorporated as a technical
committee into the Council of Europe, seems to have consisted mainly of conducting
studies into topics of interest and developing recommendations on aspects of good
practice. There was also a modest system for the circulation of newsreels 91 . Attempts
were made to create BTO information films but these depended on interest from
87 the Foreign Office briefed its permanent representative that the bilateral negotiations it was pursuing
with France were quite difficult enough without trying to negotiate through BTO
88 such as an exchange system for radio broadcasts. The British Broadcasting Corporation was also
outside direct government control and could not be obliged to implement any commitments made by
the government on its behalf
89 to the Foreign Office, film was simply a medium. They were just as interested in organising public
lectures
90 with, again, the strongest anti-American sentiment coming from the Dutch
91 these tended to be of military manoeuvres with names like "Operation Bulldog"
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independent organisations whose risks could not always be underwritten, tended to be
onerous as well as labour-intensive and as often as not had to be dropped.
By 1951 the BTO system seemed to have shaken down to the extent that both the
French and the British wondered whether there was enough for the committee to do92.
The "cultural" part of its remit was mainly restricted to the initiatives already
mentioned. The possibility had existed from the start of merger with the Council of
Europe, whose own Cultural Experts' group was getting under way and was drawing
on the BTO members' experience of cooperation.
Further progress seemed to depend on whether anything more could be done towards
the liberalisation of exchange of goods and persons following the initial concessions.
These did lead to a progressive reduction in the categories of items which could not
be imported under Open General Licence or the continental equivalent. Nevertheless,
in the UK the subject was regarded by the Board of Trade as a matter for the OEEC,
thus drawing attention to a recurrent problem of cultural cooperation: the fact that
much of its natural territory forms part of a larger area of work proper to other bodies
and subject to different priorities. The Committee of Cultural Experts could and did
exert some pressure nationally to have books, in particular, given a priority grade in
terms of customs treatment.
The work on cultural free trade (including the Cultural Identity Card) had been
deemed successful, and there were modest achievements to record on the exchange of
newsreels and educational films, and joint courses. There were no significant
achievements on art gallery and library exchange, translation, exhibitions or attempts
92 see PRO FO 924/906, Richard Seymour's account of a conversation with M. Joxe of France
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to set up a fund for culture. Talks on television standardisation had also failed to
produce agreement: the UK and France had chosen one standard, the rest another.
Finally, the issue of reaching agreement on the protection of works of art in wartime,
initially seen as an important part of the agenda, had been taken over by the
Conference on Civil Defence.
Much of the documentation of the "cultural experts" emphasises the extent to which
its members themselves had developed a spirit of cooperation 93 . However, there is a
sense that this was substituted for creative intellectual input. When the organisation
came to review its achievements, it simply checked off its original shopping list of
ideas. Throughout the meeting records there is little hint that the group tried to define
what it should or might achieve through cultural cooperation. Rather, it seems to have
operated by trying out ideas, of which those which met with the least opposition
would be taken forward. Fundamentally, it operated on a principle close to
Parkinson's Law that work expands to fill the space available.
Whether it could seriously claim to have acted to lead the populations of its signatory
states towards a deeper appreciation of the principles which form the basis of their
common civilisation seems debatable. The UK thought that it did, on the grounds that
much of the effort had been steered away from artistic enterprises towards what it
considered a practical programme of study visits by professional groups and
conferences of university vice-chancellors 94 . This is consistent with a view of cultural
cooperation which sees its purpose as back-up to a defence treaty: a kind of peace-
93 cf. the Secretary-General's review of BTO's achievements in its first three years, PRO FO 924/870
94 on the one occasion when the Arts Council of Great Britain appears in the BTO discussions, the
observation is the following: the ACGB is "an independent body concerned only with artistic matters
and ....could not be asked to take an interest in Western Union" (PRO FO 924/727)
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time version of war-time propaganda, where it helps if you understand and have
sympathy for the people who are supposed to be on the same side as you.
For those who were uneasy with the yoking of culture so easily to defence
propaganda, as the papers note the French were, or who had looked to BTO to provide
services geared to the study and conservation of European visual arts (the Belgian
representative), or for a programme aimed at encouraging the appreciation of modern
art (the Dutch), this record looks less impressive. At the level of identifying some of
the operational difficulties in the way of cultural free trade, BTO had served a useful
purpose but that had led only to incremental changes in administrative action, which
were still better than no changes at all.
It is difficult to resist the conclusion that the absence of a British experience of
wartime occupation may have been a strong underlying theme in BTO's conflict of
ideologies. Without direct experience of the repression or perversion of cultural life,
and with an idea of cultural relations based on the security of ordinary life, the UK
delegates failed to make a connection between "high culture" and ideas about
solidarity. Instead they dismissed their colleagues, for much of the time, as
"companies of clouds" not because of any strongly idealistic approach taken by the
latter95
 but because they saw the European "high" cultural tradition as a potentially
unifying force, aimed at least in part in restoring a European sense of self-respect.
To assess BTO's success as a first attempt at European level by countries to work out
a strategy for cultural cooperation where there was relatively little pre-existing
community of interest to draw upon, one must note first that it does not assume
95 
apart from Belgium's M. Kuypers, who really does seem to have had a dream
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anything other than state-centred interest: the fundamental aim of the Treaty, after all,
is to preserve and strengthen a defence alliance. But in the provision of unifying
symbols or services, BTO was weak. It did best when examining practical aspects of
administration which approximate to law — its work towards reciprocal loosening of
import barriers on cultural material and, to a lesser extent, on free movement of
persons, and interchange of individuals wishing to learn about aspects of its
administrative systems. In this respect it began to move towards the kind of process of
harmonisation of legislation practised by the EU: the kind of "hard policy" which
operates, directly or indirectly, to modify the economic climate within which culture
exists. In its other manifestation, that of managing public opinion, its "cultural" aspect
is unimpressive — it must be doubtful whether even the holders of BTO cultural
identity cards felt significantly more positive about Western Union than they would
have done without them. Its successes in this area lay much more in providing a
framework within which essentially bilateral mechanisms — visits and courses — could
be applied, but which remained small-scale.
Western European Union and NATO
Before leaving the subject of cultural cooperation as an adjunct of defence and foreign
policy, one must touch, briefly, upon the later history of BTO as Western European
Union (WEU) and the cultural aspects of NAT0 96. The expected merger of BTO and
Council of Europe cultural work was in fact deferred until the beginning of the 1960s.
The Foreign Office hoped that BTO might come to be regarded as "a sort of steering
committee for the Council of Europe Cultural Experts, so that within the larger group
96 North Atlantic Treaty Alliance
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the smaller should pursue previously agreed policies"; meanwhile within WEU, the
FRG and Italy would be joining "a going concern.. .offering quick returns" 97 in terms
of links between government officials, school inspectors, youth leaders and teachers.
The main purpose of WEU, once the negotiations to establish a European Defence
Community had failed 98 , was to draw together the strands in a package which offered
a forum for restoring German sovereignty and controlling rearmament 99 . The old BTO
Consultative Council expanded to include meetings on foreign policy and defence. It
also enabled the UK and the European Community's member states to meet on neutral
grounds until UK accession in 1973, after which it fell somewhat into abeyance.
There is no particular reason to assume that its cultural activity differed significantly
from that of the BTO. It continued to take some interest in civil service exchange until
at least the late 1980s. It produced items as diverse as a five-language vocabulary
book of cinematographic terms 1 °° and the system of conferences of European
university rectors which in due course became the Council of Europe's Committee on
University Problems. It also kept the Cultural Identity Card going until the Council of
Europe took it over.
In general, studies of NATO rarely mention the cultural aspect of its operations.
The NATO treaty, signed in 1949, had scope for cultural cooperation under Article II
but no action was taken until 1953, possibly triggered by WEU expansion. According
to Max Beloff 101
 this was at the insistence of Canada, which could not accept a
97 PRO FO 924/1042. The Public Record Office does not have records later than 1953 relating to
cultural cooperation in WEU
98 in 1954; see Milward, op.cit, pp 119-120, and others
99 Archer, 1994, op.cit
100 the Italian for a 'sprocket-hole' is 'perforazione'
101 M. Beloff, "New Dimensions in Foreign Policy", Allen & Unwin, 1961
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defence arrangement which had no political underpinning. Heald and Kaplanm2
suggest that the motivation for this, in their view unconvincing, element was to ensure
that NATO could be classified as a regional arrangement which supported common
culture, and was thus consistent with the UN charter m and not a rival regional power-
base. A third likely factor was the beginning of a NATO Information Service the
previous year104.
The Foreign Office disapproved of the bracketing of cultural relations with
information, which in NATO was run on lines modelled closely on the US State
Department and in which they thought cultural cooperation would come off worse105.
However, there was widespread European support for a NATO effort at cultural
cooperation l °6 , inspired by a growing feeling that NATO had to be grounded more
thoroughly in public consciousness as a spiritual as well as a military alliance. Jordan
notes the view of the first Secretary-General, Lord Ismay: "he recognised that it was
not enough continually to assure the Russians of the unity and steadfastness of the
Alliance to resist aggression: it was almost equally necessary to convince the peoples
of the Member countries of the existence of this unity and the necessity of it"107.
The thinking mirrored that behind the Brussels Treaty, showing just how far the value
of cultural cooperation as an underpinning to defence alliances had by 1953 become
102".m Heald, & L. S. Kaplan, "Culture and Diplomacy, the American Experience", Greenwood Press,
1977
103 they note that this "regional" status was seen by many as a get-out clause which permitted regional
aggression independently of the UN, since it implied action might legitimately be taken within the
region in defence of common values — as, for example, in the recent Kosovo action
104 R. S. Jordan, "The NATO International Staff/Secretariat 1952-1957", Oxford University Press, 1967
105 the large number of books by former State Department heads of cultural relations explaining why
cultural relations is as important as information suggests the Foreign Office was probably right
106 see also S. L. Bills, "The US, NATO and the Third World: Dominoes, Imbroglios and Agonising
Appraisals", in L. S Kaplan, (ed.), "NATO after Forty Years", SR Books, 1990, on the suddenly
pressing need to repackage NATO after the 1950 US Congress hearings
107 Jordan, op. cit., p. 173
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accepted wisdom. The Council of Europe also considered the possibility in the
context of the proposed European Defence Community in the 1950s'° 8 . One UK
official likened the apparent trend for every international organisation at that time to
go in for cultural cooperation to "a species of cultural mumps" I °9 , an ailment that
children go through (but usually get over). But in the case of NATO, American
mumps was the worst.
As Peter Coleman 110 shows, this was the period when the CIA was investing covertly
in the Congress for Cultural Freedom, an association of intellectuals active until the
late 1960s in organising seminars and conferences. This might almost be seen as a
revival of the Paul Valery "Entretiens" - intellectual cooperation, but this time used
for explicitly western political priorities. Ninkovich argues that for the Americans
cultural relations had become intellectual relations with "ideas as the determinant
cultural reality" — culture thus became "the last hurdle before international
understanding ol 1.11. This is an interesting distinction, harking back, first, to
Coudenhove-Kalergi's perception that culture is intimately linked to national identity
and, second, to the proposition that the world of the intellect is essentially universal.
For the USA intellectual relations involved the conflict of two systems, western and
eastern.
There was a general feeling among the European partners that if the Americans
wanted to use NATO for cultural cooperation they should be allowed to, since this
would help keep them interested in the defence of Europe. UK policy was to
108 the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly was the debating chamber for the European Defence
Community proposal
109 PRO FO 924/1012
110 P. Coleman, "The Liberal Conspiracy", Macmillan, 1989
1 I I Ninkovich, op.cit., p. 182
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encourage NATO to concentrate on transatlantic interchange 112 . In a rare burst of
forward thinking, the Netherlands' Dr Reinink, who was also one of the BTO's
cultural experts, was commissioned to produce a report on the prospects for NATO
cultural cooperation. To the horror of the British, he came up with proposals for a
wide-ranging cultural programme based on Europe intended to "create a recognised
Atlantic community, or more accurately to obtain recognition that an Atlantic
community exists" 113 ( in effect, a spiritual Marshall Plan for Western Europe
requiring, naturally, a substantial budget).
Although the Foreign Office records do not make it clear what happened, the Reinink
report was quietly shelved, no doubt on expense grounds 114 but also because NATO
governments were not prepared to upgrade cultural cooperation to a full-scale
"cultural community", or, in the words of Richard Seymour "a kind of Atlantic
version of the Commonwealth" rather than "a façade for talking purposes". By the end
of 1954, the UK permanent delegation to NATO reported that "the committee is now
so lost in the maze of Dr Reinink's report that if nothing is done to throw out precise
proposals we shall all have culture engraved on our hearts at the retiring age!".
Nevertheless a limited programme did get under way. Again, it seems that the absence
of a clear common aim seems to have disabled cultural cooperation. However, Beloff
notes that all the civilian activities of NATO were kept starved of funding, with the
result that the military arm achieved a "genuine internationalism" which did not
extend to the civilian side. Jordan confirms that this was the fate of the Information
112 the information for this section is contained in PRO FO 924/1012 and 1038
113 PRO FO 924/1038. The Foreign Office view was that nothing could be gained by encouraging
NATO to duplicate existing intra-European cooperation
114 the State Department, after all, was already getting results though bilateral, if covert, means
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Division: he does not mention the Reinink report, but states that "many projects
suggested by the Division were not carried through, owing to lack of money or of
adequate terms of reference, or of domestic support and encouragement" 5 . While
NATO has retained a programme of support for exchange, I have been unable to
establish that it ever undertook a programme involving "pure culture". Council of
Europe papers 116 suggest that by 1965 all contacts of a cultural cooperation nature
were with its Scientific Division, which offered research grants.
Conclusion
On the basis of its record of achievement, it would be hard to claim that cultural
cooperation succeeded in establishing a climate of public trust and confidence in the
post-war Western Europe defence alliances. There are no accounts in the UK records
of either which suggest that the work was even known outside a small section of the
European population' 17; unlike UNESCO, where the files contain frequent references
to public reaction to its programmes 118 . Had WEU become the European pillar of
NAT0 119 , and perhaps its "civilian" arm as well, a stronger cultural emphasis might
have developed. Instead, WEU's eventual future bias leaned towards the European
Union, where culture was by that time already on the point of being established within
115 Jordan, op. cit., p. 188. Examples of NATO cultural initiatives given include the NATO Caravan of
Peace, paid for by the US government and a big success in Greece, Italy and Turkey, where
vulnerability to USSR cultural propaganda was felt to be a daily reality; films about NATO, study
visits for journalists and latterly a scientific publications programme
116 CCC (65) 21
117 there are, for example, no press cuttings or evaluation studies
118 not always favourable
119 see J. Myers, "The WEU: Pillar of NATO or Defence Arm of the EC?", London Defence Studies, no.
16, 1993
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the EU's Treaty competences, and its cultural work was hived off to the very different
Council of Europe.
Some tentative conclusions can be drawn from these try-outs for a distinctive
European multilateral cultural cooperation, on its own or within a global organisation.
The first is that culture was incorporated into new international relations systems
where it had not previously figured in order to act as a stimulus towards a political
goal which was not necessarily cultural. The goal might be European unity, world
peace and security, or defence and mutual aid, but it was not the federal ideal of
fostering diversity. The second is that there was no clear consensus on the ways in
which cultural cooperation might help to achieve that goal. Within the organisations
where the UK was a dominant voice, cultural cooperation centred on an intensified
web of contacts and relations for exchanging information about each other's systems
but not interested in common policies or in culture per se. The prevailing imagery
being purveyed was that of western-style democracy and liberal institutions. For
continental Europe, this was an incomplete imagery which needed to be supplemented
by assertions of Europe's past spiritual and cultural greatness and its potential for
future renaissance. These were, fundamentally, different self-images, appealing to
different popular needs and arising from different experiences of the war and of the
inversion of civilisation perceived by Stephen Spender.
In trying to create and apply its own view of multilateral cultural cooperation, the UK
Foreign Office disregarded and distrusted the substantial, specifically "European",
tradition of intellectual cooperation which had been built up without its participation
on the continent. It regarded UNESCO as the sole suitable venue for intellectual
cooperation, which took insufficient account of its importance in a European context.
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The report of Sir Alfred Zimmern I2° to the UNESCO Preparatory Commission on
what might be learned from the ICIC hints at the way the UK might have wanted
things to go. This envisages a synthesis of ICIC and CAME which combined some
acknowledgement of the Bergson "élan vital" as an element in cooperation with a
serious emphasis on planned action undertaken only after the rationale for it had been
clearly understood and agreed. Much of the subsequent disillusionment with
UNESCO, particularly in the case of the anglophone countries, came from the sense
that it was devising programmes for the sake of being seen to be busy and active,
which in turn seems to have led to a pattern of under-resourcing 121
 which has
remained to the present day.
The financial aspects of cultural cooperation also reflect the UK-France polarity. In
terms of national policy interest, France had more to gain from a substantial
investment in cultural cooperation 122
 while in order to justify the use of public funds
on any scale 123
 the UK relied on visible returns the nature of which it could rarely
predict. This was even more the case for the US State Department, which had endless
battles with Congress over UNESCO. The perception that money spent on the
intellectual-creative areas of cultural cooperation was not money well spent worked
against the Anglo-Saxon rationale for supporting cultural cooperation in the first
place, i.e. that public perception of the international systems themselves would
improve.
120 the original UK candidate for the job of secretary-general, and a former deputy to Bonnet at IIIC:
the Foreign Office thought the report the best such document they had seen
121 it may not be accidental that the UK, at least, thought the most efficient of the programmes was the
one where governments kept direct control of the purse strings
122 
as Jacques Rigaud noted, the benefits of UNESCO to France are increased twelvefold by the simple
fact of its presence in Paris (J. Rigaud, "Les Relations CultureIles Exterieures, Rapport au Ministere
des Affaires Etrangeres", Documentation Francaise, 1979)
123 c.f. the history of public criticism of the British Council
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Even so, and despite conventional wisdom about British attitudes to Europe, the
papers suggest, not so much UK unwillingness to participate in a specifically
European cultural cooperation like BTO, as misgivings about the value of cultural
programmes in general. The Foreign Office was extremely sensitive to accusations of
not being interested in Europe and felt the record would show that it had played its
part. What it was not able to show was an appreciation of the extent to which cultural
cooperation in Europe was bound up with the continental experience of the war and
the way in which appeals, such as that of de Rougemont, to culture as the core and
defining "European experience" were more than superficial rallying-calls for the
window-dressing of a political project.
Finally, these early experiments show how unlikely it was that the functionalist
argument in favour of integration, that of essential services more efficiently delivered,
would become applicable to cultural cooperation. Its advantages were political,
whether in the form of a quasi-propagandist rebuttal to the Soviet "cultural offensive",
of more popular support for the Western European defence alliances or of securing
influence in developing countries in a non-imperialist way. Cultural cooperation
would be judged on how it achieved these objectives. Yet such objectives were clearly
difficult to achieve when strongly contrasted sets of motives were in operation.
The Council of Europe, examined in the next chapters, brings the duality of European
cultural cooperation together. Its forty-five year history shows how the attempt has
been made to develop a working theory of cultural cooperation from the different
strands already established through the extended bilateralism of the UK and the much
more deeply embedded process of social reshaping under a cultural agenda which the
federalists had installed within an integration context. These were modified in turn by
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the highly case-specific tradition of Nordic cooperation. The interaction of all these
produces what the Council itself likes to think of as a "philosophy", but which in fact
is a process of continuous reinvention in response to changing circumstances.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
The Council of Europe: background and structure
The Council of Europe and its cultural cooperation span half a century. Within that
time it has acted as a testing-ground for different approaches in cultural cooperation.
In order to present this process as coherently as possible, this and the chapters
following will deal thematically with the Council's work, beginning with an historical
explanation of the context, political and administrative, within which it takes place.
This is followed by an account of its main programme orientations over the years, and
will conclude with an examination of the themes emerging from these and their
implications for European cultural cooperation.
International relations theory and literature
Terminology drawn from international relations theory is helpful for locating cultural
cooperation within a theoretical framework, and can also read across to developments
in thinking related to cultural policy at the domestic level. Particular attention is paid
in the following chapters to the idea of cultural cooperation as an attempt to
demonstrate "communitarian" theory within international relations, as opposed to
"cosmopolitan theory", as developed by Chris Brown l . The analysis also makes use of
the ideas of James Der Derian 2 relating to "anti-diplomacy".
1 C. Brown, "International Relations Theory: New Normative Approaches", Harvester/Wheatsheaf,
1992
2 J. Der Derian, 1987, op.cit
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This thesis favours a realist, or neo-realist 3 , approach to explain outcomes, in that
these are attributed to the interests and behaviour of individual states rather than an
assumed 'consensus' represented by the organisation itself and, indeed, purveyed by
the organisation as an image of cooperation. The work of Keohane4, a neo-realist, will
also be drawn upon for definitions of "cooperation" and that of Deutsch for
consideration of "policy" and the characteristics of integration. However, the choice
of commentators (in a wide field) is guided partly by the extent to which they take
into account the non-realist, especially idealist, approaches which play such a large
part in cultural cooperation. It will be argued that the essential elements of such
cooperation are identity and interest, separately or together. International relations
theory as a critique of cultural cooperation will be examined in chapter 9.
Literature of the Council of Europe
Cultural cooperation in the Council of Europe has, as usual, very little critical
literature. The closest is the account by Grosjean (1994) 5 , a valuable and accurate
synthesis which undertakes some analysis but is essentially a commissioned work of
advocacy and celebration and does not pretend to be a critical examination. Haigh
3 the term "realist" in international relations is associated with E. H. Carr (who according to Brown
(1997) supplied the international relations vocabulary) and with M. Wight, whose essay "Why is there
no international theory?" (published in H. Butterfield and M. Wight, (eds.), "Diplomatic
Investigations", George Allen and Unwin, 1966) is regarded as seminal (see S. Smith, in "International
Relations Theory Today" (S. Smith & K. Booth, eds.), Polity Press, 1995; also C. Brown,
"Understanding International Relations", Macmillan, 1997). In this view, international relations is
primarily about the way nation states pursue their particular interests within a system which is
fundamentally anarchic. Neo-realism seeks to explain the unpredictability of such behaviour by
identifying the sets of rules which govern and constrain it. Realism is seen by Wight as deriving from
Machiavelli, and is compared with other traditions (rationalism, revolutionism), deriving from Grotius
and Kant respectively.
4 R. 0 Keohane, "International Relations and State Power", Westview Press, 1989
5 E. Grosjean, "European Cultural Convention 1954— 1994", Council of Europe, 1994
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(1974) 6 presents the early years of cultural cooperation within the CoE, but again is an
advocate. A doctoral thesis published in book form 7 analyses the "cultural policy" of
the Council but is in German and therefore inaccessible to this author. Baeten 8 (1987)
offers a description from the point of view of an arts administrator seeking to provide
information, but this is not, on the whole, a critique and is out of date.
Some histories of the organisation exist, 9 most of which make reference to its cultural
function and generally agree that it is one of the justifications of the Council's
existence. More general works also refer to it in this context. However, it tends to be
mainly the educational side of the programme which is singled out, with the exception
of the Council of Europe art exhibitions, an unbroken series from the early 1950s to
the present day. Its intergovernmental nature makes some critics assume that the
Council's cultural cooperation is similar to bilateral cultural cooperation 1 °. De Witte
discusses the Council of Europe in his article "Cultural Linkages" but considers it
"cumbersome", is disparaging about the extent to which it remains in the control of
member states 12 and does not examine its programme. Roche & Pigniau (op.cit), in
their invaluable account of French cultural diplomacy, and J. M. Mitchell (ditto) both
ignore the Council of Europe. Two commentaries are provided by Denis de
6 A. Haigh, "Cultural Diplomacy in Europe", Council of Europe, 1974
7 J. Kruse, "Europaische Kulturpolitik am Beispiel des Europarats", Munster, 1992
8 E. Baeten, "Arts Policy of the European Community and the Council of Europe", 1987
9 P. Duclos, "Le Conseil de l'Europe", Presses Universitaires de France, 1970; A. H. Robertson, "The
Council of Europe: its Structure, Functions and Achievements", London Institute of World Affairs,
1956; J-L. Burban, "Le Conseil de l'Europe", Presses Universitaires de France, 1985. However, the
Council seems to hold little attraction for international relations theorists, who generally discuss
multilateral action in terms of the UN and its agencies
10 a typical such comment appears in William Wallace's introduction to "The Dynamics of European
Integration" (1990, op.cit), p. 17: "from the creation of the Council of Europe, with its modest cultural
exchanges and town-twinning schemes, to the ambitious programmes of Franco-German exchanges,
governments have acted on the assumption that increased interaction under conditions of mutual trust
does change attitudes"
II de Witte, in Wallace, op.cit., p. 196
12 as the following chapters will show, he is not entirely correct to dismiss it as "very much a tool in the
hands of the member governments" (ibid.).
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Rougemont, one in the form of an anniversary assessment 13 , the title of which says it
all, and the other a "bilan" of achievement carried out by his Centre in 196414.
Accordingly, these chapters draw heavily upon documentation of the Council itself,
especially meeting papers of the officials' group 15 (variously called the Committee of
Cultural Experts and the Council for Cultural Cooperation) which are preserved at the
Council's headquarters in Strasbourg. These are backed up by public records of the
British Foreign Office and Ministry of Education (where available) 16 , which provide
insight into the early years, although little after the late 1950s has been retained17.
Finally, and to a limited extent only, the author's own notes and recollections as a
delegate to the Council for Cultural Cooperation from 1986 — 1996 have been
consulted.
The Congress of Europe and the Council of Europe
The background to the Council's creation is covered in many political memoirs of the
period as well as in accounts of the post-war development of international
organisations. There is a general consensus that the Council was defused politically
from the outset and remained useful mainly as a lubricator for the real business of
13 D. de Rougemont, "35 Ans d'Attentes Decues, mais d'Espoir Invaincu: le Conseil de lEurope", in
Cadmos issue no. 30, 1985 (journal of the European Cultural Centre, Lausanne)
14 European Cultural Centre, "Bilan des Activites Culture(les au Service de lEurope 1949-1964.
15 these papers have reference numbers indicating their provenance, year and order of issue: thus,
document CCC(67)4, the report of a working party, is a paper tabled at a meeting of the Council for
Cultural Cooperation in the first half of 1967
16 PRO FO 924/854, 878-9, 909-917,1008-9, 1224; FO 371/80119, 88628, 88647, 96355, 102316-8,
124788, 131008, 173361-5; and ED 121/1128, 1130-37 and 1144.
17 under the 30 year rule, material after 1969 is not yet public
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political integration 18 . Its role in European integration is now generally downplayed19
and it seems to have attracted little critical attention on its own account 20 . However, it
is important politically for having been the crucible 21 , in the early 1950s, for
integration schemes including the "Schuman Plan" which became the European
Communities, and again as a re-entry point, in the 1990s, for the states of the former
eastern bloc, including Russia.
The Council of Europe was formally established in 1948 as an intergovernmental
body without supranational powers, or indeed any decision-making capability
independent of its member states. It has a tripartite composition - a Committee of
Ministers (foreign ministers whose powers are delegated to a group cA peAxwar\eat
representatives, the Ministers' Deputies), a Consultative Parliamentary Assembly
made up of delegates from national parliaments, and a permanent secretariat 22 . Its
main instruments of regulation are intergovernmental conventions, backed up with
non-binding recommendations and resolutions. The latter may be taken by the
Assembly and passed to the Committee of Ministers for endorsement, action, or
inaction.
Its intergovernmental nature, with no transfer of sovereign powers, prevented the
Council from gaining acceptance as an arbiter of "European policy", by which is
meant a level of reference higher than the national against which domestic policy
18 Federalist historians, such as Mayne and Pinder (1990, op.cit) writing from a UK perspective, and
Greilsammer (1975, op.cit), writing from a French one, agree in regarding it as having been subverted
by British (mainly) and Scandinavian (partly) insistence that it remain intergovernmental and without
legislative powers to override Member States
19 
e.g. by Milward (op.cit), Margaret Sharp in Wallace (1990, op.cit)
20 •
m English — the same may not be true elsewhere
21 in the words of the Belgian statesman Paul-Henri Spaak, it acted as an "aircraft-carrier" (PRO FO
371/73095)
22other organs, such as the European Court of Human Rights, are obviously important to the
organisation but have no particular relevance for cultural cooperation
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decisions were taken and measured. For Archer, the Council was the "spirit level",
supplying moral pressure, debate and attempts at standard-setting which were closely
bound up with the idea of Europe as a moral entity acting for a more enlightened
governance within the world. A key feature was that it offered, in Archer's words, "an
ideological orientation for even the Western European states that were unable to join
NATO" 23 . The Nordic countries thus enjoyed a particular status and influence from
the start, reinforced by their ability to co-ordinate amongst themselves, something
which the BTO countries had never really achieved. Subsequently it served the same
function for the new democracies of central and eastern Europe.
Given its links with the Congress of Europe, it would have been surprising if the
Council had not attempted cultural cooperation from the outset. In the Council's
statute this is an explicitly moral commitment to the "ideals and principles which are
their24 common heritage". The context is different, however, from that of BTO or
NATO: the goal which is to be served is that of European unity, not a specific
alliance. Foreign policy and defence, with which cultural cooperation had to date been
associated, were excluded from the remit of the Council of Europe, which was instead
focused on social and economic progress. It was associated also with human rights
and "fundamental freedoms". This immediately gave cultural cooperation an interior
context, related to the management of society within member states' own borders,
which had not been present previously.
Structurally, the Council was set up as a debating chamber (the Consultative
Assembly) whose recommendations would be remitted to an executive (the
23 Archer (1994), op.cit., p. 59
24 i.e.	 the signatory states
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Committee of Ministers) for decision25 . The secretariat provided services to both, but
separately. As the Assembly began to set up its various specialist committees, so
"shadow" committees of national servants were convened to examine the results and
advise their ministers on how to proceed. Accordingly, in the early days of the
Council of Europe the running on content was made by the Assembly, several of
whose members on the cultural affairs committee were convinced federalists and
veterans of the Hague Congress. It is not surprising, therefore, to find that the
Assembly took up many of the recommendations from the Congress, chief amongst
them the creation of a European Cultural Centre and a College of Europe.
The Centre, set up in Geneva shortly after the Congress took place under de
Rougemont's direction, was originally intended to fyaNe seNtrai identiIity. an
information centre, promoting "an awareness of European unity"; a forum, providing
"a meeting place for leaders of thought enabling them to express a genuinely
European point of view on all the great questions..."; a co-ordinator of scientific
research "especially in the spheres of Teaching, Psychology, Philosophy, Sociology
and Law"; a multilateral cooperation centre, encouraging "free circulation of ideas,
literature and works of art" between countries; and a focus for university cooperation
and textbook revision26.
This remit, a watered-down version of which appears in the cultural recommendation
from the Hague Congress, looks remarkably like that of the pre-war Institute of
Intellectual Cooperation. But two key tasks demonstrate de Rougemont's own vision
of the Centre as a political entity: it was "to exercise vigilant care over the words
25 the balance of power was intended to be about equal, with a quasi-bicameral feel
26 PRO FO 371/ 102318 (taken from De Rougemont's draft: the final text was much less detailed)
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actually used in discussion without which no pact could be concluded"; and was "to
affirm... the right of every citizen to ascertain the true facts of current events,
uninfluenced by interpretation or commentary and...the duty of every government to
secure for its people the exercise of that right...." In other words, it was to act as a
kind of supra-governmental arbiter: what de Rougemont himself had called "un
Conseil de l'Esprit europeen"27 . It would study and opine, not co-ordinate in a neutral
fashion. It would have a view and a policy; and this would be accepted in some sense
as a European policy.
De Rougemont had emerged from the Congress with approval for the principle of the
Centre but no institutional backing. The European Movement itself, now the voice of
European federalism, did not take over responsibility for the Centre, which received
instead what it hoped would be temporary financial support from the Swiss federal
authorities until the Council of Europe could be persuaded to assume sponsorship.
Once it was clear that the Council was not prepared to regard the Centre as its
"cultural self', Swiss support became permanent. The Centre continued (and
continues) to function as a research centre but its relationship with the Council of
Europe remained ill-defined and its influence on cultural cooperation at inter-
governmental level very limited. Today it is unknown outside specialist circles and
enjoys no political prestige. The European Movement invested more effort in the
College of Europe, set up at Bruges under the direction of the federalist historian
Henri Brugmans. Over the years the College, whilst not associated with the Council
of Europe, has become a mainstream, not specifically federalist, element of European
27 Deering, op.cit. p. 278
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integration and claims a significant proportion of European Commission staff as its
graduates. Unlike the Centre, it is highly regarded as a repository of expertise in
European integration studies.
Working methods: the Committee of Cultural Experts
The preparatory cultural work of the Hague Congress, and the "low-tech" 28 nature of
the subject matter, meant the Assembly had a raft of proposals ready for consideration
within a short time. As well as support for the Centre, these included the extension of
BTO work on the free circulation of cultural material; the creation of a system of
"practical aid" to "private organisations that are working to promote European
culture"; and meetings of ministers with responsibility for education and culture to
discuss an agenda suggested by the Assembly itself (which it thought should cover
topics such as the heritage, folklore, film and broadcasting etc.)29.
As a result a working group of officials from national culture and education ministries
(where these existed) and foreign ministries was convened at the beginning of 1950 to
advise the Committee of Ministers on the Assembly's recommendations, one of the
first areas to organise in this way. The group borrowed the title Committee of Cultural
Experts from BTO. The fate of the European Cultural Centre was discussed at official
level but postponed on Ministers' agendas until it was finally dropped altogether 30 .
However, the need to keep in mind the possibility that all cultural cooperation might
28 i.e.
	 requiring relatively little specialist advice
29 PRO FO 924/879
30
only the Netherlands appears to have offered serious political support for the Centre, which it
subsequently assisted through the formation of the European Cultural Foundation
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be remitted to such a body, and with it any available resources, meant that in the first
years it was difficult to develop a coherent in-house programme.
The early work of other committees is of limited interest in this study, except to
provide context. For example, in 1964 cultural cooperation was one of nine steering
committees working in areas as diverse as criminology, public health, human rights
and legal issues (where there were seven subject committees dealing with, inter alia,
patents, wines and spirits and foreign money liabilities). The pattern of work here
was, and is, normative, or standard-setting. Cultural cooperation, therefore, was
already unusual in Council of Europe terms in having relatively little to offer in the
normative area.
In its first years the Council was mired in conflict between the Committee of
Ministers and the Assembly. The former felt the latter was irresponsible and
unrealistic; the latter thought the former was interested only in thwarting its ambitions
and stifling imaginative debate 31 . The Cultural Experts' report to the Committee of
Ministers in June 1950 emphasised mainly educational cooperation. The Assembly
was not satisfied with this response and began to press for a less reductionist approach
to cultural cooperation which reflected its own ideals and identified "the common
elements of European culture (ideals and methods)" 32. Cultural cooperation proceeded
for some time in this somewhat unsatisfactory manner, as a series of proposals being
31 •in the course of a decade, it is interesting to note, the perception changed completely within the UK
Foreign Office: it felt that the Committee of Ministers had become stale and conservative, while the
Assembly was now acting as a genuine international forum for airing issues
32 AS (2) 65: Assembly motion for the organisation of a European Cultural Centre, 1950
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batted to and forth between the Assembly and the Committee of Ministers, without
much attempt to analyse either purpose or method, let alone impact33.
The European Cultural Convention
In 1954, Anthony Haigh, a British diplomat who had acquired a strong personal
commitment to the development of cultural cooperation, took on responsibility for
drafting of a European Cultural Convention 34
 which would establish a formal
instrument for the Council's activity in this field, though without defining its content.
This was intended to break the deadlock. The Assembly was initially suspicious of the
Convention, which it saw as a mechanism for constraining rather than griviZeging
cultural cooperation.
The European Cultural Convention was meant to act not just as a mechanism for
collective cooperation but as an "umbrella" convention providing cover to countries
who had not yet negotiated bilateral conventions with one another. While its structure
clearly reflects the UK preoccupation with defining multilateral cultural cooperation
as an extension of the bilateral form, the text does not establish any kind of hierarchy;
indeed, it barely alludes to bilateral cooperation at all. It is still the basis of
multilateral cultural cooperation within the Council of Europe.
33 
a UK civil servant comments that the experts "ought to be given comprehensible terms of reference
or else none at all and left to work out their own salvation as happened in Western Union" (PRO FO
924/ 880)
34 •it should be noted that the international convention, outlining general principles by which signatories
agreed to abide and action they agreed to take, would have been the most binding instrument open to
the Council of Europe for the regulation of a specific area in the absence of any coercive powers.
However, the European Cultural Convention seems to have been a one-off in terms of regulating
agreement on ends and means within Council fields of competence — other conventions exist, but
achieve specific aims in policy terms rather than creating the framework within which cooperation will
take place: another example of cultural cooperation's peculiarity as an area of cooperation
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Its features include a commitment in the preamble to "a policy of common action
designed to safeguard and encourage the development of European culture". The
signatories then agree to "take appropriate measures to safeguard and to encourage the
development of its national contribution to the common cultural heritage of Europe";
to encourage and promote the study of others' languages, history and civilisation; to
consult each other "within the framework of the Council of Europe with a view to
concerted action"; to facilitate the movement and exchange of objects and persons;
and to "regard the objects of European cultural value" in their control as "integral
parts of the common cultural heritage of Europe". At the secretariat's suggestion a
clause was included permitting the accession of non-member states of the Council if
invited to do so unanimously by the Committee of Ministers.
International conventions are considered to have binding force on their signatories but
are difficult to enforce, in the absence of meaningful sanctions 35 . The European
Cultural Convention's more radical elements seem to have been little noticed at the
time. The wording in effect commits its signatories to maintaining at national level
policies likely to lead to the overall enhancement of the "common cultural heritage of
Europe". There is no evidence, however, that the signatories have ever taken this to
heart. It also, as the Secretariat noted at the time, enunciates the fact of a "common
cultural heritage" in which all have an interest, just as, in the case of human rights, all
agree to participate in the work of the Court even if they do not accept its jurisdiction.
The nature of that heritage is, however, left undefined, as is the nature of the "policy
of common action" to be embarked upon as a result. There are no instances in which
35 as Oppermann notes in regard to UNESCO's Convention on Educational, Social and Cultural Rights,
"the juridical stringency of those rights.., must be doubted" (T. Opperman, "Cultural Agreements", in
Encyclopaedia of Public International Law, vol. 9, 1986, pp 56-58). The UNESCO Convention on the
Illicit Traffic of Cultural Policy is a good example of a convention with good intentions but little
chance of being enforced
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member states of the Council have been called to account by the organisation for any
alleged deficiencies in safeguarding this heritage. The European Cultural Convention
therefore does not enable the Council to act in any sense as an overseer of national
standards, or indeed as a setter of such standards.
It has also been noted that the capacity to extend membership to non-member states
during and particularly at the end of the Cold War period was significant. As well as
Finland, which acceded to the European Cultural Convention in 1970 but did not join
the Council of Europe as a full member until 1990, and Yugoslavia in 1987,
Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland were all able to accede in 1989, before
democratic governments had been established. Spain was able to participate in
cultural cooperation from 1957 onwards, while still under Franco. However, no-one
seems to have remarked on this far-sightedness at the time 36. Overall, the text of the
Convention might mean a lot, or very little. This flexibility of interpretation gives
states considerable latitude - one reason why there has been little member state
enthusiasm over the years for amending it37.
The Cultural Fund and the European Cultural Foundation
The Convention was supplemented in 1959 with a novel mechanism intended to
insulate its programme from the uncertainties of annual renegotiation by the
Ministers' Deputies. As the only Council of Europe committee with a more significant
spending programme than normative function, the Committee of Cultural Experts felt
the so-called Cultural Fund was needed not simply to carry over commitments from
one year to the next but also to raise additional funds from outside the public purse.
36
comments in the UK records indicate that it was not in fact a new idea in international diplomacy
37 •in 1999 there was, however, a proposal for amendment from the Netherlands
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The Council was by now conscious of efforts38
 to introduce cultural cooperation into
the European Communities, inclining the non-EEC member states to invest in
safeguarding their monopoly on this aspect of integration.
The Cultural Fund, therefore, far more than the European Cultural Convention, can be
seen as an attempt to rethink cultural cooperation and revive the Council of
Europe programme lest cultural cooperation migrate elsewhere, thus marginalising the
Council further. The financial arrangements involved a fixed national contribution
using a formula based on payments to the Council budget as a whole, supplemented
by additional voluntary contributions, which could be from private sources. This
remains the way CoE cultural cooperation is funded.
Haigh hoped that it would enable resources to be targeted on the larger projects that
had hitherto proved impossible to put together. In order to resolve concerns about
possible duplication, it included an agreement with the recently created European
Cultural Foundation (ECF) jointly to collect private funds, a proportion of which
would be retained by the ECF, the remainder to be paid into the Cultural Fund.
However, the gamble to attract significant sums from private sources failed badly.
The project was not attractive enough. ECF National Committees generated scarcely
any income for the Cultural Fund and the arrangement ended in 1962.
The European Cultural Foundation was set up in Geneva in 1954 in an attempt to
raise funds for the European Cultural Centre. In its early days it was closely
associated with the federalist movement, in particular de Rougemont and Brugmans.
Over the years, however, that link has become less strong. De Rougemont's account
38 such as the Belgian led group "L'Intergroupe des Interets Intellectuels" which attracted some notice
in 1955 from leading integrationist figures such as Robert Schuman
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of the setting up of the ECF (for which he claims credit) appears in the Foundation's
journal39 . The aim was to replicate in Europe the great American foundations
"financed by capital drawn from Europe itself...to restore our continent's sense of
moral independence, to give our research scientists and creative artists confidence in
themselves and in the future". The Netherlands government shortly afterwards
oversaw its move in 1957 to Amsterdam.
The ECF is interesting partly as an early experiment in cross-national business
sponsorship. Prince Bernhard announced at the Foundation's first Congress in 1957
his aim of attracting contributions of 5,000 guilders apiece from corporate affiliates40
alongside an individual membership of 400 "prominent Europeans". It is fairly clear
that the Foundation was intended to act within Europe as a counterpart to the Ford and
Rockefeller Foundations, with an agenda favouring integration but focussing
primarily on direct intervention to assist the cultural world itself. Although the ECF
still flourishes, it no longer acts as a fund-raising body, depending instead on income
from the Dutch national lottery and football pools and contract work carried out for
the European Commission.
The Council for Cultural Cooperation
In 1960 it was finally agreed that the social and cultural work of the Western
European Union should be transferred to the Council of Europe41 . The merger brought
in two new committees, one for university vice-chancellors and one for film experts.
As a result the Committee of Ministers merged the old Committee of Cultural Experts
39 article, "A Three-Stage Rocket: a Brief History of the Foundation" in "Character and Culture of
Europe", von, no.4, October 1960. No page reference.
40
mostly Dutch and German
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with the Administrative Board of the Cultural Fund to form the Council for Cultural
Cooperation (CCC), a title which reflects the presence of representatives from the
Consultative Assembly and the ECF. Three new permanent committees were
established which were responsible to it. All three were educational in nature,
although as we shall see one began to acquire a strong cultural dimension: Higher
Education and Research (HER); General and Technical Education (GTE); and Out-of-
School Education, which dealt with youth, physical education and adult education.
The work inherited from WEU included plans for a conference of WEU ministers of
education, which the CoE took over and retained as a fixture. Although its agenda was
exclusively focused on education matters 42, Grosjean states that the first of these
meetings produced guidelines that were subsequently taken up for cultural policy43.
This reflects the apparently highly political, and contentious, nature of the
preparations for this first meeting. The papers of the UK Foreign Office make it clear
that part of the intention was to use the preparatory work for the conference to set up a
policy steering group which would take over responsibility for educational and
cultural cooperation both within the Six"4 and for the Council of Europe as a whole45.
This would have moved cultural cooperation out of the sphere of cultural diplomacy
and towards an integrated European education policy dominated by the supranational
community of the Six.
41 the "partial agreement" system which enables activity to be conducted within the Council by a
smaller number of its members (see Duclos, op. cit.)
42
see PRO ED 121/1130
43
see Grosjean, 1994, op.cit., p. 39
44 the pre-enlargement European Economic Community is often referred to as "the Six", "the Nine" or
"the Twelve" to point up the changed nature of its membership
45 the 1959 report of the Administrative Board refers to a proposal for "a European Office of Cultural
Relations through which all cultural work in Europe would be canalised" (p. 29)
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This attempt to link a ministerial conference to a new management structure for
cultural cooperation appears to have been very damaging 46 . Perhaps it accounts for
the suspicion with which the CoE has viewed the EU's forays into cultural
cooperation from the 1960's to the 1990's, as almost a planned act of territorial
annexation. Haigh regarded it as tantamount to a coup ("a revolt ...against the
ministers of foreign affairs"47) in which education ministries tried to marginalise the
cultural diplomats. This sense of relations soured still echoes in the relationship
between the culture ministries (now the Culture Committee of the Council for
Cultural Cooperation) and the Committee of Ministers, where a low-level battle for
control remains a continuous feature of the landscape.
The introduction of debate about education policy at the domestic level through
meetings of departmental ministers visibly switched the agenda of the Council of
Europe in multilateral cultural cooperation towards education and away from culture
for the rest of the decade. Thus, by 1960, the structure of cultural cooperation had
settled into its present form, with modifications, but with a strong bias towards
education and away from culture. The European Cultural Convention provided a
formal framework for enabling annual programmes to be drawn up by the CCC48 and
approved by the Committee of Ministers. The Cultural Fund provided a reasonable
degree of flexibility, being a global sum which could be attributed by the CCC
without further reference to the Committee of Ministers.
46 the proposal appears to have been particularly associated with Belgium, and linked to the Plan
Fouchet, the French-led attempt to restructure the EC with a stronger intergovernmental component
which would have included educational and cultural cooperation. The UK suspected a Franco-Belgian
attempt to marginalise them by marginalising the CoE, although the French appear to have switched
tack and supported retaining cultural cooperation within the CoE framework
47 PRO ED 121/ 1130
48 Resolution (61) 39 of the Committee of Ministers remained in force until December 1977 when it
was replaced by a second resolution reconstituting the CCC as a steering committee (CDCC) with
renewable terms of reference
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By 1963 cultural cooperation was taking a substantial share of the Council's budget.
Of a total of 1,587,900 FF, the CCC took 276,000 FF - 50,000 FF more than its
nearest committee rival, although the organisation's total running costs accounted for
649,000 FF. At this period the Council of Europe itself was perceived to be failing,
lacking in influence and outgunned by the success of the European Economic
Community49 . Cultural cooperation, in common with other cooperation fields, came
under growing pressure to compress and sharpen both its objectives and the action
taken to achieve them, particularly from non-EEC countries who depended upon the
Council to maintain their influence in European affairs.
Structurally and politically, progress in the Council of Europe seems thereafter to
have been defined in large part by the evolution of the European Community. The
failure of the UK to join the EEC resulted in a short-lived attempt to revive the
Council as a forum for wider European cooperation. It did produce a number of
serious conventions 50
 on subjects as varied as conflict resolution and labour
conditions (in which its claim to fame is to have pioneered the concept of the
minimum wage). By 1970, the Assembly was described by Duclos as "une sorte de
miroir fidele des diversites locales" 51 , a grassroots perspective which had been
strengthened by the establishment in 1961 of the Conference of European Local and
Regional Authorities (CLRAE), which has its roots in an Assembly gathering of 1953.
The pinnacle of the Council's activity, then as now, was human rights52.
49 this wistful note is struck as early as 1956 - in Robertson (op.cit), the foreword by Guy Mollet, a
leading parliamentarian of the Assembly, notes that "other forms of European cooperation are making
faster progress on a more limited basis" (p. ix). Robertson notes that cultural cooperation is one of the
few areas to have developed operational expenditure, and observes that it is "one of the most effective
of all the committees" (op. cit., p. 140)
50 the recent (1998) report of the "Committee of Wise Persons" to the Committee of Ministers mentions
there have been over 170
51 Duclos, op. cit., p. 54
52 Archer regards the CoE's human rights system as the most effective one in operation on an
international level
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Thus the Council established itself as a specialist in the non-economic aspects of
European integration. Some of this activity had a bearing on cultural cooperation,
notably the various initiatives on landscape and built heritage 53
 . The fact that it no
longer had a serious stake in the economic aspects of integration weakened it,
however, especially in relation to the OECD, which as Haigh notes54
 also began to
expand into educational cooperation from the 1960s onwards55 , specialising in
research and information with a strong development focus.
The crisis induced by the successful application by three of the Council of Europe's
members (the UK, Ireland and Denmark) to join the EC in 1973 put the organisation
under further pressure. From 1975 onwards it seems to have undergone a process of
constant reorganisation and remodelling, beginning with the introduction of the
"medium-term plan" system, under which the Committee of Ministers approved five-
year plans with sets of objectives and operational constraints to which the committees
were expected to conform. A sense that the committees had proliferated out of control
appears in UK papers as early as 1963 56
 and throughout the 1970s committee papers
reveal a battle to bring them back within the general management of the Committee of
Ministers by restricting them to a small number of large-scale projects each with
agreed life-spans and targets. The CCC seems to have been regarded as a particular
problem child57.
53 listed by Grosjean on p.75 of his study: at least three different committees were active in this field,
not including occasional incursions by the Council for Cultural Cooperation
54 Haigh, op.cit
55 it also covered environment and social policy (Archer, op.cit)
56 PRO FO 371/173363 — at this period committees were spawning working parties and policy seemed
to be a question of how many meetings of how many people ought to be paid for (CCC had eight
working parties in 1963)
57
see, for example, CCC (75) 14, in which the Secretary-General attempts to impose a political
steering group on the committee with the aim of preventing it from "jeopardising rather than
improving" the state of intergovernmental negotiations
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The CCC was reconstituted at various times in accordance with these political efforts
to streamline the organisation (which, though growing in membership, was not
attracting increased levels of funding from its member states). In 1977, the CCC was
placed under new terms of reference 58 which explicitly separated out the two strands
of "educational" and "cultural" policy for the first time, though keeping them under
unified management. It kept its name 59 and the autonomy it had under the Cultural
Fund but lost its sub-committees. "Culture" did not acquire managerial autonomy
within the CCC/CDCC system until 1990 when the CDCC again acquired new terms
of reference which established it as an umbrella structure supervising four specialist
committees (education, culture, cultural heritage — formerly a separate steering
committee — and higher education).
The mid-1980s represent a low point in the Council of Europe's fortunes. Further
expansion in the European Community (which had twelve members by 1986, and had
recently begun to consolidate a growing cultural role at ministerial level through
meetings of the Counci160) meant it was starting to fulfil its threat to outstrip the
Council of Europe in terms of financial resources available. Its social dimension had
been launched in the mid-1970s and by 1987 it had overcome the objections of
"Community competence" 61 to the ERASMUS programme for university exchange,
with a budget of 307.5 million ECU 62 , well in excess of anything the Council could
command. The continued relevance, and possibly existence, of the Council of Europe
was seriously in question.
58 these replaced the original 1961 terms of reference which set up the CCC
59 however the initials change from CCC to CDCC, reflecting the technical change of status to a
Steering Committee ("Comite Directrice" in French) which brings CDCC in line with other CoE
committees
60 see Chapter Ten on the institutions of the EC (Council, Commission, Parliament)
61 ibid
62 
source: Green paper on European Social Policy: options for the Union, CEC, 1993 (COM(93)551)
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The CSCE process and the Council of Europe
The Council of Europe may well have been saved as a viable organisation by the
CSCE63 process, assisted by the expanded membership of the European Cultural
Convention which preceded the fall of communism. As noted, the Convention was
used as an induction process for the countries of the communist bloc from the late
1980s onwards, i.e. while they remained under communist rule. In the four years
between 1990 and 1994 the number of signatories increased from 28 to 42, accounted
for primarily by the unforeseen fragmentation of federations (the USSR and
Yugoslavia) into autonomous states. In addition, with the aim of creating a complete
"map of Europe", some small autonomous states (Andorra and Monaco) who had not
hitherto sought to accede were encouraged to do so.
The 1990 summit meeting of the CSCE completed a process which had begun with
the Helsinki meetings of 1975, seen as "the high-water mark" of East-West détente.
Its agenda looked back to WEU as a classic combination of defence commitments
underpinned by "the development of international relations with a view to
contributing to the freer movement of people, ideas and information and to
developing cooperation in the cultural, economic, technical and scientific fields..."
Cultural relations formed the so-called "Basket III"65•
63 Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. The CSCE, which covered east and west Europe
as well as the USA and USSR, was not an international organisation as such, but a standing conference
of diplomats over many years intended to "manage" the Cold War and negotiate advances in detente.
Within CSCE, cultural cooperation assumed its classic role, that of underpinning foreign and defence
policy
64 J. J. Maresca, "To Helsinki. The CSCE 1973-75", Introduction, p. xii. Duke University Press, 1985.
65 meaning a group of related subjects managed within a single negotiating committee
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Culture was grouped with information, rather than with scientific research, reflecting
developments at that time in UNESCO. As in UNESC066 , this proved controversial
and difficult to negotiate. However, according to Maresca, cultural relations (in the
sense of exchange) performed their diplomatic function of providing material on
which it was relatively easy to agree, paving the way with partial success for the more
difficult concessions needed on freedom of information.
The Helsinki Final Act67 was not a treaty but became CSCE's de facto constitution"68,
paving the way for the formalisation of the process into an organisation 69 after the fall
of the Berlin Wall. Basket III is amazingly detailed, with provisions about
competitions for town planners, inclusion of works by other countries' composers in
national repertoires and courses for restorers, emphasising its status as cultural
diplomacy, an extension and consolidation of the contents of bilateral cultural
agreements based on the practice of Mixed Commissions. The multilateral
programme of the Council of Europe does not feature.
Two cultural conferences followed Helsinki, with mixed results. The 1985 Budapest
Cultural Forum, involving "leading personalities", was not considered a success,7°
getting bogged down in vast numbers of highly specific proposals and failing in the
end to agree on a concluding document or even a communiqué. As Lehne notes, the
66 the events which led to the US and UK departure from UNESCO in the mid-1980s were related to
conflict over information policy. See numerous writers on this, including M. Imber, "The USA, ILO,
UNESCO and IAEA - Politicization and Withdrawal in the Specialised Agencies", Macmillan, 1989; J.
Maddison, "The UNESCO and Britain Dossier, 1945-1986", Royston, MADA, 1986; C. Wells, "The
UN, UNESCO and the Politics of Knowledge", Macmillan, 1987
67 signed in 1975 by 35 countries as the culmination of the negotiations
68 Archer, 1994, op.cit
69 CSCE is thus now OSCE
70 A. Bloed (ed.), "From Helsinki to Vienna: Basic Documents of the Helsinki Process", M. Nijhoff,
1990
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cultural proposals "never became the subject of serious negotiations at the Vienna71
meeting", the umbrella process which carried forward the Helsinki Act. In his view it
did nothing to change the impression that "the concretization of cultural cooperation
could be left to the bilateral level. 72"
The second event, a symposium on cultural heritage which took place in Cracow in
1991, was also short on outcome but nevertheless helped to feed into a Concluding
Document from Vienna which combined some familiar rhetoric on free movement of
art works, exchange of persons and joint endeavours with linkages between cultural
cooperation to human rights in new ways. This involved rights of access to cultural
events from abroad, encouragement to NGOs to become involved in implementing
state agreements, and the restatement of a provision in the Helsinki Act related to "the
contribution" of national minorities in much stronger terms, namely the commitment
to endure that persons belonging to national minorities or regional cultures could
"maintain and develop their own culture in all its aspects". It did not, however, lay
down guidelines for further cultural cooperation.
It had been suggested that the Council of Europe might become the de facto
"executive arm" of the new Organisation on Security and Cooperation in Europe
(OSCE) on cultural matters. This did not happen, but its involvement in the
CSCE/OSCE process led to a much tighter focus on human rights as the core of its
work. Throughout the 1990s, work on cultural cooperation has been a process of
coming to terms with both this and the implications of the formal extension of
71 the diplomatic conference proposed by Gorbachev to discuss the "common European home" and
agree post-1989 mechanisms for European security and cooperation
72 S. Lehne, "The CSCE in the 1990— Common European House or Potemkin Village?", p. 13.
Braumiiller, AIIA, 1991,
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European Community competence into culture and education in the 1992 Treaty of
Maastricht.
Conclusion
The Council of Europe offered the first post-war opportunity for cultural cooperation
to take place in a context other than that of foreign and security policy. It had to
develop, however, in a climate of declining influence in the process of European
integration as a whole, dependent largely for its functioning on being seen as
distinctively a part of intergovernmental Europe73.
In addition, a structure which initially saw cultural cooperation as an extension
(through the Cultural Convention) of diplomatic cultural functions proved inadequate
in the face of political challenges which threatened its monopoly. The tensions
inherent in a control system which pitted realist concerns (the Committee of
Ministers) against idealist concerns (the Consultative Assembly) seemed initially to
have been resolved in favour of the former. In fact (as should become clear in the
succeeding chapters) they were revived by the creation of a domestic dimension
(conferences of specialist ministers) which championed — or were made to seem to
champion — a significantly more interventionist and idealistic agenda, which
substituted a "philosophy", "theology" or "cultural policy" 74 derived from the
Assembly and its predecessors.
In this somewhat fluid and unfocused social and political territory, dominated by fears
of irrelevance and usurpation, the aims of cultural cooperation could be reinvented in
73 hence the frequent reiteration of the theme that "Europe cannot stop at the borders of the
Six/Nine/Twelve"
74 terms used by, respectively, Grosjean, Deering (of de Rougemont) and Haigh
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ways that sometimes seemed removed from the political aims of the Council of
Europe itself, let alone the governments who nominally controlled it 75 . They seemed
to have less to do with the careful negotiation of legal instruments intended to
underpin a European commitment to democracy and rule of law than with reviving
some of the aspirations which guided the pre- and post-war thinkers who sought to
place culture at the centre of European integration. In doing so cultural cooperation
came increasingly to concentrate on diversity, trying to reconcile that favourite mantra
of European cultural cooperation, "unity in diversity".
75 the reason why de Witte's disniissiveness of the CDCC as a passive tool of its governmental masters
is somewhat different from reality
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CHAPTER EIGHT
Cultural cooperation in the Council of Europe: the CDCC and its programme
In this chapter, the evolution of the cultural cooperation programme from its
beginnings around 1950 to its present form will be explored. It is to be expected that
major changes will have taken place over half a century. What is particularly striking
in this examination, however, is how the programme mirrors change and conflict in
social concerns and political priorities as opposed to consistent and maturing progress
towards clearly articulated goals. The impression gained is of changing mood rather
than measurable, or measured, achievement. In other words, the process being
reflected is that of the management of culture as public policy rather than that of
deepening European integration.
The Council of Europe programme is not notable for its clarity. The accusations of
vagueness which tend to accompany it l at various stages of development are usually
justified. Evaluations for effectiveness are rare, feedback from the national or regional
level about impact even rarer. The practice of issuing detailed annual reports precisely
accounting for expenditure lasted only from 1960 to 1963 (the period in which the
Cultural Fund had its own Administrative Board). Subsequent reports list activity but
not details of expenditure and use a somewhat frustrating international rhetoric which
tells the reader more about aspirations than about achievement. This is partly because
from about 1963 onwards the programme ceases to be grant-based, switching instead
to a programme method based on meetings and specialist publications. Accordingly,
I found in CDCC's meeting records, especially where written comments have been sought from
delegations
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"content" can be difficult to pin down; the programme as presented to the member
states usually lacks concrete illustration and can often only be interpreted and not
assessed; in places the best that can be managed is an educated guess at what was
intended.
What does become clear, however, is that the cultural cooperation programme of the
Council of Europe can be expressed as a series of successive themes. The first, lasting
till the mid 1960s, is fellow-feeling, adjusting to and negotiating the condition of
peaceful coexistence. It is more "getting-to-know-you" than the functionalist "we-
feeling", a sense of separate identities pitched without much warning into a new
relationship which they can only hope will be to their common benefit. This is the
only period in its history where cultural cooperation seems really to address the
"common cultural heritage".
First steps: 1950-1954
Early efforts at designing a cultural programme for the Council of Europe took place
in difficult conditions. There already existed two core groups within the CoE system —
the BTO countries and the Nordic countries — who had created arrangements
involving joint cultural action. The Consultative Assembly had opined strongly in
favour of a decentralised approach, recalling that of the ICIC 2 (it deplored "increased
control by governments of everything affecting culture" and urged that governments
"coordinate and stimulate the numerous activities of organisations" rather than "either
try to control or dissociate themselves altogether")3.
2 unsurprisingly, since the committee in question was chaired by Salvador de Madariaga, a veteran of
the Arts and Letters Sub-Committee who had also chaired the Cultural Committee at the Hague
3 PRO FO 924/857
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The Committee of Cultural Experts tried to sort the requirements of a cultural
programme into "methods to be adopted in the interest of European unity to raise the
cultural level of the population by education of adults, university extension lectures,
broadcasts and the cinema, exchange of records and films between nations and by art
and folklore exhibitors" and "collective utilisation of the artistic and particularly
archaeological treasures, which constitute one of the fundamental elements of the
common heritage of the European peoples" 4 . In other words, the aim of cultural
cooperation would have both a pedagogic aspect and a symbolic aspect, which would
entrench Europe in the public mind as a source both of improvement to the quality of
life and of a renewed sense of identity.
Between 1950 and 1954 the programme settled down into a series of ongoing
initiatives and small annual grants to organisations. BTO's Cultural Identity Card
scheme was extended to the CoE and remained in the programme until the early
1980s. Individual grants were awarded on an ad-hoc basis, rather as the European
Commission was later to do. Member states continued to try to suggest joint
initiatives. Mr Kuypers, the indefatigable Belgian delegate to BTO, urged a
programme of mass-produced art reproductions upon the committee, which got as far
as drawing up proposals before finally acknowledging its impracticality 5 . He had
more success in attracting backing for an already planned exhibition about 16th
century humanism, which the Council duly took over and part-financed 6 . The
exhibition became the first of a series: by 1960 six had been hosted on artistic and
4 PRO FO 924/828
5 the sheer scale of the operation defeated the small secretariat, who, as one art expert remarked, would
have needed storage space equivalent to Strasbourg Cathedral (PRO FO 924/1009)
6 despite having oddly chosen, as the same expert noted in the course of a memorably acerbic meeting
report, "to start a series of exhibitions on European unity with the period in which that unity effectively
broke up"
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intellectual movements ranging from Mannerism to Romanticism. They remain a
fixture in the programme, 26 having been held to date7.
Still looking to reach a wider public, the Cultural Experts also examined ideas to
create, variously, an International Broadcasting University and a "Voice of Europe"
radio station. The latter did not get beyond the Christmas message stage despite heavy
pressure from France. In general, the CoE had little luck either with this kind of
infrastructure-based activity or with efforts to adapt national systems to the needs of
intellectuals 8 . That the art exhibitions took permanent root may be attributable to the
fact that one country at a time took on main responsibility for it, both financial and
organisational, rather like the later European Cities of Culture scheme operated by the
EU. This type of cultural cooperation has a unique place and function which will be
discussed in the next chapter.
Programme content 1954 -1965
The introduction of the European Cultural Convention did not significantly change
the content of the programme. The Cultural Identity Card and the art exhibitions
remained the centrepieces. The first report of the Administrative Board in 1960
records that 95 research fellowships had been awarded since 1953. As well as prizes
for newsreel films of European interest, a small number of grants was made available
for translating works from lesser-known languages into English or French. This was
done by selecting three countries per year to be the recipients of a lump sum which
7 
all are described in an evaluation carried out for the Council of Europe in 1999 by Elina Middleton-
Lajudie
8 a reference to the situation of refugees from Eastern Europe
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they then disbursed. Work had begun on a folklore project, which involved the
publication of a scholarly book on some aspects of European folktales.
Some money was set aside for grants for events or courses. They had to be part-
funded from elsewhere (50%) and were for specific projects only, of "high utility in
relation to their cost" and were — in theory — non-renewable (in practice they tended
quickly to become programme fixtures). Examples included grants in 1959 to the
Norwegian Foreign Affairs ministry to organise a study tour for teachers to Brussels
and Strasbourg; to the Institute of European History at Mainz; and to the Religious
Drama Society of Great Britain for organising an international conference.
Neither Haigh's nor Grosjean's account devotes much space to the first fifteen years or
thereabouts of the cultural programme. Haigh dismisses it as "primitive" in
comparison to the "collective cultural cooperation" developed during the 1960s, a
view which will be examined in the next chapter. Grosjean relies on a 1992 DECS9
document which categorises the work as generally directed towards "reconciliation"
after the war. Neither seems an entirely accurate assessment. It would be truer to say
that this was a programme aimed at contributing to a gradual mutual familiarisation
effort by the diverse populations of the Council of Europe.
The cultural cooperation programme up to about 1965 was worthy but very small-
scale. It was also very much of its time. Prizes for "inspiring" factual films about
subjects such as the Rhine, the State Opening of the UK Parliament or the Dutch dyke
system ("Hold Back the Sea") are at once recognisable to British people over forty as
part of the ethos of the post-war education system. They will have touched
9	 •Directorate of Education, Culture and Sport: i.e., the secretariat
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individuals' lives here and there without contributing much to an understanding of
European unity, but perhaps creating a pre-disposition to ideas of such a nature 10 . The
translation programme allowed for too few completed translations per year to be
accomplished and contained no provisos guaranteeing dissemination". An extremely
disparate range of CoE-supported research theses was published as "European
Aspects" . Again, the effect of such initiatives may have been to touch one life and
through that, others: to offer a British example which may be recognised as having
had a repercussive effect, one research grant was given to Peter Brinson, later of the
Gulbenkian Foundation and an influence in British dance, to explore European
archives of classical ballet12.
This style of cultural cooperation seems to derive from British cultural diplomacy:
broad-based, low-key, information-based, inspirational only in the sense that the
practical and prosaic may inspire, relying on the chance response. Its impact would in
fact have been impossible to assess in terms of its objective. A small Greek child
made to sit through a Council of Europe approved film about the Rhine would be as
likely to feel bored and hostile as inspired by the marvellous example of common
action presented. It is notable that these initiatives focussed strongly on the
similarities between nations, as examples of common problems faced, or happy
collaboration on a solution to a common problem. The underlying message was of
similarity beneath surface difference: the "foreignness" of Europeans to each other
was invariably skirted.
10
a parallel might be found in the work of the Council for World Citizenship, an NGO set up in the
same post-war atmosphere of attempts at comprehension
this was in essence the project revived in the 1980s by the European Community
12
other topics include the psychology of refugees. These grants ceased to be offered from 1960
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Reconciliation implies a confrontation with the past, as well as possibility for the
future, that simply did not happen. These projects tried in a sense to disregard the
immediate past as an aberration which disrupted the ordinary and natural
predisposition of Europeans to work together on the future whilst recalling what was
good and unifying about their history. They promoted back to the citizens of Europe a
portrait of themselves as confident, forward-looking, interested in each other and
celebratory (newsreels of royal weddings seem to feature regularly). There is little or
no element of actual common problem-solving within the programme itself or of
acting consciously to improve the quality of the cultural life of the European
populace. This perhaps reflects the extent to which these policies were still being
tested out at national level as well as responding to a fundamental need for optimism.
At the same time it replicates the image-based nature of cultural diplomacy.
The programme lacks two further things which at this stage one might have expected:
an attempt to find and promote a European symbolism 13 ; and a sense of the
personality of the organisation as something in itself worthy of loyalty. One of the
few attempts at symbolism, Europe Day, failed to take root because of bad planning14.
As regards loyalty, the CoE's practice of drawing up conventions establishing
minimum standards and common practice might be said to have established the
organisation as a force for good in the daily lives of the citizens. In the 1950s,
however, conventions were little used within cultural cooperation except for
standardising aspects of university study. Ways of using them do not seem to have
13 in fact it was the Assembly that took this on, as Carole Lager shows ("L'Europe en Quete de ses
Symboles", Euroclio series, Peter Lang, 1995): it generated most of the "symbols" of Europe which are
sometimes seen as embodying its "cultural dimension": the flag of stars on a blue background, the
choice of Beethoven's Ninth Symphony as an official anthem
14 it coincided in many countries with the anniversary of liberation from WWII occupation, which
subverted the symbolism very effectively. A later, more targeted, event, European Schools Day, seems
to have had better success, though not in Swansea in the late 1960s
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been actively sought out. In fact, very few legal instruments have ever been drawn up
within the Council for Cultural Cooperation and its successor.
From the "leisure debate" to Arc-et-Senans: sociology and culture, 1965-1972
The second theme of cultural cooperation is culture in society. If, prior to 1965, the
emphasis was on Europeans' common identity, after 1965 it shifted to their perceived
common interests. The 1962 to 1965 process of rethinking the Council's strategy had
radical implications for the "cultural" side of the cultural cooperation programme. The
secretariat's nine-point plan, adopted in 1965 as the "cultural policy of the Council of
Europe" 15, proposes a culture programme "adapted progressively to the methods of
cooperation introduced in the education field" 16
 with special reference to the
"European cultural heritage in the new conditions of industrial society". Direct awards
of film prizes and translation grants disappeared, to be replaced by studies on the
importance of cultural policy planning and the role of public authorities.
The impetus behind this change was the involvement of a new generation of players
in cultural cooperation who used the Out-of-School Education Committee as a
springboard to develop a specially European dimension to national thinking about
cultural policy. Although the composition of the CCC had always been mixed I7 , it
now included education policy specialists with a strong interest in cultural policy, in
particular Jeanne Laurent, who represented the education ministry of France on the
15
see Haigh, op.cit, pp. 216-8
16 CCC(65) 1, draft 3 rd report. According to Grosjean, this was a by-product of the Education ministers'
conference of 1960, while the methods referred to appear to be those of convening meetings of
specialists which prepared recommendations on good practice
17 i.e. involving both education ministry and foreign ministry officials
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CCC, but had been a driving force in the arts sector in the 1940s 18 , and Marcel Hicter,
a Belgian official responsible for youth and leisure policy in the French Community.
In the same year the CCC commissioned studies on "cultural responsibilities in the
present phase of European civilization", including "urbanism", the cultural
implications of town planning, "cultural equipment" and the role of public
"collectivities". Hitherto the CCC's concern had been mainly to disburse money for
cultural activity to be conducted at arm's length, rather as the ECF was subsequently
to do. The new approach implied that it would try to shape thinking in the
increasingly autonomous sector of cultural policy and administration. Laurent and
Hicter imported a set of policy concerns unrelated to cultural diplomacy, which not
only reflected the growth of culture as a policy area in France under Andre Malraux,
but also emanated specifically from the French education ministry. They had already
been introduced into the Out-of-School Education Committee under the broad
heading of "permanent education" 19 , itself derived from French thinking about
"education populaire" but which also recall earlier forays by ICIC into problems of
industrialisation and public taste. These ideas solidified within a new category of
"cultural development", emphasising domestic rather than external policy concerns,
and thence into the CCC's flagship cultural concept of the 1970s, "cultural
democracy" versus "the democratisation of culture".
18 see D. Looseley, "Paris versus the Provinces: Cultural Decentralisation since 1945", in M. Cook,
(ed.), "French Culture since 1945", Longman, 1993; also Fumaroli, 1992, op.cit
19 the author of its publication, "Permanent Education, an Agent of Change", Henri Janne, was one of
the four contributors to the first conference of cultural ministers in 1976, as was J. A Simpson, author
of the CCC's "Permanent Education and Community Development"
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In 1965 the CCC held a policy debate on "the problem of leisure" 2° with memoranda
by Laurent and Hicter to which the other delegations responded. Both officials
express concern about the effects of "passive culture": Laurent urges "a forward-
looking study, made in a spirit of enquiry into what was discernible and desirable in
the civilisation of the future" 21 , a survey of future needs and problems which "only
economists had so far made"; while Hicter emphasises a more spiritual approach,
based on Joffre Dumazedier whose definition of leisure as "essentially a problem of
the individual and of conditions in which individuals make free choices" 22 is
advanced. Hicter's arguments are remarkably like those of de Rougemont and the
personalists and, before them, of the ICIC sociologists 23 in their emphasis on
"development of the personality" contrasted with the "fundamentally amoral"
entertainment industry" whose object is not "the service of mankind but financial
gain". The subject, he concludes, is "the democratisation of culture" 24 and the
opportunity of "creative activity" for all.
This debate is key because it confirms the switch away from a "cosmopolitan" to a
"communitarian" agenda, to use the terms suggested by Chris Brown, which will be
explored further in the next chapter. The "cosmopolitan" approach is exemplified by a
project of the Council of Europe at the time, in which CCC took part, called "Europe
Marches On" 25 , a series of travelling exhibitions and films originally celebrating
20 it should be noted that this was partly a response to the Consultative Assembly, which had adopted a
recommendation on the subject, apparently based on input from trade unionists, as well as industrialists
who had not liked it at all
21 CCC (65) 18, addendum
22 ibid
23 i.e. Professor Shotwell and his colleagues
24 he seems here to have used the term to mean changing attitudes, rather than the more disparaging
sense later given to it by the advocates of "cultural democracy" when contrasting efforts to improve
l)ublic taste with those designed to inspire individual creativity
a somewhat regrettable English rendering of the more felicitous French "LEurope continue"
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"birthplaces of art and industry in Europe" 26 . Essentially intended to create (positive)
links in the public mind between their own experience and the larger scale of
"Europe", this is cultural cooperation which serves an externalised political end 27 , in
which the relationship with bilateral cultural relations is clearly seen.
The "leisure debate", by contrast, sets out a different stall, one based on the
cultivation of diversity and social improvement. It has very little to do with the idea of
"being European", or indeed with asserting the glories of a European lineage. Brown
identifies "communitarian" theory particularly with environmentalism, but could as
easily have applied it to this new strand of cultural cooperation which attacks the
apparently unifying factor of global economic interdependence in favour of a sort of
spiritual self-determination and self-awareness. As he states, "for community to begin
to emerge there has to be a growing awareness of common interests and identity; the
creation of 'one-world' is a necessary condition.. .but is not, of itself, sufficient"28.
Identity is still present in this project, but it is no longer expressed in the attempt to
create a larger community of interest which subordinates the local and the particular —
indeed, it celebrates the particular at the expense of the universal.
Nevertheless, in the course of the "leisure debate" the implication of "a single
common cultural policy for Europe" was immediately perceived and, as quickly,
rejected as a desirable prospect. In some quarters the Laurent-Hicter approach was
perceived as disguised dirigisme29 and even incitement to class warfare 30 . However, it
26 the Council of Europe returned to this approach in the 1980s and 1990s with its "Cultural Routes"
project, a series of consciousness-raising gatherings and publications on linking aspects of European
culture such as the Baroque or the Hanseatic League
27 ultimately, the Kantian aim of "perpetual peace": see Brown (1992), op.cit
28 C. Brown (1995), "International Political Theory and the Idea of World Contnzunity", p. 93, in
Booth & Smith, op. cit.




offered some practical advantages. It could be developed in the Out-of-School
Education Committee with perfect ease, more or less integrated with the "permanent
education" philosophy being developed there by the same group: a "cultural policy"
managed within an education context. It enabled the CCC to get around the problem
of public impact by addressing a smaller audience (policy-makers and other
specialists) with studies and recommendations for action at national level and thus
reinvent itself as a policy think-tank for culture 31 . It was also cheaper than trying to be
a cultural foundation: as a later report noted 32, at government level European unity did
not convert into cash contributions, without which no mass campaign was seriously
achievable, though behind-the-scenes investments in programme items which
interested or benefited individual governments were becoming normal practice.
Those elements, such as grants to translators and work on a folklore collection, which
were considered to be out of keeping with the aim of policy planning were duly
dropped. "Inherited" items, such as the Cultural Identity Card, to which member states
showed an attachment were classified as "ways and means" (of doing what, is not
very clear). Most of the cultural budget went on studies, presumably delivered to
member states then left to individual discretion33 . Papers from the UK Ministry of
Education34 make it clear that, for some at least, culture now appeared to be a private
fiefdom of the secretariat, inclined to proceed on the basis of reports commissioned
from individual experts rather than the comparison of experiences in the different
31 the origin of its self-image as "a laboratory for ideas", even if some of these seem in fact to have
started life in UNESCO test-tubes
32 CCC (67) 4, "Europe Twenty Years Ahead", a report of "three wise men", one of whom was Marcel
Hicter, suggested various changes to the CCC programme in 1967
33 CCC papers are notably short on information of this nature
34 PRO ED 121/1128: the absence of a culture sub-committee "makes it possible for the strong
secretariat on the culture side to push its own programme through CCC with little scrutiny"
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countries. There was concern that work was being undertaken and paid for which
would have "no demonstrable result"35.
In addition to art exhibitions and cultural identity cards, the CCC continued to
maintain a programme on film. This included plans for a Council of Europe film
week36 to replace the system of prizes; assistance for the dubbing and distribution of
the chosen films; and a conference on distribution. Additional projects, such as a
proposed card index cataloguing fragments of Byzantine artworks, were included
because individual member states lobbied for them.
The culture programme split increasingly into activity which could be considered
broadly to do with "the common heritage" (such as art exhibitions) and the research-
based work covering "new requirements of industrial civilization", to borrow the term
used in the 1965 programme document. As regards the former, several initiatives
seem to have been in hand at this time relating to the technical conservation of the
built heritage37 , leading up to preparations for a conference of specialised ministers.
This marks the start of work on "built" heritage with a separate identity from cultural
cooperation38 . The latter appeared under a series of headings: for example, "Man and
his Environment" covers studies on the aesthetic training of town planners, urban
design and the development of taste. "Creativity" includes an item on "collective
artistic productions of a European nature" and another on action by public authorities
35 - -ibid. A particularly cold eye was cast on the study of "socio-cultural equipment of towns", which UK
officials could not believe would be "worth the effort it will involve.. .The work so far has a certain
interest if and when ideal conditions prevail but there is something of the "angels on a pinhead" quality
about researches which inform us that the cultural equipment of, say, Gloucester should include an
opera house, three theatres and a theatre workshop... .no doubt it should, but where does it get us to
know this?"
36 which would be held at an already established film festival somewhere, such as Locarno
37 •including research into training for experts and "current aspects of craftsmanship"
38 money was voted from the Cultural Fund for a small pilot conservation project in Malta in 1968,
which appears to be a fore-runner of the later system of offering technical assistance to chosen sites
where there are particular conservation difficulties
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on acceptable living conditions for artists 39 . These two areas gradually became the
main focus for the CCC, developing in the 1970s into its two major cultural projects.
The period of student unrest in many countries of Europe known as the "events" of
1968 ironically acted as an endorsement to the growing sociological focus of the CCC
programme. The objectives of the programme 4° read like a university syllabus rather
than an exercise in co-operative action between governments:
• integration of culture in permanent education;
• mobilisation of social and human sciences for the benefit of administrators;
• reinstating culture in its social context;
• the conception of culture not as an end in itself but as a means by which man can
see how he stands in relation to the world around him, create an individual style of
living and improve his style of human relations; organisation of work by the
prospective method corrected by the application of norms.
The immediate response to "1968" was to concentrate on youth programmes. The
impact of the political events, however, as is clear from the debate which followed,
varied tremendously between those delegations, like France and Belgium, which felt
that fundamental issues of public policy had been called into question41 , and those,
like Switzerland, who felt more worried by the rhetoric that was being used than by
anything which had actually happened in their countries. However, for Hicter in
particular the task of the CCC was now to get beyond "the contradictions of our
technical and bureaucratic consumer society" and find a role for the young,
particularly in combating the effects of mass communication ("a mosaic of boneless
39
a persistent UNESCO theme that has never attracted much response from either the Council of
Europe or, to date, the EU
40 CCC (69) 2
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padding")42 . At this point Hicter's role in the Council of Europe strongly resembles
that of Jules Destree before the war in ICIC, as an advocate of political intervention in
the cultural sector on sociological grounds.
This appears to be the point at which the CCC began to act as, in effect, the European
region of UNESCO, a role it had hitherto disliked but which, with the shift away from
diplomatic considerations, now acquired a certain logic. In 1969 UNESCO produced
a preliminary study on cultural policy, which offered a definition: "a body of
operational principles, administrative and budgetary practices and procedures which
provide a basis for cultural action by the state." 43
 An ad-hoc CCC cultural
development committee reproduces this in its own paper as a guiding definition. Its
identification of policies with principles contrasts interestingly with the idea of policy
as "sets of preferences", used by Deutsch, implying that policy is based on something
immutable rather than that it can and will change with circumstances: the world as it
should be rather than the world as it is. It is unclear to what extent member states
themselves felt in need of Council of Europe guidance in determining either principles
or sets of preferences. UK papers suggest concern at the proliferation of research
proposals on culture and some distaste for the idea that national policies might be
modified in line with their findings.
41 Grosjean, himself Belgian, refers to it without qualification as "the cultural crisis"
42 CCC (69) 7
43 
see X. Dupuis, "Culture et Developpement: de la Reconaissance a l'Evaluation", UNESCO/ICA,
1991, for an account which demonstrates the symbiotic relationship between the two organisations at
this time; also Grosjean, op.cit, p.101, who confirms that the 1972 UNESCO ministerial meeting,
EUROCULT, drew on CCC discussions
44 "we can see no profit (in defining) structures and contents of lifelong integrated education... we must
underline in this context our determination to control our own programmes" (PRO ED 121/1128)
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UNESCO held an intergovernmental conference in 1970 45 , the first of a series, to
which the specifically European follow-up on cultural policies in Helsinki
(EUROCULT) two years later was a response 46 . Much of what was offered as CCC
thinking about cultural development seems to have been derived directly from post-
Malraux (and post-1968) France 47 . The programme is almost wholly based on
analysis and research, perhaps reflecting the fact that France at this time already had a
substantial research department in its culture ministry able to direct the Council of
Europe's output". Comparative study of national situations, which the British had
favoured, was rejected in favour of encouraging "national research aimed at joint
study of the various cultural strategies", which would include a "slim volume of the
main requirements of a cultural policy". One "experimental study of cultural
development in towns" grew into the CCC's major cultural research project of the
1970s49.
45 this took place in Venice and, according to Dupuis, "a reconnu que la culture est inseparable de la vie
quotidienne et que la culture scientifique et technique est une realite qui doit imperieusement etre prise
en compte" (op.cit., p.21)
46
others followed in other parts of the world, culminating in the 1982 MONDIACULT conference in
Mexico
47 Caune mentions that Malraux's successor, Jacques Duhamel, was strongly committed to the idea of
cultural development (J. Caune, "La Culture en Action: de Vilar a Lang: le Sens Perdu", Grenoble,
1992); and Duhamel's speeches of the period bear this out (J. Duhamel, "Discours et Ecrits",
Documentation Francaise, 1994). M. Conil Lacoste (op.cit) also draws attention to the "constant
obsession" of the French Director-General of UNESCO, Rene Maheu, with the subject
48 Dupuis (op. cit., pp. 98-99) implies as much, referring to the series of socio-cultural indicators
produced by the Ministry of Culture from the early 1970s onwards and the document "Notes sur la
methodologie de la comptabilite culturelle" which DECS put to the CCC in 1969 and which advocated
a system of collecting cultural data. This could hardly have come from anywhere else
49 initially the "14 towns project" — the numbers of towns involved seem to fluctuate, so I have
followed Grosjean -, which studied how towns in different member states executed their municipal
responsibilities for culture. The aim was to produce case studies leading to guidelines which other
European towns could adopt
201
Cultural policy-making became entrusted to a small group of specialists, led by the
French Ministry of Culture. With cultural development 50 as its framework, this group
now began to develop a concept which it called "cultural democracy" as an essentially
social strategy, a rejection of the "democratisation of culture" (extending access to
high culture to a wider spread of society) in favour of liberating the innate creativity
of each individual by favouring techniques of "socio-cultural animation" 51 and
rejecting an "imposed" culture in favour of self-determination at grass-roots level.
The successful export of these French policies to the Council of Europe hit a high
point in 1972 at a meeting of twenty "futurologues" and researchers chaired by
Jacques Duhamel at Arc-et-Senans, designed as input to the EUROCULT meeting.
The resulting "declaration" rapidly acquired quasi-biblical status and is thought to
have launched the term "cultural democracy" itself52 . The declaration is a cross
between a manifesto and a series of demands, and is plainly non-governmental in
nature; but its ready acceptance within the Council of Europe in the wake of 1968
marked a new phase in which cultural cooperation could be redefined as
confrontational, "alternative", more radical than its patrons in national administrations
5° the term does not appear in the CCC's "Policy, Machinery, Directives, Methods, Programme"
document (undated, but from the content prepared around 1965-6), where the emphasis is on
comparative study, but appears in CCC(69) 7 as part of the remit of the Out-of-School Education
Committee, chaired by Simpson, who was succeeded by Hicter. By 1971 the whole of the cultural
programme is described as "cultural development". Xavier Dupuis offers a hint that the concept was
pioneered in Africa, beginning with the Charter of the Organisation of African Unity (1964) and before
that with the 1956 Congress of Black Writers and Artists (Dupuis, op. cit., pp. 31-33). A moving spirit
of the latter, Leopold Senghor, was also a deputy of the Council of Europe Consultative Assembly in
the 1950s
51 Besnard notes that this concept had been around in France from 1964 onwards and links it
specifically to the "education populaire" movement, while Looseley (op.cit.) associates it more with the
"Sixty-Eighters", following the perceived failure of the Maisons de la Culture movement of Malraux.
Both authors emphasise animation socio-culturelle as "une sorte de l'ecole parallele, sinon une contre-
ecole" (Besnard, p. 19) or a way "by which the non-public becomes politically aware of its situation,
freeing itself from alienation and repossessing itself" (Looseley, p. 227). Both emphasise its debts to
French sociology
52 Grosjean, 1994, p.101. The reference is: "realiser les conditions d'une 'dernocratie culturelle'
comportant, dans une perspective de decentralisation et de pluralisme, l'intervention directe des
interesses"
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themselves would perhaps dare, or wish, to be 53 . It was aimed primarily at UNESCO,
and may in fact have been somewhat manipulated for the purpose of associating
centre-left governments, in particular, with idealistic and radical thinking, thus pre-
empting standard Eastern accusations about capitalism and Western degeneracy54.
The welcome it received, therefore, may have had less noble motives than Grosjean,
for instance, is prepared to admit.
The language of this ultra-communitarian text, and particularly the extraordinary
"resistance" rhetoric it embodied, will be discussed in the following chapter. Its
significance for CCC was in providing a basis upon which to seek a political
imprimatur for the ideas which were becoming the CCC's "mission statement". The
key themes of these are set out in a 1973 document on permanent education55 : radical
challenge to the "long-established European 'cultural model' "; challenge to the
"functional society" and its baggage of "cultural mediocrity" created by "pseudo-
rationalism"; rejection of the "culture of the past"; and the replacement of "mosaic
culture" by "structured culture" which situates the individual in society. This recalls
Emmanuel Mounier's insistence on the "person" as an individual integrated with his
community.
53 Marcel Hicter hints at this in his contribution to the 1969 debate on policy and programme when he
speaks of choices to be made ''between the political systems which protect formal freedoms and those
which institute fundamental freedoms" — a breathtaking extension of the field of operations of cultural
policy, but one which has rooted itself in Council of Europe orthodoxy, and one which recalls de
Rougemont's claims at the Hague Congress (CCC (69) 7, op.cit)
54 a feature of UNESCO gatherings during the Cold War from the 1948 Wroclaws mposium onw ards
55 Permanent Education — the Basis and Essentials, CCC, 1973. No named author. Part of the series
"Education in Europe"
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Cultural democracy and the European Cultural Charter: 1973-1982
The theme of culture and the individual in society continues well into the 1970s. The
aim of cooperation had moved away almost completely from the creation of a
European identity towards the promotion of a vision of social change within Europe.
The CCC programme consists of a succession of working groups and ad-hoc
committees engaged in commissioning investigations which would, ideally, provide
planning tools, though CCC papers are unrevealing about the extent to which
potential users availed themselves of these tools56.
The key strands of the work had already been identified: aspects of planning for
culture, which was beginning to develop into a concern with the methodology of
cultural policy in member states; and creativity, which began increasingly to focus on
the politically charged territory of the culture industries. Both these took place under
the broad heading of "cultural development". Meanwhile, "cultural democracy",
rightly identified by Grosjean as the most recognisable of the CCC's "unifying
concepts", appears to have been just that — an underlying philosophy which translated
personalism into a rhetoric for cultural cooperation and shaped its programme.
Accordingly, one finds no project specifically entitled "cultural democracy". It was
expounded as a series of aims at the political level and offered for endorsement to
culture ministers at their first Council of Europe conference in Oslo in 1976. In a
policy paper57 presented on that occasion, the author argues that the task of the
Council of Europe, having rejected cultural diplomacy, is to lead governments
towards cultural pluralism, suggesting possible answers to common problems. The
56 
a Swiss suggestion in 1975 that CCC's practical impact at national level be assessed seems to have
been ignored (CCC(75)1/2)
57 J. A. Simpson, "Towards Cultural Democracy", Council of Europe, 1976
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suggestion in this paper is that national administrators have made a muddle of the
challenges of cultural policy and should now be encouraged to look to the Council of
Europe for guidance about what to fund and why.
From a later perspective, much of this looks over-confident and over-ambitious - "the
European voice, as it is heard in the Council, is not raised to defend an old order, but
to herald change" 58 — but it does convey a sense of purpose, a belief that study and
planning are what is needed to guide society in specified directions. Its conclusion
evokes de Rougemont: CCC has "contrived to produce ....an ensemble of concepts
which constitutes a moral force, a European conscience" 59 . This is the apogee of the
Council of Europe "philosophy" 6 °, a point at which idealism and realism seemed to
converge. However, it also contains the philosophy's problems: its assumption of
consensus combined with an essentially oppositional nature. Simpson urges this
intergovernmental forum to denounce values "inimical to its own, even when they
have the support of popular opinion and mass behaviour patterns as served or
moulded by the mass media or the culture industries"61.
In the light of this rejection, in effect, of diplomatic priorities in favour of sociological
ones, it is hardly surprising that cultural cooperation should have been perceived as
increasingly problematical by the Committee of Ministers62 . A key element of cultural
diplomacy is that it should be perceived as politically neutral, "safe" territory, oiling
the wheels for weightier matters. The anti-diplomacy of the CCC in the 1970s
58 Simpson, op. cit, p.42
59 ibid., p. 124
60 at times it appears to live on: the 1996 survey "In From the Margins" argued in similar ways, though
without Simpson's sense of certainty, for a broad concept of culture and an acknowledgement of a
central role for culture in the public policy process
61
op.cit, p.104
62 it will be recalled that these are ministers of foreign affairs, receiving briefing from, mainly,
diplomats
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appeared to espouse a specific ideology closer to that of an NGO than an
intergovernmental organisation. The CCC began to be increasingly heavily criticised
from both within and without: from within for rejecting the mission of influencing
public opinion in favour of European integration, and from without (i.e. its
delegations) for its unwillingness to evaluate its achievements in relation to the
political aims of its governments. The "rhetoric gap" is plain to see in the account of
its first ministerial conference, in which the idea of rejecting the past is generally
politely refused63 . "We have also seen and learnt, if we did not know it before, that
cultural policies and cultural politics are indissolubly connected with tradition,
heritage and socio-economic systems in each country", noted the post-Oslo report to
CCC, a little ruefully.
The CCC seems to have devoted much of this period to relabelling its various
activities, which still included old staples such as art exhibitions alongside newer
activities such as expenditure assessments 64, and dealing with criticism of its lack of
wider relevance. The 1976 Oslo conference was therefore as much about throwing up
ideas for reorientation as about providing political approval for cultural democracy65.
Beneath the confident rhetoric lies much uncertainty from those outside the core
group66 . The culture programme was competing with the education programme° for
ways of making an impact; and, although barely mentioned at this stage, the European
Commission's burgeoning "social dimension" programme would have been a factor
also.
63 the interventions of the ministers, though edited, are offered as direct rather than reported speech64 Dupuis, op.cit, describes three of these taking place in France, Sweden and the Netherlands,
researching spending on culture. He sees these as forerunners of the economic impact assessments
popular in the 1980s
65 see CCC (75) 13, on the Council of Europe medium-term plan
66 CCC (75) 25, meeting report
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From 1976, the dominant emphasis was on the two68
 major projects which CCC was
allowed to undertake on culture after the 1975 reorganisation. The focus of the first
(Project 5) was on the "improvement of cultural policies at national level", intended
to examine relationships between national, regional and local levels. This took in the
formerly separate research project on "cultural policies in towns" as its "local" aspect.
The second was to be a project dealing with culture and the mass media. This was
tried out in various permutations, including "integrating television and post-television
technical media into cultural policies" and even "training for a critical reading of
televisual language". CCC eventually settled for "culture and the media".
Of the two, the greater emphasis was placed on the cultural policy project 69 . This was
the post-Oslo project, "the framework and basis for the CCC's cultural activity". The
intention was now to create a "cooperation system permitting the constant pooling of
information"" between cultural policy-makers. Following the change in structure
which did away with the Out-of-School Education committee, the CCC's cultural
planning nexus swiftly relocated itself within the planning group for Project 5 where
it became the "inner circle" responsible, de facto, for the bulk of CCC policy
alongside the secretariat. The project seems to have relied substantially on meetings
and studies7I
 to produce its "basic analytical tools". The "towns" part of the project
seems to have had the more enduring legacy (descriptions of the project tend to
67 the difference in expenditure levels in 1976 was considerable: 3.8 million FF on education, compared
with less than a million on culture
68 a third project, on the writer and artist in a changing society, was planned in 1975 but finally
dropped, to be incorporated (rather uneasily) in the "second generation" mass media/ culture industries
project
69 
also known as the "Cities and Culture project" (R. Rizzardo, "The Cultural Challenges for Europe's
Regions", CDCC, 1993)
70 CCC (77) 8. At this point the project was known as project 9. It became project 5 the following year
71 it produced a series of policy publications under the heading "Your town, your life, your future"
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concentrate almost exclusively on this) 72 . The ideological aspects of cultural
democracy are here played down, and the practical exchange of experience
emphasised, perhaps reflecting input, for the first time in CCC history, from outside
practitioners.
The "partner" project on the cultural role of the mass media, Project 6, under the
chairmanship of a Belgian television specialist, mainly prepared ideas which, it was
hoped, might become the basis for a "European" media policy. Simpson73 notes in
passing that it aspired to regulate the nascent satellite broadcasting industry 74 . It
included a pedagogic element ("guidelines on teaching methods") and planned a
network for informing member states about new developments, but produced instead
a highly dirigiste draft resolution recommending a "concerted audiovisual policy by
the national authorities concerned".
Following the structural upheaval in which work had to be "shaped" to fit the
terminology laid down by the medium-term plan, the two major projects took up the
bulk of the CCC's attention until beyond the end of the decade. Although planned
since 1974, Project 5 only launched as such in 1978 and did not finish until 1983.
However, in 1979 the Project 5 group, by now the CCC's de facto policy committee,
proposed new terms of reference for itself which would mandate it to work on a large-
scale consultation exercise conducted with cultural interests at national, regional and
local levels. The result would be a charter, to be ratified at political level, which
72 see Grosjean, op.cit., p.43: the main emphasis lay on towns' solutions to their practical problems
and on evaluation of their action and the lessons to be learned from it"
73 Simpson, op. cit.
74 this project has hints of failure about it. After long postponement, it seems to have been very much a
Franco-Belgo-German affair, and Grosjean downplays it in his account, which also suggests a
truncated three-year lifespan instead of five. The CCC moved on rather rapidly to its follow-up media
project, Project 11
208
would "codify the objectives and the fundamental principles of a cultural policy for
Europe" 75 . The idea of a European charter had been put forward by the Secretary-
General at the second ministerial conference in Athens in 1978 and appeared to be
based on a French initiative, a "Charter of the Quality of Life" 76 . The communiqué
from the event suggests agreement to this was the main outcome of the meeting,
although the meeting report itself does not.
The attempt to elaborate a European Cultural Charter 77 is an example of a failed
attempt to impose a communitarian project on a political structure which had not been
designed to accept it. It may have originated in UNESC078 , as the presentation (as a
precedent) of an African Cultural Charter project at the CoE's 1981 ministerial
conference in Luxembourg suggests 79 . The idea of a charter was extremely
contentious and eventually had to be recast as a political statement of limited scope
and status80 .
At the turn of the decade the CDCC continued to think in terms of cultural
development, using the Project 5 group as its policy centre. In a 1979 paper81 on
"future prospects" it saw cultural action as a forward-looking strategy, gathering and
developing ideas, and promoting "practical explorations and experiments in the field"
to test them out. In practice, however, the CDCC's capacity to mastermind
experiments seems limited to the terms of the reference of its major projects.
Consideration of themes for new projects, alongside the preparatory work for the
75 CDCC (79) 8 rev. draft 1980 programme
76 Report of the 2nd Conference of Specialised Ministers responsible for Cultural Affairs, Athens, 1978
77 see also Chapter Nine
78 the work was managed by a former UNESCO official who had become a national delegate and was a
future, director of DECS
79 a further outcome of the OAU/UNESCO cultural development project described by Dupuis, op.cit.
See 3 rd conference of specialised ministers responsible for cultural affairs, Luxembourg, 1981:
presentation by Basile Kossou
6° the 1984 "Declaration on European Cultural Objectives"
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Cultural Charter, seems to have taken up most of the available resources. A small
number of one-off projects seem to have taken place, loosely connected to research
into "aid to artistic creation"82.
The impression gained of this period as a whole is of conflict beneath the surface
consensus characteristic of the meeting papers of international organisations.
References in meeting reports 83 hint at trouble, ranging from comments on "a
disturbing meeting" full of "petty squabbles over Project 5" in 1979 84, to the sense of
"a much calmer spirit" after "the stormy period of the last six years", in which CDCC
"has abandoned its earlier ambitions" to try to be "the pioneering focus for
educational and cultural unity"85.
In fact, by the mid -1980s it seems clear that the cultural programme was in some
trouble. The DECS memorandum86 from which Grosjean quotes, despite an effort to
characterise the period as one of "pooling of solutions", acknowledges that
multilateral cultural cooperation was in "a period of crisis" brought about by fear of
the EC and "stronger doubts about European cultural identity". Other factors may also
have contributed, however. The desire to assert universal principles and to direct
effort towards a set of common aims, coupled with the explicit rejection at the
beginning of the 1970s of a less politicised strategy of comparison and sharing of
information, had led to a situation in which reciprocity ceased to be a possibility. The
attempt to express cultural cooperation as a "common philosophy" appeared to lay
81 CDCC (79)10.3
82 e.g. a colloquy on the theatre hosted by the UK
83 usually in the presentations of Assembly observers, which tend to be reproduced verbatim
84 CDCC (79) 14
85 CDCC (81) 17
86 "Future orientations of cultural cooperation in Europe", DECS, 1992
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bare a conflict about the relationship between culture, cultural policy and
governments.
Cultural policies and cultural industries: 1983-1990
During the 1970s and early 1980s, the promotion of cultural cooperation as a channel
for social engineering and a branch of futurology led to a strong programming
emphasis on research and method. Despite the failure to translate cultural democracy
into a universal political commitment at member state level, its narrow and broad
themes - the management of arts and amenities and the place of culture, expressed as
creativity, in an industrialised society — continued to inform CoE cultural cooperation
through the 1980s. In the second half of the decade they became its staple.
As Projects 5 and 6 came to an end, they were replaced by new projects, numbered 10
and 11. Their subject matter followed naturally from that of the earlier projects.
Project 10, which looked at the management of cultural policy at regional level,
continued the sociological perspective of Project 5 by seeking to analyse this in terms
of "cultural dynamics" 87 . Project 11 utilised the growing confidence of some member
states that pressure at the European level could be used to assert an equal weight for
cultural interests with the economic interests of the "culture industries", particularly
the broadcast media.
87 "To what extent had human sciences been used to analyse the links between culture and
region?.. .Could the system put together by the Council of Europe for studying various aspects of
culture and cultural democracy be applied to the "culture-region" problem area?" (Interim report by the
study group responsible for Project No. 10, pp. 9-10, Council of Europe, CDCC, 1987)
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Project 1088 used a system of locally-held hearings and seminars to explore how
culture was managed in different European regions, the outcomes of which were then
written up and published. Two conferences were held, one in Florence at the halfway
stage in 1987, the second as a final conference in Lyons in 1991 89 . Although the
project began with the objective of testing out the ideas about cultural democracy
which CDCC documentation had been rehearsing for well over a decade°, it is
evident that this had to change fairly rapidly in the face of a different reality. For
instance, although the interim report places quite a lot of emphasis on examples which
support the "house philosophy", such as the influence of "Peuple et culture" 91 and of
"animation culturelle", it is also obliged to acknowledge that some people prefer not
to use the word animation any longer. The project work evolves to reflect late 1980s
concerns — how cultural programmes reinforce or recreate a regional identity, how
culture joins forces with other social interests to tap into funding structures, the
economic argument that cultural budgets are not expenditure but investment.
Did Project 10 merely record and analyse the changes it encountered or did it supply a
missing European context? In the same year (1987) that the interim report appeared,
the 5th Specialised Conference of European Culture Ministers took as its theme the
economic impact of culture, its documents prepared by economists rather than
sociologists. Little of the work of Project 10 seems to have informed these
discussions. By the time its final report appeared, it was necessary to record a gap
88 variously "Cultural dynamics in regional development" and "Culture and Region": despite the
theoretical five-year duration of such projects, the dates Grosjean gives for this are 1982 to 1991 —
nearly a decade in itself
89 the two are very different, the first having produced, under the influence of the Standing Conference
of Local and Regional Authorities of Europe, a list of demands including a Regional Cultural Fund; the
latter much more low-key and confining itself to a few projects, such as a training course for cultural
administrators, which could be carried out within a modestly resourced programme
90 the interim report constantly refers back to the various texts and recommendations of the later
ministerial conferences and even the Arc-et-Senans Declaration of 1972
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between the ideas about cultural policy which the project had promoted and the
experiences of the policy-makers and administrators who attended the final
conference92 . The end of Project 10 may in fact have been the point at which there
ceased to be a real attempt to promote the idea of a Council of Europe "cultural
policy". Thereafter the Council of Europe began to market itself as a kind of resource
centre for professionals engaged in public administration, largely eschewing the
difficult political area at member state level.
Project 11 93 , by contrast, began as, and remained, a highly political initiative. It saw
the Council of Europe's task as to assert cultural objectives against economic ones and
to obtain a political commitment to public sector regulation at a time when the media
were perceived as alarmingly in thrall to market forces 94 . The new project, again
under Francophone Belgian direction, and against a national background of
considerable sensitivity 95 , was initially supposed to focus on music 96 but quickly
extended itself to other issues in contention at European Community level: resale
price maintenance on books and records 97 ; harmonisation of VAT; copyright law; the
status of the artist; how to "Europeanise" programme-making; film subsidy.
After holding meetings with representatives of artistic circles as well as the culture
industries themselves, Project 11 held a final conference at which recommendations
91 the movement which influenced Marcel Hicter
92 The Cultural Challenges for Europe's Regions, Project 10, final report, Lyons 1991 (Council of
Europe, 1993)
93 full title, "Promotion of creativity, taking into account the culture industries" (1982-86)
94 this was foreseen at the conclusion of Project 6 which was considered by an in-house evaluation to
have proved that "the functioning of the sole market forces (sic) is insufficient to ensure the
development of culture" (CDCC (81) 10)
95
specifically, the ownership of RTL; and more generally, the start of Franco-Belgian pressure to
establish a favourable audiovisual policy within the EC (see Chapter Ten)
96 as a contribution to European Music Year (1985), a Council of Europe political initiative which had
not been launched in CDCC
92 in some countries a formal government policy, but in others an unofficial trade arrangement, and in
either case suspected of being a restrictive industrial practice
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were drafted to be taken forward for adoption by CDCC. In the event, they were
unacceptable to a group of countries and went forward only with strong reservations
on parts of the text. The most contentious of these referred to measures to be adopted
by public authorities, particularly as regarded the regulation of broadcasting and the
idea that broadcasters should be required to invest in production as a condition of
access to new networks. Some of the recommendations cut across the work of the
Council of Europe's own committee on mass media, CDMM, which was in the early
stages of preparing a much more industry-oriented approach to the audiovisual sector.
These contemporaneous projects offer very different versions of cultural cooperation:
the one, towards the end 98 , largely discarding national interest as a factor to the extent
that the project seemed virtually neutral in terms of government level feelings towards
it99 ; the other highly politicised, with "tip-of-the-iceberg" overtones related to the
intensely national interests — at both ends of the spectrum - operating below the
surface. The CDCC has subsequently avoided issues where national interests are
powerfully polarised.
The lessons of Project 10 may be seen in the next innovation of cultural cooperation
which followed the failure of the European Cultural Charter: the system of national
cultural policy reviews. The idea came from Sweden, which had been strongly
opposed to the idea that a Council of Europe Charter could make formulations for the
proper functioning of cultural life in member states. Its suggestion was that evaluation
could help states identify where their action was appropriate to their aims, rather than
to prescribe what those aims should be. It was based on a similar exercise undertaken
98 -	 •in its earlier stages the project seems to have been a little too intrigued by cultural animation in the
Jura region to appear quite pure in this respect
99 the exceptions were in countries like Switzerland and Belgium with heavy investments in
transfrontier contacts based on shared language areas
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in 0ECD 100 , where aspects of member states' economic policy were subjected to
examination by a team of external evaluators, whose report was then defended before
the other member states by a senior representative (a minister, or similar).
The reviews began with France, which published its national report, explaining and
defending its management of cultural policy and assembling relevant data, in 1988,
followed by Sweden in 1989. Several others followed before the focus switched from
west to east in response to the requirements of the new member states. The examiners'
report ml
 would then be the basis of national debate leading where appropriate to
changes in policy. Over time, it was hoped, the reviews would mount up and form a
significant archive of comparative material.
The new project was seen not as a one-off with a pre-determined life-span but as a
fixture for as long as countries were interested in it. According to Grosjean its
rationale is "the need for a common approach to evaluation" 102 . Another explanation
may be the opportunity which it provides for member states to assemble statistical
material which may have been lacking and to explore strengths and weaknesses
within the national system in a politically "neutral" context 103 . In the absence of
follow-up assessment of changes made as a result of the reviews, it is unclear whether
countries have in fact used them to conform to a "European" norm. In Grosjean's
account the accent seems to be on how diverse the various systems are.
100 since OECD was a body with a wider membership than Western Europe, the method was used for
drawing attention reasonably tactfully but publicly to areas where particular governments failed to meet
,
'normal" western liberal standards
101 this task is usually carried out, usually in teams of four or five, by a mixture of the DECS "house"
experts and others, practitioners or academics, without previous CoE involvement
102 Grosjean, op.cit., p. 49
" based on discussions with officials from participant countries
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For reasons of space l °4
 it is not possible to give a detailed account of other elements
in the culture programme at this period. Since the beginning of the 1980s it has been
increasingly large and diverse. The art exhibitions have been a constant feature, the
one unbroken link to the beginning of Council of Europe cultural cooperation105.
From time to time attempts were made, usually by the Secretary-General on behalf of
the Committee of Ministers, to reintroduce other symbolic activities such as prizes on
the grounds that these "satisfied more fully both member states' needs and Europeans'
expectations" 1 °6 . Examples included the Prix Europa l °7
 and the European Theatre
Prize, which ran for a few years before being quietly dropped because of its lack of
impact compared to its cost 108 . A typical year might be 1988, when alongside the
major projects and policy reviews the programme included an attempt to create a
European Poetry Foundation; a colloquy on schools and museums; plans for a
conference on arts and education; and support for academic work on linguistic
terminology. Two of these were projects suggested by member states 109 ; the others
initiated by the secretariat. In addition, the CDCC was working that year on "cultural
routes" 11 °, largely at the behest of the Committee of Ministers which in turn was
trying to accommodate a Parliamentary Assembly resolution on trans-border
itineraries.
104 for this reason also the decision has been taken to omit all reference to work on the cultural heritage,
which was not brought within the remit of CDCC until 1990 and retains a strongly separate identity
105 for example, between 1980 and 1990 five exhibitions were held, ranging from Florence under the
Medici to Anatolian civilisation and the impact of the French Revolution
106 CDCC (83) 30— this may have been a response to events within the EC, where the European
Parliament had started to vote monies for just such "symbolic" initiatives as the European Community
Youth Orchestra
107 a joint "house" enterprise with the European Cultural Foundation set up to reward films and
documentaries thought to contribute to the European idea
108 mainly the expense of travelling juries. Like other cultural prizes (such as the EU's "Aristeion"), the
balance between irrelevance in a large country with a strong linguistic profile and prestige in a smaller
one with a lesser-used language proved hard to get right
109 schools and museums (Austria) and arts and education (UK)
110 the CDCC was instructed to take on this project and continued with it until the 1990s, despite the
difficulties of expressing what was essentially a tourist incentive in terms which might interest cultural
authorities
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The position of film in the CDCC is slightly anomalous, in that a separate experts'
group has been active since it was inherited from the WEU in 1961, with an agenda
which was mainly concerned with the development of education technology. After
1965 it covered production, distribution and other problems of the film industry and
gradually concentrated on the structural difficulties of European cinema. However,
the group seems to have had only limited impact in this high-profile and controversial
policy area l 11 . In 1989 when a Council of Europe contribution to the European
Community's European Year of Film and Television was required 112 the CDCC
Experts were sidelined. Nor were they given a role in the management of the
intergovernmental "Eurimages" fund for cinema and TV co-production which was set
up within the Council of Europe after the rejection of such a fund within the EC.
However, recently they have embarked on the preparation of two draft conventions,
on co-production in Europe and the preservation of the cinematic heritage, the first of
which has been considered generally useful (the latter has yet to be adopted).
The 1990s: expansion and networking
By the beginning of the 1990s the last of the "major projects" of cultural cooperation
had come to an end. The overall structure of the Council of Europe's programme no
longer demanded such initiatives and for some time the national cultural policy
reviews replaced them as the "flagship" aspect of the cultural cooperation programme.
These were mainly of interest to the participants, however, and most member states
continued to feel that the CDCC needed to be seen to be addressing high profile
111 for examples of texts drawn up by the Cinema Experts Group, see Grosjean, op.cit, pp. 56-58; also
Lange and Renaud, op.cit
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policy concerns. There were attempts to keep alive the idea of cultural cooperation as
a generator of new, forward-looking thinking, most notably in the study project on
"culture and neighbourhood", in effect a continuation of Project 10 113 . However, the
absence of much evidence of convergence around a Council of Europe norm and of
wide-ranging influence on government thinking on cultural policy compared to the
heyday of cultural democracy now made CDCC's claim to be a "laboratory of ideas"
look a little threadbare114.
At the same time, political imperatives required the CDCC to respond to the new role
of the Council of Europe as a stage on which problems of transition for new
democracies could be worked out. Here the disjuncture between the "internalised"
style of the Culture Committee 115 and the "external" style of the Committee of
Ministers became strongly evident once again. There was, and continues to be,
pressure on all the committees to make their programmes relevant in terms of human
rights, tolerance and democratic values. CDCC's first attempts to respond to this
included trying to formulate concepts of "cultural rights" within the context of
protecting national minorities. It proved difficult, however, to integrate this kind of
thinking into a programme which, in an effort to engage and retain the interest of
national cultural ministries, had chosen to ground itself in aspects of their direct
responsibilities.
112 as a sign of cooperation between the two bodies, although the "Year" was in fact an (ill-judged)
element of the Adonnino Report on a People's Europe, intended to identify ways of 'humanising' the
unloved European Community
113 a selection of case studies of cities, including Liverpool and Bilbao, where local experiments in
cultural management were seen to have been successful
114 for example, the Council seems to have had next to nothing to offer on key issues of government
cultural policies in the 1980s and 1990s such as managing the relationship with large national
institutions, adapting tax structures or dealing with reduced public expenditure
115 from 1990, the CDCC was divided into four subject committees, including the Culture Committee
(CC-Cult). This subgroup of CDCC is entirely responsible for determining programme content and
aims
218
Certain possibilities had been effectively blocked off 116 . The Committee of Ministers
consistently declined to increase the budget for culture (harder than ever to justify in
the face of competing demands from the more efficiently run education and heritage
committees). As McMurry and Lee might have foreseen, expertise continued to be
transferred bilaterally not multilaterally, suggesting that the Council of Europe had
not established itself as a more efficient vector of cooperation than member states'
own structures. The group which had formed within and around DECS, with the
CIRCLE network 117 as its nucleus, therefore began to work directly with groups of
like-minded cultural activists encountered in the course of implementing the major
projects and who wished to create informal ties amongst themselves on a European
level.
Project 10 claimed to have succeeded in reaching over 3,000 individuals during its life
span ' 18, as a result of which the project's managers realised that they could no longer
promote the Council's version of cultural policy as a realistic model. They thus
switched their interests to comparing the methods by which cultural policy was
administered within member states. On the initiative largely of the secretariat and its
advisers, CC-Cult began to set aside some of its programme for small-scale initiatives
to encourage cultural organisations (mainly arts bodies) to network at European level.
Networking provided the Council of Europe with a chance to return to first principles
by offering itself as a resource to the intellectual community.
116 in an echo of the 1950s, governments once again avoided setting up new institutions which they
would then have to resource
117 this group of researchers and information officers may be seen as the successors to the Project 5
policy group, although they did not have that level of formal responsibility within the CDCC. Its
members have consistently been used by DECS as experts on national cultural policy reviews, on
project 10 and its successor, and most recently as an instant "task force" deputed to draw up a report on
cultural policy in Europe ("In from the Margins", Council of Europe, 1996)
118 final report, 1993, op.cit., p. 88
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Of particular interest to the DECS approach of the 1990s ,
 derived from Project 10,
was the training function of networks, which might be harnessed and developed, not
necessarily as a way of promoting a particular orthodoxy 119
 but as a means of
achieving the elusive original goal of encouraging a trans-border mindset and ways of
working. A course run by the Marcel Hicter Foundation 12° and financed by the
Council of Europe had this aim, although one might argue that teaching people how to
formulate projects for the international institutions to fund is a little artificial, not to
say self-perpetuating 121 . The networking approach also led to a certain demand for
input into the policy-making process. Groups such as the European Council of Artists
(a Scandinavian-led pressure group) and the Informal European Theatre Meeting were
at one point unsuccessfully proposed to member states as "privileged partners" with
whom to open some unspecified form of policy dialogue.
As well as a form of intellectual cooperation, a network-based policy allowed those
who participated to attempt a return to some of the ideals of federalism and cultural
democracy — participation, grassroots self-determination, the bypassing of the
(national) political level, channelling advice (which might or might not be of use)
rather than trying to negotiate compromises between conflicting national interests122.
This reopened the old gap, partially closed during the previous twenty years, between
119 
although the possibility that networks might be receptive to the "Council of Europe idea" should not
be excluded
120 
a Belgian "not-for-profit" organisation in memory of the former CDCC member, funded by the
French Community of Belgium and contracted by DECS to operate training courses on its behalf, using
many of the "house" experts
121 it has, however, been helpful for running conventional bilateral cultural relations programmes
122 DECS' 1992 description of the programme of the early 1990s as "cooperation... organised primarily
through 'clearing houses' and networks" shows the extent to which the focus had shifted
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the organisation's interests and those of the member states, leading to renewed, albeit
less acrimonious, criticism of its relevance, effectiveness and working practices123.
Accordingly, the focus, helped by the reform of the organisation as a whole, has
returned to member states' interests, in particular those of the new members. A good
example of the new flexibility is the ten-year long attempt to put together a coherent
CC-Cult project centred on books and publishing 124 . Originally sparked by the
political need to keep language-based issues on the agenda, the project combines
several useful aspects of other cultural cooperation "styles" whilst avoiding their
pitfalls. Eschewing a sponsorship/advocacy rule, as used with networks, DECS' team
instead targeted professional associations and devised an active response to what it
found. The project's literature avoids promoting a particular point of view, whether
that of the "house" or of a particular member state. The impression it gives is of
ideological neutrality and adaptability. Like project 10, its method is reports, studies
and conferences, but it also diversifies into subsets of other activities (a "book cultural
policy review" system, a "book cultural route"), picks up on useful new technologies
which it can promote and inform about (digitally-based print-on-demand techniques
of value to cash-strapped publishers) and sets up nationally-based projects (New Book
Economy). It contains an element of normative work in the project, involving
codifying best practice in the management of archives and libraries. It has no group of
"experts", but brings several specific tasks related to technical problems in member
states under a single umbrella and gives the impression of being co-ordinated rather
123 a 1996 working party, which included the present author, made recommendations for reform which
centred on restoring main responsibility for the determination of the programme, its aims and content
to the national delegations
124 this began seriously in 1992 as a French initiative (including the provision of a senior expert to carry
it out) following their hosting of the 7 1h conference of culture ministers, for which they chose the theme
and directed most of the preparation. Prior to this "books" had featured in the programme for years
without any serious activity attached to it
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than imposed. This "mixed economy" stands in contrast to the traditional CDCC
preference for analysis and synthesis into a "house style", which is then applied, in
quasi-academic fashion, to a range of situations.
The cultural policy reviews have also changed following the arrival of large numbers
of new member states, for whom they offer real advantages. Rather than attempting to
cover the whole range of policy issues in one country, these reviews now address a
group of specific issues. A complementary project — transversal studies on managing
"desetatisation" and privatisation — has been launched in which a group of "old" and
transitional member states are studied together. In 1998 a Dutch-funded project called
MOSAIC was launched under the system of voluntary contributions used for the art
exhibitions. This uses the cultural policy reviews to create a channel of access for new
member states on a demand-led basis to specialised advice on difficult policy areasI25.
Both developments — books and cultural policy — suggest a movement away from the
general to the specific. If cultural cooperation is in the process of reinventing itself
once again, it is with an emphasis on assembling project management techniques
which can be applied to individual requirements. The process of transfer of expertise
has come to the fore because of the existence for the first time of a quasi-client
relationship within the system.
Planning papers for 2000 126 show how the "standards" of the programme (cultural
policy reviews, support for networks, art exhibitions, cultural routes, cinema) have
been compressed into three "all-purpose" categories (cultural development policy,
125 in this it is reminiscent of the system of "technical assistance" which has for years been a strong
feature of the heritage programme: a member state asks for an expert from another member state to
visit, consider a particular problem in conservation and draw up a report. It is then up to the requesting
state to act on the report
126 kindly made available by Mme Vera Boltho of DECS, for which I am grateful
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technical assistance and "visions of Europe"), which reflect the types of cooperation
which generated them. However, these are no longer the fulcrum: that has shifted to
27the "political" priorities of information technology 1 and technical assistance
(through the Mosaic project).
This repackaging clearly shows the influence of the two Council of Europe "summits"
at Heads of Government leve1 128
 which were the organisation's response to political
developments in eastern Europe. The first of these produced new core principles or
pillars — the pre-eminence of law, pluralist democracy and human rights — and
included a reference to "common cultural heritage enriched by its diversity". The
second summit dropped the reference to culture and a debate is still running as to
whether culture is or is not a "fourth pillar" of the Council of Europe. It has been
sufficiently emphasised 129 , however, to oblige a rethinking in which high visibility
and political content take priority, in the form of standard-setting accompanied by
monitoring of compliance, and budgeting according to results.
The logic of this would be to cut back actual multilateral cultural cooperation quite
considerably. If the aim of intergovernmental action in Europe is to prevent major
lapses from standards, there is very little within cooperation on culture which
contributes to it, just as it never succeeded in contributing meaningfully to world
peace. There are few signs that this is acknowledged. In the following chapter it will
be suggested that part of the explanation lies in the way that cultural cooperation
provided the Council of Europe, at a time when it had effectively ceased to be a
significant international force, with an alternative narrative which preserved some of
127 normative work, within a newly created "house" style involving a "good practice" text emphasising
freedom of expression and empowerment
128 in 1993 (Vienna) and 1997 (Strasbourg)
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the core ideals of the Hague Congress federalist vision. The notion of cultural
cooperation as "both an objective and a method" 130 , i.e. as a value in itself rather than
one means amongst others to an end, is central to the idea of a "different" Europe
which challenges the values of its established politicians. The fluidity of its
programme, however, and the constant repackaging it has had to undergo to appear
relevant, shows that this visionary Europe remains unable to shake free from the
political demands which cultural diplomacy continues to make.
129 see "Building Greater Europe without Dividing Lines", Report of the Committee of Wise Persons to
the Committee of Ministers, Council of Europe, 1998
130 view expressed by the Director of DECS in a policy paper to the CC-Cult, 1999
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CHAPTER NINE
Types and changes in cultural cooperation in the Council of Europe
The previous chapters have tried to show how the Council of Europe has developed
cultural cooperation and some of the pressures which informed its choices. This
chapter examines the outcome of these choices and argues that at the peak of the
Council's cultural influence the goal of better interaction between states and peoples
became not just secondary to, but entirely displaced by, that of constructing and
promoting a value system which, far from reflecting "cultural policy" as practised by
governments, explicitly rejected those policies and offered itself as a critique of them.
However, as the fluctuations in its fortunes show, more traditional approaches are not
entirely routed and have recently reasserted themselves.
International relations theory and cultural cooperation
In international relations theory, the terms "realist" and "idealist" are used to convey
the relationship, often conflict, between governments, keen to maintain the status quo,
and secretariats who with their expert advisers look for change rather than
containment. Chris Brown' offers a less loaded, more satisfactory, contrast between
"cosmopolitan" and "communitarian" approaches which in practice try not merely to
co-exist but to cooperate actively. This allows for a wider range of motives in
situations where governments may often combine realist and idealist perspectives (or,
put more cynically, present realist motives as idealist). Brown does not discuss the
'Brown, 1992, op.cit
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personalist legacy, nor indeed cultural cooperation, but his categories supply an
excellent framework for a discussion of the Council of Europe scenario and will
therefore be used in this chapter. They also provide a valuable link with the
"Classical" and "Romantic" ideas of society which provide the backdrop to cultural
policy, and not least to the Bergsonian synthesis between intellectual cooperation at
the level of scientific contact and creative cooperation which tries to place the artistic
impulse2 at the centre of the body politic.
A "cosmopolitan" approach to international relations is state-centred, inclined to
interpret events and action as governed by the various interests of the participants. Its
antecedents are Kant and the Enlightenment and it is assumed to have a certain
universality of outlook. The post-war international relations structure may be
considered to have been built on the assumption of cosmopolitan values: based on
commitment to the idea of international law as the major governing factor to
international relations. It looks for more rational ways of running the world's affairs
which include moral interests, social institutions and the higher interest of humanity
as a whole 3 . The decision to study different cultural policies in member states in terms
of how well they meet their aims, rather than to redirect those aims, might be
considered as cosmopolitan4.
A "communitarian" approach, conversely, depends on the assertion of a "general will"
as the legitimating factor in decision-making, which can only be expressed via small-
2 
one might consider Mounier and the idea of "L'Inutilisable" here: in particular, "l'ecole tue pour
toujours l'artiste que tout homme porte en soi", which might stand as a motto for communitarian
cultural cooperation ( from his "Preface a la Rehabilitation de l'Art et l'Artiste" in Revolution
Personnaliste et Communautaire", op. cit, p.186).
3 Brown includes both Marxism and Benthamite utilitarianism in this category
4 whereas "realist" would hardly suit the spirit of open-mindedness with which some, if not quite all,
undergo this process
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scale organic communities. Not necessarily anti-nationalistic 5
 but distrustful of the
state, it has its roots in Rousseau and the Romantic movement. Communitarians place
a premium upon social solidarity and question the supremacy of "man" (the Western
thinker) over civil society. Brown groups idealist thinkers 6 , utopians and many post-
modernists in this category. He also associates the term with the growth of what he
calls "epistemic communities", a term originally coined to describe pressure groups
and NGOs who base their arguments on scientific consensus combined with
"concealed political threat" 7 . The obvious illustration is Greenpeace, but the term is
also applied to expert groups within an international organisation. The Council of
Europe's cultural democracy project, with its outsider input, insistence on radical
change and on the sterility of "classical" education systems and desire to obtain
political commitment to a shared philosophy of "culture-centredness", is surely the
ideal communitarian project.
Clearly, these descriptive categories do not meet every aspect of cultural cooperation.
The eminently communitarian Denis de Rougemont would have insisted strongly
upon the centrality of the universal image of mankind, as it was the unique gifts and
achievements of "the European man" which for him justified Europe's place in the
world. However, they do provide a recognisable paradigm for the conflicts being
worked out over the years in multilateral cultural cooperation.
The Brussels Treaty Organisation approach was never anything but cosmopolitan:
posited entirely on the interplay of relations between states, seeking to extend benefits
5 Brown regards Hegel as the "team leader" of the communitarians, and there are clear links with the
kind of nation-building processes identified by, inter alia, Benedict Anderson ("Imagined
Communities", Verso, 1983)
6
who include many pre-war international theorists including ICIC's Alfred Zimmern
7 C. Brown, "Understanding International Relations", pp. 233-4. Macmillan, 1997
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within a vaguely articulated notion of the general good for as long as this did not
conflict with or detract from the benefits enjoyed by the immediate constituency. The
Council of Europe initially followed this line, but changed under the influence of the
Consultative Assembly and influential individuals. From 1965 (the "leisure debate")
onwards, the drive towards a cultural policy, based on the tenets of "permanent
education", seems wholly communitarian: culture as, in essence, for the good of the
individual, his or her personal development and location within a community. There
is, furthermore, a "resistance" element based on rejection of economic, or
consumerist, values which seems to go beyond what a government cultural policy
could be expected to adopt.
Cosmopolitan cooperation in the Council of Europe
International relations theory also offers useful insights into what we mean by
"cooperation", a word which is rarely defined yet seems to cover anything from a
joint political statement to a tacit agreement not to complain about international
money diverted to an essentially national activity. Anthony Haigh 8, inventor of the
Cultural Fund, speaks of "collective cultural cooperation" in terms of spirit versus
matter, evoking de Rougemont's ideas of "consciousness" and "cultural mission"
rather than a series of administrative exchanges aimed at improving the efficiency of
the status quo.
Keohane is one of the few to examine what is meant by international cooperation. He
sees it not in terms of a common mission but of reciprocity and retaliation: you give
something, you get something back, otherwise you withdraw your offer. As we have
8 Haigh, "Cultural Diplomacy in Europe", op.cit. p. 216
228
seen, this reciprocity was already central to post-war bilateral cultural relations; and it
seemed at first to carry forward into Council of Europe cultural cooperation — the
"pragmatic approach" to which Haigh refers. Keohane explains reciprocity as game
theory: cooperation is likely to result in the certainty of a limited gain, preferable to
the risk of losing all in a bid to win all.
He acknowledges, however, that reciprocity is difficult in multilateral situations.
Cooperation requires that "the actions of separate individuals or organisations — which
are not in pre-existent harmony — be brought into conformity with one another
through a process of policy co-ordination" 9 . But the gains may not be clear, there is
often nothing that can be withdrawn and incentives to enforce compliance are low.
This seems particularly true of multilateral cultural cooperation, where if one of the
group decides not to participate the others will scarcely be affected, unless there is
some form of kickback affecting bilateral cooperation, which is rarely if ever the case.
In other words, why engage in multilateral cultural cooperation when the benefits are
far from obvious? They can be quantified in the field of the cultural heritage, where
there is a general goal of improving the overall standards of conserving and
appreciating the heritage to the benefit of al1 10 , but are otherwise not obvious. If there
is no obvious benefit to common action, one has to be invented, since the alternative
proposition — common action is not necessary — is unthinkable in terms of an
organisation which has to justify itself. Keohane cites Haas' term for this: "upgrading
the common interest", a process by which benefits offered now will be paid back in
the unknown future. Thus the process itself becomes the benefit, and concessions are
9 R. 0 Keohane, "International Institutions: Two Approaches", p. 280, in Der Derian, op. cit., pp. 279-
302
11:i
which may account for the fact that, from the outset, the "heritage sector" has made much greater use
of the international convention as a standard-setting instrument
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made in order to build up the process rather than achieve any immediate measurable
outcome.
The process of cooperation within BTO, despite the absence of obvious concrete
results, therefore appears to its participants as worth persevering with partly because
the "getting to know you" process works amongst officials themselves as well as,
theoretically, amongst the general public. The aim is improved good-will at all levels
which will smooth the path of more substantial negotiations; this can at least be seen
to be linked to the ultimate goal, no resumption of war. Nothing is at stake which
impacts on national policy interests in this, the softest of "soft policy". The comment
of Inis L. Claude, cited at the beginning of this thesis, demonstrates how cultural
cooperation is often regarded by those who deal in the wider picture.
However, one might suppose that benefit cannot be deferred for ever and the time
must come when a return is demanded on the investment. One way to evaluate
cooperation, according to Keohane, is in terms of change resulting from it.
Cooperation need not necessarily be benign (the strong may gang up to force
compliance on the weak) but it should be able to demonstrate an outcome to show that
it has made some difference. Cultural cooperation as a cosmopolitan project is
difficult to justify in these terms. Even where 1950s-1960s-style promotional activity
is likely to have had isolated pockets of impact, for example, amongst the audiences
for its prize-winning films, or readers of its (few) translations, and the spectators of its
art exhibitions (though in all but a few cases these were confined to capitals where
international events already happened), it seems likely that this in itself hardly
justified continued investment. Furthermore, it must have become clear by the early
1960s that the primary aim, exchange, was being met quite independently of efforts
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by international organisations, in ways ranging from municipal twinning schemes to
the ubiquity of television and quicker, more practical travel, such a significant factor
in the days of ICIC.
Nor is it evident that multilateral cultural cooperation is as effective as cultural
diplomacy in terms of providing an image. Cultural diplomacy does not only look
outward: part of its task is to underpin national foreign policy by offering a reflection
of the country back to itself with which the citizen will be satisfied and which will
incline him to continue to support the government's actions. The task of reflecting
back, through culture, a positive image of participation in Europe was already
significantly harder than for a single member state, if only because of the difficulty of
associating cultural advantages with membership of a defence treaty. BTO seems to
have had most success when the link was clear and referred primarily to the
propagation of Western ideals as a defence against communism (and, by implication,
a war with the Russians). Leadership courses, information films and booklets, and
opportunities to exchange ideas and travel all planted the message that the
organisation which laid these things on was also ready to fight to defend the values
they represented.
For the Council of Europe, a different problem existed: how to inculcate a strong
sense within the populations of fifteen diverse European countries of belonging to a
single entity. Reinforcing the reciprocal element to bilateral cooperation might seem
an obvious option: making the "foreign" familiar. In 1992" DECS presented the aim
of this first stage as "to avoid the resurgence of fanatical nationalism", but its
immediate task was more pragmatic: to secure the requisite popular loyalty for the
II paper cited in Grosjean, op.cit
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project of European unity. Little attempt was in fact made to confront the causes or
results of that fanatical nationalism; yet neither was there any serious attempt at
intergovernmental level to develop a set of alternative symbols for Europe.
From the outset, two different approaches were evident. One assumed that the Council
of Europe would operate much as BTO had done, i.e. promote Western values with an
Atlantic tinge. This was the view of the UK 12 , and is uncompromisingly cosmopolitan
in its insistence on the division between the image which the western Europeans
combine to present to the world and the reality of their operation as individual
sovereign states. Cultural cooperation in this scenario is politically "neutral", in that it
has no impact on the conduct of internal policy beyond that of reflected image. The
Scandinavians countries seem to have supported this view initially.
The other approach was articulated by France but supported, at least in part, by most
continental countries and by Ireland 13 . This argued for a significantly different
cooperation with a much broader base: mutual knowledge and exchange, certainly,
but also standardisation ("an aspect of the process of unification" 14) of national
practices and the creation of supra-national authorities and activities 15 . This, if not
going all the way towards the federal ideal of the Hague Congress, suggests a will to
accept that cultural cooperation might involve common policy. Accordingly, early
cultural cooperation was already a hybrid and was seen by some as a staging post
towards a much more integrated process.
12 
cf. Richard Seymour, of the British Council, to his Norwegian counterpart in 1951: "where joint
action by Member States is recommended, it should be regarded as a widening of the bilateral basis
rather than a narrowing of the world basis" (PRO FO 924/914)
13 
see response to Richard Seymour's paper, ibid.
14 PRO FO 924/ 917
15 including European awards, exhibitions, joint film productions and a University of Europe
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If an idea of cultural cooperation as potential harmonisation of aspects of domestic
policy allied with strong "European" imagery was already established in 1951, the
willingness to press ahead with a programme which was not obviously delivering
results is explained. It was, in fact, a question of deferred benefit. The failed attempt
to use the renegotiation of the European Economic Community 16
 and the first meeting
of education ministers in 1960-1961 to create a European cultural/educational
superstructure is prefigured in this early declaration of intent. Thus, although
Anthony Haigh attributed the "cultural mission" to the Consultative Assembly, there
was a strong political pressure in that direction from some governments.
Nevertheless, this remained a possibility rather than a cause for immediate action,
especially as regarded institutions. Bruno de Witte also observes the reluctance of
European states to attempt a concentrated common approach in culture and suggests,
rightly, that there is much to be said for an appearance of action without significant
consequences: "could it be because this is a sector of symbolic politics in which it
matters more to be seen taking numerous initiatives in various settings rather than
developing effective and coherent forms of regulation? " 17 . Contemporary bilateral
developments seem to confirm this: in 1954 France and Germany concluded their own
bilateral Cultural Accord which intensified exchange between them while the British
Council suffered severe cutbacks for its work in Europe in order to shift resources to
the developing world. If it mattered, you did it bilaterally.
The intellectual community itself seemed scarcely readier to move cultural
cooperation beyond the cosmopolitan. The 1954 Council of Europe Round Table
16 the "plan Fouchet", which would have established educational and cultural cooperation as a Member-
State controlled competence, like foreign and defence policy
17 •m Wallace (1990), op.cit., p. 202
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which took place in Rome in 1954 under the chairmanship of Denis de Rougemont
disappointed its chairman, as he admits in his preface: "I awaited, pencil in hand, the
ingenious, wise and daring suggestions that would surely not fail to stream in from all
sides". To his surprise, these "convinced and tried Europeans.....occupied themselves
with multiplying objections... and warnings against the mysticism of union" to such
an extent that he ended by asking himself whether "the very notion of European
culture corresponded to any reality or was merely a slogan for over-enthusiastic
schoolboys" 18
De Rougemont's idea had been that culture is to politics as content is to form, the
creative impulse which dictates in what direction policy shall move. The Round Table
suggested not only that intellectuals themselves were no longer interested in that idea
(even within the federalist movement itself there had been a major schism between
"realist" and "idealist" wings, de Rougemont heading the latter), but were also
uncertain whether culture could even be employed effectively in the service of
unification 19 . It went instead for practical service-based activity — documentation,
services for journalists, language-teaching — which might be more effectively
delivered multilaterally than bilaterally.
Some of the Round Table's interests sound very like the approach later taken by the
European Commission: functionalist, requiring the existence of added value, directed
towards underpinning economic revival. However, the main reasons for the failure of
a cosmopolitan, or diplomatic, approach to cultural cooperation lie in the inability of
18 in M. Beloff, "Europe and the Europeans - an International Discussion" , pp. ix-x. Council of
Europe, 1957. Those present included Sean O'Faolain, Alcide de Gasperi, Arnold Toynbee and Robert
Schuman
19 not until 1986 was there again a serious move to mobilise cultural personalities in favour of
European union (the Florence conference of the European Commission)
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those involved to create a delivery structure that would have utilised national
machinery to provide serious services, whether because of lack of clarity of purpose
or lack of faith in the organisational machinery of the Council of Europe, or both.
"Communitarian" cultural cooperation: cultural policy
The twenty years from the mid-1960s to the mid-1980s may be seen as an experiment,
in which the failures of a cosmopolitan approach were succeeded by an attempt to
create a "cultural policy" shaped by the perception that domestic problems existed for
which governments were not finding their own solutions. Cultural cooperation
became a means of supplying (largely communitarian) solutions presented in different
ways: as a tool "to enable...states...to meet their educational and cultural needs more
rapidly and more efficiently" 20 ; as "collective" action, valid in its own terms, toward
the fulfilment of a "cultural mission" 2I ; or as "the development of a common
philosophy based on the founding concepts of cultural development, permanent
education, cultural democracy" which did not aim at enhanced efficiency but at "the
elaboration of fundamental concepts" 22
 .
The "communitarian", or social, phase runs roughly from the 1965 "leisure debate" to
the replacement in 1984 of a European Cultural Charter by a lower-key Declaration
on Cultural Objectives. The relative novelty of cultural policy as a concept separate
from education policy and the ubiquity of debate about the future of the "leisure
20 CCC (65)2 meeting report
21 Haigh (1974), op.cit., p. 216
22 1992 DECS paper on "Future Orientations for Cultural Cooperation in Europe" cited in Grosjean,
op.cit., p. 121
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society" in the mid-60s gave some credibility to the idea that an international
organisation might take the lead in its development. Public structures were still new
enough and fluid enough to adapt to the idea that "principles" could be developed
which national governments would incorporate into their own policy planning - the
idea that it is "possible to progress from the 'democratisation of culture' to 'cultural
democracy' " 23 . It was perhaps the last occasion in which intellectuals could
confidently set the agenda for international government action in Europe.
Two points should be made about cultural development/cultural democracy24 as a
communitarian project. The first is the ambiguous position of member states in
relation to it. Keohane suggests that the aim of cooperation is conformity, but
intergovernmental cooperation has no mechanisms for enforcing this. Its measure of
effectiveness can only be the extent to which it is taken up at national level. The
evidence suggests that it did enjoy a considerable degree of influence25 , but that
governments held back from the kind of political commitment which would have
given it the status accorded to, for example, human rights.
Secondly, despite its cross-referencing with UNESCO, the CoE's cultural democracy
programme was an essentially federalist project in the mainstream European sense. It
allowed the organisation to declare its separateness from governments and to return,
in a sense, to its roots. The values projected are those articulated by Denis de
Rougemont26
 in "The Way of Federalism": inclusivity; the safeguarding of diversity
23 DECS foreword to the report of the 2'd
 Conference of European Ministers responsible for Cultural
Affairs, Athens 1978
24 the two terms are often used interchangeably, although "cultural development" is generally the
preferred descriptor — "cultural democracy" being used to denote the "ideal state" to which policies are
assumed to aspire
25 in the case of Norway, for instance, a complete overhaul of government policy took place using the
Council of Europe's ideas as a basis: see L. J. Wilhelmsen, "Cultural Policy in Norway", (bound
typescript; British Library accession date 1976)
26 de Rougemont (1950), op.cit
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by ensuring that different systems and circumstances are enabled to flourish;
complexity rather than simplification, so that the autonomy of the individual is given
priority; power to reside in neighbourhoods and groups, not with governments,
managed through private shared networks. Cultural democracy redefined the
relationship between the Council of Europe and governments, who became of interest
only in so far as they were advancing the interests of the European citizen by applying
the project.
The Council was also able to align itself with the intellectual community in a way that
had until then been available to UNESCO, with its networks of national commissions,
but not to the relentlessly government-dominated Council of Europe. The language of
"needs and aspirations" becomes prominent from 1970 onwards, fed in from a
community on whose behalf the Council itself claims to speak: acting both as a
mediator to governments and as a pressure group for social rather than political
change. Martha Finniemore27 (1993) shows this happening in the context of
UNESCO's scientific programme and concludes that power-bases of specialised
knowledge build up in international organisations which can thus effect social, though
not political, responses in member states. If UNESCO indeed acted as catalyst for the
shift in the Council of Europe's approach (and given the speed and timing of the shift,
it seems reasonable to assume it did) this has resonance, particularly when one looks
at the impact of cultural democracy at the operational level in the UK, where (as
"community arts") it was influential amongst arts organisations though not at central
government leve128.
27 M. Finniemore, "International Organisations as Teachers of Norms", in International Organisation,
No.47, no. 4, pp.565-597, 1993
28 see R. Hewison, "Too Much: Art and Society in the Sixties, 1960-1975", Methuen, 1986, on the
problems of community arts in getting Arts Council support, and R. Shaw, "The Arts and the People",
Jonathan Cape, 1987, on cultural democracy as an attempt to displace "traditional" high art forms
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Finniemore notes that in UNESCO the impetus had come from a consultant, Pierre
Auger, who urged that science policy should move from passive support to active
pressure with the express intention that member states should give priority to a policy
on scientific matters which until then had been marginal or non-existent. Like cultural
policy, science policy came out of the blue: "science was believed to proceed most
efficiently and productively if left to scientists...Science policy and promoting the
science capabilities of member states were not even mentioned" 29 in the original set of
UNESCO aims. "UNESCO officials simply declared science policy-making to be
necessary and good; there was no serious attempt to prove that was so" 30 .
Finniemore's account looks very similar to what happened in the Council for Cultural
Cooperation.
Finniemore suggests that the Cold War acted as the primary outside stimulant to
create a UNESCO science policy. For the Council of Europe, read 1968. Whereas the
massive European insecurities of WWII were almost entirely ignored by cultural
cooperation, the social upheavals of the late 1960s received enormous attention, even
though they were by no means universal. The strong Franco-Belgian flavour of the
cultural democracy project no doubt accounts for this. However, although this may
have supplied the political justification for a "cultural policy" programme, the process
had been moving that way earlier than 1968. A national project already existed in
French public policy which provided a ready-made template for the rest of Europe to
embrace. Furthermore, as part of "permanent education", it had already been
successfully transplanted as part of the Council of Europe's "education policy".
29 Finniemore, op.cit, p. 577
3° ibid., p. 583
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Some of the rhetoric in Council of Europe documentation at this time is startlingly
"alternative", suggesting the organisation wished very much to align itself with the
ideas of the youth movement. A memorandum prepared for EUROCULT 31 deplores
the funding of theatres or museums: "they provide culture for the cultured". Instead,
"culture that is handed out must give way to culture that is experienced....Everything
is cultural that is meaningful to the individual, gives him pleasure and contributes to
his development". The individual must undergo a "cultural apprenticeship"32.
A document on "permanent education" goes further, arguing that the recent "crisis"33
called into question "the very roots of European culture, i.e. the long-established
European model" 34 . This is less a policy document than a polemic: the "functional
society...erodes and dismantles 'European culture' and the State machinery, although
it is not self-contained but itself imbued with national, religious and humanist
culture"; so education must cease to be "the sclerotic invocation of the past as a
preparation for the future" 35 , "the concept of 'class' will be eliminated" and teachers
will become "animateurs" 36 , while "psycho-social technology" will replace
"prescribed" curricula. It concludes by accusing the school system of "upholding
individualist principles" and "resisting" the "development of community life"37.
The concepts found in "permanent education", and cultural democracy, were not new.
They can be traced back to the French pre-war Front Populaire and the wartime
31 probably by the secretariat, although this is not clear
32 "An experiment in multilateral cultural cooperation in Europe: the Council for Cultural
Cooperation", CCC, 1972
33 
unspecified; however, cultural development rhetoric tends to assume that the reader will know that it
is the student unrest of 1968 which is being referred to
34 CCC, 1973: part of a series on "Education in Europe": this quote appears on p. 1
35 ibid., pp. 3-4
36 ibid., p. 21
32 ibid., pp. 36-37
239
Resistance. Titmus 38 relates this to French concern with developing an educated
working class 39 and the evolution of an explicit public policy under Leo Lagrange for
managing the cultural dimension of leisure. Joffre Dumazedier 4° and the movement
"Peuple et Culture", a sociological research-orientated organisation interested not
merely in the cultural betterment of the individual but in subsequent "social action",
have already been mentioned.
The willingness of the members of the CCC to absorb these preoccupations suggests
more than passive acquiescence or even a cultish desire to give cultural cooperation a
belief system. Concerns about "a sterile, commercial pseudo-culture" 4I go back to the
Frankfurt School and were being expressed elsewhere by such as Raymond Williams.
Besnard42 (1980) notes the extent to which "animation culturelle" was taking off in
France at the same period that Jeanne Laurent and Marcel Hicter were introducing it
to the Council of Europe. As he describes it, it appears to have had its own set of
guiding principles which cut across the whole range of the French public policy
system. The strands of French life to which he relates it (the Catholic voluntary
movement, syndicalism, dissatisfaction with the perceived rigidity of the scholastic
system) are similar to those in Greilsammer's (1975) study of French federalism, in
which Europe is embraced in reaction to the centralised, elitist French state and
38 C. J. Titmus, "Adult Education in France", Pergamon, 1967
39 he notes that the British find this preoccupation strange because of the part played by their tradition
of free public library provision and adult extension classes provided by the university system
40 Although the link should not be over-emphasised, Dumazedier also had some connections with
Mounier, de Rougemont and Ordre Nouveau (he was not, however, either a Catholic or a personalist)
41 Titmus, op.cit., p. 52
42 P. Besnard, "L'animation socioculturelle", no. 1845 in the series "Que sais-je?", Presses
Universitaires de France, 1980
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associated with decentralisation, flexible planning, the "deproletisation" of the
individual, participation and "la primaute du culture1"43.
The cultural democracy project, therefore, became the cultural policy of the Council
of Europe not simply because it was resolutely pushed by the member state which
more than any other had chosen to associate its national self-image with cultural
policy, nor because its intellectual credibility made it irresistible, but also because it
had roots in European idealism. Its communitarian aspects attracted a secretariat
which was perceived as having a free hand with the content of a troublesome part of a
cooperation programme. Finally, it was able to achieve a close synthesis with the
activity of UNESCO, itself troubled in the mid-60s by the lack of a convincing
European aspect to its activity.
Furthermore, this type of cooperation did not really need active consensus. A sort of
negative assent was sufficient, as the record of the 1976 ministerial conference
demonstrates. Ernst Haas 45 offers findings on consensus formation in the
Consultative Assembly based on voting pattems 46 which illuminate behaviour of
officials in working groups and, by extension, ministers. He finds that education and
cultural questions are those on which national delegations most often vote with
unanimity, because, he considers, these issues have few implications for national
programmes. In other words, they cost nothing politically and can be used as a flag-
waving tactic for the institution itself. Whether they would sign up so readily to the
43A. Greilsammer, "Les Mouvements Federalistes en France de 1945 a 1974", p. 201. Presses
d'Europe, 1975
44
see report of 4ffi Regional Conference of UNESCO National Commissions, Sofia, June 1962, which
notes the lack of "activities specially designed for Europe" in UNESCO's programme, and suggests that
Europe's contribution "can be conceived only in terms of the whole world" through intellectual
cooperation, its unique selling point
45 E. B Haas, "Consensus Formation in the Council of Europe", University of California Press, 1960
46 officials' committees, by contrast, rarely vote
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same texts at home is a moot point: Haas' findings suggests they would not 47 . The
same may be said of officials advising ministers on multilateral cultural cooperation.
In committee they will look for negative political or policy effects nationally rather
than positive gains, and will not necessarily insist on the latter. Thus one should be
wary of taking apparent consensus at face value, or of mistaking acquiescence for
enthusiasm. It may simply indicate absence of consequences.
Just as it offered an independent identity to the organisation, cultural democracy
provided member states with a "brand name" for the neglected culture dossier and
equal status with permanent education, CCC's flagship communitarian project. It also
provided a defensible methodology which could be presented as distinctive, ground-
breaking and, most important of all, inclusive, in that it allowed, indeed relied on, the
involvement of experts who were not necessarily government officials. The "network"
method is the dream of intellectual cooperation made flesh: small groups of like-
minded individuals (Brown's "epistemic communities" 48). Their presence, in theory
unencumbered by the political interests of their governments, in practice allows the
advocacy of a communitarian-idealist agenda. This accounts for the consistency of the
"Council of Europe view" over a twenty to thirty year period in which member state
interests have been very much more politically eclectic.
47 "
members ... voted for texts which, perhaps because they were no worse in quality than many of those
the Assembly had passed in earlier years, aroused no objections. When, however, members asked
themselves whether these texts were ones to which they could confidently put their names in their
national parliaments considerable diffidence could be seen" (p. 64)
48 the term is borrowed from Peter Haas to describe technical pressure groups who use scientific
consensus combined with the threat of bad publicity to set agendas which governments are then obliged
to control (see Brown, 1997, op.cit)
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This consistency appears most strongly in the attempt at a European Cultural Charter.
Seen initially as an opportunity to enshrine the Arc-et-Senans Declamation 49 , it was
regarded by the secretariat as "an initial effort to define a cultural policy for Europe"5°
and emerged from the CDCC's "epistemic community" par excellence, Project 5.
After consulting ten "prominent European personalities", selected by the Secretary
Genera151 , a wider consultation was undertaken. A text was presented to culture
ministers at their 3rd Conference but was rejected. Sweden articulated the objections:
"we consider it inconceivable to have politically elected governments formulate
recommendations on the functioning of cultural life. When discussing cultural
objectives on a national level, we have always considered it to be of paramount
importance that statements from government and parliament should relate to
responsibilities and action by public authorities. "52
This suggests that the limits of a communitarian project within cultural cooperation
had been reached. The charter not only attempted to make normative a number of
principles which might be acceptable as desiderata, but it also took the responsibility
for deciding the priorities for policy-making — Deutsch's "sets of preferences" - out of
the political sphere and relocated it with intellectuals, rather as de Rougemont had
envisaged his European Cultural Centre might do. The flawed assumption was that
certain areas of public policy might be bound, at national level, by "European"
principles derived from a very particular set of circumstances, namely, French
education policy, affected by national experiences, especially 1968, and mediated by a
49
see previous chapter for an account of this text as a "doctrine" allegedly "unanimously and
wholeheartedly" endorsed at the 2"d
 conference of culture ministers in Athens (the conference report
suggests nothing of the sort)
50 CDCC (79) 10
51 including Denis de Rougemont, the Luxembourg culture minister (who would host the next
conference), and Lord Kennet (Wayland Young), the Labour peer, environmental activist and former
member of the Parliamentary Assembly
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project which set out to examine cultural provision in municipalities and ended up
promoting a theory of cultural policy. By contrast, the European Declaration of
Cultural Objectives, adopted four years later at the Berlin conference, appears as a set
of affirmation5s of a general nature, resembling a set of "best practice" guidelines of
the kind currently being developed again in CC-Cult, in which the nature of the policy
is left open. Where the Charter assumed a kind of harmonisation without the
mechanisms to enforce it, the Declaration is consistent with a cosmopolitan system,
which accepts a limited framework of universal goals but leaves action to be decided
elsewhere.
Keohane suggests that cooperation involves some assessment of risk and benefit.
Cultural cooperation is often noticeably lacking in reward. Pressure comes from a
limited and not always influential circle (intellectuals/artists) rather than from the
general public. A communitarian project within cultural cooperation, which in the
absence of public pressure offers benefits of an ideological nature only 53 , is therefore
unlikely to succeed without making some concessions to this factor of cost and
benefit.
It may even be the case that such projects need an element of opposition in order to
remain true to their own intellectual starting points and to a self-image which defines
itself as extra-national in a system which remains primarily nation-based. The
difficulty of identifying the point at which the communitarian agenda needs to
compromise with cosmopolitan interests, which are on the whole happy to maintain
52 3rd Conference of Ministers with responsibility for Cultural Affairs, Luxembourg, 5-7 May, 1981, p.
154
53 this is obviously not true of all countries equally — there may well be countries where evidence of a
strong and idealistic stance in relation to European cultural policy will produce significant returns at the
ballot box. The point is that there will be countries — the UK being an obvious example — where such a
stance will not attract public approval, and may, as in the 1980s and 1990s, attract the reverse
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the system as it is, may be at the heart of intellectual cooperation's dilemma, which is
how to find the means of implementing its beliefs and visions when it cannot mobilise
public pressure at the national level. Many commentators on the European federal
idealists point to the fact that they failed for precisely this reason (for example,
Coudenhove-Kalergi, who nevertheless saw that culture had national rather than
supranational appeal) . Sympathetic chroniclers such as Mayne and Pinder 54
 (1990),
whilst they accept this, argue that the failure was not total because some of the
federalists' ideas gained acceptance. Similar arguments are used by Grosjean:
"European cultural cooperation ....has enabled ideas and concepts perceived as
minority views owing to their dispersal to emerge gradually as 'mainstream ideas' "55.
This explanation sounds closer to a description of the way single-issue pressure
groups achieve their objectives than of intergovernmental negotiations. It reinforces
the communitarian status of cultural democracy as a grassroots advocacy project
accommodated within a system (the public administration of culture within European
states) without fundamentally changing it. Grosjean is nevertheless right in
identifying the stealthy progress of these ideas into the mainstream of thinking, even
if they do not succeed in supplanting other policy, such as the sustenance of
traditional art-forms or "high culture".
The philosophy of the visionary outsider is still found and articulated within cultural
networks, as a recent article in the newsletter of the main Project 5 spin-off group,
CIRCLE, shows: a "voluntary group" developed out of a project meeting, which grew






but of "'believers' rather than 'knowers' 56 , people who have suddenly found a vocation
which gives meaning to their lives", supported by "the courage of a few civil servants
in the cultural section of the Council of Europe who unhesitatingly placed their trust
in these dangerous individuals" 57 . The article, by one of the founders of Project 5,
concludes that "the cultural fraternity that existed in European monasteries and
medieval universities ...has been replaced by culture ministries... .A new resistance
movement must be mounted", to be orchestrated by "cultural activists" who will "rise
up in protest — at international level — against what is happening". This is an almost
classic description of intellectual cooperation filtered through the vision of the
European idealists, and one of which de Rougemont would have approved. It also
reveals a self-image ("dangerous"; "resistance"; "believers") which depends on being
outside the mainstream and on being seen as challenging and confrontational.
Some of this element of "resistance" is present in what James Der Derian calls "anti-
diplomacy" 58 . Der Derian's approach to his subject is to use Foucault's ideas of
genealogy to explain diplomatic culture more profoundly than is generally the case in
realist authors, from Harold Nicolson to Hedley Bull. Although he does not say so, he
uses a cultural perspective to approach foreign policy and is thus an ideal
commentator on cultural cooperation 59 . For him, diplomacy and culture are both
"sponge words, in the sense that they can soak up a variety of operational meanings
but at some saturation point they begin to leave a logical and functional mess
56 there is an unconscious echo here of Der Derian's diplomat 'daimons' or 'knowers' mentioned in
chapter 1
57 "Circular: research and documentation on cultural policies", no.10, July 1999 (p. 3, "Thirty Years",
by Augustin Girard)
58 J. Der Derian, "On Diplomacy: a Genealogy of Western Estrangement", Blackwell, 1987.
59 Der Derian actually uses the UNESCO expert debates on cultural policy as a theme for his chapter on
diplomatic culture, as an example of evasion: since no-one could agree on what was meant either by
culture or by the cultural policy of states, it was decided to order some more studies...
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behind." 60 His diplomacy recalls Matthew Arnold's view of culture as a system for the
management of anarchy and evokes, too, the idea of the artist/intellectual as social
mediator. Commentators such as Nicolson play down the idea of the diplomat as the
cultivated man, despite the proximity of the two callings, preferring a mainly post-
mediaeval imagery based on trade and "common sense" 61 . Der Derian evokes the
earlier travelling cleric, disseminating courteous values in the church's own "mission
civilisatrice" — part of the favourite imagery of the European idealist.
Diplomacy also has to do with the protection of the group from "the Other", an idea
here borrowed from Sartre but common in the literature of European integration and a
term which the Council of Europe secretariat occasionally uses in its own efforts to
locate or propose action within an ideological framework. The classic "other" for
Europeans is Islam, replaced (until recently) in the 20t1 	 by communism.
However, if, using Der Derian's method, communism is the post-war cosmopolitan
"other", cultural cooperation posits an alternative communitarian "other" in the form
of industrialisation, American culture and the "monstrous" media of Marcel Hicter,
which threaten cultural identity in general and the French language in particular.
One of Der Derian's "interpenetrating paradigms" 62 of diplomacy, which he calls anti-
diplomacy, is a variant of utopianism, devoted to the removal of segmentation within
society (examples range from Thomas More, in his championing of the domestic over
the external in policy, to the "Philosophes" who channelled desire for glory into the
passion for science - "plans for perpetual peace were largely a plan for perpetual
60 ibid., p . 31
61 French commentators would be less likely to take this view, given the status of artist-diplomats such
as Paul Claudel or Jean Giraudoux
62 Der Derian, op. cit., p. 5
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research" 63). It is not hard to see, first, in the ideals of personalism and, later, in the
creation of a "common philosophy" of development and self-determination in place of
exchange and projection this sort of critique of diplomacy itself: its perceived sterility,
lack of interest in participation and its emphasis on the state rather than the
community.
Reconciling cosmopolitan and communitarian
In this reading, the changing shape of Council of Europe cultural cooperation appears
as the conflict between these two styles of cooperation. The period prior to 1965
shows how uncertainty about objectives and how to achieve them combined with
different interpretations of the job in hand to thwart a "cosmopolitan" approach to
cultural cooperation along the lines of bilateral cultural diplomacy. After 1965, and
progressively towards the mid-1970s, this type of cooperation was simply replaced by
a communitarian approach with its roots not in diplomacy but in ideas about society
developed, appropriately, in and around the French Resistance and able to colonise
the older, but dormant, traditions of intellectual cooperation which also had lines back
to Bergsonism. The communitarian project was in retreat from the point where it
came into direct conflict with national political priorities, in particular in the refusal of
national interests to reject the idea of heritage and tradition in the kind of sweeping
terms found in documents like those quoted. The communitarian experiment in its
"pure" form ended with the rejection of the European Cultural Charter.
63 ibid., p. 163
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There is not space to examine subsequent cultural cooperation in depth. However, it
seems reasonable to see it as a succession of communitarian-cosmopolitan hybrids,
combining elements of both approaches. The documentation of project 10, "Culture
and Region", begins in the full flush of communitarianism64
 and ends five years later
as a testimony to cultural diversity, which goes so far as to acknowledge that "nations
are still the best framework for identities" 65 . This should not be interpreted as a
progress from a "wrong" approach to a "right" one, simply as evidence of an
accommodation with the previously rejected values of national identity and cultural
heritage.
There is a similar accommodation in the national cultural policy reviews which began
in 1985 and continue in a modified form today. These show member states
"repossessing" cultural cooperation in a way which acknowledges the communitarian
project, by conceding the notion that consistency Europe-wide may be, at least, a
nominal aim, but refuses to treat it as a paradigm for their own policy decisions. The
reviews are cosmopolitan in their autonomy, their "take it or leave it" design66
(participation is entirely optional; so is action arising from the review), and their
concern with visibility — the idea that cultural cooperation has to be seen to have
direct benefit, even if deferred. There is an echo of cultural diplomacy in the system
of semi-publicly67
 staged "defences" of the cultural policy in question by a minister
and/or a team of senior officials (a situation which would raise issues of propriety - is
64 
see the section "Cultural dynamics: a broad democratic concept" in the interim report of the project
10 study group, by Michel Bassand, Council of Europe, 1987: this specifically locates the project
within the cultural democracy format, to the extent of repackaging the anodyne Declaration on Cultural
Objectives as a statement of the aims of cultural policy (the term is never used in the text)
65 II The Cultural Challenges for Europe's Regions", report by Rene Rizzardo of the final conference of
project 10, Lyons, October 1991, p. 58. Council of Europe, CDCC, 1993
66
reflecting their OECD origin, perhaps: an organisation predicated on exchange of information and
gradual adherence to norms, or evolution rather than revolution
67 •	 ii.e. n a session of the CC-Cult (Culture Committee), which is not, however, open to the public
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it appropriate for civil servants to cross-question ministers?- if taken seriously) and in
the fact that participants may benefit politically from being seen to be willing to
accept outside criticism68.
The mixture has had its failures: the project on "culture industries" (project 11) ended
in political stalemate over the way in which cultural cooperation was used to make
points about differing government policies. In this project, the "resistance" agenda
was turned against global media ownership as the "enemy", but in a context of
competing national interests, which might seem on the face of it more characteristic of
a cosmopolitan project 69 . Success depended on one view prevailing over the other; but
reciprocity could not operate where no sanctions existed to oblige one side to change
its behaviour. Its overt ideology of deregulation versus state dirigisme really prevents
it being described as "cooperation" at all. However, the technique — using one policy
area, culture, to attack other policy areas, namely, free market economics — is
certainly one with potential, albeit better suited to an arena (the EU) where coercion
has weapons (Qualified Majority Voting) to help it achieve its goals.
Since 1990 the tension between cosmopolitan and communitarian cooperation seems
to have been resolved, at least for the time, in a new interest in "classical" normative
work. The kind of standard-setting which, combined with technical assistance,
currently dominates cultural cooperation is not obliged to operate in a political
vacuum, unlike the short-lived "common philosophy" of cultural democracy. In the
two summits, it has a purposeful framework in the same way as the EU. The
communitarian style lives on to an extent in the encouragement of artists' networks
68
a parallel may be drawn here with the utterly un-communitarian but stubbornly long-lived art
exhibitions series: a successful international exhibition makes its host look good
69 although I have not researched it, it seems probable that similar "mixed agendas" occur in areas such
as environment and health policy
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but the idea that these will in any real sense replace "old" cultural diplomacy 70 , rather
than run in counterpoint to it, depends on a belief that national interests will
themselves give ground to supranational and regional interests. Networking revives
the appealing self-image which comes from being part of the "club" of the European-
minded but has yet to move from an oppositional role, concerned with its own needs
and demands, to an interactive and reciprocal relationship with either member states
or the institutions71.
The efforts to shape the cultural cooperation programme as it appears at the end of the
1990s72 suggest that new activity has been based on consistency with a broad agenda
designed to support democratic values and human rights 73 . Insistence on support for
"core" values has always been a justification for cultural cooperation but until recently
was set aside in favour of more specialised ideological strategies. The result is that
cultural cooperation has accommodated this insistence on values by embracing
diversity as its agenda, thus removing much of the pressure to conform to a particular
vision of Europe. Diversity allows for a universalist approach as well as protection of
the particular, and seems better able to accommodate national interests than the rather
single-minded communitarian agenda.
Strong dispositions either towards cosmopolitanism or towards communitarianism
continue to coexist and to confront each other, however: hence the views expressed in
the passage quoted from the CIRCLE newsletter, which sees the task of cultural
70 an idea which appears, inter alia, in "In from the Margins" (op.cit), which itself looks rather like a
final effort to assert an uncompromisingly communitarian agenda
71 cultural networks have so far been the preserve of research students rather than established critics,
and I am indebted to Valerie Brisset (MA, Warwick) for her study and observations on which I have
based some of the foregoing conclusions
72 key elements of the programme in 2000 were to be: normative work on new technologies (i.e.
internet access and use); cultural policy reviews in new member states, plus sector studies on e.g.
privatisation; support for archives and archive policy; technical assistance (MOSAIC); support for
networks and training of administrators; art exhibitions and exchanges (CC-Cult (99) 20)
251
cooperation as to "speak out" against or subvert a bureaucratic/ technocratic system
for controlling natural anarchy, and a detectable secretariat unwillingness to accept
any dilution of the idea of cultural cooperation as a principle in its own right. One
recent DECS paper suggests that cultural cooperation should itself be an aim of
foreign policy rather than vice versa, a perverse view which seems entirely rooted in
the "common philosophy" days when its function as support for diplomacy was
confidently rejected.
Conclusion
The cultural cooperation of the Council of Europe has been neither progressive nor
consistent but is rather a series of attempts to try out different roles for itself. Early
attempts at a cosmopolitan form of cultural cooperation failed because of its inability
to deliver significant benefits to the parties concerned. Powers to harmonise, as the
French early perceived, would have provided a greater chance of success by enabling
cultural cooperation to diversify into "hard policy" areas where cultural benefits might
be derived from the imposition of curbs on the operation of economic sector,
particularly where these had a linguistic application, such as broadcasting, film and
publishing. Accordingly these particular sectors have persisted on the agenda of
cultural cooperation even when no mechanism existed to convert the protection of
diversity into a policy requirement.
Communitarian cooperation looked for a time as if it would succeed where
cosmopolitan types had failed. Its oppositional nature seemed well suited to a sector
73 in the report of the "Wise Men" (see previous chapter) and at successive summit meetings
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which had a history of advocacy rather than efficacious action. But it was weakened
by its reliance on imposing a vision of what cultural policy ought to achieve which
excluded and indeed attacked "traditional" responsibilities towards "high culture". Its
one-sided critique could not be incorporated into national policies which did not share
its preferences. It suffered also from being rooted in a particular cultural location
(broadly, France and the areas of francophone influence) as well as the tradition of
federalist-personalist ideology which embraces thinkers from Joffre Dumazedier to
the historians Henri Brugmans and Jean-Baptiste Duroselle 74. The communitarian
project required, at the least, a broadly sympathetic left to left-centre political
environment in which to flourish. Finally, it took much of its political impulse from a
series of events (the student unrest of 1968) which had an uneven impact across
Europe and which enjoyed different degrees of influence75.
Communitarian ideas of cultural cooperation try to offer a constant in a world of
change. Ultimately, the cultural democracy project was not flexible enough to stay
relevant in a more cosmopolitan context, although adaptable enough to switch to a
more neutral "research and information" format. This in itself, however, did not bring
with it political commitment: hence the continued search throughout the 1980s and
1990s for relevant themes which would enable cultural cooperation to retain the
political support of culture ministers. The national cultural policy reviews, an attempt
to find a satisfactory "'nixed" formula, were successful within limits but may have
suffered from lack of impact outside the immediate sphere in which they took place,
74 
author of a controversial history of Europe which recounts European history in terms of its peoples
rather than its nations (see J-B Duroselle„ (tr. R. Mayne), "Europe: a History of its Peoples", Viking,
1990)
75 
see R. Fraser et al., "1968, a Student Generation in Revolt", Chatto & Windus, 1988
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and the small number of research professionals who might be expected to derive
benefit from their findings76.
Meanwhile, bilateral cultural relations continue to develop and grow, undiminished by
the activity of international organisations. The British Council, for example, has
rarely taken an interest in the CDCC since the earliest days. Roche & Pigniau's77
assessment of French cultural diplomacy in 1995 compares France with the UK,
Germany, Spain and Portugal. The Council of Europe is not mentioned (although
UNESCO is). The main argument in favour of multilateral cultural cooperation has
been that assistance is more "neutral" and easier to accept when it comes through a
non-governmental agency. The Council of Europe's cultural cooperation has not
developed in this way, however. Even the cultural policy reviews have not, on the
whole, been about seeking and providing help with problems — countries undergo
them on the basis that they have a good story to tell.
The most recent reinvention of cultural cooperation seems to draw the legacy of
cultural diplomacy, seen in, for instance, the MOSAIC programme's focus on specific
problems of specific countries, or the country-specific studies being carried out on
transversal policy problems. The emphasis is placed firmly at the national leve178,
with cultural cooperation acting as a kind of trading floor: a return to exchange as the
basic unit of cultural cooperation. Efforts to displace governments in favour of
intellectuals have been dropped. In this kind of cooperation, the communitarian
76 I am not aware of research which traces the paths of cross-national cultural policy ''borrowing" or
how much this may be due to bilateral awareness in very specific instances (e.g. Netherlands interest in
UK experience prior to its museum 'privatisation' of the 1980s) and how much to use made of Council
of Europe studies on cultural policy, although I can say with confidence of the (perhaps atypical) UK
that at governmental level the latter have been uninfluential
77 op.cit, pp. 172 - 189
78 perhaps in belated acknowledgement of the aspirations towards statehood which have been
characteristic of the post-Cold War Europe
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programme has been subsumed into a broadly cosmopolitan framework, largely shorn
of the contentious elements of both and perhaps offering a solution to the long-
standing problem of reciprocity.
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CHAPTER TEN
Cultural cooperation and the European Community
The work of the Council of Europe has been affected indirectly by the European
Community throughout its history, even though the latter was explicitly set up without
provision for cultural cooperation in its range of "competences" 1 . As seen already,
there were political attempts as early as 1960 not just to alter this, but to give the
Community and its member states the leading European role in cultural cooperation, a
move much resented by non-members as well as the Council of Europe itself. This
reflected the Community's capacity, unparalleled in any other European international
organisation, to regulate and legislate, thus opening the potential for harmonisation of
the "hard", economics-driven policy practices that affect "soft" cultural policy.
This chapter will examine how the European Community devised a form of cultural
cooperation using the specific powers and mechanisms at its disposal. It will be
argued that the EC2
 resembles other international organisations in that its "cultural
policy" is as much the product of the mechanisms by which the Community operates
(especially the tripartite relationship of its main institutions 3 , the Council, the
Commission and the Parliament) as of any coherent vision of a "European cultural
community".
1 a "Community competence" refers to a policy area in which the Community is given specific
authority, under the terms of its governing Treaty, to act as a Community (and thus legislate on behalf
of its member states)
2 these initials are preferred to EU, since only the Community can act and take decisions about Treaty
competences
3 the term "institution" is commonly used in the literature and day-to-day work of the Community to
denote one of the interacting 'partners', each with its own specific functions, which together make up
the Community as a legal entity: as well as the Council, Commission and Parliament, the European
Court of Justice and the Court of Auditors are institutions of the Community
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The result has been a bifurcation process in which a "hard" policy, centred mainly on
culture as a money-generating feature of the economy, has been integrated with
mainstream Community thinking, while a "soft" policy of cultural cooperation has
been developed on, if anything, more conventional lines than that of the Council of
Europe. Far from ushering in a more centralised policy approach, the legitimising of
culture within the Community framework has emphasised the policy role of the
Member States while Community intervention has recently swung behind using
culture as an emollient for the wider integration project.
Cultural action, cultural policy, cultural cooperation? 
The history of cultural cooperation within the EC means that, although the above
terms often appear to be used interchangeably, in practice they each carry a certain
weight. The Commission4 itself has, until recently, avoided the use of the term
"cultural policy", stating explicitly that it has no locus in this area, which is the
exclusive competence of Member States. Traditionally it has preferred the French
term "cultural action" to make clear that its intervention is of a limited nature. Since
1996, however, it has begun to speak in terms of a "Community cultural policy". The
European Parliament5 has consistently used the term "cultural policy" in a
Community context, most recently arguing that the proposed framework programme,
Culture 2000, should be described as an instrument for financing and programming
cultural policy. The Council, however, has insisted on the term "cultural cooperation"
and shows no sign of being willing to accept the Parliament's wishes on the matter6.
4 the European Commission is the Community's executive but also has powers of its own to enforce
legislation and, crucially, the "right of initiative" — the prerogative of proposing and drafting any
legislation to be taken
5 the European Parliament has been directly elected since 1979. As with the Council of Europe, it has
tended to press for an extension of Community influence in policy-making, including areas such as
culture which until 1992 were formally outside Community competence
6 
as at December, 1999
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In this chapter, therefore, the blanket term "cultural intervention" will be used unless
one of these various positions is being explicitly invoked.
The literature of European Community integration
The European Community has generated a vast literature with its own self-contained
academic community, whose specialists in the UK include William Wallace, Helen
Wallace, Juliet Lodge, Alan Milward and many others. This literature is separate from
that of international relations, and emphasises how the core features and philosophies
of the Community project operate, rather than specialised fields such as culture which
have not been central elements. Amongst works with this broader scope, Edwards and
Spence7 offer an exhaustive account of the workings of the European Commission,
including how lobbying works, the role of the "cabinets" 8 and the Commission's
relationship to the Treaty 9 . The latter in particular is essential for the understanding of
the internal tensions regarding non-Treaty-based activity such as culture prior to 1992.
Amongst academic specialists, Milward 10 provides an unusual, relevant and satisfying
commentary on the economic history of the Community, rejecting a common view
that its basis is in the suppression of the nation-state in favour of the argument that the
post-war order it embodies is built on the nation-state. He regards the views of such as
the European Movement" as "political sterility" which "has rightly justified the
7 G. Edwards and D. Spence, (eds.) "The European Commission", Longman, 1994
8 personal advisers to the twenty appointed Commissioners who make up the "College" of the
Commission
9 "The Treaty" is the "constitution" of the European Community. The original is the Treaty of Rome;
all subsequent versions are regarded as "completing" this Treaty rather than replacing it. It is normal in
EC terminology to refer to "the Treaty" meaning the different revisions. Where one particular version is
meant, this will be indicated in the text
10 A. Milward, "The European Rescue of the Nation State", Routledge, 1992
11 the main federalist grouping which emerged from the Hague Congress, whose ideas pervaded
cultural cooperation
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exclusion of their holders from the ranks of the blessed" 12 . If Milward is right, then
the absence of cultural cooperation from the Community's core concerns is logical,
since as we have seen the idea that integration is first and foremost a cultural project
belongs very much to the federalist vision.
Commentators who do focus specifically on culture use a variety of approaches
reflecting different disciplines (especially anthropology and political science). De
Witte (in Rijksbaron, Roobol and Weisglas 13 , 1987, and Wallace 14, 1990), who is
perhaps the most prolific in English, considers the development of a Community
presence in culture as an example of "spill-over" 15 , in which harmonisation becomes
necessary as a result of action taken elsewhere. While this approach has resonance for
those areas of policy which combine economic and cultural aspects, it is less
convincing as an explanation of why the Community eventually acquired funding
programmes for "mainstream" cultural activities. Cornu i6
 offers a post-Maastricht
study of the relationship between culture and the subsidiarity principle. MacMahon17
gives a straightforward account of the legal basis of Community action in culture.
Perrieux 18
 analyses Member State behaviour regarding cultural intervention and
concludes that national priorities are very much to the forefront.
Other commentators approach Community intervention in culture from the point of
view of its supposed effects on national cultural identity. By overestimating the
12 ibid., p. 340
13 A. Rijksbaron, W. H. Roobol, M. Weisglas, M, (eds.), "Europe from a Cultural Perspective",
Amsterdam, Nijgh en van Ditmer, 1987
14 W. Wallace, (ed.) "The Dynamics of European Integration", Royal Institute of International Affairs,
1990
15 
see page 152 for a discussion of functionalism, neo-functionalism and "spill-over theory"
16 M. Cornu, "Competences Culturelles en Europe et Principe de la Subsidiarite", Bruylant, 1993
17 J. A. MacMahon, "Education and Culture in Community Law", Athlone Press, 1995
18 A-S Perrieux, "La Communaute Economique Europeenne, les Etats et la Culture, 1957-1987", in
Revue de Synthese, pp. 271-287, Vol. IV, No.3, July-September 1990
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Commission's role and, perhaps, taking the rhetoric of integration a little too seriously
they see a threat to national cultures. Shore 19 , an anthropologist, links a growth of
interest in culture during the 1980s to the failures of neo-functionalism 20 , but sees the
EU's "cultural policy" as an exercise in boosting the imagery of European integration
without considering the political pressures motivating the various players. For a
diverting horror-comic account by an author without a clear grasp of the limitations
governing Community action, see Breeze21.
Alan Forrest22 offers an account of developments post-1983 at the decision-making
level of the Council which, since the Council itself does not interpret its decisions for
the public, is an essential corrective to the view that policy is made and executed
exclusively by the Commission. For a selection of views, influenced by a meeting
convened by the Commission in 1986, which assembles arguments from mainly
French and Italian federalists on culture as part of the "osmose necessaire" of
Community we-feeling, see Papini & Delcourt23.
All these commentators have valid perceptions according to their different
standpoints. It is that difference which makes it necessary to look in some detail at the
somewhat prosaic reality of Community cultural intervention. I have drawn heavily
19 C. Shore, "EU Cultural Policy", in The European Journal, November 1995
29 "functionalism" argues that international organisations will in due course replace national structures
because of the greater efficiency with which they can deliver technical services, and are thus designed
to achieve this ("form follows function"); "neo-functionalism" acknowledges this has not happened,
and modifies the theory by arguing that integration will come about piecemeal, through the
consequences (spill-over) of the decisions nation-states make jointly
21 A. Breeze, "Culture Vultures: the European Community's Imposition of Cultural Conformity",
International Freedom Foundation, 1992
22 A. Forrest, "A New Start for Cultural Action in the European Community; Genesis and Implications
of Article 128 of the Treaty on European Union", in European Journal of Cultural Policy, Vol 1, No. 1,
pp 11-20 (1994). This brings up to date an earlier article by the same author, "La Dimension Culturelle
de la Communaute Europeenne", in the internal EC journal, Revue du Marche Commun (pp. 326-332,
no.307, May-June 1987). The author was formerly head of the Cultural Division of the Council
Secretariat and, as such, closely involved over many years with most aspects of cultural cooperation at
this level
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for this on the Commission's own publications and a small number of articles by
officials, commentaries from the cultural sector. My own experience working in the
Commission and representing the UK in Council negotiations over a ten year period
(1986-1996) informs the interpretations offered.
Structure and functions of the institutions of the European Community
The European Community is not a federalist project in the sense that the Hague
Congress intellectuals understood the term, though the federation of states may be its
ultimate goal. This has implications for the role of culture within the project.
International relations theory, which proved useful for a discussion of the Council of
Europe, is less helpful here: these theorists emphasise the global rather than the
European order and have a sobering tendency to regard the EC as a specialised, and
rather minor, sub-set with relatively little to offer the student of the wider picture.
However, two theories of integration which cannot be overlooked when discussing the
EC are functionalism 24 and neo-functionalism.
Functionalism dates back to the 1930s and is based on the assumption that
technological and global change make it inevitable that more and more of the public
policy functions performed by the state will be transferred to international
organisations, since this will be more efficient, until eventually the nation-state will
23 •in J. Delcourt & R. Papini, (eds.), "Pour une Politique Europeenne de la Culture", p. 2. Paris,
Economica, 1987
24 the best and most detailed discussion of functionalism and neo-functionalism I have come across is
that of Charles Pentland (C. Pentland, "International Theory and European Integration", Faber &
Faber, 1973)
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wither away entirely. Neo-functionalism, which developed in the light of experience
of post-war international structures, acknowledges that functionalism has flaws and
accepts the probable continuation of the nation-state, assuming instead that as more
and more decisions are made internationally, they will create new circumstances
which require yet more joint solutions: "spill-over theory"25.
In the EC the stress is not upon constitutional instruments defining relationships and
competences but upon systems, and the management of formerly sovereign systems in
a new pattern (i.e. post nation-state) 26 . Neo-functionalism is important in the EC
context because it is not simply an outside analyst's tool but also a conscious credo
which, fully articulated, motivates Community actions. Until the mid-1970s it could
be confidently asserted as the Community "philosophy". Its focus on the efficient
delivery of cross-border services helps to explain not only why no competence in
culture was originally deemed necessary, but also why the Community has not,
organically, developed a "cultural policy" as it has, for example, a competition or a
fisheries policy, and why its cultural support programme frequently appears, to those
who have an interest in it, superimposed and unsatisfactory.
The Treaty of Rome in 1957 established a European Economic Community (EEC) as
one of three supranational authorities (the others were the European Coal and Steel
Community and the European Atomic Energy Community). In 1967 these three were
25 
a classic example of "spillover" might be the directive and regulation governing the movement of
cultural property, in which Community harmonisation was considered necessary, despite decades of
happily co-existing national systems, because the implementation of the single internal market meant
that customs checks between EC countries would no longer be available to enforce national legislation
26 W. C. Olson & A. J. R. Groom, "International Relations Then and Now: Origins and Trends in
Interpretation", Routledge, 1991 (chapter 8 discusses neo-functionalism as "a strategy for 'federalism
by instalments'" (p. 174) and relates it to the encouragement of networks)
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unified as the European Communities with a single Council and Commission. The
Treaty of European Union in 1992 (the "Maastricht Treaty") created the European
Union, of which the European Community (with the word "Economic" deleted)
became the core and legal personality. Culture became a formal Community
competence (i.e. area in which the Community could legally take action) in 1992.
The key to the EC is the interaction of its institutions, each of which has clearly
defined powers and responsibilities. Unlike the Council of Europe, Member State
governments are not the sole repository of policy-making. The Council, which has its
own secretariat, consists of member states' governments and is responsible for all
decisions enacting EC law or setting up spending programmes. The Council enacts
Community law through adopting Decisions (the normal method for creating a
programme), Directives (which must then be converted into national law) and
Regulations (which become national law immediately). Resolutions are not binding,
but are simply expressions of political will. Officials' working groups exist in all
specialised areas to prepare the work of ministers who meet as the "Culture
Council" 27 , "Education Council" etc.
However, since 1992 28
 the Parliament has had co-decision-making powers in some
areas, including culture. The Parliament is also the Community's ultimate budgetary
authority29
 and can stipulate expenditure within certain limits, including reinstatement
of Commission proposals deleted by the Council. The Parliament has its own
22 between 1984 and 1992 a semi-formal device existed to enable culture ministers to meet as
"ministers meeting within the Council", giving them access to Council facilities and enabling them to
adopt resolutions whilst enabling the participation of Member States (Germany, Denmark and the UK)
who did not accept the involvement of the Community in cultural matters
28 under the provisions of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), 1992, generally known as the
Maastricht Treaty
29 "Parliament and the Council form the Community's budgetary authority and only Parliament's
President can sign the budget into law" (Westlake, in Edwards & Spence (1994), p.231)
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committee system which works by appointing individual rapporteurs to recommend
opinions and amendments to draft legislation. It may also present its own reports on
subjects of its choosing, though these have only moral force. The Court of Justice
exists to oversee the application of Community law and to rule in cases of uncertainty.
Although the effect of Community law on the cultural field is not the primary concern
of this study, there certainly exists a body of case law which has been significant in
establishing that culture is subject to the operation of the single market 30 .
The Commission is not a secretariat, but alone has the capacity to initiate legislation
(the "right of initiative"). The Council and Parliament, therefore, may only legislate
on the basis of a proposal from the Commission. Since 1984 a Commissioner, usually
from a southern member state (the exceptions have both been from Luxembourg), has
had responsibility for culture, even though no formal competence existed before
199231 . The Commission is divided into directorates general (DGs): that dealing with
culture is DGX or 10 32. A central part of the Commission's perception of its role is as
"guardian of the Treaties"33.
The Commission's apparent lead in arrogating to itself the functions of cultural
cooperation without a Treaty basis for such action is accounted for by its traditional
view of itself as the "motor of integration" — in other words, as responsible for
promoting what it takes to be the common interest even if this takes it into areas
30 
see de Witte (in Wallace, op.cit) who concludes that ECJ rulings demonstrate that "there is no clear
separation between economy and culture" (p. 197); in other words, the rather obvious but sometimes
disputed fact that you cannot make rules which discriminate against trade with other EC partners on the
grounds that a particular undertaking is "cultural"
31 previously, a "Cultural Questions" section was set up in the General Secretariat of the Commission
32 •in 1999, the incoming Prodi Commission abolished the system of numbered DGs and amalgamated
the culture and education portfolios
33 i.e. responsible for ensuring that member states, and Community legislation, operate absolutely
consistently with the Treaties, which take priority over national law — the Commission's tendency to
interpret this role to its own advantage has been challenged in the European Court of Justice
Commission's own action
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technically off-limits. Much of this was justified under article 235 of the Treaty of
Rome, which permits Community action outside the scope of the Treaty if it helps
realise the objectives of the Treaty. What some Member States regarded as "creeping
competence" was seen by other Member States and the Parliament as reinforcing
integration34.
The Community budget
An understanding of how the Community budget operates is central to the study of
Community cultural intervention, since it explains how the Commission has been able
to act without formal authorisation to create a cultural programme. In certain
circumstances, the Commission can appropriate funds without the explicit
endorsement of the Counci1 35 . Prior to the 1990s it was fairly common practice for
comparatively small sums to be designated in this way. Eventually, and successfully,
the Council challenged this in the ECJ, leading to the freezing of a number of small
budget lines. This is how the whole of the budget for cultural action prior to 1992
came to be created by a combination of small but gradually increasing amounts either
instigated by the Parliament or appropriated by the Commission without formal
reference to the Council other than in the budget negotiations: a de facto cultural
budget "owned" by two of the institutions but not the third. 36 . The Parliament in any
case had the power to restore any cuts proposed by the Counci137.
34 for a full discussion of the question of Treaty base, see Usher, "The Commission and the law", in
Edwards & Spence, pp. 148-152
35 the "action ponctuelle" mechanism, originally designed to enable rapid action when required, e.g. in
response to a disaster in a Member State
36 .
since 1988, Parliament's ability to increase the global total of Community spending has been
curtailed by a series of Inter-Institutional Agreements.
37 this too has been restricted since 1988: see Westlake, op.cit. p. 233: "Council cuts are no longer
automatically restored in parliamentary first readings and the onus falls on the Commission to defend
'vulnerable' lines".
265
The role of culture in the Community before 1977: the Plan Fouchet
The fact that cultural cooperation was not included in the original Treaty of Rome is
sometimes assumed to be because the Member States felt threatened by the
implications for their cultural identity (the apochrypal remark attributed to Jean
Monnet that if it were to do again he would have started with culture may have
popularised this view more widely than it deserves 38). A more plausible explanation is
that when the Community was founded cultural cooperation was associated with
foreign policy and defence, as was explicitly the case in BTO and NATO and would
have been the case if the European Defence Community had succeeded.
The EC was conceived in essentially materialist terms, as the importance of
functionalism suggests. However, the economic community was not an end in itself,
but designed to lead in time to a political community. If there was a need, as Milward
suggests, for an "alternative belief system", particularly for the Germans, then
"Europeanism was a realistic alternative or supplement to Christianity" 39 . It was
certainly not impossible that cultural cooperation might be added once the economic
foundations of the Community were secure, just as in time the mainstream territory of
national diplomacy should be incorporated also. As early as 1955 there had been an
initiative, by concerned intellectuals led by the Belgian Baron Philippe Nothomb, to
create a complementary "European Cultural Community" 4° but it was not until the
38 the remark is not found in any of Monnet's writings (Deering, 1991); Roberto Papini asserts it was
spoken privately to friends, and takes it as a comment on the failure of functionalism pure and simple
to cultivate a sense of common European feeling (Delcourt & Papini, 1987)
39 Milward, op.cit, p.337
40 PRO FO 924/1136: it is unclear exactly what Nothomb and his "Intergroupe des Interets
Intellectuels" had in mind (the presence of Gonzague de Reynold in the group suggests that a revival of
the ICIC under the EC banner was one possibility), though it included plans for an international literary
academy, a review, a scientific institute and an exchange organisation. No political commitments were
offered and nothing seems to have come of it
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launch of the "Plan Fouchet" 41
 by the de Gaulle government in 1960 that cultural
cooperation as an EC activity was seriously considered.
This plan, proposed by France to reform the Economic Community towards a political
union42 , would have introduced cultural cooperation, but would have placed it under
the control of a specially constituted Council of education ministers, without a role for
the Commission (instead, the suggested European Office for Education would have
acted as the executive). As we have seen, it was conceived as extending beyond the
Six to enfold the whole sphere of cultural cooperation in a Community-dominated
framework. In an early draft, France explicitly proposed that Member States
coordinate and "unify" their policies in four fields of "common interest": foreign
policy, economy, defence and culture 43 . This was modified by the other partners to
cooperation. The proposals eventually foundered on Dutch opposition to what was
seen as a weakening of the role of the Commission'.
Despite the work of a committee set up under a Luxembourger, Pierre Pescatore, to
develop plans for the cultural aspects of the new union, the Plan Fouchet was dropped
in 1962. The centrepiece of the Pescatore committee, however, a proposal for a
European University at Florence45
 for which the Italians had already offered a site and
which they did not want to lose, stayed under consideration. A Foreign Office
assessment at the end of 1961 states: "The only certainty about cultural cooperation
43 B. J de Araujo, "Le Plan Fouchet et l'Union Politique Europeenne", Universitaire de Nancy, Centre
europeenne universitaire, year of publication not shown, but probably 1967
44 traditionally seen by smaller countries as their main safeguard against domination by the political
interests of the larger countries
45 this was achieved some years later, but as a postgraduate institution rather than a "university of
Europe". It was not a new idea: the minutes of the ICIC note, a little plaintively, that "M. Destree asked
only that, for the benefit of posterity, note should be taken of the fact that in 1922 someone had had the
idea that there should be an International University." (PRO ED 25/34/1 — first session of ICIC)
41 
named after the minister responsible for drawing up the proposals
42 
much of this was eventually realised in the TEU of 1992
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among the EEC powers is that this will increase; but the pace and direction of this
increase cannot yet be assessed"46 . The FO thought the focus was likely to be on
higher education, however, which turned out to be right in the short-term.
The case for introducing cultural cooperation into the "functional" EC was, therefore,
largely political, linked to the next stage of integration. The remit of the Pescatore
committee, according to Bloes, was clear: to institutionalise "un domaine...Ou, par
priorite, devait s'operer un transfert des allegiances, celui de la sphere culturelle Ou se
fait l'echange entre valeurs et attitudes"47 , part of a strategy to build "we-feeling n48
amongst core elites. The idea of the "transfer of allegiances" is central in neo-
functionalist ideology. It assumes that, as the supranational authority begins to deliver
on its promises, a grateful populace, benefiting from higher living standards, will
attribute this to the efficiency of economies of scale and turn against the inefficient
national governments who cannot deliver these benefits.
As Lodge49
 points out, it was clear by the mid 1970s that the transfer of loyalties was
not happening to plan: in times of prosperity governments got the credit, but in
recession governments and the EC shared the blame. But this was hardly so in 1960
when there was every reason to suppose that economic integration alone would
deliver the goods: this was, as Wallace s° notes, the high water mark of post-war
integration. French interest in cultural cooperation looks more like spill-over in
reverse: by incorporating elements from the existing cooperation scenario into the
46 PRO FO 924/1363
47 R. Bloes, "Le 'Plan Fouchet' et le Probleme de l'Europe Politique", p. 152. College of Europe, 1970
48 the term attributed to Karl Deutsch
49 J. Lodge, "Towards a Human Union: EEC Social Policy and European Integration", in British
Journal of International Studies, pp. 107-134, Vol. 1 No.2, (1978)
50 Wallace, op.cit, introduction
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supranational project, de Gaulle 51 declared limits to integration and asserted culture
and education as nationally-controlled competences within a multilateral framework.
Allegiance might be transferred more effectively, but to a Europe in the safe hands of
its governments, led by France 52 . Perhaps, too, the inclusion of culture would help to
reinforce the "Catholic nexus" represented by Schuman, Adenauer and de Gasperi
against the "Atlantic" tendency represented by the British, and the part played
generally by "culturalisme", with the French language seen as a force for continental
unity53.
Community action from 1977 to 1984
The Plan Fouchet established certain aspects of Member State interest patterns which
continued to have significance for future developments in cultural cooperation,
namely, a strong French (and Italian) interest in identifying culture with European
integration but defined essentially as a progressive project which would enable a
response on a European level to nationally-driven requirements; an equally strong
Dutch interest in preserving the integrity of the Community project in which the
common legal structure represented by the Treaty guaranteed equality between
Member States; and a German strategy, governed by caution and diplomacy, which
aimed to make use of cultural cooperation as a legitimate tool of foreign policy within
51 see E. A. Kolodziej, "French International Policy under De Gaulle and Pompidou: the Politics of
Grandeur", (Cornell, 1974) for a discussion of de Gaulle and integration, in which he argues
specifically that de Gaulle sought to place the Community largely under Franco-German control
52 recalling Coudenhoeve-Kalergi's belief that the function of culture in the European project was to
reassure Europeans that their individual identities were not eroded by integration
53 hinted at, rather than developed, by Bloes, op cit
269
the Community54 . This alignment created a difficult negotiating situation in which it
was hard for the Counci1 55
 to make further progress towards integration.
Cultural cooperation does not surface again in any serious form until the early 1970s,
although the European Parliament early on established a committee on culture and
research. Now the impulsion was no longer inter-governmental but came from the
Parliament and the Commission itself. Edwards & Spence incorrectly suggest that
this originated with the ideas relating to "A People's Europe" current during the 1980s
("...topics...believed to touch on the daily lives of the average European citizen"56).
In fact, the revival of interest happened a decade earlier than the events to which they
refer, and the motives were both more complicated and more interesting.
Edwards & Spence comment that "relatively few policy initiatives have ever derived
directly from the fervid imaginations of faceless Commission bureaucrats"57.
However, the decision to create a Community role in culture has to be attributed
largely to a Commission seeking to re-establish itself as a political force at a time
when its future was not looking good. It was not the result of a half-considered
political directive of Member States, but of a calculated guess that by colonising the
"social" areas omitted from the Treaty the Commission could improve its own
position without needing to have recourse to the Council for political decisions.
Despite the failure of the Fouchet proposals, the changes which followed in the 1960s
and early 1970s, such as EPC, tended to strengthen the Council. By seeking a new
54 Germany had a particular interest in political cooperation by traditional diplomatic means which led
it later to propose a formal system (European Political Cooperation, or EPC), in which foreign and
defence policy problems, and eventually cultural cooperation — all outwith the EC's remit — could be
discussed at multilateral level by the Six. The link with foreign policy also ensured the Lander could be
kept at arm's length, since cultural relations at bilateral level is an unequivocal competence of the
federal government
55 as the EC institution which both articulated the political will of governments and which alone could
initiate changes to the Treaty (as opposed to new legislation based on the Treaty)
56 
op.cit, Chapter 1, "The Commission in perspective", p. 18
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role in functions such as culture, education and employment, the Commission could
reinforce its own prestige and stem the perceived shift towards inter-
governmentalism.
In her discussion of the significance of the social dimension, Lodge attributes its early
neglect to the assumption that economic prosperity would continue to grow, carrying
with it the necessary shift in loyalties which would enable the project to progress
towards political integration. Thus the OPEC crisis of 1973, which made the
Community's claims to offer consistent material improvement look vulnerable,
resulted in a turning towards the idea of "social union" and measures aimed directly at
the citizen58 . The Social Action Programme and new information policy launched in
1975 were citizen-directed measures intended to create a sense of clearly perceived
gain despite economic setbacks.
Education, despite the absence of a Treaty competence, became integrated into the
social programme of the Community in 1976 by way of an action plan based largely
on mobility and social provision. The Commission rapidly succeeded in developing
programmes as flanking measures linked to the Community's social and vocational
training competences. Despite substantial political opposition, by the end of the 1980s
at least four primarily educational prograrnmes 59 plus the EURYDICE information
57 ibid,
58 an interesting commentary on this period is offered by Ben Roberts ("The Social Dimension of
European Labour Markets", pp. 39-49, in "Whose Europe? Competing Visions for 1992", UK, Institute
of Economic Affairs, 1989), who argues that the introduction of an emphasis on the social frame was
"based mainly upon ideas that were associated with the parties of the centre and the centre left", based
on "certain national experiences and beliefs of the 1950s and 1960s that are far from generally agreed"
(p. 41)
" ERASMUS, COMETT, Lingua and Youth for Europe
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network had been adopted by the Counci1 60 .
As early as 1974 the European Parliament had declared its deteimination to provide
for Community cultural intervention. It proclaimed its wish that, in due course, 1% of
the entire Community budget would be devoted to cultural expenditure. In 1976 it
inscribed 20,700 ECUs 6I
 in the Community budget to be used for cultural intervention
and provided quite detailed stipulations about how the money was to be used. The
founders of the European Community Youth Orchestra, for example, had successfully
lobbied the Parliament the same year to use its powers62.
For the Commission, Parliament's demands had some political advantages: for
example, good-will gestures to countries planning accession, such as the agreement
entered into with the Greek government to assist the restoration of the Parthenon over
a lengthy period. But the resources were insufficient to launch anything resembling a
Community-wide action plan and the way in which they were allocated lacked any
coherent guiding idea63 . This gradual, rather back-door accretion of resources may
have backfired in due course, since by the time formal programmes came to be voted
the financial level reached was regarded by the more financially hawkish Member
60 these programmes marked the beginning of German difficulties with cultural action as a Community
competence, which was unacceptable because of the way the German constitution delegated
responsibility to the Lander (thus the German government could not technically negotiate and agree
programme in this area). The problem was not resolved entirely until 1992. See also C. Jeffery and J.
Yates, "Unification and Maastricht: the Response of the Lander Governments", in C. Jeffery & R.
Sturm (eds.), "Federalism and European Integration", Frank Cass, 1993, which suggests that the
Lander's price for a compromise on culture was the involvement of a Committee of the Regions in
order to separate culture from foreign policy (where the federal government had competence)
61 
an ECU is calculated on the basis of a basket of currencies but has generally been roughly equivalent
to a US dollar
62 
and has been a fixture in the budget ever since
63 it should not be assumed that the Parliament's powers over the budget allowed unlimited additions to
be made. Even before the Inter-Institutional Agreement of 1988 which regularised the amounts by
which the Parliament could exceed the recommendations of the Council Budget Committee, there
existed percentage limits beyond which spending could not be increased. Thus the Parliament could
not, for instance, unilaterally decide to allocate its favoured 1% of the Community budget to culture —
this is, and always has been, a symbolic rather than a real commitment
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States as, if not a ceiling, then as a ballpark figure: if they could not hope to achieve
reductions, they were not about to vote major increases in a programme they saw as
low political priority. By the time cultural intervention had a legitimate base, the
Commission had to argue its case for resources on a twenty-year track record of
unaccountability, unevaluated impact and absence of careful management.
The Commission's first communication64, 1977
While it is not absolutely clear at what point the Commission decided to extend its
social action to culture, it is clear that it was to be a "communitarian" project, linked
to issues where its strategy had already worked, notably employment and social
exclusion, rather than the difficult "political" area of cultural cooperation where the
Council's domination65 gave it no significant role. The Commission's strategy,
elaborated by the Frenchman Robert Gregoire, was based on the potential of using
economically-based Community legislation for proposing action advantageous to the
"cultural sector". In other words, fields in which action could legitimately be taken on
internal market grounds in order to prevent distortion, such as copyright
harmonisation, the VAT levied on art sales, or the status of self-employed workers,
should be identified and presented as a package of measures in support of one
particular sector, culture. This was presented in 1977, soon after the launch of the
education projects66 . Unlike that of the Council of Europe, the Community's cultural
programme was intended to develop independently of educational cooperation. The
64 a "communication" is the term used for a Commission policy proposal, often, but not necessarily,
containing the draft legislation proposed. They are normally addressed to the Council and to the
Parliament, where the latter's opinion is required
65 cooperation in foreign and defence matters remained the exclusive competence of the Council under
EPC
66 Commission of the European Communities, "Community Action in the Cultural Sector",
(Supplement 6/77, Bulletin of the EC)
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Commission was free, therefore, to develop an approach which did not have to be
justified as contributing to the social betterment of Europeans generally.
There were problems with this approach. There were relatively few areas in which
Community competence was unambiguous enough to allow the Commission
confidently to advocate action. Only five such measures are clearly identifiable in the
1977 paper: the simplification of customs clearance formalities, already in hand in the
relevant committee; inclusion of "cultural workers" (a term without a generally-
accepted definition) in the scope of a new Community employment vacancy clearing-
house system; inclusion of young cultural workers in new vocational training
exchanges being launched; a draft directive on the use of the dealer's margin for VAT
assessment on art works; legislation to harmonise copyright and related rights; and the
introduction of Community-wide resale rights, or droit de suite.
Of these, the Commission has indeed proposed legislation on dealer's margin-based
VAT, copyright harmonisation and droit de suite, but at different times (the last not
until the mid-1990s) and negotiated them as internal market, not cultural, measures.
The extent to which cultural aspect were taken into account would depend on internal
Commission priorities in drafting and upon the subsequent degree of domestic
coordination at Member State level. Subsequent vocational training programmes did
not prioritise cultural workers, nor did employment vacancy schemes.
In other instances, either the Treaty basis was not evident (proposals for legislation
on the distribution of fake art works); or the proposal had a basis but looked less than
pressing (recognition of art experts' qualifications°, proposals for a Community-wide
67 
mutual recognition of qualifications throughout the Community is a notoriously slow and difficult
process to negotiate, with many arguments for exceptions
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record card system for the provenance of art works, a regulation intended to give
special copyright protection to creative craftsmen); or action was up to Member States
since there was nothing in Community law to require it (creation of special common
taxation arrangements for cultural foundations, reformed income tax regimes for
artists — both areas of fiscal policy which remains the exclusive competence of
Member States; changes in royalty systems for playwrights, and revised social
security systems for cultural workers).
Finally, the action of the Parliament in providing a de facto culture budget had landed
the Commission with a "culture programme" which did not resemble its careful
rationale, but looked more like the early Council of Europe: these were the kind of
consciousness-raising exercises the Commission had no authority to undertake68,
ranging from grants to a conservation centre in Grenoble and the Brussels-based
"Europalia" festival (featuring a different country each year) to a scheme for
arranging a "European Room" in a museum which, if successful, would result in "a
great many curators" being "encouraged to organise their own European rooms"69.
These were clearly "traditional"-type cultural diplomacy activities intended to flatter
the Community's own profile, and were probably the result of individual lobbying;
though in a nod to the Council of Europe's competence in this area, some unspecified
"socio-cultural" projects were to be included which would support cultural
democracy70 .
70 the only examples given are two television co-production projects, one about great Europeans of the
past, the other a news programme, possibly a forerunner of the short-lived "Europa TV" project of the
1980s
68 these included grants to Pro Venetia Viva, the organisation which the CDCC had been urged by the
Council of Europe's Secretary General to finance
69 Commission communication 6/77, op.cit
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The 1977 communication relied, for moral rather than legal support, on a range of
sources: the 1976 Tindemans report 71
 which associated culture with "we-feeling";
some rather vague pronouncements about values and identity included in Heads of
Government Summit communiqués; and two fairly prescriptive resolutions of the
Parliament, one of which concentrates on the preservation of the architectural heritage
and the second of which endorses some of the ad hoc projects contained in the
communication. The intention was to secure a Council resolution approving the
proposals. However, the resolution was not adopted and the Commission was left
without the political imprimatur for its culture proposals that it had obtained for its
education proposals.
The mixture of arguments — on the one hand, a traditional appeal to culture as a
technique for effecting solidarity, on the other the necessity imposed by the
Community's own rules to link all action to existing economic and social measures —
undermines the communication's logic. It leaves doubts about the Commission's real
intentions (the fact that money was already being disbursed would have come as news
to most member states, who had no equivalent mechanism to the CDCC at this time
by which they could express their own interests or interrogate the Commission), and
appears driven by the need to promote and popularise the organisation itself.
71 forerunner of the Adonnino Report ("A People's Europe")
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The Euro sean Foundation the Mitterand overnment and the Commission's second
communication (1982)
The Commission's follow-up communication 72
 appeared in 1982. In the interval there
had been some political developments which strengthened the Commission's position
despite its lack of success in implementing its 1977 plan of action. The first was the
progress towards a broader European union which began with the Tindemans Report
and culminated a decade later in the Maastricht Treaty in which foreign policy and
security policy were brought together as the "second pillar" of the Union. Cultural
cooperation already had a low-key place in this through the "cultural directors" group
which met inter-governmentally under European Political Cooperation (EPC)73,
where the Commission played only a minor role. The "cultural directors" were (and
are) diplomats in charge of bilateral cultural relations nationally. Their presence in
EPC shows that the link between cultural cooperation with foreign and security policy
(the other matters mainly dealt with in EPC) remained strong.
The decision in 1982 to set up a European Foundation belongs in this tradition.
Originally proposed in the Tindemans Report, the European Foundation was to be set
up with a mixture of Community and Member State funding. It was to be based in
Paris and would implement cultural and educational projects approved by a board of
Member State trustees. Although similar in aim to the semi-privately sponsored
European Cultural Foundation74
 , it was not intended to supersede the ECF.
72 Commission of the European Communities, "Stronger Community Action in the Cultural Sector",
(Supplement 6/82, Bulletin of the EC)
73 the intergovernmental system devised in the 1970s to enable matters not covered by the Treaty to be
discussed within the Community framework: see Nuttall's account in Edwards and Spence, op.cit
74 so similar, in fact, that the ECF's director, Raymond Georis, was lined up to run it
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As, in effect, a vehicle of classic cultural diplomacy without implications for domestic
policy, the Foundation was much less politically contentious than making culture a
Community competence. It would have been a sort of cultural EPC, removed to a
sphere of operations where inter-institutional power-broking played no part. In fact,
the plan for a Foundation fell apart when the Second Chamber of the Netherlands
Parliament refused to ratify it in 1987. But political enthusiasm for the Foundation
had waned anyway: it was already obvious that the Commission had no intention of
giving up its activities to a Member State-controlled entity and the indications were
that the Foundation's choices would be neither imaginative nor even significantly
different from those of the Council of Europe.
The second factor which moved the EC approach to culture away from cooperation
towards strategic Community intervention was the election of the Mitterand
government in 1981. It was soon clear that France would seek to engage the
Community, and especially the Commission, with cultural policy in accordance with
its own heavily interventionist strategy. Jack Lang, the influential minister of culture,
was not in the least interested in multilateral cultural cooperation as group
collaboration on image-building common projects; he used bilateral cultural relations
to construct a series of alliances, especially amongst Mediterranean countries 75 , but
with the aim of building a consensus around his vision. The construction of "Fespace
culturelle europeenne" 76 involved almost a parallel Community based on creativity
and competitiveness which would take on the USA, especially, on its own ground:
"l'Europe, confront& au defi americain et qui a trahi sa propre culture, doit retourner
75 R. Desneux, "Jack Lang: la culture en mouvement", Favre, 1990
76 a term much in vogue during the 1980s and enthusiastically embraced by the Commission
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a sa creativite propre... 77
 . This "cultural Europe" had nothing to do with intellectual
cooperation between elites or citizen-directed propaganda, but was conceived as a
market in which the structures of capital and commerce were redirected to serve
European political aims. To this end, participation of the Council was essential, since
the Commission could not act without it.
The Commission's 1982 paper seems influenced by the French position, particularly
in pressing the claims of the audiovisual sector. The text as a whole is more confident
than its predecessor. Although its arguments still rely on the idea of culture as a sector
of deprivation to make the case for prioritising it, greater emphasis is placed on the
ways in which the Community can intervene to the benefit of cultural workers 78
 with
only the occasional lapse into overkill ("there is a danger that one day there will be a
general shortage of qualified cultural workers"). The tone is clearly meant to
encourage the transfer of loyalties by hinting heavily that it is the indifference of
governments which causes a blockage preventing real economic improvement.
There is also, however, a real sense, and for the first time, of Lang's idea that the
cultural creativity of Europe is a playing card in the struggle for competitiveness. That
Gregoire personally shared the views of his countrymen seems evident: in an article79
explaining the Commission's approach to culture, Gregoire uses a rhetoric of crisis
close to that of Lang at UNESCO: "prenons garde que la crise economique et la crise
sociale du secteur culturel ne degenerent pas maintenant en une crise de la culture! Le
risque existe qu'on cree moms — ou moms bien — et que la diffusion, déjà trop
78 
a Parliament term which enabled the net to be cast more widely than simply "artists" and
"intellectuals" to give the impression of a significant section of the European workforce
79 R. Gregoire, "L'action Communautaire dans le Secteur Culturel", article in Revue du Marche
Comtnun no. 217 — undated, but the content suggests it was contemporaneous with the 1982
communication
77 
speech given by Lang in Hamburg in 1984, quoted in Desneux, op.cit., p. 52
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restreinte, ne se restreigne encore...0u nous redressons la situation et nous assurons
du mane coup le maintien et le developpement de la culture ou nous laissons la
degradation se poursuivre et nous allons droit au declin culturel. Qui dit declin
culturel dit declin tout court: decadence, effacement, disparition" 80 . In a later article81
in the Revue du Marche Commun, Gregoire situates "cultural action" explicitly as a
necessary and integrationist strategy: "la Communaute suit la chaine qui part de
l'economique, passe par le social et aboutit au culture1" 82, even though for the moment
the emphasis remains strongly social (he cites Jack Lang as having asked for a "clause
du travailleur culturel le plus favorise"83).
Gregoire bases his advocacy of Community action in culture explicitly on the
argument that the cultural sector is subject to Community internal market legislation
like any other yet is not "like any other" in that it requires special investment because
of its political importance. He rejects cultural cooperation, which is too weak (because
of its lack of enforceability) to be effective. The idea that the Community must put its
weight behind a revitalisation of the cultural sector in both social and economic terms
is consistent with the notion that, far from having a homogenising effect on European
cultural diversity, the Community has the capacity to preserve and revive it, so that
"cultural Europe" itself becomes the political goal of economic and social Europe.
This is a genuinely culture-centred vision and not the deprecating "series of specific
80 ibid, p. 9-10
81 R. Gregoire, "La Communaute et la Culture", in Revue du Marche Commun no.274, pp. 56-62,
February 1984
82 ibid, p. 56
83 ibid, p. 58
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but disparate measures mostly symbolic in nature" which the Commission itself
describes twenty years later84.
By 1982 the Parliament's annual budget line had increased to 706,000 ECUs. It is here
that the second communication loses coherence, despite repackaging its ad-hoc grants
as "measures for widening the audience" (in his 1982 article, Gregoire does not
mention them at all, though they are described in the much less personal-sounding
1984 piece). The two Treaty-focused sections 85
 are much the strongest, argued on a
proper Treaty base (articles 36 and 117-8 are specifically cited, and there are frequent
references to established legislation, such as VAT, and mechanisms, such as the
European Regional Development Fund). The text is effective in pointing out the areas
where Member States could use Community law to support their cultural sectors but
don't. The other sections rely on exhortation and seem to be justifying various ad-hoc
decisions 86 . The gap between the Commission's ideas and its real action is rather
evident.
One reason why the Commission's advocacy of cultural intervention failed to
convince politically at this stage may be its assumption that governments (to whom
the communication was addressed and whose action was needed) were willing to bend
the rules in favour of an allegedly disadvantaged group whose problems, though
doubtless genuine, were not likely to be the subject of massive popular discontent in
any Member State, even France, and who were not obviously using what influence
8.4 Commission of the European Communities, "New Prospects for Community Cultural Action", p. 2,
COM (92) 149 final, April 1992
85 "Freedom of trade in cultural goods" and "Improving the living conditions of cultural workers"; the
two others are "Widening the audience" and "Conserving the architectural heritage"
86 for example, a series of concerts by a string quartet under the heading "Quartet for Europe" is
presented as an "experiment" proving that cultural exchanges can be "more flexible" (p. 26). Concrete
examples are few, however, and where they are given it is unclear whether the Commission funded
them or simply heard about them
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they had to affect public opinion in favour of the integration project. The diffuse
community of "cultural workers" does not compare with the vocal and increasingly
"Euro-literate" academic and educational sectors when it came to putting on political
pressure nationally. Ironically, a more brazen appropriation of culture for purposes of
European flag-waving along the lines of the European Community Youth Orchestra,
Eurojazz87
 and other more obviously populist ideas, might have had more success. At
the same time, the Commission's institutional difficulties with competence made a
stronger commitment to the French view of "l'espace culturelle europeenne"
impossible, given the degree to which it cut across the principle of an unfettered
internal market and the absolute lack of Treaty competence to act politically on
grounds which were cultural, not economic.
Above all, the Commission was weakened by the lack of a political mechanism for
securing the support of those Member States who might not be averse to a cultural
version of the Common Agricultural Policy. The narrow target sector it had chosen,
the lack of populist appeal in its proposals and the constant need to protest its lack of
interest in "cultural policy" made it unconvincing. Its lack of transparency about its
modest expenditure aroused suspicion. It needed more than ever to enter into a
political dialogue with the Council.
The role of the Council: 1984-1992
The adoption of legislation to improve the situation of cultural workers required the
acquiescence of the Council. As Alan Forrest records, this situation created a problem
in itself: "whilst there was no intention to legislate in the cultural area, culture came
87
a youth jazz group which received regular Commission funding for a period in the 1980s
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up as part of more general policies.. .or under the influence of court cases" 88 . The
introduction of ministerial meetings was certainly in part a response to this
manifestation of "spill-over". But, as with the Council of Europe, there were strong
and conflicting political motivations behind the pressure to set up such a system.
Experience of the education programme may have helped prepare positions, and the
Commission's two communications ensured its stance was known. By the time the
first meeting of ministers took place in 1984 89
 France was already in the vanguard and
promoting the idea of a strong and interventionist Community presence in a
"European" cultural sector, supported by the southern countries; at the other end of
the spectrum, the UK and Denmark9° were opposed to any suggestion that
Community competence should be extended to culture. Germany was also opposed,
because of the position of the federal government and the Lander. In the case of the
UK, there was also a strong element of opposition to Community expenditure on
culture91.
Thus when EC culture ministers met for the first time positions were already
polarised. The strategy favoured by Jack Lang, whose biographer credits him with
having initiated the meeting together with his Greek counterpart, Melina Mercouri,
was to build up support for an attempt to introduce a new article in the planned
revision of the Treaty92. The formal justification for this was the 1983 Stuttgart
88 Forrest, 1994, op.cit, p. 13
89 
a meeting the previous year in Naples (see Missir, in Delcourt & Papini (eds)., 1987) seems to have
included only the southern governments
90 Denmark's opposition was based on the prerogatives of its Parliament, the UK's on a more general
policy of preventing the expansion of Community competence
not because it was culture, but because government policy was to resist new spending in most areas.
92 the Single European Act was adopted in 1987 and added several elements to the Treaty, but not a
cultural article
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Declaration on European Unity 93 , agreed by Heads of Government, which
specifically included a section on cultural cooperation. This, while holding back from
an explicit commitment to Community action in culture, emphasised culture as an
element linked to further Community development. In particular it sanctioned the use
of the EPC framework for cultural cooperation (the "cultural directors"), which
suggests that the German Presidency hoped for a diplomacy-based approach which
would help it domestically with the Lander. The text makes no reference to the
Treaty. However, the contrasting political positions94
 which it has to reconcile makes
it rather ambiguous, in much the same way that, a decade later, the similarly worded
article 128 of the Maastricht Treaty seems to represent no single clear view of what
the article is intended to achieve 95 . It reads, in fact, much like earlier treaties (the
Brussels Treaty, NATO, the Council of Europe's statute) which provide for cultural
cooperation rather than actively design it.
The missing "third institutional partner" thus entered the dialogue late, and in
circumstances which, typically, were full of ambiguities and in which the tension
between cultural cooperation and cultural policy was unresolved. The culture
ministers could not meet formally as a "Council" 96 . They could not take decisions,
merely adopt resolutions. By the early 1980s it was clear that some areas where
commercial logic implied a case for harmonisation were also core areas of cultural
cooperation: copyright and commercial piracy of intellectual property; free movement
93 for text see Council of the European Union, General Secretariat, "Texts concerning Culture at
European Community Level", OPEC, 1994, Annexe, p.201. The Heads of Government "agree to
promote" a number of activities, including exchange, possible joint action on heritage conservation
and "coordination of cultural activities in third countries" via EPC
94 for example, it is highly unlikely that the Mitterand government would have signed a text which
specifically excluded the possibility of a cultural competence
95
e.g. its insistence on "cultures" rather than "culture", which points away from harmonisation towards
diversity
96 the so-called "mixed formula" of "the Council and ministers meeting within the Council" was
intended to acknowledge that the competence problem was unresolved
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of cultural goods, because the Treaty permitted the exclusion of "national treasures"
(a term requiring definition) from free movement; and, increasingly, new
developments in satellite broadcasting, where the blocking of cross-border
transmissions was an issue. Measures relating to these were certainly adopted but on
grounds that were not cultural but commercia1 97 . The cultural forum within the
Council thus reflected mixed motives: pressure for a cultural dimension, certainly, but
also acceptance of the case for some kind of management mechanism to handle an
increasingly unruly situation.
Between 1984 and 1992 19 resolutions98
 were adopted by culture ministers on an
eclectic range of topics, from plans for a sculpture competition to the virtues of
business sponsorship in the arts, with a further ten sets of conclusions99
 . Some of
these documents represent an aspect of culture which appealed to the Presidency of
the day and have no real additional significance. Others were more purposeful: a 1985
resolution urging the Community to co-ordinate library cooperation in data processing
later stimulated the inclusion of libraries in a five-year telematics programmem.
The resolutions, which often did not result in action, nevertheless built up into an
alternative set of guidelines for the Commission, hitherto left to its own devices and
those of the Parliament. Most contain an invitation to the Commission to study a topic
and report back, or consider how it might "make a contribution" to some virtuous aim
such as the development of the theatre in Europe. Nevertheless, there is still a sense of
parallel rather than converging tracks. In the five years following the Commission's
97 i.e. within other, "proper", Councils, such as Internal Market for copyright and audiovisual, or
Telecommunications for library cooperation
98 see Council Secretariat, op.cit, for the complete set
99
usually a sign that no action is to be taken
wo managed, however, away from the cultural section of the Commission
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1982 communication, only one resolution lm mentions it; while the concept of
"l'espace culturelle europeenne" is discernible only in a few preambular references to
the economic aspects of cultural activity. Equally absent is any mention of the
"symbolic" measures being implemented under the Commission-Parliament nexus.
This is because the Commission did not discuss them with the Member States.
Rather as they were simultaneously rejecting the Council of Europe's Cultural
Charter m2, EC Member States declined the Commission's vision of a consistent
philosophy of cultural intervention with a mainly social aim derived from the social
action plan of the 1970s. The Commission had argued that improved social conditions
within a certain social group would effect the desired loyalty transition amongst that
group, as amongst others, which was necessary for integration to succeed. This
strategy could be slotted into a grander vision of "cultural Europe" as a creativity-
based parallel to the internal market of commerce and capital. Furthermore, the
integration-driven view of cultural cooperation embraced by the Commission was still
at odds with the consciousness-raising programme initiated by the Parliament,
although the Parliament certainly backed the Commission in its ambitions.
Meanwhile, "European cultural policy", consistently repudiated in the present,
belonged somewhere in the future along with political union.
The resolutions show that, once the culture ministers began to meet, they compounded
the confusion rather than resolved it by pushing favourite topics m . Their lack of
101 that of 18 December 1984— the first adopted by ministers themselves — on "greater recourse to the
European Social Fund in respect of cultural workers"
102 see previous chapter
103 it is possible, by matching dates of resolutions to the member state holding the Presidency at the
time, under the six-month rotation system, to trace particular national interests in these texts: business
sponsorship of the arts to the UK presidency of 1986, training of arts administrators to Luxembourg,
archive policy to the Netherlands, etc.
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backing for the Commission's cross-cutting project was primarily because of the
competence issue but the Commission's strategic goals also interested them less than
the opportunity to direct it towards support for their own, more mainstream, concerns.
These in turn resembled a traditional agenda of intergovernmental cooperation, with
a low integration content.
Citizens' Europe: a change of tack
Two developments of the mid-1980s illustrate the growing cleavage between culture
as an organic part of the Community integration project and culture as a tool for
achieving that integration. The Adonnino report on "A People's Europe" of 1985104
was a by-product of the perceived failure of the Community to attract positive popular
support. Part of the "deepening" process which is said to be the necessary
accompaniment to that of enlargement, the Adonnino report made some proposals for
encouraging "we-feeling". Many of its suggestions now look wide of the mark,
focussing as they do on "irritants" related to cross-border commerce (traffic control,
foreign residence, voting rights) and institutional symbolism such as a EC flag and
anthem (appropriated from the Council of Europe) rather than the ordinary conditions
of life for the majority who do not travel.
The Adonnino group in fact made only four "cultural" proposals: a European Film
and TV Year in 1988; a European Academy which would award prizes to the
meritorious; a Euro-lottery; and a suggestion for extending reduced admission for the
young to museums and cultural events. Only one, the Film and TV Year, was acted
104 
see Bulletin of the European Communities Supplement 7/85, "A People's Europe: reports from the
ad-hoc committee"
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upon and was not a success 1 °5 . Nevertheless, the Adonnino report is significant
because its assumption that high-profile cultural events led to "we-feeling" obliged
the Commission politically to look more towards this traditional type of cultural
action and away from the genuinely innovative (but difficult) approach of the two
communications of 1977 and 1982.
The change of direction was symbolised by the arrival of the Delors Commission in
1985, which brought with it a new and high-profile commissioner for culture, the
Italian Carlo Ripa di Meana, who decided for the first time to woo the "high culture"
constituency. A large-scale cultural conference was held in Florence, where the
commissioner further broke with tradition by asserting that the occasion was "the
'106. Various high-profile personalities werebirth of a Community cultural policy'
invited to give their views on what a Community cultural policy should look like,
particularly in the light of technological developments, though conveniently
overlooking the legal obstacles to its delivery. The cultural community was
henceforth to be invited, not to expect improvements in its social situation, but to
design its own preferred European cultural policy without worrying too much about
the institutional context in which it did so.
The Commission's third policy statement, published the following year 107 , had to take
these developments into account alongside the political failure of the attempt to
incorporate culture into the Single European Act of 1987 108 . This text tends to
105 the Year failed to make much impact because of too little planning time and the difficulty of
persuading member states either to release Community resources for it or invest at national level
106
section heading in "Europe in Transformation: the Cultural Challenge: Culture, Technology,
Economy", report of the Florence Conference, March 1987, Commission of the European Communities
107 Commission of the European Communities, "A Fresh Boost for Culture in the European
Community", (Supplement 4/87, Bulletin of the EC): the French term "relance" better conveys the
essence than the rather optimistic English translation
108 blocked by the UK, Germany and Denmark
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substitute rhetoric109 for argument. It is designed to resemble a standard Community
action plan, with five fields of action each containing three or four sub-categories,
suggesting that the Commission's strategy had moved away from justifying
intervention on Treaty grounds towards seeking approval for a cultural programme
based on the principle of critical mass: there was now sufficient established activity,
with sufficient political support, for it to be presented as an ongoing programme of
work11°.
The original vision is greatly watered down in this document. The situation of cultural
workers is played down, suggesting that the Commission had accepted the
improbability of progress on this, or had simply lost interest post-Addonino. Its
spending programme, now renamed "access to cultural resources" is given a much
higher profile, reflecting its confidence that there would be no serious challenge111.
Several new projects are floated, for the first time apparently trawled from a number
of outside sources: a Community data bank for commercial sponsorship, involving a
"token contribution" of 1 million ECU; a "policy for publishing", seemingly based on
ideas gleaned from one of a growing number of "expert consultations" 112 to which the
Commission had recourse at this time; and the development of Europe-wide cultural
statistics, an honourable but unsuccessful attempt to pool resources with the Council
of Europe. The section headed "dialogue with the rest of the world" recalls the
109 "the debate as to whether or not the Community has the necessary competence to intervene cannot
hide the growing clamour from its citizens to participate in cultural life or their demand for new
mechanisms for exchanges and cooperation in this area" ("A Fresh Boost....", op.cit, p.6)
110 the Commission's own assessment of it, five years later, is frank: "albeit modest, it (cultural action)
was enough to confirm the value and importance of the growing common approaches and aroused
growing interest among the professionals" ("New prospects...", 1992, op.cit, p.2)
111 •in fact there was, but not until the mid-1990s, and in a broader context, when the Council mounted a
legal challenge to the Parliament's practice of abusing the budgetary procedure by creating budget lines
for expenditure with no legal base. The ECJ found in favour of the Council and several "illegal" lines
(including one for "cultural development") were frozen.
112 in this case, the short-lived Advisory Committee on Books, set up with the involvement of the
Member States, and the European Group of Publishers, a lobbying network.
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Stuttgart Declaration but also reflects the discrepancy between the troubled status of
culture within the Community and the fact that cultural cooperation already featured
(with a bigger budget and a "classical" cultural relations profile) in the Lomê
Convention 113
 . A section on training for the cultural sector can be traced to the "Livre
Bleu", a paper 114
 launched unilaterally by France after the failure to insert culture in
the Treaty. The Commission followed the reference up with a set of proposals but
these were never acted upon.
The audiovisual sector and culture
The audiovisual sector is of central significance in the development of a EC cultural
programme during the 1980s. It motivates the effort invested by the French
government, in particular, in establishing the principle that intervention in the culture
industries should be justified on both cultural and economic grounds. This pressure
has been consistent throughout the period, as has been France's argument, reflected in
some Commission initiatives, that the aim of Community intervention must be to
legitimise certain forms of discrimination (such as quotas for television programming
of European origin) which will "defend" the European film and television industries
from the global market and permit trading protectionism115.
113 a co-operative treaty between the EC and the African, Caribbean and Pacific countries (ex-colonies
and dependencies), which had contained an article mandating financial contributions for cultural
projects since the mid-1980s, administered by the Commission from national allocations through a
special Foundation
114 this initiative, which bracketed culture and education, was essentially a return to the Plan Fouchet. It
proposed a fresh start through a process of "variable geometry", i.e. without those member states who
did not want to take part, and listed several suggestions. As well as the failure of the Treaty
amendment, this was triggered by the rejection of the French-inspired proposal to create a European
Community film and TV production fund
115 see G. Nowell-Smith & S. Ricci, eds., "Hollywood and Europe: Economics, Culture, National
Identity, 1945-1995" (British Film Institute, 1998) for essays exploring the long history of this issue. In
his introduction, Nowell-Smith traces the divergence in French and British attitudes to the post-war
decision of the UK to drop quotas in favour of the Eady levy system
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By 1987 the Commission had put forward normative proposals relating to satellite
broadcasting, both technical (the "MAC/packet" Directive) and regulatory
("Television Without Frontiers") and was far advanced with preparations for the
MEDIA 116
 programme. In addition, the Commission had committed itself heavily to
the development of HDTV 117
 . All of this was justified on economic, not cultural
grounds118.
The Commission also attempted to introduce a directive setting up a European support
fund for film and television production. This was blocked in the Council by Denmark,
Germany and the UK on competence grounds. The proposal subsequently became the
"Eurimages" fund administered via the Council of Europe and financed by national
contributions (had it been a Community initiative it would have been funded centrally
with no opt-out possible). The Commission's revised proposal, which became the
MEDIA programme, was based, successfully, on the idea that Community support
could legitimately be approved as a kind of "flanking" policy, a series of small
projects which supported the development, distribution and exhibition aspects of the
audiovisual industry 119 but did not subsidise directly the making of films.
The "Livre Bleu" and the Resolution of 1988
By the end of the decade, therefore, a de facto "cultural policy" of the EC had been
116 Mesures pour Encourager le Developpement de l'Industrie Audiovisuelle
"7 High-Definition Television, a technology developed by the French and Dutch companies Thomson
and Philips which was intended to compete with US and Japanese technology as the next generation of
television. The project failed when the EC industry itself broke ranks with the Commission and shifted
towards digital. See X. Dai, A. Cawson, P. Holmes, "The Rise and Fall of HDTV: the Impact of
European Technical Policy", in Journal of Common Market Studies, pp. 149-164, vol. 34, 1996
118 the European Broadcasting Directive, for example, was based on the argument that access across
borders for satellite broadcasters had to be guaranteed in Community law. Although the subtext was
rampantly cultural, the pretext was the free movement of goods and services within the internal market
119 e.g. by providing money for script development, exhibition space at trade fairs for small
independent producers, assistance with dubbing/subtitling, etc.
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developed around the culture industries, where the economic factors were sufficiently
strong to support a legal basis for Community action. The dual purpose of this
cultural-economic sector is seen in the fact that culture ministers, and the officials'
group which prepared their meetings, negotiated the content of proposals like
MEDIA, the Broadcasting Directive and the export of cultural property — areas where
national competence was at least partly that of culture ministries — which then passed
to the Internal Market Council for adoption under internal market rules. This was not
invariable, however: for example, the main negotiations on the copyright/
neighbouring rights directives took place outside the officials' 12° working group.
In this increasingly blurred and unstructured situation, brought to a head by the
French "Livre Bleu", Member States felt obliged to find an accommodation which
would acknowledge the existence of a cultural intervention programme outside the
Treaty which all could accept. This was the motive for the German Presidency in
1988 to steer through a resolution which created an agreed structure, without ceding
the competence issue, accepting the existence of Community "cultural action". The
relevance of this lies less in the nature of what was agreed than in the fact that the
Member States themselves were placed in a better position to influence the direction
of future policy.
They did so initially by indicating priority areas for the Commission to tackle 121 , all of
which reflected their own domestic policy concerns rather than the promotional
aspects of culture as a part of the integration project. The "priority areas" bear very
different degrees of weight: the audiovisual sector, for example, was already an
120 known until 1988 as "cultural attaches", reflecting the post-Stuttgart assumptions that it would
handle questions of cultural diplomacy
121 the audiovisual sector, books and reading, training in the cultural sector and business sponsorship
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established fact of Community policy, while the inclusion of business sponsorship, an
area where the scope for Community action is not obvious, looks like a concession to
UK interests 122 . Essentially, however, the step was important because it supplied an
agreed political agenda which the Commission could and did work to, to the extent
that it followed up with policy papers on three of the four areas (audiovisual —
already in the pipeline -, books and reading and cultural training).
In his 1992 article, Alan Forrest identifies seven broad categories of work undertaken
from 1988 until the inclusion in the Maastricht Treaty of a legitimisation for culture in
1992. These reflect the shifting interplay between the Community institutions. The
first two (audiovisual and books) are the Member States' political priorities and can
thus be considered as the main outcome of the 1988 resolution; whereas the third,
architectural heritage, does not feature among the 1988 priorities and represents the
influence of the Parliament in a series of "symbolic achievements". The remainder
consist of European networking (actually much more of a post-1992 feature despite a
1991 resolution under the Netherlands Presidency); "encouragement of cultural
initiatives of a European character", a way of describing the "somewhat arbitrary"
sums of money disbursed to arts organisations from the late 1970s onwards; "other
activities" ( in fact, a range of topics raised in various resolutions but rarely resulting
in action) and "cultural aspects of other Community policies" 123 , the almost forgotten
attempt to use Community policies to benefit cultural workers.
Although this is a more effective classification than anything the Commission itself
ever attempted, it cannot mask the essential lack of logic behind what, by 1992, had
122 which it was
123 Forrest, op. cit., p. 15
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become the de facto Community cultural intervention programme. It is dominated by
the culture industries on the one hand, - the grey area where Community intervention
carried the possibility not only of expenditure but also of regulation - and
architectural heritage on the other — an area where the Commission had established a
presence through selective grant aid to a small number of high-profile conservation
projects and, from 1988, a competitive annual scheme for grants for individual
smaller projects, apportioned out so that every Member State usually benefited124.
This was entirely a Commission-Parliament initiative. Member States at government
level were excluded, and usually learned of the results through a press notice. It
cannot be said, therefore, that after 1988 the Community programme was entirely
managed according to Member State wishes or that they exercised complete control.
The Community programme and 1992: the existence, or otherwise, of a "European
cultural policy" 
Thus by 1992 the core elements of Community cultural intervention were already in
place, through a process of spill-over on the one hand and accretion on the other.
Three areas in particular — the audiovisual sector, the publishing sector and
architectural heritage — had emerged as powerfully symbolic fields for Community
action, evoking ideas of cultural threat from, respectively, the USA, the English
language in general and the modern world which disregarded Europe's past glory. One
may still see traces here of de Rougemont's contention that Europe's case for a place
of esteem in the post-war world was mainly cultural. An ancillary territory of single
124
examples of the Commission's patronage include the long-running commitment to the conservation
of the Parthenon and its later extension to Mount Athos; beneficiaries of the so-called "pilot project"
scheme range from the spire of Salisbury Cathedral to fortifications in Luxembourg and the renovation
of a railway in Greece
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market activity — copyright, transfrontier broadcasting, the art trade — was also
increasingly acknowledged for its cultural considerations 125 . The "cultural principle"
was becoming defined as conservative: to be invoked on the occasions when the logic
of the market went too far. Yet the central functional rationale for action still had to
be compatible with removing inconsistencies of trading practice between Member
States.
From 1988 the audiovisual programme developed separately from the culture
programme, the bulk of which was devoted to architectural heritage support but
which, by 1990, still had unallocated resources of 500,000 ECUs a year to spend on
random "symbolic actions" 126 . Most of these were low-profile and probably of limited
impact 127 . In the absence of any evaluation prior to the early 1990s there can be no
certainty, and a few high-profile projects, notably the European Community Youth
Orchestra, certainly achieved high impact by virtue of the names associated with
them 128 . But such initiatives do not represent a consistent policy. This was essentially
cultural diplomacy, intended to boost the Community's image by associating it with
appealing activity. Ironically, the example par excellence of this "recognition" factor,
the European City of Culture programme, is an initiative of the Member States rather
than the Commission or the Parliament129.
125 by 1991, the Commission felt confident enough to say so in its proposal for a directive on rental
right, lending right and related rights (COM(90)586 final), putting forward culture as a justification for
action: "copyright is a basic instrument of cultural policy, as there is a vital commercial component in
the aims it pursues and the ways in which it is applied." (p. 4)
126 see Colleen Scott, "The Mephisto Waltz", Information Box I, pp. 36 —9. IETM, 1990
127 e.g. Commission grants to festivals such as the Brecon Jazz Festival and the international theatre
festival at Wiltz, or "local" events such as the Belgian Prix Reine Elisabeth piano competition
128 initially associated with Claudio Abbado, the ECYO has consistently attracted top names and has a
reFutation for excellence.
12 launched under ministerial resolution in 1985, the programme is Member State financed and
nominated with only a nominal contribution from the Community budget and no role for the
Commission and Parliament in the selection of candidates. Unsurprisingly, the latter institutions have
been battling since 1992 to change this.
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Although acting at first more like a business sponsor, whose relationship with culture
is motivated by the wish to improve its public image through benevolent patronage,
than a public authority, the Commission then started to target the arts constituency
itself (already "Europeanised" through contact with the Council of Europe and the
growing interest in "networking"). This it did first by advertising the availability of its
uncommitted funds for multilateral initiatives, then by opening various
consultations 13° . This coincided with a period of anxiety amongst the cultural
community about the perceived impact on the arts of "1992", the completion date for
the single market about which a certain mythology had arisen 131 . Unsurprisingly, this
new direct contact between the Commission and the arts community led to a demand
for a properly designed multilateral cultural cooperation programme for the sector
geared to the kind of work it wanted to do rather than what was considered exportable
by national cultural relations systems 132 . Whether any of this influenced the political
decision of the 1991 IGC to accept, finally, a limited competence for culture in the
Treaty is doubtful, but it did contribute to a climate which was both more receptive to
and more critical of the new competence when it arrived.
The Treaty of Maastricht — the impact of Community competence
The Treaty on European Union (TEU) of 1992 introduces culture as part of a group of
new competences (education, health, consumer protection) intended to offset the
130 most notably its 1989 "Committee of Cultural Consultants", a panel of high-profile personalities
convened to draw up ideas for a Community spending programme
131 a helpful explanation of the situation relating in particular to state aids appears in pp. 177-183 of
"Harmony or Confusion for Culture in Europe?", proceedings of a seminar, published in association
with CIRCLE, 1994
132 the "Platform Europe" scheme made Commission money generally available for the first time in
1990
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effects of industrial change and economic convergence. The loyalty factor is still
strongly evident: "in the other areas mentioned" (which include culture) "selective
action could add substance to what the Community is doing and make its role more
visible to the general public" 133 . In practice, however, it was still the loyalty of the
cultural community rather than the general consumer which was being sought. Plans
to supply benefits for cultural workers were replaced by incentives to arts
organisations, in particular cross-border networks with whom the Commission
traditionally liked to hold a dialogue 134 , to act as channels for the integration message,
using the arts as a mediation to reach the sceptical public.
From a Council perspective Alan Forrest sees the effect of this change as a series of
conflicts resolved: the new competence authorises spending programmes, offers
flexibility to minimise potential damage in harmonising legislation, and makes the
Community's external position look a little more coherent. However, his analysis (that
the chances of real impact are no more than "reasonable" 135) highlights the
difficulties of an approach to culture that tries at once to defend diversity by focusing
on the threat to it from a single dominant cultural form, whilst at the same time
talking up the unity of Europe through insisting on the importance of a distinctively
European and common cultural heritage. This contradiction appears in the drafting of
the article on culture itself.
133 Commission commentary on TEU, "From the Single Act to Maastricht and Beyond", p.28,
COM(92)2000 final
134 see Mazey & Richardson (in Edwards & Spence, 1994, op.cit): "some fairly stable 'policy networks'
....were apparent as early as the mid-1950s"; and "while some interests ....have managed to become
part of an identifiable 'policy-making community'.., most are involved in ill-defined and rather loose
'issue networks'..." p. 170.
135 Forrest, op. cit., p. 18
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In its original proposal to the Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) on Political Union
the Commission proposed rights and obligations relating to cultural expression as
part of a new concept of EU citizenship 136 . There are several significant differences of
emphasis between this and the eventual outcome, the most striking of which are the
Commission's inclusion of language and communication as a central element in a
new policy, its implication of Community responsibility to safeguard, rather than
simply enhance, the cultural heritage 137 and its playing down of any distinction
between the tasks of Member States and those of the Community as a whole.
The Commission did not succeed in establishing European citizenship as the
centrepiece of TEU. Without this element, the central argument in the Commission's
draft is the need to protect diversity. Modest as it appears at first reading, its own
proposal would have given the Commission the right to propose a raft of legislative
measures covering the gamut of economic-cultural and social-cultural issues
explicitly basing them on the need to protect the cultural heritage and encourage
diversity. This would certainly have amounted to a cultural policy.
The price exacted for the Treaty clause for legitimating the de facto Community
presence in culture by those Member States which had opposed it was its closest
possible approximation to a programme of cultural cooperation without the
characteristics of Community action. In common with several other new competences,
such as health, an "exclusion clause" prevented harmonisation, while the "integration
clause" assuring that cultural considerations could be taken into account in the
formulating of other policies is rather weakly worded compared to some of the other
136 SEC(91)500, 15.5.91
137
an echo, perhaps, of the European Cultural Convention's "common cultural heritage"
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such clauses 138 . The cultural aspects of audiovisual policy were isolated within a
category of "artistic and cultural creation", in which modest action to assist artistic
content was permitted but regulation on cultural considerations was not.
The most effective curb on future action, however, was the combination of a
unanimity requirement (education and health both accept qualified majority voting)
with the extension of co-decision to the Parliament, a combination found in no other
article in Maastricht. Finally, the removal of all references to language and the low-
key reference to cultural diversity makes it difficult for the Commission to use the
protection of diversity as a basis for proposals. The article does not enjoin the
Community to act to protect diversity, merely to respect it.
Article 128, therefore, is some way short of a Community cultural policy. The record
of a symposium held shortly afterwards by the CIRCLE network 139 shows how
difficult it is to square with the whole notion of a "European cultural policy", with
some speakers reduced yet again to the rhetoric of the Hague Congress. The
symposium tries, as have many arts organisations since, to fill in the blanks by
supplying "a scheme of interpretation for governments and parliaments for a better
understanding of article 128 of the Maastricht Treaty" 140• This comes across less as an
aid to understanding than as a reminder of the things the cultural sector thought it was
getting.
138 compare taking "cultural aspects into account" with forming "a constituent part of the Community's
other policies" (health protection) or contributing "to the achievement of the objectives set out in
paragraph 1 through the policies and activities it pursues under other provisions of this Treaty"
(industry)
139 "Harmony or Confusion for Culture in Europe? The Impact of the Single Market and of the
Maastricht Treaty", proceedings of a seminar, Venice, 26-28 February 1993, published by the
Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri. A helpful assessment from the Commission on the impact of EC
law on cultural funding is found in pp. 181-183.
140 ibid., summing up by Stefano Rolando, p. 279
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The Commission produced a new communication 141 within weeks of the Treaty being
signed. In one sense the paper's main aim was to set the record straight. It contains a
self-critical 17-page annex listing the Commission's action to date in detail, with
expenditure figures (never before supplied) but without assessing the effectiveness of
its intervention. Peppered with references to consultation it shows how far the
Commission has moved from its earlier stance. Nevertheless, the paper is
fundamentally, like its predecessor, a repackaging initiative rather than a result of
fresh thinking. It seeks legitimacy for what has already taken place by defining a
number of retrospective aims, and asks permission to continue as before.
Article 128 has become a kind of descriptive framework within which to present
Commission activity, in the form of support for collaborative arts, backed by a grant
scheme and a commitment to quarry existing Community programmes for more
money, alongside a "common heritage" programme, drawing on the existing grant
scheme for conserving the architectural heritage and the pilot project of subsidising
translation schemes which the Council had previously backed 142. The distinction
between audiovisual action as cultural cooperation 143 and as a Community policy with
cultural elements (MEDIA) is carefully maintained. This is an exercise in
legitimation, a promise of a new relationship rather than fresh thinking.
After Maastricht a shift can be seen away from culture as part of the social and
economic fabric of the Community towards external action and competitiveness.
Reasserting the traditional foreign policy/ culture interface the Community
141 "New Prospects for Community Cultural Action", COM (92) 149 final, 29 April 1992
142 Resolution of the Council and the Ministers responsible for cultural affairs meeting within the
Council of 9 November 1987 on the translation of important works of European culture
143
support for film festivals, support for cultural television programmes, possible involvement in
Eurimages
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increasingly builds image-boosting cultural components into its aid programmes 144 ; at
the same time it revives the idea of the cultural sector as an important player in the
European economy which justifies investment on job creation grounds. This strand of
policy has tended to concentrate on the information technology sector, with particular
implications for multimedia, and suggests a modified version of the French "cultural
industries" strategy of the 1980s 145 . By the end of the decade, the Fifth Framework
programme for Research and Development actually contained a section designed for
the protection and regeneration of the cultural heritage, particularly in cities.
Some in the arts community already saw in this the substitution of a policy utilising
culture for a policy directed at culture: "the Commission. driven by the Council of
Ministers...will invent its own agenda based on the perceived needs of the cultural
sector: an agenda that will reflect more the internal priorities of the political
institutions than those of artists and their audiences" I46 . Despite the efforts of some
Member States I47 , the idea that the integration clause might be used by Culture
Ministers as a lever "to seek change when prospective directives and regulations
threaten to damage cultural interests" 148 was effectively buried when the Commission
was forced to acknowledge that, in any conflict between cultural and economic
144 such as MEDA, aimed at reinforcing stability to the EU's south, or PHARE, which strengthens the
infrastructure of prospective Member States to the east. A precedent already existed in the Lome
programme for ACP countries which had embarrassingly turned out to have a bigger cultural budget
than the mainstream Commission cultural budget line
145 a possible explanation is found in Dai, Cawson and Holmes (op.cit) when they suggest that, having
had its fingers burned in attempting to be a protagonist in the media market, the Commission may be
more cautious in future about direct participation as opposed to more generalised background support
146 comment by Simon Mundy, quoted by Rod Fisher in his introduction to the CIRCLE symposium,
Venice 1993, op.cit., p. 151
147 notably Belgium and Ireland
148 Fisher, ibid., p. 160
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interests, it was likely to give precedence to the latter149.
The requirement that Community policy operates in accordance with the principle of
subsidiarity has also worked against changes in the way the cultural sector is
treated 15° - it is quite hard to argue convincingly that Community intervention is
needed to ensure the wellbeing of cultural provision at national level. Combined with
the lack of a harmonising capacity in article 128 and the persistent emphasis in the
drafting on culture as both diverse and unifying, the scope for a coherent policy is
limited.
In particular, article 128 does not resolve the split personality of Community
intervention in culture. In the great tradition of texts demanding cultural cooperation,
it is vague about what it wants to achieve. It authorises a degree of action to
counteract "spill-over" from the impact of globalisation on the one hand and the
fostering of an open and internationally competitive economy on the other, but does
not offer exemption from either. But it does introduce non-commercial values into the
discourse of the internal market. In this sense, it may be regarded as an extension of
cultural policy to the Community level. This is essentially the agenda that has been
pursued through the Community's "other action". It aims to encourage, rather than
protect, diversity.
149 the long-running test case of this has been the question of cross-border book pricing agreements,
where Belgium and the Netherlands in particular have consistently tried to pressure the Commission
into taking a stand on cultural grounds in support of retail price maintenance in same-language areas,
despite the fact that the Commission generally regards fixed pricing as restrictive trading practice in
other areas. They have yet to succeed, but show no signs of giving up
150 Article 3b of the Maastricht Treaty authorises Community action "only if and in so far as the
objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States and can
therefore, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved by the
Community. Any action by the Community shall not go further than what is necessary to achieve the
objectives of this Treaty".
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At the same time, article 128 also insists on both the inevitability and the attractions
of a shared European identity. It requires the Community to engage in a cultural
diplomacy programme directed at its own citizens. The French term "rayonnement",
much favoured in France's bilateral cultural diplomacy, seems especially apt to
describe this notion of cultural intervention as the benevolent face the Community
shows to its citizens: as the Commission's own publicity document has it, culture as
"common property" 151 of European citizens. In both readings of the article, the agenda
of the needs of artists themselves has been displaced.
The Council's own post- Maastricht guidelines 152 emphasise working methods whilst
accepting the Commission's interpretation of its future role. It underlines the choice of
sectors (audiovisual, books and reading, heritage, and "other forms of cultural
expression") whilst leaving the tasks and aims of "cultural action" undefined. Like the
Commission, it chooses to focus on inter-institutional relationships, not developments
in cultural policy.
Article 128 does not create a Community cultural policy, therefore, but brings culture
into the mainstream of Community operations. The Commission had viewed the
cultural sector as either a potential cheer-leader for the European idea or a sector of
disadvantage. Although the new competence gave it a more conventional patron-
client relationship with the sector, the absence of scope to initiate legislation on the
sector's behalf means that the Commission's usual role of intermediary between sets
of interests has less weight. Its only real sphere of policy influence is as patron,
stimulating rather limited quantities of cross-border working, and to a lesser extent as
151 K-D. Borchardt, "European Integration: the Origins and Growth of the European Union", p. 73.
European Documentation, 1995
152 Conclusions of the Council and the Ministers of Culture meeting within the Council of 12
November 1992 on guidelines for Community cultural action
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a watchdog, ensuring that culture gets a mention when new programmes are drawn up
elsewhere. Pushed back in the direction of cultural cooperation by the belief that
investment in the arts creates public goodwill, Community cultural intervention has
become, if anything, more conventional than it was before the Treaty.
Post-1992 cultural intervention: the Kaleidoscope, Ariane, Raphael programmes
The Commission's immediate post-1992 priority, and that of the Council also, was to
submit proposals for Community programmes of expenditure. It produced three: the
"Kaleidoscope" programme 153 ; the "Ariane" programme 154 ; and the "Raphael"
programme 155 . Two were simple exercises in repackaging; the third, "Raphael", was
based on consultation meetings with Member State experts and genuinely tried to
rethink Community support for the built heritage in particular, replacing the
Commission's ad-hoc arrangements with individual Member States by a more
complicated system designed to involve expertise from across the Community in the
development of major conservation projects. It associated cultural intervention with
other Community programmes benefiting the heritage (especially the RTD (Research
and Technological Development) Framework Programme. Sector-centred and
technical in its bias, it is the only one of the three to reflect and complement Member
153 Decision No. 719/961EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 March 1996
establishing a programme to support artistic and cultural activities having a Community dimension: this
eclectic system of grants for artistic enterprises combining partners from three or more Member States,
represented the Parliament's budget line repackaged
154 Decision No. 2085/97 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 October 1997 establishing
a programme of support, including translation, in the field of books and reading: based on the small-
scale subvention scheme for literary translations, extended to benefit a wider range of book-related
activity
155 Decision No. 2228?971EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 October 1997
establishing a Community action programme in the field of cultural heritage
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State public policy in its emphasis on sharing of professional expertise (Action II) and
public access and participation (Action 111)156.
The other programmes, on which there was no advance consultation, were fairly
obvious interim measures to regularise the situation of the previous decade, and as
such, were bound to disappoint 157 . None of the three was resourced on a par with
programmes such as "Socrates" and "Leonardo" in the education sector158.
"Kaleidoscope" was essentially symbolic, requiring transnational partnerships (some
of doubtful authenticity, according to arts sector rumour) to be formed in order to
attract small amounts of EC money 159 into projects which would probably have taken
place anyway. "Ariane", though seen by some smaller countries as having potential to
replace national subsidy for their publishing industries, would only have had the
potential for impact if substantial resources were invested in it. That, paradoxically,
could have raised the problem of Community competence once again (subsidies to
industry being a delicate issue).
Culture and other Community policies
Because the cultural provisions themselves were limited, great hopes were initially
pinned on the "integration clause", which asks for "cultural aspects to be taken into
account in its action under other provisions" of the Treaty. It was seen both as a way
156 neither Kaleidoscope nor Ariane relates its proposed support directly to policy goals; Raphael is also
the only programme of the three to stipulate both follow-up and measurable outcome
157 see Rod Fisher's introduction to the CIRCLE symposium, op.cit., p. 159 - "lacking in ambition and
vision" and "hardly the new start that had been promised", with no response to offer to "the changing
nature of transfrontier international collaboration"
158 the budget for Kaleidoscope over three years was 26.5 MECU; that for Ariane 7 MECU over two
years; and for Raphael 30 MECU over four years. Compare expenditure of 307.5 MECU on the
Erasmus programme 1987-92 and 206.6 MECU on Comett 1986-92 — both later absorbed by
respectively Socrates and Leonardo (source: European Commission, European Social Policy Green
Paper, 1993)
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to influence Community legislation in favour of culture and as a way to divert funds
from other Community projects to cultural projects. In terms of legislative impact
those hopes seem to have been misplaced. The Commission's first assessment of the
impact of the clause I60
 considers several fields where action has been taken — freedom
of movement of persons, copyright, taxation, competition policy, free movement of
cultural goods and agricultural production — but is unable to identify specific areas in
which the regulation concerned took account of cultural considerations.
Instead the paper maps out how the legislation concerned affects the cultural sector —
worth knowing but not what the Commission was asked to do. Even in competition
policy, where a specific Treaty change was made to safeguard state support to culture,
the paper warns that this does not constitute an exemption from the normal provisions
of the internal market I61 . In the key policy areas of the publishing industry and the
audiovisual sector, the Commission asserts the necessity of compatibility with
Community law for fixed book pricing and, whilst emphasising on the one hand the
importance of protecting pluralism, on the other points out that cultural objectives are
not enough to secure exemption from open access rules (i.e. the granting of exclusive
broadcasting rights in certain cases).
The greatest overlap between cultural policy and Community regulation to date is in
the field of cultural property, where work began in the mid-1980s on developing a
legislative framework to manage the absence of border policing of the export of
159 like most small Community programmes, the culture programmes offer part-funding only and
withhold part of the money until after completion
160 First Report on the Consideration of Cultural Aspects in European Community action, report by the
European Commission, April 1996
161 "the cultural sector, in its economic aspects, is subject to the rules of competition as are the other
sectors. It is therefore necessary for this sector also to guarantee that competition is not distorted and
that the provision of aid out of proportion to the cultural aims pursued is avoided". Ibid, part 1, p. 13
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works of art 162
 in a single market with (ostensibly) no borders. Not only was this an
example of an avowedly "cultural policy" issue being regulated at Community level,
but much of the negotiation was carried out at the level of culture ministers and
officials 163 . This legislation, however, was not dependent on the cultural provisions of
the Maastricht Treaty and is based on articles 113 (the Regulation) and 100A (the
Directive). The Commission's 1996 report does no more than recapitulate this
legislation and provide a snapshot of current monitoring and issues outstanding.
The report shows that while article 128 provides a point of view from which to
examine Treaty-based legislation, it does little or nothing to affect the way that
legislation is framed. The most illuminating section of the document provides an
account of ECJ 164
 judgments, several of which predate the Maastricht Treaty, in
which plurality or diversity is accepted as a justification for certain action if the Court
is satisfied that this is neither disguised economic protectionism nor discrimination on
nationality grounds. In other words, there are no safeguards for diversity in the post-
Maastricht world that were not there before.
The Commission is on more congenial ground in describing how Community
programmes are used to support a cultural objective. It is able to give plenty of
examples ranging from the benefits to museums 165
 from the Research and
Development Framework programme to the 29% of projects on adult education under
the Socrates programme which can be classified as "cultural". Much of this
162 •	 •in its one specifically "cultural" reference, article 36 of the original Treaty of Rome provided for
Member States to be able to take measures to prevent the loss of national treasures — in effect,
permitting them to refuse export licences in exceptional cases
163 Council Regulation (EEC) no. 3911/92 of 9 December 1992 on the export of cultural goods;
Council Directive 93/7/EEC of 15 March 1993 on the return of cultural objects unlawfully removed
from the territory of a Member State
164 European Court of Justice
165 the European Museums Network project, the AQUARELLE project on the use of telematics, the
VASARI, MARC and MUSA projects
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information had been provided three years earlier in a study166 commissioned by
DGX, again based on pre-Maastricht activity. This concluded that around 2,473
MECU 167
 had been spent on culture in the period 1989-1993, of which four-fifths
came from the Structural Funds 168 , mostly in the Mediterranean countries to attract
tourists to heritage sites.
In concluding, the Commission acknowledges that "most Community policies have a
cultural dimension, interact on the cultural field and mobilise players in the cultural
sector" 169 . From this it deduces that article 128 constitutes a "cultural policy" which
"includes encouragement actions... .and the actions taken and the policies conducted
on other legal bases of the Treaty": not to be confused with "cultural policies
conducted by the States, regions and other decentralised institutions", but specific to
the Community. It then interprets this as requiring a contribution to "the European
model of society built on a set of values common to all European societies" (a
definition taken from its own opinion given to the 1996 IGC) 170 .
This goes well beyond anything in the Treaty. The Commission here seems to be
redefining article 128 in accordance with its own interests and priorities. It
reintroduces some of the thinking (particularly about "the defence of cultures"171)
which was subsequently watered down in the negotiation of article 128, and adds to it
the wholly new suggestion that "Community cultural policy must promote an
166 
"Community Support for Culture", a study carried out for the Commission of the EC (DGX) by
Bates & Wacker S. C., June 1993
167 MECU = million ECU
168 the European Regional Development Fund and the European Social Fund, Treaty instruments
intended to reduce inequalities in standards of living between EC regions resulting from industrial
decline, long-term unemployment etc
169 First Report on the Consideration of Cultural Aspects in EC Action, op. cit., part 5, pp. 1-2
1 " Initial Contributions by the Commission to the Intergovernmental Conference on Political Union,
SEC (91) 500, 15 May 1991
171 ibid. A phrase used in the explanatory memorandum to the Commission's original draft of the
culture article, p. 122, where it appears as "dissemination and defence of cultures"
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expansion in the cultural influence of European and the European model of society" 172
— an idea which not only does not appear in the Treaty article but which is not in the
Commission's original draft either.
The Treaty of Amsterdam: article 151 
The response of the Council to the Commission's report on integration of cultural
aspects into Community actions is found in a 1997 resolution of the same name 173 . It
does not take up the Commission's suggestion that the aim of Community cultural
policy is to enhance the "European model" of society and popularise it elsewhere.
Insofar as it responds to the Commission's redefinition a Community "cultural
policy", it seems more interested in fostering a sense of Community citizenship and
supporting freedom of expression. By insisting that the Community must "have
careful regard to the impact of other policies on culture" it rather hints that the
Commission has not done its job of assessing that impact before, rather than after,
such policies have been formed.
The sole modification made to article 128 in the Treaty of Amsterdam, which resulted
from the second IGC of the 1990s, specifically associates the integration clause with
the need to respect diversity 174. This change does not entrust the Community per se
with the task of defending cultures; instead it changes the emphasis to one of
vigilance: requiring the Community to ensure that the way in which culture is taken
into account serves mainly, though not exclusively, the aim of preserving difference.
172 "First Report..", op. cit., part 5, p. 3
173 97/C 36/04, 20 January 1997
174 article 151.4: "the Community shall take cultural aspects into account in its action under other
provisions of this Treaty, in particular in order to respect and to promote the diversity of its cultures"
(European Union, Consolidated Treaties, 1997)
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This effectively contradicts the Commission's interpretation of the integration clause
as being about a European model of society.
Culture 2000
Most Community programmes are approved for a fixed term, usually five years, then
replaced by a new programme, sometimes a refined version of the old (as in the case
of MEDIA II) or a portmanteau of several programmes grouped into a "framework"
(as with Socrates and Leonardo, the education and training programmes into which
several smaller programmes were combined). Here culture followed education. At the
instance of the Council, which sought a "guiding, comprehensive and transparent
approach for cultural action within the Community" I75 , the Commission presented its
proposal for a single cultural programme, Culture 2000176.
Culture 2000 is quite explicitly a programme of cultural cooperation in the traditional
mould ("the Community's method of intervention is based on cooperation"), intended
to make the Community's involvement more evident to the European public "who are
unaware that such efforts are being made to preserve and promote their cultures"177.
Cultural interests and initiatives are set in the context of broad Community policy
objectives: enlargement, social cohesion, employment and accelerated integration.
The latter part of the paper is devoted to an "orientation" on "the explicit integration
of cultural aspects into Community action and policy". Although it contains a
commitment to "a legislative framework favourable to culture", this is mainly an
account of work in progress which has a cultural dimension in the usual domains178.
175 Council Decision of 22 September 1997 regarding the future of cultural action (97/C 305/01)
176 COM (1998) 266 final
177 recalling the Commission's original 1992 response to the new articles as about making the
Community's role "more visible to the general public" (COM(92)2000 final, op.cit, p. 28)
178 fixed book pricing, copyright, VAT, the audiovisual sector
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Its one innovation is to suggest activating the so far unused provision of the Council
recommendation contained in article 128. This mechanism would allow culture
ministers to express views on areas of policy within their purview 179 but which are
negotiated in other Councils, thus (perhaps) influencing the ministers concerned; for
example, a hypothetical recommendation from culture ministers extolling the merits
of business sponsorship might affect the decision on whether the directive on tobacco
advertising should include a ban on arts sponsorship by tobacco companies 180 .
However, Culture 2000 is primarily a financing instrument. The Commission has
devised some new goals which include "highlighting cultural characteristics common
to the European people"; "creativity as a source of sustainable development within the
cultural area common to the European people"; using culture "to contribute to social
cohesion"; and increasing "the profile of European culture in non-member countries".
To these ends it proposes three types of intervention: "integrated projects covered by
structured, multiannual cultural cooperation agreements"; "major projects with a
European and/or international dimension"; and "specific, innovative and/or
experimental projects within the Community and/or in non-member countries". The
Commission uses "Kaleidoscope" as its model, with no special provision for either
heritage or books and reading (though the former appears to be permissible with the
wider categories). The "cultural cooperation agreements" (language apparently
borrowed from the sphere of external relations) seem designed to meet criticism that
Kaleidoscope did not follow through with its support and provided no infrastructure
support for networks, who are identified as the main partners.
179 examples suggested are business sponsorship, natural sites and monuments, "moral rights"
180 although there was never such a recommendation, the tobacco advertising directive is real and so
was the dilemma outlined here
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The "specific projects" have an explicitly socio-economic dimension and seem
intended to embed cultural intervention within the broader Community context. They
refer to issues such as access and participation, the young, "new forms of cultural
expression (nature, solidarity, science, peace etc.)". There are echoes here of the
Council of Europe's programmes of the 1980s, as well as that body's new "house"
objectives. This aspect of the proposal seems to have appealed to both the Parliament
and the Council, perhaps because it at least seems to try to relate to their own policy
objectives with references to access and participation, social exclusion and involving
the young.
However, the suggestion that support of up to 1 million per project be devoted to
"major projects" intended to "strike a significant chord with the people of Europe"
has been criticised by both the other institutions. The Council, in its common
position 181 , reinstated the three named subject areas (arts, books and reading,
heritage) and reduced the allocation to "major projects" (now renamed "specific
cultural events"). Most of the Commission's specific ideas for new flag-waving
activities (European Days, Presidency festivals, "recognition of great artistic talents")
were rejected, leaving only the Council-instigated and nationally-managed European
City of Culture with a guaranteed place in the programme. The revised text also
dismisses the Commission's attempt to use the programme to finance cultural
cooperation outside the Community 182.
181 published as Common Position EC No. 26/1999
182 
countries such as those due to accede in the next wave of enlargement and the members of the
European Economic Area are specifically invited to associate with this and other Community
programmes. This is standard Community pre-accession practice and is not to be confused with
"rayonnement"
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There are practical arguments for this (the Parliament's rapporteur has pointed out that
the likely audience for such events is probably already Euro-aware) but there is also a
clear rejection of the use of cultural cooperation for "we-feeling". Cultural diplomacy
on behalf of the institutions is less attractive than a supporting role for issues which
concern Member States — in this case, the question of access and exclusion. There is
also an implied criticism of the Commission's attitude to networks, i.e. that they are
important primarily as a vector to get the institutions' message across to the arts and
their audiences. In fact this simply reflects how the Commission sees networks in
general: as intermediaries who can provide the Commission with a ready-made
"European view" on policies and will work with the Commission to gain support for
its action183. It is not the way cultural networks see themselves, and suggests that the
days of "privileged partnership", to use the Council of Europe term, may have been
short-lived.
Conclusion
Adding culture to the Treaty as a Community competence has not significantly
affected the way it is handled as a policy area within the Community framework. The
areas of policy most influenced by Community legislation were susceptible to such
influence before 1992, and the Commission's approach to them differs from its "pre-
competence" thinking only in the extent of its readiness to use culture as a feature of
cohesion which will enhance the appeal of its other policies. Its funding programmes,
which, by the nature of the sums potentially, if not actually, involved, attract greater
attention than the parallel programmes of the Council of Europe, have not closed the
183 see Mazey and Richardson in Edwards & Spence, op.cit, pp. 169-187, on "the Commission and the
lobby", an explanation of how the Commission employs interest groups to build a policy agenda which
Member States must then confront
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gap between Member States' interests and the Commission's desire to encourage "we-
feeling" and loyalty transfer, but have drawn attention to its existence.
Why has this happened? Unlike previous practitioners of cultural cooperation, who
were confronted with an immediate cultural remit without time to think it through, the
Community had fifteen years of experimenting with a cultural cooperation policy
before it was legally required to implement one. Member States have not been able to
agree whether a policy of fostering diversity involves forms of cultural protectionism
to enable a specifically "European" culture to withstand the pressures of globalisation
(explicit in the debates about media policy and, above all, the GATT negotiations of
the early 1990s); or whether it means keeping cultural policy out of the sphere of
supranational action by denying the Community a legislative role 184 . The
Commission, meanwhile, has been unable to find a satisfactory compromise between
its role as guardian of the Treaty, and thus of the unhampered operation of the internal
market, and its wish to play a proactive role in cultural policy. It has therefore
revisited cultural diplomacy as a purveyor of positive imagery. The Community's
cultural policy, in this reading, promotes the idea of Europe, and specifically the
European Community, through culture.
At the centre of this failure to reinterpret cultural cooperation effectively for a
supranational institution seems to be evasiveness about the issue of identity. Alan
Forrest's experience led him to conclude that the issue of language lies at the heart of
the Community's cultural difficulty 185 . This issue, suppressed in Community cultural
184 it has been suggested that Member States in fact "fear" that the Community will iron out cultural
difference if allowed to legislate in this area. I have never encountered any evidence to support this
view, nor do I consider it to be seriously held within the institutions themselves
185 A. Forrest, "The Politics of Language in the European Union", in European Review, Vol. 6, No. 3,
pp. 299-319
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discourse, is vividly and publicly expressed within the institutional life of the
Community itself, from the outcry in the French press about the new dominance of
English-speaking chefs de cabinet in the Commission 186 to the wrangles undergone at
any expert meeting hosted by a Member State where interpretation is not provided in
German. In Culture 2000, as in article 128, the Council has deleted references to
languages when they have been put forward by the Commission187.
The closest the Community has come to developing a serious "cultural policy" was
during the Lang era when French strategy was driven by concerns about the status of
France as the lead player in European cultural matters 188 and French as the primary
language in European transactions. In 1979 Jacques Rigaud spelled out the severity of
the challenge and the only possible solution: "le plurilinguisme...seul peut preserver
la vocation universelle de la langue francaise" 189 , which in turn involved "une vue
universaliste, fondee sur le dialogue des cultures". The logic of Lang's European
policy was precisely that: to secure the position of France by establishing cultural
diversity as the pivot of an assertive European programme of financial investment in
the cultural industries, backed up by appropriately restrictive legislation, in which
culture was the leitmotif, but economic investment and control the means.
The fact that this programme ultimately failed to rally enough Member State support
to carry it through (by suitable Treaty amendments) reflects partly the rather obvious
186 in particular, "Liberation", following the decision of the incoming Prodi Commission in 1999 to
abandon the convention by which cabinets shared the nationality of the commissioner they served
187 for an interesting sidelight on the efforts made to preserve multilingualism in the official workings
of Community in order to protect the status of French, see A. Fosty, "La Langue Francaise dans les
Institutions Communautaire de l'Europe", Quebec, 1985
188 for the antecedents to Lang, see also E. A. Kolodziej, "French International Policy under De Gaulle
and Pompidou: the Politics of Grandeur", Cornell, 1974; and R. F. Kuisel, "Seducing the French: the
Dilemma of Americanisation", University of California, 1993
189J. Rigaud, "Les Relations Culturelles Exterieures, Rapport au Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres",
p. 18. Documentation Francaise, 1979
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self-interest behind it, and the equally obvious self-interest of the UK, in particular, in
opposing it. But there is also a political problem about confronting the idea that
cultural policy involves exploring national difference and by extension the situation of
minorities, both European and non-European. It subverts the idea that culture is
essentially unifying. In this context the Commission's attempt to abandon the
"difficult" nationalistic aspects of cultural identity in favour of the simpler approach
based on a unifying message such as that of its "European Integration" booldet 19° is at
least understandable. But it does, in effect, relegate European cultural cooperation to a
large-scale bilateral cultural diplomacy operation in which the European institutions
themselves play the part of the nation-state trying to show the citizens a picture of
themselves as creative, influential and united by more than divides them.
The reluctance to confront the question of cultural identity is akin to the post-war
Council of Europe's unwillingness to face the fact of the Second World War. It may
suggest that meaningful multilateral cultural cooperation is impossible unless it is
either "repatriated" into recognisably national terms or presented in the form of one
culture (or set of diverse cultures) actively presenting itself in a "European" showcase.
Refocusing action on the cultural sector by concentrating on networking projects also
avoids the issue of identity — it merely permits a return to the idealism of intellectual
cooperation without the overlay of public influence once claimed for it and
conveniently overlooks the alienation between the arts and public life and opinion.
190 Borchardt, op.cit., p. 73: "Cultural assets such as the city of Venice...or the plays of Shakespeare




 discusses the way in which official nationalism has accommodated
European integration only to find identity bubbling up elsewhere (in campaigns which
attack the internal market as a threat to, e.g., local cheese). She notes that UK and
Danish resistance to the integration project reflect the absence of a need for the EU to
fill any psychic gap relating to state identity, unlike French reinvention of Europe as a
larger France or German feelings of internal conflict about Germany's size and power
(resolved by seeing Germany fixed within the wider European context). Her comment
that "a European identity may be the preserve of Europe's elites for whom Europe is
already a social space" 192 may be behind the sudden concern of the Council that
Culture 2000 should major on social inclusiveness193.
Hugh O'Donne11 194
 examines national stereotypes in sport, comparing how these are
presented in comparison with the "European academic community" with its shared
texts and "high cultural identity", which are then overwritten in local discourses.
These use north-south stereotypes in particular to establish values (the cold, efficient
north versus the warm temperamental south 195). Europeanism itself has different local
meanings — in Greece, for instance, Europe is a signifier of Greek frontier status
distinguishing them from their Albanian neighbours. He concludes that trying to
create a sense of community through culture is probably a waste of time: "Team
Europe may be possible on Brussels headed notepaper but will always be defeated by
actual national teams" 196 . Other essays in the same collection come to similar
191 B. Laffan, "The Politics of Identity and Politic Order in Europe", in Journal of Common Market
Studies, pp.81-102, Vol. 34, 1996
192 ibid, p. 99
193 traceable to the Irish Presidency of 1996
194 H. O'Donnell, '' Team Europe? Stereotypes of National Character in European Sports Reporting",
pp. 79-95, in A. Musolff, C. Schaffner, M. Townson, eds., "Conceiving of Europe: Diversity in Unity",
Dartmouth, 1996
195 a Spanish football team on form can find itself described as "the Germans of the south"
196 O'Donnell, op. cit., p. 95
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conclusions through the examination of "European" metaphor and semantics. Nigel
Reeves suggests that we ignore at our peril the "deep-seated diversity of
identities.. .rooted in different value sets and in the continuing need to perceive one's
own identity through its distinction with other nationalities"197.
Thus the tension between cosmopolitan and communitarian continues as an
undercurrent in the European Community's cultural cooperation experiment. Article
128/151 makes two sets of different demands, requiring that the distinctiveness of
European cultures rather than culture be preserved and encouraged, whilst at the same
time emphasising the supposedly unifying effect of the European heritage. The
message of the spending programme is universalist, emphasising the merits of
cooperation, "working together" 198 on common artistic or conservationist projects
which can be promoted as examples of the communautaire spirit.
At the same time, a much more communitarian project is discernible in the continued
insistence that Community law must somehow be made to operate in favour of
protecting culture from the effects of the open market. This rejects the global, and the
unspoken assumptions in "realist" diplomacy that policy is a series of compromises
made on the particular in order to achieve the more general goal represented by "the
common interest". It favours instead the local and the small-scale, represented by
pressure for exemptions, quotas and ring-fenced subsidies, arguments which depend
on culture's own "difference" and need of protection from the gales of modern life.
197 N. Reeves, "Den festen Kern festigew Towards a Functional Taxonomy of Transnational Political
Discourse", p. 166, in Musolff etc., op. cit., pp. 161-9
198 a favourite Community theme, and the title of a much-used guide to the Community institutions by
Emile Noel, a former Secretary-General of the Commission
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CONCLUSION
This thesis began by asking a number of questions about multilateral cultural
cooperation: its relationship to cultural diplomacy and to public policies for culture;
its purpose and success rate; and its role in European integration. In particular, is it a
stage towards a common European cultural policy? The analysis of developments
suggests that the cultural cooperation process itself does not constitute such a stage.
Within the European Union, the process of convergence in certain policy areas within
the Community's competence can certainly be interpreted as drawing some aspects of
cultural policy towards a common European norm; but this process takes place
largely independently of the cultural cooperation system, which modulates it rather
than setting its agenda and dictating content.
The defining characteristic of cultural cooperation is its duality, which ultimately
prevents it from acting as either a cohesive or a trail-blazing force. From its earliest
manifestations it has oscillated between its cultural diplomacy functions on behalf of
the European integration project and the aspirations of its participants to make it
relevant to the internal policy-making process at national level. Whilst on the whole
the cultural diplomacy function operates on one level only - that of enhancing the
image of the integrating organisation using culture to promote positive popular
reaction - the cultural policy function has several layers: as a vehicle for promoting
national policy interests at the European level; as a way of building up the influence
of the international organisation within member states; as an alternative rallying point
for culture professionals dissatisfied with the prevailing ideology at national level; or
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even, though less often than should be the case, as a genuine exchange for skills,
experience and comparative data capable of assisting in the policy-making process.
In addition, it can serve as a forum for advancing the interests of intellectuals as a
social group. By and large, though, Paul Valery's observation that it has failed to
make itself either necessary or valued beyond certain limits remains true.
From its earliest manifestations in the International Committee for Intellectual
Cooperation through the Brussels Treaty Organisation to the Council of Europe and
EU of today, governments engaged in multilateral cultural cooperation have inclined
to one or the other of these two functions. The Anglo-Saxon tendency has been to
keep as closely as possible to the straightforward aims pursued through bilateral
cultural relations. But even in an organisation like the BTO, where the purpose of the
enterprise is explicitly linked to defence and foreign policy and there is no ostensible
cultural policy dimension, the records show that this was frequently regarded as an
unacceptable limitation, leading to lack of clarity of purpose and a consequent
inability to develop action which consistently delivers on its declared objectives.
The tendency led by France and Belgium, on the other hand, by placing a premium on
the intellectual as a beneficiary, and also formulator, of public policy has championed
the cultural policy version of multilateral cultural cooperation. The difficulty here has
been that visions of what cultural policy should be at this level have had to
accommodate different ideas about both the role of the state and the aims of such
policies themselves, leading to claims for consensus which are often not well founded
and which result in inaction at the national level where they are directed.
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It is interesting that a distinctive "British" and "French" style of multilateral cultural
cooperation has not, on the whole, been complemented by a distinctive "German"
style. Germany's late arrival on the scene, after the main lines of cultural cooperation
had been drawn, obviously accounts for much of this. However, the division of labour
between the federal government and the Lander in Germany has also resulted in a
strong German inclination to ground this type of activity as much as possible in the
processes of intergovernmental diplomacy. This position, which perhaps also reflects
a renunciation of the German history of "breaking the rules" in the use of cultural
propaganda, is closer to the British than the French model' despite the strength of
Franco-German ties both in bilateral cultural relations and in EU relations generally
(the so-called "Paris-Bonn axis").
On occasions, however, multilateral cultural cooperation's dual nature has served as a
strength. Such occasions seem to have been times of general uncertainty, when the
very fact that shared attempts to make sense of the aftermath of upheaval exist points
to the need for an idea of common values: as, for example, in the push towards
"normality" after WWII; the articulation of a "philosophy" of cultural development
which responded to the events of 1968; and the reintegration of the former
Communist countries into Western ideas of democracy after 1990. Cultural
cooperation has not always been quick to respond to such needs, and some of its
responses, such as the Council of Europe's Declaration of Cultural Objectives, seem
i
a closeness reflected in the frequent similarity of British and German negotiating positions on cultural
matters both in the Council of Europe and in the EU
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to have been formulated after the need for them has passed.
If multilateral cultural cooperation's relationship with cultural policy is ambivalent
and ultimately of limited relevance, however, it is clear that it has a high symbolic
significance within the European integration project as a whole, particularly with its
federal aspects. Initially intended to promote a cosmopolitan, intergovernmental
agenda of familiarity and recognition — essentially a bid to underpin the case for
cohesiveness in a defence and security context - multilateral cultural cooperation has
increasingly become associated with a much more communitarian idea of Europe
bound up with the federalist vision of small self-determining communities networked
in an overarching European legislative framework, with national governments playing
a subordinate role.
The Council of Europe has developed this within an intergovernmental context to the
point where its cultural programme represents a tension between competing visions.
One tries to assert a conventionally outward-looking view of culture (for example, the
art exhibitions programme). It recalls the British approach to cultural relations and is
intended to please, to flatter, above all to reassure the citizen that greater European
convergence is not a frightening leap into the unknown but a natural
institutionalisation of what exists already. The other (e.g. the cultural democracy
movement) offers an idea of Europe as a dynamic, challenging force, separate from
conservative-minded governments and pushing them towards radical social change
in tune with a federalist view of the world. It depends on the notion that governments
fail their citizens, who are naturally more progressive than they. In cultural democracy
it comes closest to Denis de Rougemont's and his fellow federalists' idea of the
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restless and the changing (the "principle of imperfection") as being quintessentially
European. The intergovernmental nature of the Council of Europe itself, however, has
generally prevented the latter vision from prevailing over the former, as has the
essentially conservative controlling presence of diplomats in the decision-making
Committee of Ministers.
The EU, which has the institutional power in theory to advance the Council of
Europe's cultural agenda via legislation, has not chosen to do so. The Member States
have so far withheld the means to achieve this by restricting Treaty competence to a
"soft" cultural diplomacy function and by insisting that "hard" cultural policy can
operate at the EU level only as a supportive measure for action which is justifiable in
single market terms. The policy territory which this covers remains remarkably
constant throughout cultural cooperation's history, with few attempts to move beyond
it. The decision of the EU's founding fathers to move away from the ideology of
federalism is mirrored in the development of cultural policy within the institutions as
a by-product of economic changes, governed by the key Community principles of free
movement of commodities and labour, regulated to ensure commerce is free to
develop a European competitiveness and compensate for the social fallout of such
competition. Within this framework, the role of culture is, again, to reassure but also
to contribute, as a creator of employment and social cohesion. The difference between
the "culture industry" and "the arts" is nowhere more marked than in their respective
treatment in EU cultural cooperation2.
2 this may soon be put interestingly to the test. As part of the Prodi/ Kinnock reforms of the
Commission a "peer group" of Commissioners is to analyse the impact of a budget cut of up to 15% in
order" to identify whole areas of policy-making which could be dropped" (article in European Voice, 6
April 2000).
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Most remarkably, the issue of identity, and culture's relationship to it, is consistently
evaded throughout the history of cultural cooperation. Instead cultural cooperation
addresses itself either to a European policy "elite" of intellectuals assumed to be
already in tune with the integration project or to an ill-defined "European citizen"
whose nature and allegiances are rarely probed deeply. In particular, the question
asked by Anthony D. Smith is avoided: "why should anyone choose a 'European'
culture and identity over any other?". 3 The assumptions which underlie cultural
cooperation's strategies remain linked to national interest.
The question of language epitomises this. Alan Forrest notes that, ironically, the
greatest progress in promoting linguistic diversity has been made under the
information society programme, where "no struggles between particular Union
languages or groups of languages were involved", aiding "a rational examination of
the requirements of the situation" 4. The battles over audiovisual policy can be
interpreted as battles about language and, ultimately, about strategies designed to
promote identities which are as much national as they are European. The same is true
of the various attempts to assert a status for culture which allows it to pick and choose
which parts of the single market it will be governed by. These strategies are
essentially nationally motivated even when the policy which directs them is itself the
result of a strong regional or federal system.
Over the years multilateral cultural cooperation has acted not as a solution to
problems, or even as an emollient for "serious" policy, but as a repository for many
3 A. D. Smith, "Nations and Nationalism in a Global Era", p. 128, Polity Press, 1995
4 Forrest, 1998, op.cit., p. 314
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sorts of expectation: of influence on political agendas by individuals outside the
political mainstream; of a continued role for Europe in the world after her centrality
has ceased to exist; of an alternative centre for policy-making which displaces purely
economics-based perspectives in favour of a strong social and community-centred set
of priorities; of a last bastion against the encroachment of industrialisation and an
Anglo-Saxon world view; of popular affection for the European project based on
acceptance of its institutions as upholders of the European inheritance; and of the
institutions themselves as a source of largesse and enlightenment which will upgrade
culture in the hierarchy of public policy.
It is hardly surprising that cultural cooperation has failed to live up to any of this. Few
other areas of policy-making carry such a weight of symbolism or depend so much on
an imagined rather than an actual role. At the root of its failure lies the problem of
integrating Bergson's question, "what ensures the preservation of humanity in the
midst of mechanical societies?" into the more short-term but immediately pressing
agenda of the management of technological, economic and social change and its
impact on basic provision. The idea that culture can exemplify the spiritual life of the
European integration project, endowing it in some way with a meaning and a glamour
it does not otherwise possess, is the inheritance of intellectual cooperation. Along
with cultural diplomacy's definition of culture as the lightweight aspect of an
educational programme, this has diverted attention from the darker side of the project,
the question of identity (glossed over in references to "diversity"), which not only
governments but also the self-regarding institutions themselves have declined to face.
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The influence of "companies of clouds" has ultimately been to deprive multilateral
cultural cooperation of a serious function in international relations by failing to
challenge governments on the genuinely international aspects of their cultural
policies. The field has instead been allowed to degenerate into a tussle for supremacy
between two political traditions, cultural diplomacy and federalism, resulting in the
kind of trivial special-interest consensus dismissed contemptuously by the American
diplomat Inis L. Claude and quoted at the beginning of this thesis5 . Despite the
streams of aspirational resolutions signed up to by Council of Europe culture
ministers during the glory years of cultural democracy and cultural development, and
the more cautious assertions of EU culture ministers since that time, the more modest
view cited by John Mole6 remains valid: "culture... is the way we do things round
here".
5 I. L. Claude, "Swords into Plowshares", op.cit
6 J. Mole, "Mind your Manners: Managing Business Cultures in Europe", p. 184, Nicholas Brealey
Publishing, 1990, new edition 1996
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Annexe A: Chronology of cultural cooperation
A CHRONOLOGY OF CULTURAL COOPERATION
1865 Creation of International Telegraphic Union:
first example of "functional" international
cooperation
1878 Victor Hugo addresses an International
Literary Congress in Paris on Public Lending
Right (Domaine Public Payant)
1883 France Alliance Francaise set up
1886 Berne Convention on Copyright
1889 Italy Dante Alighieri Society founded
1894 Germany All-Deutscher Verb and created
1899 First international conference to consider the
protection of cultural property in time of
war(the "Hague Peace Conferences")
1902 First meeting of Verband der
Museumdirektoren
1907 Second Hague conference
1920 League of Nations Covenant establishing the League comes into
effect
1922 League of Nations International Committee on Intellectual
Cooperation created under Henri Bergson
1922 France Association Francaise d'Action Artistique
(AFAA) created
1922 Coudenhoeve-Kalergi founds Pan-Europa
movement
1924 Germany AAD (later DAAD) set up in Heidelberg
1925 Institute of International Intellectual
Cooperation set up in Paris under Julien
Luchaire
1926 Pan Europa conference, Vienna
1926 League of Nations ICIC Arts and Letters Committee set up
under Jules Destree
1926 League of Nations Creation of International Museums Office
1929 UK All People's Association created by Evelyn
Wrench
1929 UK UK National Committee for Intellectual
Cooperation set up
1930 League of Nations Paul Valery takes over chair of ICIC Arts
and Letters Committee
1932 Germany Goethe Institut founded
1935 UK British Council set up
1935 France/ Germany Comite Franco-Allemand set up to further
cultural links
1938 Switzerland Pro Helvetia created as "spiritual defence".
Conference of Allied Ministers of Education
1942 launched in London
1943 UK British Association for the Advancement of
Science Committee on Post-War Education
(includes Zimmern, J. Huxley, W.E.
Williams, Rene Cassin)
1943 Sweden Svenska Institute founded
1943-4 France/ UK Cultural Relations sections set up in both
Foreign Ministries
1944 United Nations Creation of UNESCO agreed
1945 UK Arts Council of Great Britain set up
1945 UNESCO UNESCO charter signed in London
following San Francisco conference
1946 USA Fulbright scholarships launched
1946 UNESCO Creation of International Theatre Institute,
first of UNESCO's NGOs
1946 Scandinavian Cultural Commission (NKK)
set up
1947 First GATT (General Agreement on Trade
and Tariffs) (Geneva Round)
1947 League of Nations IIIC formally wound up; assets transferred to
UNESCO
1948 The "Hague Congress" of European
Federalist movements
1948 BTO Signature of Brussels Treaty of Economic,
Social and Cultural Cooperation by UK-
France-Benelux creates Brussels Treaty
Organisation (also known as Western Union)
1948 Council of Europe Statute of Council of Europe adopted
1948 OEEC Creation of Organisation for European
Economic Cooperation
1948 World Conference of Intellectuals, Wroclaw
1948 UNESCO Julian Huxley's "philosophy" of UNESCO
published a titre personnel
1948 UNESCO ICOM (International Council for Museums)
set up
1949 NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation created
1949 Cultural conference at Lausanne, follow-up
to Hague. Launch of European Cultural
Centre
1950 UNESCO General Conference defines basic tasks,
including technical assistance
1950 UNESCO Convention on Cultural Free Trade
1950 Council of Europe Committee of Cultural Experts set up
1951 Germany Cultural relations department created in
Foreign Ministry
1951 Council of Europe Richard Seymour's paper on multilateral
cultural cooperation
1952 Germany Relaunch of Goethe Institut
1952 Germany Inter Nationes founded
1952 UNESCO International Conference of Artists, Venice
1953 NATO Working group on Social and Cultural
Cooperation recommends programme of
cultural cooperation
1953 Council of Europe European Round Table (Rome)
1954 BTO BTO becomes Western European Union on
accession of Germany and Italy
1954 Council of Europe European Cultural Convention
1954 France/Germany Schuman/Adenauer Cultural Accord places
cultural relations on a legal basis
1954 European Cultural Foundation established
1955 Inter-Groupe des Interets Intellectuels
discusses a "European Cultural Community"
1956 UNESCO Launch of East-West project
1956 Council of Europe Cultural Fund set up
1957 EC Treaty of Rome signed
1957 Council of Europe Conference of Local and Regional
Authorities in Europe (CLRAE) set up
1958 France Ministry of Culture created
1960 WEU Cultural cooperation transferred to Council
of Europe
1960 OECD OEEC becomes Organisation for Economic
Cooperation and Development
1960 Council of Europe 1st Conference of Ministers of Education
1961 EC First European Summit agrees to take
forward the Plan Fouchet. Pescatore
Committee set up
1961 Council of Europe Resolution CM (61) 39 sets up Council for
Cultural Cooperation (CCC)
1962 EC Plan Fouchet abandoned
1963 France/ Germany Treaty of Cooperation signed, including
Franco-Allemand Jeunesse programme
1964 Council of Europe CCC/ECF agreement discontinued
1965 Council of Europe Launch of Europe Day (first 5 th May, later9th may)
1965 Council of Europe CCC issues its first document on its "cultural
policy"
1965 Council of Europe CCC's "leisure debate", in which ideas for
cultural democracy are launched
1965 Council of Europe Group of Technical Experts on heritage
questions set up
1966 UNESCO Declaration of Principles of International
Cultural Cooperation
1967 Council of Europe Report of "Trois Sages" relaunches cultural
programme
1970 EC European Political Cooperation (EPC)
established
1972 Nordic Council Secretariat for Cultural Cooperation set up
1972 UNESCO Meeting of culture ministers (EUROCULT)
at Helsinki on cultural policy
1972 Council of Europe Arc-et-Senans Declaration
1972 UNESCO World Heritage Convention
1972 Nordic Council Cultural cooperation secretariat merged with
Committee of Ministers secretariat
1974 EC ? First meeting within EPC (European
Political Cooperation) of "Cultural
Directors"
1974 EC European Parliament resolution on
Community action in the cultural sector
1975 CoE European Music Year
1975 CSCE Helsinki Final Act contains "Basket III" on
cultural cooperation
1975 EC Lome Treaty creates African, Caribbean and
Pacific (ACP) aid programme, which
includes provision for supporting cultural
activities
1975 Council of Europe Secretary-General working party on cultural
cooperation
1975 Council of Europe Introduction of medium-term planning
system
1976 Council of Europe 1st Conference of Ministers of Cultural
Affairs, Oslo
1976 EC First appearance of a budget line for culture
voted by the European Parliament
1977 Council of Europe CCC reconstituted as a steering committee
(Comite Directrice), CDCC
1977 EC Commission publishes its first
communication on cultural questions
1978 Council of Europe 2nd Conference of Ministers of Cultural
Affairs, Athens. Cultural Charter proposed.
1978 Council of Europe Project 5 officially launched (cultural
development)
1979-80 France Report on cultural cooperation by Jacques
Rigaud
1981 Council of Europe 3rd Conference of Ministers of Cultural
Affairs, Luxembourg
1982 Council of Europe Project 10 launched (culture and region)
1982 Council of Europe Project 11 launched (culture and
communication)
1982 UNESCO Culture ministers' meeting (MONDIACULT)
1982 EC Agreement to establish an inter-
governmentally-funded European
Foundation to support cultural projects
1983 EC "Stuttgart Declaration" on European Union
mentions cultural cooperation
1983 EC First meetings of "cultural attaches" group
within Council
1984 EC First formal resolutions adopted on cultural
questions at Council level
1984 Council of Europe 4th Conference of Ministers of Cultural
Affairs, Berlin
1984 Council of Europe European Declaration on Cultural Objectives
adopted
1984-6 UNESCO USA and UK withdraw from UNESCO
1985 EC First European City of Culture (Athens)
1985 EC Adonnino Report, "A People's Europe"
1985 Council of Europe European Architectural Heritage Year
1985 CSCE Budapest Cultural Forum
1985 Council of Europe Cultural policy review programme begun
1986 Beginning of GATT Uruguay Round
(bringing in services — GATS)
1986 EC Commission conference on culture, Florence
1987 EC Commission communication: "Fresh Boost
for culture...."
1987 EC Single European Act (SEA)
1987 Council of Europe 5th Conference of Ministers of Cultural
Affairs, Sintra
1988 Council of Europe Cultural policy review of France published
1988 EC France proposes a "Livre Bleu" of EC
cultural and educational cooperation
1988 EC Committee on Cultural Affairs (unofficial
Council working group) set up under
German Presidency
1988 UNESCO World Decade of Cultural Development
1989 EC Cultural cooperation included in EEA
agreement with EFTA
1989 EC European Year of Film and Television
1989 Council of Europe Cultural policy review of Sweden published
1990 EC MEDIA programme adopted
1990 CSCE Paris Charter for a New Europe
1990 Council of Europe 6th Conference of Ministers of Cultural
Affairs, Palermo
1991 CSCE Cracow Symposium on the Cultural Heritage
1992 EC/EU Treaty of Maastricht establishes Community
competence in culture (Art. 128)
1992 Council of Europe 7th Conference of Ministers of Cultural
Affairs, Paris
1993 Council of Europe Cultural policy review of Austria published
1994 Council of Europe Cultural policy review of Netherlands
published
1995 EC "Kaleidoscope" programme launched
1996 Council of Europe 8th Conference of Ministers of Cultural
Affairs, Budapest
1997 EC "Ariane" and "Raphael" programmes
adopted
1997 UNESCO UK rejoins UNESCO
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The Governments signatory hereto, being Members of the
Council of Europe,
Considering that the aim of the Council of Europe is to achieve
a greater unity between its Members for , the purpose, among others, of
safeguarding and realising the ideals and principles which are their
common heritage;
Considering that the achievement of this aim would be furthered
by a greater understanding of one another among the peoples of Europe;
Considering that for these purposes it is desirable not only to
conclude bilateral cultural conventions between Members of the Council
but also to pursue a policy of common action designed to safeguard and
encourage the development of European culture;
Having resolved to conclude a general European Cultural
Convention designed to foster among the nationals of all Members, and
of such other European States as may accede thereto, the study of the
languages, history and civilisation of the others and of the civilisation
which is common to them all,
Have agreed as follows
ARTICLE 1_
Each Contracting Party shall take appropriate measures to
safeguard and to encourage the development of its national contribution
to the common cultural heritage of Europe.
ARTICLE 2
Each Contracting Party shall, insofar as may be possible,
(a) encourage the study by its own nationals of the languages,
history and civilisation of the other Contracting Parties and grant facil-
ities to those Parties to promote such studies in its territory, and
(b) endeavour to promote the study of its language or languages,
history and civilisation in the territory of the other Contracting Parties
and grant facilities to the nationals of those Parties to pursue such
studies in its territory.
_ 3 _
ARTICLE 3
The Contracting Parties shall consult with one another within
the framework of the Council of Europe with a view to concerted action
in promoting cultural activities of European interest.
ARTICLE 4
Each Contracting Party shall, insofar as may be possible,
facilitate the movement and exchange of persons as well as of objects of
cultural value so that Articles 2 and 3 may be implemented.
ARTICLE 5
Each Contracting Party shall regard the objects of European
cultural value placed under its control as integral parts of the common
cultural heritage of Europe, shall take appropriate measures to safeguard
them and shall ensure reasonable access thereto.
ARTICLE 6
1. Proposals for the application of the provisions of the present
Convention and questions relating to the interpretation thereof shall
be considered at meetings of the Committee of Cultural Experts of the
Council of Europe.
2. Any State not a member of the Council of Europe which has
acceded to the present Convention in accordance with the provisions of
paragraph 4 of Article 9 may appoint a representative or representatives
to participate in the meetings provided for in the preceding paragraph.
3. The conclusions reached at the meetings provided for in para-
graph 1. of this Article shall be submitted in the form of recommendations
to the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, unless they are
decisions which are within the competence of the Committee of Cultural
Experts as relating to matters of an administrative nature which do not
entail additional expenditure.
4. The Secretary-General of the Council of Europe shall commun-
icate to the Members of the Council and to the Government of any
State which has acceded to file present Convention any decisions relevant
thereto which may be taken by the Committee of Ministers or by the
Committee of Cultural Experts.
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5. Each Contracting Party shall notify the Secretary-General of
the Council of Europe in due course of any action which may be taken
by it for the application of the provisions of the present Convention
consequent on the decisions of the Committee of Ministers or of the Com-
mittee of Cultural Experts.
6. In the event of certain proposals for the application of the
present Convention being found,to interest only a limited number of the
Contracting Parties, such proposals may be further considered in accord-
ance with the provisions of Article 7, provided that their implementation
entails no expenditure by the Council of Europe.
ARTICLE 7
If, in order to further the aims of the present Convention, two
or more Contracting Parties desire to arrange meetings at the seat
of the Council of Europe other than those specified in paragraph 1 of
Article 6, the Secretary-General of the Council shall afford them such
administrative assistance as they may require.
ARTICLE 8
Nothing in the present Convention shall be deemed to affect
(a) the provisions of any existing bilateral cultural convention to
which any of the Contracting Parties may be signatory or to render
less desirable the conclusion of any further such convention by any of
the Contracting Parties, or
(b) the obligation of any person to comply with the laws and regul-
ations in force in the territory of any Contracting Party concerning the
entry, residence and departure of foreigners.
ARTICLE 9
1. The present Convention shall be open to the signature of the
Members of the Council of Europe. It shall be ratified, and the instru-
ments of ratification shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of
the Council of Europe.
2. As soon as three signatory Governments have deposited their
instruments of ratification, the present Convention shall enter into force
as between those Governments.
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3. With respect to each signatory Government ratifying subse-
quently, the Convention shall enter into force on the date of deposit of
its instrument of ratification.
4. The Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe may
decide, by a unanimous vote, to invite, upon Such terms and conditions
as it deems appropriate, any European State which is not a member
of the Council to accede to the present Convention. Any State so invited
may accede by depositing its instrument of accession with the Secretary-
General of the Council of Europe. Such accession shall take effect on
the date of receipt of the said, instrument.
5. The Secretary-General of the Council of Europe shall notify
all Members of the Council and any acceding States of the deposit of
all instruments of ratification and accession.
ARTICLE 10
Any Contracting Party may specify the territories to which
the provisions of the present Convention shall apply by addressing to the
Secretary-General of the Council of Europe a declaration which shall be
communicated by the latter to all the other Contracting Parties.
ARTICLE 11
1. Any Contracting Party may denounce the present Convention
at any time after it has been in force for a period of five years by means
of a notification in writing addressed to the Secretary-General of the
Council of Europe, who shall inform the other Contracting Parties.
.2. Such denunciation shall take effect for the Contracting Party
concerned six months after the date on which it is received by the
Secretary-General of the Council of Europe.
Annexe C: Title XII (Culture), Article 151, Treaty of European
Union (Treaty of Amsterdam)
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TITLE XII (ex Title IX)
CULTURE
Article 151 (ex Article 128)
1. The Community shall contribute to the flowering of the cultures of the Member States,
while respecting their national and regional diversity and at the same time bringing the
common cultural heritage to the fore.
2. Action by the Community shall be aimed at encouraging cooperation between Member
States and, if necessary, supporting and supplementing their action in the following areas:
— improvement of the knowledge and dissemination of the culture and history of the
European peoples;
— conservation and safeguarding of cultural heritage of European significance;
— non-commercial cultural exchanges;
artistic and literary creation, including in the audiovisual sector.
3. The Community and the Member States shall foster cooperation with third countries and
the competent international organisations in the sphere of culture, in particular the Council of
Europe.
4. The Community shall take cultural aspects into account in its action under other
provisions of this Treaty, in particular in order to respect and to promote the diversity of its
cultures.
5. In order to contribute to the achievement of the objectives referred to in this Article, the
Council:
acting in accordance with the procedure referred to in Article 251 and after consulting the
Committee of the Regions, shall adopt incentive measures, excluding any harmonisation of
the laws and regulations of the Member States. The Council shall act unanimously
throughout the procedure referred to in Article 251;
acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission, shall adopt recommendations.
